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ABSTRACT

This thesisexaminesthe recruitment,role, and effectivenessof special
advisersto departmentalministersbetween1970and 1987and attemptsto
establish whethertheir placein the British systemof government has
become institutionalized. Interviewswith 160 advisers,ministers and
former officials, a questionnairecompletedby advisers, and relevant
contemporaryliterature, provided the principal data.
The literature, with its diversetheorieson ministers' roles and
relationships with the permanentbureaucracy, supplied a framework
within which modelling was conductedon both the potential place for
advisersin the systemand the needsof ministersfor extra assistance.
An exploration of reasonsgiven by ministersfor appointing advisers
showshow far ministersfelt theseneeds.
Evidence from the questionnaires
and interviews reveals the wide
range of activities in which advisersengageand that their role and
place are productsof the interplay of various factors. Variations in
the effectivenessof advisersare analysedalong with case studies
illustrating their occasionalimpact on policy making. Limitations on
advisers, and the characteristicsof effective ones, are identified.
Most featuresof the advisers'potential placewithin the system
are shownto exist, along with an increasedformalization of the role.
Although they are only a partial solution to ministers' problems, the
issue seems to havebecomenot whether they havea place, but how it
might be extended.
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY.
SECTION A.

ETTI

THE SCENE.

The introduction of specialadvisersinto the permanent, 'neutral',
civil servicestill basedon the nineteenthcentury Northcote-Trevelyan
reforms intended to abolishpatronageandjobbery caused strong and
varied reactions. Diverseviews were expressedon both the influence
and desirability of specialadvisers:
It's the most important developmentin modern government in
Britain (Bernard- now Lord - Donoughue- in Young and Sloman,
1982,p. 88).
At best they're a minor cosmeticon the great granite face of
the body politic (Young and Sloman,p.91).
The invasionof Whitehall (SundayTimes, 21 April 1974).
They've not really madeany great contribution to British
public life ... A high percentageof special advisers have
been killed off by not getting the data. (A former civil
servant).
It absolutely transformed my life in the department
...
greatly strengthenedthe position of the minister in
controlling the department(Tony Benn - interview).
All that seemsspecialto me about thesenew advisersis that
their position combinesthe functionsof lesser politicians
with the salariesof higher Civil Servants(Lord Rothschild,
1977, p. 170).
This study will suggestthat theseviews are exaggerationsin one
direction or the other.

The systemof specialadvisershasexistedfor a number of years
and despitethe varietyof reactionsto themtherehasbeen no major
study of therole theyhaveplayed. In Australia, by contrast,the
Royal Commission Q11Australian Government Administration (1976)
established by the Whitlam Governmentin 1974commissioneda report on
how the new systemof 'ministerial advisers', introduced at the end of
1972, had beenoperating(Appendix, Vol. 1). As the system has become
more establishedin the UK there hasbeenincreasing discussion about
whether it shouldbe extended. In particular, it has been suggested
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that ministersshould be assistednot just by one or two advisersbut by
larger and more systematicallystructuredcabinetson the continental
model.
This studyshouldhelp to inform the discussionand shedlight on
the debate about how far the specialadvisersystemshould be a step
towardsa cabinet-typesystemrather than a finished product in its own
right. Whicheverof thesetwo positionsis adoptedit is of value to
know how well the systemhasworked. An analysisof situationsin which
some special advisershaveworked most satisfactorily might indicate
ways in which otherscould operatemore effectively.
Some of the themesand key questionsrunning through this study
reflect the comparativelyrecentdevelopmentof specialadvisersand the
fact that their place in the systemof governmentwas still a matter of
conjecture. The main themesand questionsinclude: What functions do
special advisers perform? What factorsdeterminethe role of special
advisers? Is there room for themat the point wherethe political and
administrative systemsmeet? How effective havespecialadvisers been?
Is the role becomingmore formalized? Is there a need,and room, for
the systemof specialadvisersto developor has it reachedan optimum.
Overall these themesand questionsrelate to the central hypothesis
being explored, namely, that specialadvisershavebecome sufficiently
institutionalized for there to be a recognizedplace for them in the
British systemof government,and that they can play an effective role.
The hypothesiswas refinedand developedas a result of discussions on
the emergingresearchfindings with the steeringgroup.
It is argued that a multi-theoreticalapproachshouldbe adoptedin
research into public administration(see,for example, Rhodes, 1991).
In developinga model of the placeof specialadvisersmany theoretical
perspectives have beendrawn upon including someof the language and
concepts of systems theory. An emphasis on flows of information
stressesthe importanceof the role of peoplewho can cross boundaries
both betweenthe political systemand the environment, and within the
political systemitself. The modeldevelopedin Chapter3, and later
analysed, makes a contribution to a variety of theories about the
functioning of a systemof governmentin which there are many channels
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of information to and from the political decisionmakerswho are largely
dependentupon a permanent,neutral, civil service to assist them
perform their many roles. Overall, however, this study is a micro
analysis of an historical developmentrather than being a large scale
theoretical work. The part played by varioustheoriesreferred to in
the study hasthereforebeenprimarily as a sourceto draw upon when
modelling the potential placeof advisers. The individual natureof the
role of advisershaslimited the ability to generalize in ways that
could make major contributionsto theoriesof government. Furthermore,
although systemstheory provides a useful framework in which to analyse
the structural forces, especiallyoverload, at work on actors in the
political system, it is also desirable to attempt to gain an
understandingof how theseforceswere perceivedby individuals. As
Pollitt (1984) argues 'action' and 'structure' approachesare not
incompatible: 'A growing numberof publishedanalysesat least lay them
alongside each other, and with greateror lesser successattempt to
integratemotivational/intentionalwith structuralelementsin a single
explanatoryframework' (p. 177).

SECTION.

METHODOLOGY.

The literature searchrevealedthat althoughonly a handful of articles
has been written specifically on special advisers, there are some
references to advisers in: official reports; Parliamentary Papers;
politicians' memoirs; and articles andbooks on topics suchas the role
of ministers, their relations with officials, and policy making.
Furthermore, the role of specialadvisershas to be set in the context
of widely discussedconcernssuchas civil servicereform and how far
the wishes of ministersare carried out. Someof these issues have
been popularizedby the yz Minis

series(Lynn and Jay, 1984,1986,
and 1987), to which many participants in this study referred.
Referencesto advisersoccur much more frequently in the diaries of some
ministers, such as Tony Benn and Barbara(now Baroness) Castle, than
they do in the memoirsof others. Although this is probably partly a
reflection of the greaterlength of the diaries and the considerableuse
made of specialadvisersby thoseparticular diarists, it might also
illustrate the ever presentbut backgroundnature of the role played by
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some advisers.Lord Callaghannoted in his autobiographythat the role
of the parliamentaryprivate secretary(PPS)was to be with ministers
frequently and 'to be observantbut usually to be silent - except when
they are alonetogether. For this reason... [they] ... hardly feature
in this accountin their capacityas ParliamentaryPrivate Secretaries;
but this doesnot lessenmy immensedebt to them for all their personal
andpolitical advice' (1987, p. 14). A somewhatsimilar role was played
by many specialadviserswhich reinforced the needto conductinterviews
to reveal the natureof their contribution.
The interviews themselvesresultedin some further unpublished
reflections being suppliedby former advisers. These,along with the
many books, articles and official documentsconsulted,were particularly
valuablein the historical and theoreticalchapters(2 and 3).
The written material alone, however, was not sufficient. In
studiessuch as this which include elite political actors, interviews as open ended as is feasible- are seen as especially appropriate
sources of information (Dexter, 1970;Kogan, 1975; Young and Mills,

1980;Aberbachgn1

,

1981;Pollitt, 1984;Pridham,1987).

About 160 interviews were conductedwith former special advisers,
former and serving ministersand former officials - mostly permanent
secretariesand principal private secretariesbut also some deputy
secretariesand chief information officers. The numbersinterviewed in
each categorywere: 84 former specialadvisers(five of whom served as
adviserssolely at Number Ten); 51 former officials; and 43 serving and
former ministers. When addedtogetherthey total well over 160 because
some people servedin more than one capacity. Serving officials and
specialadviserswere forbidden from taking part in the study. Virtually
all former specialadviserswho had servedat any time between 1970 and
1987and who were living in the UK agreedto take part. For one reason
or anotherabout 26 of the departmentaladviserswho had served during
this period did not participate. Probably a slightly higher proportion

of the 26, thanof thosewho did participate,playeda specialistrole.
Nevertheless,evidencegatheredin the study about their functions
thatoveralltheir rolesweresufficientlyvariedto mean that
suggests
their lack of participationdid not markedlydistortthe findings.
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The vast majority of the interviews were tape recorded. Although
some researchersargueagainst(see,for example,Headey, 1974; Philip
Williams, 1980)on balancethe advantagesseemto lie in favour of using
recorders(Young and Mills) with Dexter moving away from his original
opposition. The basis upon which the information could be used
varied. Someinterviews were attributable,a few were entirely
off-the-record and many - especially with former officials - were
conducted on a non-attributable basisbut with the understandingthat
permissioncould be soughtto use information in an attributableor
identifiable way. When this permissionwas soughtit was given in the
overwhelming majority of cases.Partly to maintainconfidentiality,
material from the interviews hasbeenusedwithout references,apart
from the nameof the intervieweein cases where material could be used
on an attributable basis. The vast majority of participantswere male;
therefore, to help preserveanonymity, the male form hasbeenusedthroughout
apart from referencesto specific females. To reducethe inevitable
congestion of namesarising in studiessuchas this, current titles
(or last - for all but deceasedformer prime ministers) have, with a few
exceptions,beengiven only at first reference. Furthermore, peers' full
titles have beenapplied only where they are necessaryto avoid confusion.
Similarly, where authorsare cited andjust one of their publications included,
the date has normally been usedonly for the first reference to that
publication.
There was a positive responseto the initial letter from William
Plowden, then Director-General of the RIPA, in which he invited
participation. The fact that not only were the interviews to be
conducted under the auspicesof the RIPA, but also most interviewees
knew at least one memberof the steeringgroup, helped provide the
elementof neutrality which is sometimesseenas important in this type
of research. All the former permanentofficials approachedagreedto be
interviewed, as did mostof the former ministers. A semi-structured
approach was adopted and overlapping standard guideline sets of
questions prepared for each of the three categories - ministers,
officials and advisers- on the basisof: William Plowden's original
grant application; initial reading; anddiscussions, individually and
collectively, with membersof the steeringgroup and other key sources.
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The problemsof using materialfrom interviews are well aired by
those who advocatethe approach. The difficulties revolve especially
around two issues. First, there are doubtsaboutthe reliability of
suchevidence. Pollitt saidof his researchinvolving a similar (and in
some cases identical) list of ministersand officials: 'with all the
interviews there was to greateror lesserextent the danger that the
interviewee'smemory was faulty or misleadinglyover-selective,or that
he or shewas "improving history"' (1984, p. 7).
One of the standardtechniquesfor alleviating this difficulty the use of triangulation (see,for example, Denzin, 1978) - was
particularly appositefor this study because,the role of each adviser
was different and, therefore,had to be specificallyexaminedusing an
historical approach which involved attempts to find corroborative
evidence - from both other intervieweesand other sources - for the
examples given. Consequently, the structure of each interview especiallythe later oneswith ministersand officials - was to varying
degreesdirectedtowardsthe testing of specificpoints about particular
advisers either appearing in written sourcesor raised by previous
interviewees. As far as possibleadviserswere interviewed first so
that their perceptions could be fed into later interviews. Where
earlier interviews had beenconductedon the basisthat permission had
to be sought before remarks were attributed, care was taken to
generalizecommentsthat had, in fact, beenmadeby the specific adviser
or his minister.

This triangulation,in turn, however,exacerbatedthe second
problem - the complexityof analysingmaterialfrom interviews other
than those with a uniformsetof questionsrequiring only short,
relatively easilycoded,answers(see,for example,Aberbachgaal.,
1981). A further factorcreatinga lackof standardizationin the
interviews was thattheexperience
of ministersand officials ranged
from working with anything from oneup to a dozen advisers. The
approachin thelattercasehadto be differentfrom thatused in the
former because
eachadviserplayeda uniquerole.
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Partsof the interviews lent themselvesmore readily than others to
systematic analysis. These included ministers' statementsof the
reasons for appointingadvisers,and ideasfor the development of the
system. On somesuchissuesit was possibleto record the opinions of
all relevantintervieweeswhich could then be presentedin a reasonably
precisemanner.
For somehighly controversialsubjects(for example,the advisers'
role in briefing ministersfor Cabinet)it was desirableto collate as
many opinions aspossible. On other topics (for example,the advisers'
role in speechwriting), once a framework for chapters, sections, and
sub-sectionshad beenprovisionally devisedon the basisof an initial
analysis, it was necessaryto collate the comments only of certain
people. Thesewere selectedon the following bases:typical and strong
examples of the particular point; interestingexamplesshowing a wide
rangeof opinions; exampleswhere the issuewas a major activity of the
interviewee under consideration;examplesillustrating how the Allrounder and Highflier categoriesof effective adviserswere developed;
and instances whereuseof memory had suggestedthere were matching
commentsfrom severalwitnessesin the samesituation(for example, Home
Office ministers, officials and advisersall stressingthe importanceof
the advisers' contributionsto speechwriting). Similar criteria were
adopted when decidingwhich examples,out of the frequently numerous
ones collated, to include in the study to illustrate particular
arguments. With the role of advisersvarying so much, and often
depending on the specific requirementsof the minister, the widespread
use of attributable quotationsandopinions was appropriate and gives
authenticity to the study.

A furthercriteriausedto determinethe selectionof exampleswas
that frequentusewasmadeof materialfrom membersof the steering
group thusenablingaccountto be takenof their expertcommentson the
analysisof their experience.
One justification for the inevitablyselectiveapproachin the
collation of materialis thatsystematic
evidenceon a range of items
camefrom the useof a questionnaire.
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Someof the advantages
of using a questionnairein addition to more
open-endedinterview techniquesare describedby AberbachgL1:
a short answerquestionnairewas usedto supplement, and in
some respects validate, responsesfrom the open-ended
questions ... Had we known then what we have subsequently
learned, we very likely would havestandardizedmore shortanswer questions acrossa wider array of samples. For our
purposes,however,neithertechniquealonecould have yielded
the combinationof nuancegleanedfrom open-ended materials
and the highly standardizeddatadevelopedfrom the shortanswerquestions.(1981, p.34-5).
In this studythe questionnaire(which is reproducedas Appendix 1)
was sentto departmentaladvisers,and usually completed,prior to the
interview. The questionnairewas designedusing the same procedures
adopted for the developmentof the interview schedules. Of the 79
departmental advisers,75 answeredthe questionnaire(one completed it
but then pulled out of the interview becauseof illness and died shortly
afterwards). The most importantaspectsof it were tick boxes rather
than short-answer questions. The questionnaire ensured that basic
information about adviserswas obtained. This not only often saved
interview time, but also meantmaterialcould be systematicallycollated
and presentedon: the frequencyof contactbetweenadvisersand various
people; reasons for appointment; functions; assessments of
effectiveness; and limitations. This was especially worthwhile given
that a large proportion of the total possiblepopulation was included
and the difficulties involved in getting a representativesampledid not
really arise. The questionnaires,particularly thosereturnedprior to
the interview, often provided the basisfor follow-up questions which
might not necessarilyhavearisennaturally during the course of the
interview. Furthermore, sendingout questionnairesencouraged advisers
to think about the itemsto be discussed,which in many cases were
eventstaking place someyearsearlier.
The final point, however, is perhapsthe most contentious of the
suggestedadvantagesof using questionnairesbecausesuch an approach
would be criticized by those who believe that it inhibits the
respondents' ability to give a spontaneousrecall of the situation
(Dexter, for example,refusedevento provide examplesof the questions
he was proposing to ask). Some of the further objections to
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questionnairesare not so greatin this studyas they are for others.
Headey(1974) suggeststhat in his researchon ministersa questionnaire
- type approachwould havebeeninappropriate. Ministers might have
thought they were constitutionallyexpectedto fulfil certain role and,
therefore, if askedto rank a list of functions might, for example, have
placed playing a particular role high even whenthis was not the case
because they felt it would be expectedof them. The lack of
standardization in the role of advisersmeansthat sucha danger was
absent from this study. Furthermore, Headey's objection that in
interviewing political leaders,'the researchertypically doesnot have
a strictly representative,let alone a randomsample' (p.57) does not
apply, as was describedabove.
There were, inevitably, further difficulties with the construction
of the questionnaireand analysisof its results. An attempt was made
to pilot the questionnaireby arranginga meeting of the project's
steering group to discussprogressafter 15 questionnaires(and rather
more interviews) had beenconducted. However, because those advisers
included at the pilot stageconstitutedabout a fifth of the total
population to whom the questionnairewas to be directed, it did not seem
appropriateto changeany of the questions. This meant,in particular,
that question 16j) remainedunalteredeventhoughits ambiguity soon
became obvious. Insteadof changingquestions,a few more points were
added to the endsof questions14,15, and 18. Another reason for the
total numberof responsesto the questionsvarying was that, in a few
cases, adviserswho had experienceof more than one department and/or
minister ticked more than one box for certain questions but not for
others. Furthermore,where somequestionson a pagewere not answered
but others were, those not answered were assumedto be in the
negligible/never/insignificantly box and counted accordingly. This
seems appropriate even thoughon a few occasions the question had
probably been overlookedrather than being deliberately not answered
becauseof its insignificance. A few of the 75 questionnairesreturned
contained no answerat all to any of the tick-box questionson certain
pages - particularly to question 17), on effectiveness. In such cases
nothing was recordedfor thosequestions.
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One adviserhad completedthe questionnaireprior to the interview
but then could not find it and so completed another one. He
subsequentlyfound the first and sentit to enablea comparisonto be
madebetweenthe two setsof answers. The matchwas reasonable,
although far from perfect. This, combinedwith commentsmadeduring the
interviews, suggeststhat there was someambiguity about the meaning of
certain questionsand a degreeof unreliability in the responsesgiven.
This factor, in addition to the failure of some advisers to answer
certain questionsat all, indicatesthat it was correct to assume that
given the much greater salienceof thesequestionsto advisersthan to
ministers and officials, the questionnaireshould be limited to
advisers.
There was often a good correlationbetweenthe results from the
questionnaire and the picture portrayedin the interviews. Where,
however, the early impressiongainedfrom the interviews suggested(as
with the proportion of time spentdiscussingissueswith the minister)
there was a conflict, particular attentionwas given both to collate
materialon this and searchfor possibleexplanations. Similar care was
taken - both during the later interviewsand in the analysisof all of
them - to gatheropinionson matterswherequestionnaireevidencewas at
variance with other sources. Attention was paid, for example, to why
comparatively few advisersthoughtlack of proper position within the
administrative chain of commandwas a seriousproblem at a time when
several reports were calling for advisersto be given a more formal
position within departments.
The limitations, but also advantages,of using a questionnaire
highlight the appropriateness
of the conclusion,as reachedby Aberbach
cl al., that a combinationof interviews and questionnairesis a most
productive methodto adopt.
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SECTION f.,j PLAN OF THE THESIS.
Although the period examinedin this studystartsin 1970, people have
always beenusedin variouspersonaladvisory capacitiesby ministers,
especiallyprime ministers. A brief examinationof theseearlier roles,
and the variousphasesin the developmentof the system of special
adviserssince 1970, helpsestablisha definition for them, and assists
in identifying the main categories. In contrast to the dearth of
material solely relating to the role of specialadvisers,there is a
considerableliterature and a variety of theoreticalperspectiveson the
role of ministersand their relationshipwith the permanentbureaucracy,
and many international comparisonscan be made. A review of this
material provides a frameworkwithin which the various themes and
questionscan be addressedand somemodelling attemptedon the potential
place for advisersin the systemof government.
Theoretical perspectivesand international comparisons provide
various pointers to the potentialneedsof ministers for additional
assistance.An explorationof reasonsgiven by ministers for appointing
special advisersshowshow far, in practice, ministersperceived these
needs. The appointmentof advisersby someministersalso reflects the
encouragementthey receivedfrom other people, including party officials
and members of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit. Evidence from the
questionnairesand interviews revealsthe rangeof activities in which
special advisers engage. The role or placeof specialadvisers is a
product of the interplay of various factors which are examined
including: reasons for appointment; ministers' continuing needs;
advisers' capabilities;and how far other peoplealready in post carry
out the functionsperformedby specialadvisers.

Variousaspects
of theeffectiveness
of advisersandlimitationson
themareexamined.Somecasestudiesillustratetheimpactadviserscan
sometimeshaveon policy making,and an analysisof the contributions
made by somesuccessful
specialadvisersallowsthecharacteristicsof
effective advisersto be identified. Most featuresof the advisers'
potential place in the systemareshown to exist, along with an
increasedinstitutionalization
of therole. An examinationof proposals
for reform is informedby an analysisof how the current systemis
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working and the extentto which it supplies solutions to ministers'
problems.
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY. DEFINITIONS. AND CATEGORIES.
SECTION A

PRE-1970.

Analysis of the history and definitions of specialadvisersrevealsthat
their place in the systemof governmentis not alwayseasy to define.
There have alwaysbeensome'outsiders' appointedas temporary civil
servants. This was particularly the caseduring, and following, the
Second World War as shownby Hennessyand Hague (1985) in: How Adolf
Hitler ReformedWhitehall. They suggestthat the people brought in were
used, 'in almost every capacityexceptthat of a Minister' (p.31).
Clearly many of them were usedin roles different from those filled by
today's specialadvisers.
However, at various times threecategoriesof peopleplayed a role
which might be thoughtsomewhatanalogousto that of thosewho are now
called special advisers:

(i)

peoplebrought into work for prime ministers;

(ii)

people brought into the private offices of departmental
ministers;
specialists (often politically committed) introduced into
departments.

(iii)

PeopleBrought in IQý

fQr Ed= Ministers.

Until the 1920stherewere alwayssomepersonaland political appointees
serving in the Prime Minister's private office (Jones, 1978). Most
later prime ministersalso brought at least one personinto Number Ten
in a staff capacity, for example,in 1964Harold Wilson (now Lord Wilson
of Rievaulx) appointedMarcia Williams (now BaronessFalkender)as his
Personaland Political Secretary(Marcia Williams, 1975,p. 24); and John
Wyndham (later Lord Egremont) joined Harold Macmillan's private
secretariesat Number Ten in 1957.The informal and ill-defined nature
of the role is well illustrated by Wyndham'sdescription of a meeting
after he had agreedto join Number Ten:
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I met my future colleaguesto fix up thejob. They askedwhat
conditions I had in mind to make. They were a bit surprised
when I quotedthemthe story of the Duc d'Aumale and Sarah
Bernhardt. The Duc senther a messagefrom his box in the
theatre where shewas acting: 'Ou, quand,combien?.' In the
interval Sarah sentback a note: 'Chez moi, ce soir, pour
rien. ' (Egremont, 1968,p. 162).
The Prime Minister's Policy Unit also had precedentsincluding: Lloyd
George's 'garden secretariat'underProfessorAdams; the statistical
section of Professor Lindemann(later Lord Cherwell) which served
Churchill during the SecondWorld War; Douglas(later Lord) Jay who
advisedClementAttlee on economicmattersin the first year of the 1945
Labour Government;and a teamof academicsunder the guidanceof Thomas
(later Lord) Balogh who worked for Harold Wilson from 1964 (Jones,
1978). According to Turner (1980)Lloyd George's 'Garden Suburbwas the
earliestof a numberof attemptsto strengthenthe Prime Minister's hold
over central government.' (p. 1). The developmentssince 1964were also
seen as marking an important change: 'In this period [1964-1976]
attempts were made by prime ministers to counterbalancethe longestablishedpredominanceof civil servantsat Number Ten through the
introduction of a more explicit personaland political set of advisers.
Indeed, it might be said that they soughtto return to the older
tradition of having their personaladherentswith them.' (Jones, 1987,
p. 46).
OutsidersBrought jn

Ministers' Private Offices.

There is a long tradition of somedepartmental ministers introducing
advisers into their private office or appointingthem in a personal
staff capacity. Lloyd Georgefor examplebrought outsiders into his
private office at the Board of Trade and Hennessy(1988) described John
Rowland as 'his specialadviserin today's terminology' (p.58). Of all
departmentsthe Foreign Office has had the most consistenttradition of
ministers appointing 'outsiders'. Philip (later Lord) Noel-Baker was
appointed as private secretaryby Lord Robert Cecil and later Lord
Parmoor when they had ministerial responsibilitiesfor the League of
Nations (Parmoor, 1936). In 1925the Labour Party's International
Advisory Committee, suspicious of the Foreign Office's role in the
Zinoviev Letter incident, proposedthat any Labour Foreign Secretary
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shouldhave a 'political' private secretarywho shouldbe a Labour Party
memberand in 1929Arthur Hendersonalso appointedPhilip Noel-Baker to
be his PPSbut he was describedas 'a prototype special adviser' by
Theakston (1988, p. 13). Othersbrought into the Foreign Office as
personalappointments- but not alwaysin the private office - include:
Stuart Hampshire for Philip Noel-Baker(Healey, 1989, p. 107); John
Wyndham for Harold Macmillan; Bill Grieg, who continued as personal
press adviserfor GeorgeBrown (later Lord George-Brown)when he moved
to the Foreign Office from the Departmentof Economic Affairs; and John
Harris (now Lord Harris of Greenwich)for Patrick Gordon Walker (later
Lord GordonWalker) and Michael Stewart(later Lord Stewartof Fulham).
John Harris later worked as specialassistantto Roy Jenkins(now Lord
Jenkins of Hillhead) in the Home Office and the Treasury. During the
war the temporary civil servant,Hugh Gaitskell, was appointed as
'Principal Private Secretaryand, in effect, Ch ffdg Cabinet' by Hugh
(later Lord) Dalton (Pimlott, 1985, p.283).
Specialists (often Politically Committed) introduced ir
Departments.
Prior to 1964 some specialistswere brought in to departmentsby
ministers, for example,Sir Percy(later Lord) Mills was appointed to
advise on, and lead, the housebuilding programmeby Harold Macmillan,
Minister for Housing (Macmillan, 1969, pp.385-402); and Professor
Lindemann was first appointedby Winston Churchill when he was First
Lord of the Admiralty in 1939(MacDougall, 1987, p.20). However, this
third categoryof pre-1970appointmentsillustrates the casethat could
be madefor suggesting1964rather than 1970saw the start of special
advisers. Young and Sloman,for example,claim that, 'as long ago as
1964a new Whitehall specieswas born: the political or special adviser,
half-politician and half-official' (1982, p. 88). The mid 1960s,
especially 1964,is also the startingdate referred to by several other
commentators including Fry (1986); Hennessy(1986); and Drewry and
Butcher (1988). A similar view is taken by some former permanent
secretariesincluding Ian (now Lord) Bancroft who was private secretary

in 1964andclaimsthat, 'the special
to the Chancellorof the Exchequer
adviserscamealongfirst of all in forcein 1964'.
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Most of the sizablenumberin this category were appointed by
Labour ministersin the 1960sand many were politically committed to the
Labour Government (see, for example, Brittan, 1969, and
1971;Kogan, 1971;Crossman, 1975, and 1977; Chester, 1982;
Castle, 1984). They include: Brian Abel-Smith, Peter Lederer, David
Piachaudappointedby Richard Crossman;Bill (now Lord) McCarthy by
BarbaraCastle; A. H. Halseyby Anthony Crosland and many
economistsby these and other ministers. The economists include:
Wilfred Beckerman,Ian Byatt, Christopher(now Sir Christopher) Foster,
David Henderson, Nicholas (later Lord) Kaldor, Robert Neild, Michael
Posner, Derek Robinson,Dudley Seers,Paul Streeten,Gordon Wasserman.
A team of Industrial Advisers under Frederick (now Sir Frederick)
Catherwood, and later Campbell (now Sir Campbell) Adamson, were
recruited for GeorgeBrown's new Departmentof Economic Affairs and
their role is describedin Adamson,1968.
Some ministersalso hada circle of friends, including academics
and specialists,with whom they would discussissues. Both Croslandand
Crossman (for whom Arnold (later Lord) Goodman was particularly
influential) are examples. Oneof the roles played by some later
special advisers, including John (now Sir John) Cope for Peter (now
Lord) Walker at the Departmentof Trade and Industry (DTI) and Robbie
Gilbert for Jim (now Lord) Prior at the Departmentof Employment, was to
maintain links with equivalentgroupsof peopleor organize meetings
betweenthem and the minister.

SECTIONIk DEVELOPMENTSSINCE1970"
This study concentrateson the period since 1970, whilst recognizingthe
importance of the previous developments,especiallybetween 1964 and
1970. In 1970,1974, and 1979there were noticeable changes in the
numberand the natureof 'outsider' appointmentsfollowing the changeof
ProblemsQfENU Government, claimed
government. In 1974Rose, in
that, 'In constitutingthe 1970Conservativegovernment, Edward Heath
imported irregulars to governmentin a more systematic and larger
number' (p.399). Although the degreeof systematizationmight have been
exaggeratedby Rose,this statementindicateswhy 1970was thought to be
an appropriatestarting point for this project. He argued that in 1970
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the Conservativesdiffered from Labour in two significant ways. First,
'the Conservativeshad worked out more legislativepolicies in detail.
Secondly, the Conservativesbroughtinto Whitehall a group of special
advisersand political secretarieswho hadbeenworking under the aegis
of the ConservativeResearchDepartment'(p.420). Writing in 1977 in
Australia, R. Smith, noted that in the UK, 'In opposition the
Conservativeshavebeencritical of Labour's useof adviserseventhough
Labour merely expandeda Conservativeexperiment'(p. 139).
Lord Hunt of Tanworth (1987) suggeststhat an important element in
the realization of the needfor more advisorycapacity for ministers
occurred towardsthe end of the Wilson Governmentin the 1960s. There
was, 'considerabledissatisfactionamongministerswith the advice they
had been given; they had the feeling that they were being blown off
courseneedlessly'(p.67). Such thinking was reflectedon by the Tories
in Opposition and partly as a result severalvarieties of irregulars
were appointed in 1970. Of the small group of political secretaries
two, Douglas Hurd and later William Waldegrave,worked for the Prime
Minister. Even after a slight increasein 1972-3 this group only
numbered seven. Someof themwere locatedin their minister's private
office, most hadbeenat the ConservativeResearchDepartment(CRD) and
most continuedto be paid by the ConservativeParty. Rosereferred to
John Harris as the 'precursor' of this group but claimed that, 'Harris's
appointment was not part of a generalstrategyof the first Wilson
administration' (1974, p. 451). In interview several permanent
secretariesagreedwith this analysis. Another group of irregulars were
'the Businessmen'sTeam' who had beenrecruited in Opposition and who,
along with the CentralPolicy Review Staff (CPRS),were more explicitly a
product of thinking developedin Oppositionthan were the political
secretaries. The teamof businessmen,who included Derek (now Lord)
Rayner and Richard (now Sir Richard) Meyjes, had no specific
departmental responsibilitiesl sc but were all locatedin the Civil
Service Department(CSD) and were concernedwith a number of projects
(seePollitt, 1984, pp.85-103).

Illustratingthevery ill-definednatureof thesetwo categories
of
irregulars, Arthur (nowLord) Cockfield,a former Commissionerof the
Board of InlandRevenueandseniorbusinessman,
was appointedto be
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'Adviser on Taxation Policy to the Chancellorof the Exchequer'. He was
called that, 'for want of any other title', and seemsto haveplayed a
role more akin to that of somelater senior specialadvisers than did
any of the Businessmen'sTeamof which he was not technically a member
anyway.
There was a large increasein the number of special advisers
following the election of the Labour Governmentin 1974. Illustrating
how this could be interpretedas a continuationof the Conservatives'
introduction of political secretariesrather than a return to the Labour
approachof 1964, Rose(1974, p.444) claimed, 'the adventof the second
Wilson governmentdemonstratedthat the Conservativeinnovation of 1970
has bi-partisan support, for many departmentalministers promptly
announced the appointmentof a political secretaryor adviser within
their private office. ' Harold Wilson claimed that in 1974 the system
had been, 'regularized' (Wilson, 1976, p.98). One of the major themes
of this study is to considerwhetherthe appointmentand useof special
advisershas beenformalized sufficiently for the phrase, 'the systemof
specialadvisers'to be appropriate. To the extentthat this has taken
place, then the systemis probably most accuratelydescribedas dating
from 1974.
It is sometimesclaimed that asfar as Labour ministers were
concerned there were two distinct phasesin the development, with the
1960sseeingthe more specialistor technicaladviserand the 1970s the
addition of the political adviser. In 1973BarbaraCastlereflected on
her ministerial experiencein the 1960sin a talk given, at Sunningdale,
to senior civil servants. It was written up in jg SundayTimes on 10
Juneunder the headingMandarin Power. In it sheboth describedhow the
special advisersof the 1960swere not fully integratedinto the team
surrounding the minister, and advocated the introduction into the
private offices of future Labour ministersof a new type of political
adviser in addition to the specialists.
In 1974numberswent up to almost 40, a quarter of whom were in the
Prime Minister's Policy Unit headedby BernardDonoughue. They were
virtually all appointedto be temporarycivil servants and the term
'special adviser' was commonly usedfor the first time. The figure
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dropped to 24 by the middle of 1976and remainedat about that level
until 1979. The numbersare illustrated in the following exchangeon 21
June 1976 when the Minister for the Civil Service replied to a
ParliamentaryQuestionfrom Ian Gow, the mostpersistentTory critic of
advisers,about the numberof specialadvisersand their cost:
Mr Charles R. Morris: Twenty four special advisers are
currently employedby the Government,at a total annual cost
of x160,000.
Mr Gow: Will the Minister acceptthe congratulations of the
House that the numberof specialadvisershas been reduced
from the figure of 29 in January,and their salariesfrom the
figure of £196,000 in January?(Official RQ=. Vol. 913,
cols 1090-1).
A limit of two specialadvisersto a departmentwas soonimposed although the Departmentof Healthand SocialSecurity (DHSS) already
had, and retained, more than that. RogerDarlington wrote in The Times
on 18 July 1978that, 'since July 1975there hasbeena rule (in a
minute from Harold Wilson) that Cabinetministers should not employ more
than two specialadvisers.' Donoughueand Tom McNally agree that the
limit of two was introducedto stopTony Benn, in McNally's words,
'staffing up a private army.' Despitesomecontrary opinions the July
1975date for the introduction of the limit of two is supportedby Tony
Banks. He lost his specialadviser'sposition in July 1975when Judith
(later Baroness)Hart was droppedas Minister for Overseas Development.
Benn offered to appoint him as his third special adviser at the
Departmentof Energy but the Prime Minister preventedthis on grounds of
numbers.
In some departmentsa clear distinction could be made between
specialist advisers and political advisers. The former are people
chosen primarily for their subjectexpertiseand the latter (generally
younger than the specialists)are chosenfor the contribution they can
make basedon their partisanloyalty to their minister rather than on
any substantialpolicy expertise. Following the election of Margaret
(now Baroness)Thatcherin 1979there was a significant drop in numbers
to about a dozen, of whom only two were in the Policy Unit. The total
figure was probably less, Sir JohnHoskyns suggested,'than the number
of peopleemployedin storing and changingthe pictures in ministers'
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offices' (1982, p. 15).
Since 1979 there hasbeena gradual increasein numbers so that
prior to the 1987election there were about25, with the Policy Unit
back to its 1970sstrengthalthoughseveralof its members were not
specialadvisersbut permanentofficials secondedfrom departments. The
increase tended to be in the number of political, as opposed to
specialist,departmentaladvisers. With a few exceptionsthere has been
an informal limit imposedby the Prime Minister of one special adviser
to a department. The SeventhReport from the Treasury and Civil Service
Committee, Session1985-86,was entitledCivil ServantsAlld Ministers:
Duties and Responsibilities(1986). Considerableevidencewas gathered
for the Select Committeeby a sub-committee. In its response the
Government stated that the appropriate number of special advisers
depends upon the sizeand rangeof the departmentand the minister's
wishes but, 'the Governmentbelievesthat the numberof such advisers
should generallynot exceedone per department,and that, as a general
rule, only Cabinet Ministers (andin exceptionalcasesother Ministers
in chargeof departments)shouldneeda SpecialAdviser. ' (Cmnd. 9841,
1986,para. 34). The Treasuryhoweverhas consistentlymaintainedthree
special advisers throughout this period. The assumption by Treasury
ministers that they would maintain the team of three advisers is
illustrated by DouglasFrench. He saysthat when Peter Cropper went
from being a Treasury adviserto being Director of the CRD, the
Chancelloraskedhim (French) to take over the specialadviserposition:
'I suppose he rang me becausewhen he was in Opposition I had worked
with him [up until 1976]. ... So he knew me and he knew the post he
wantedto fill and I supposehe felt the two went together.'
Although the period coveredby the presentstudy finished with the
1987GeneralElection it is relevantto note severaldevelopments since
then. The numberof departmentalspecialadvisers has continued to
increase and specialadvisershavebeengiven their own pay spine somethingwhich had beensoughtfor a long time.

20

ENC
DEFINITIONS. OUTLINE QE FUNCTIONS. AND
TERMS QE EMPLOYMENT.
In the 1960s the term 'irregulars' was used but an authoritative
definition of suchpeoplewas elusive. According to Sam Brittan,
The 'irregular' official or adviser, who has beena featureof
the Whitehall sceneunderLabour is not the samething as the
traditional 'temporary'. Many yearsbefore 1964 there were
temporarycivil servantsin the professionalgrades,recruited
for specific purposes. The EconomicSectionof the Treasury,
for example, was for long recruitedon this basis
The
...
basic differencebetweenthe temporariesand the 'irregulars'
is that ministersare much more involved in the appointmentof
irregularsthan of temporaries. The 'irregular' doesnot owe
his appointmentto the civil servicemachine,and his place in
the hierarchy is lesscloselydefined... In practice the
distinction is blurred at the edges. There are many people of
whom it is quite impossible to say whether they are
temporariesor irregulars (1969, p.331).
A sharpdistinction must be drawn, Klein and Lewis (1977) however argue,
between special advisersand 'the much larger and more heterogeneous
categoryof "irregulars" ... This categorycovers a variety of advisers
and expertsbrought into governmentdepartments(asdistinct from being
personally attachedto Ministers) by both the 1964Labour and the 1970
Conservative Administrations. Special advisers, in effect, are a
particular sub-group of the species"irregulars" ' (pp.3 and 24-5).
Klein and Lewis arguethat the specialadvisers' role is different from
that of the economistsimported into the Departmentof Economic Affairs
by the Labour Governmentin 1964or from the businessmenrecruited by
the Heath Administration.

Variouscategories
to be
of 'outsiders'arenot usuallyconsidered
specialadvisers.Theyinclude:theCPRS;mostof thoserecruited into
the civil serviceduring the war, someof whom continued serving
governmentsof differentpartiesafterit for exampleOliver (later
Lord) Franks and Edwin (nowLord) Plowden; most of the economists
recruited to thecivil serviceby the 1964LabourGovernment. In his
autobiography,Sir Donald MacDougall, who was recruited to the
Departmentof EconomicAffairs in 1964,attemptedto distinguishbetween
various economistsmostof whomwereappointedat the sametime. He
reportedthathe chaireda groupof EconomicAdvisersconsistingof six
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people: Alec Cairncross,JohnJukesand himself were non-political but,
'three might be termed "political" advisers.' They were Neild, Kaldor
and Balogh (MacDougall, 1987 p. 151). Most, if not all, of the
economists recruited to departmentssuch asthe Ministry of Overseas
Development(ODM) soonbecameacceptedby ministersand other officials
as a permanent part of the departmentso that in none of her three
periods as political headof the ministry did Judith Hart regard the
economistsasbeing her personaladvisers:'they were totally integrated

into thedepartment.
' The reporton the 'irregulars' appointedafter
1964 which was preparedby the Fabiansfor the Fulton Committee argued
that many irregulars were economistsand 'helped to build up the
Government'sstaff of economicsand statisticalexperts' (Fulton Report,
1968, Vol 5 (2), p.559). Evidence that the development of such
specialist staff involved far more thanjust the provision of personal
support staff for ministerscame wherethe FabianSociety advocatedthat
only 'in somemore seniorcases'(p.565) should the 'irregulars' enjoy
accessto the minister. 'Irregulars' not enjoying regular accessto the
minister would not usually be classifiedas specialadvisers.
For somegroupsincludedin the historical analysisin Sections A
and B it is lessclear whetherthey would now be regarded as special
advisers. In someways it is rather contrived to attempt to impose
later categorizationon peoplewho were performing or developing roles
considered important by the minister for whom they were working. The
difficulty, and to some extentartificiality, in drawing a sharp
distinction in practicebetweenspecialadvisersand other 'irregulars',
especially for the 1964-70period, again indicateswhy 1970is a more
appropriatestarting date for this study. Nevertheless,it is important

to definethe peoplewhohavebeenregardedascentralfiguresin this
analysis, andan examination
of variousgroupshelpswhen compiling a
list of featuresto includein thedefinitionof specialadvisers.
Of the pre-1970 categories,many of the individuals named in
Section A would later havebeenregardedas special advisers. Indeed a
few of them, i. e. Abel-Smith, Kaldor, and Lynes were officially
designatedas special advisers to ministers in the 1974 Labour
Government, and Piachaudbecamea specialadviserin the Policy Unit.
Similarly two of the economistsappointedto work for Balogh in the

22

1960s (Stuart Holland and Michael Stewart),and Francis Cripps who
worked for Kaldor, becamespecialadvisersin 1974. In subsequent
writing a number of these1964advisersare referred to as special
advisers. Hennessy (1988, p. 172) says, for example, that Neild,
'enteredthe Treasury with Labour as a specialadviserin October 1964,'
and Neild writes that Kaldor, 'was specialadviserto the Chancellor of
the Exchequer during the Labour governmentsof the 1960s and 1970s'
(Guardian.2 October 1986). In reality in 1964, asone of the Treasury
officials of the time argued,there was a great influx of economistsand
specialadvisersand they were often the samepeople.
However, severalof the 1960seconomistswere given more specific
posts within the civil servicethan thoseoccupied by later special
advisers. For example:Neild, whom Brittan (1969, p. 336) called, 'the
most effective of the original irregulars', becameEconomic Adviser to
the Treasury in 1964; Foster became Director-General of Economic
Planning at the Ministry of Transport in 1966; and Seers became
Director-Generalof EconomicPlanningat the ODM in 1964. Similarly the
'Industrial Advisers' probably occupiedmore of a role as advisers to
the department, rather than the secretaryof state, than did later
special advisers. Such an interpretationis supportedby the words of
Sir DouglasAllen (now Lord Croham). In 1967he describedthe role of
'the ft=ent's
small but highly expert teamof Industrial Advisers'
(p. 353 - emphasisadded)despitethe fact that R. G. S. Brown (1965,
p. 330) referred to Catherwoodasbeing a 'personal adviser' to the
minister.
Blackstone (1979) includes the 1970 Conservative Government's
businessmenwith the specialadviserscategoryand in the House of
Commons on 10 May 1976, Tim Sainsbury, a former member of the
Businessmen'sTeam who had subsequentlybeen elected to Parliament,
implied that he regardedhimself as having beena specialadviser:
Mr Sainsbury askedthe Minister for the Civil Service what
advice is now given to specialadviserswith regardto their
political activities.
Mr Charles R, Morris: In December1974the previous Prime
Minister issued a memorandumof guidance to Ministers in
charge of Departmentsabout the terms and conditions of
employmentof specialadvisers. This guidancestill stands.
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Mr Sainsbury: Is the Minister awarethat when I was a special
adviser I was expectedto, and did, resign from my ward
committee to conform to the strict rules that were then in
force and that should still be in force? Is he satisfiedthat
those samestrict rules are enforcednow?
Mr Morris: Yes

...

(Official $g

911, col. 23).
. Vol.

By contrast CharlesMorris hadonly a few months earlier on 23
February replied to anotherof the numerousTory attackson the cost of
special advisersby pointing out that underthe Heath Government, 'in
addition to specialadvisersthe civil serviceadministration had to
live with businessmen'steams.' (Official Report. Vol. 906, col. 21).
As in Klein and Lewis's studytherefore, the businessmenwill not be
countedas specialadvisers.
Definition 4f dial

Advisersand Outline Qf Their Current Role.

Various featuresdistinguishspecialadvisersalthoughnot every point
appliesto all:
(i) They are appointedby the minister for whom they work: 'a Political
Adviser is the personalappointmentof his Minister. ' (Wilson, 1976,
p. 203))
(ii) They are appointedto servein a full time or part time capacityin
their minister's department. Even if they are not paid they have an
official status that distinguishesthem from friends of the minister
whom he might consult on particular issues,for example William (now

Lord) Wedderburn
who advisedMichaelFoot in an unofficialcapacity on
Trade Unionlegislation. Thevastmajorityof specialadvisersbecome
temporarycivil servants;mostarepaid directlybut in a few cases
their employer receivescompensationfrom public funds. Even though
Lord Glenamara (formerly Ted Short) suggestedthat calling special
advisers civil servantswas only a devicefor paying them, they are
generally expectedto adhereto civil serviceregulations. In 1986 the
Treasury and Civil ServiceCommitteemadethe acceptedposition clear by
stating that the Headof the Civil Service, Sir Robert (now Lord)
Armstrong had told them that specialadvisers'are civil servants and
they are bound by all the conventionsof civil servants'(Vol. 1, para.
5.21).

(iii) They servefor only aslong astheindividualwho appointedthem
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remains the minister in the departmentand wishesthem to continue in
post; althoughif the party remainsin power they can be reappointed by
a new minister in the samedepartmentor be appointedto serve in a
different department. EdwardBickham, for example,was appointedby Jim
Prior, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in 1983. He was
reappointed to be specialadviserin the Northern Ireland Office (NIO)
by DouglasHurd when he becameNorthern Ireland Secretaryin 1984on the
resignation of Prior. Hurd subsequentlytook Bickham with him as
special adviserwhen he becameHome Secretaryin 1985. Following the
reappointmentof Hurd as Home Secretaryin the new Governmentformed by
Mrs Thatcher after the June 1987 General Election, Bickham was
reappointed as specialadviser. The potentially precarious nature of
the position is illustratedby severalexamples. David Coleman was
given up to two yearsleaveof absencefrom Oxford University to take up
a post as specialadviserto the Home Secretary,Leon (now Sir Leon)
Brittan, who wished him to start almost immediately. Initially,
therefore, in April 1985, he beganpart time, and had not cleared his
university office for his replacementbefore Brittan was moved from the
Home Office in the July reshuffle, resulting in Colemanhaving to clear
his room in the Home Office asthe new Home Secretary brought Bickham
with him. Colemanbecameadviserto the newly appointed ministers of
statein the Departmentof the Environment (DoE). Michael Stewart took
up his appointmentas specialadviserto the Foreign Secretary only a
few days before Tony Crosland'sdeath. However, the new Foreign
Secretary,Dr David (now Lord) Owen, 'wantedhim to stay and thought it
was quite a generousdecisionon his part to stay.'
(iv) They work directly to the minister. G. S. A. Wheatcroft is an
example of a borderline casewho would not really count as a special
adviser partly because he did not work directly to the minister.
Although he had helpedthe ConservativeOpposition develop its Value
Added Tax (VAT) proposalsin the late 1960sand was appointed by the
Chancellor, his appointment was as honorary adviser to Customs and
Excise Departmenton technicalVAT problems. Johnstone(1975) said of
his work:
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The situation created when an 'outside' adviser comes to
occupy a room in a governmentdepartmentand look over the
shoulders of a group of civil servants going about their
professional avocationsis alwayspotentially delicate, but
its handling by Ash Wheatcroft ... was an object-lesson in
wisdom, tact andcharm - assistedpossiblyby the fact that he
was officially attachedto the departmentitself and not to
its Minister (p. 15).
(v)

They are clearedto seeofficial papersand they have to be
positively vettedalthoughat least onerefused.

(vi)
(vii)

They cover a broadfield of work.
They do not haveexecutivefunctions or authority over civil

servants.
In various Labour Party/Fabianpublications(for example, Labour's
evidence to the Fulton Committee (Vol. 5 (2) pp. 652-673); ßh
Administrators (Fabian Society, 1964);Labour's Eij= Hundred Days
(Pimlott, 1987))at least two typesof political appointmenthave been
advocated. First, political adviserswho would work very closely with
ministers and would clearly be countedas special advisers. Second,
policy expertswho would work more in an executivecapacity within the
civil service machine. To the extentthat Labour ministers followed
this second approach, someappointments,especially in the 1964-70
period, are on the borderline of fitting the abovedefinition of special
advisers, for example, ChristopherFoster, Dudley Seers and Robert
Neild. Chestersuggests(1982)that althoughKaldor, Balogh, and Neild
were all political appointees,only the first two were clearly seen as
being sufficiently specialand distinctive not to raiseproblems about
the relationshipwith the EconomicSection.

TermsUsed.
A bewildering variety of sometimesoverlappingterms have beenused to
describethe peopleappointedby ministersto work closely with them in
departments. Of the two abovecategoriesusedby Labour the first are
political advisers but the useof that term is not restricted to
politically committed, often young, people working very closely to the
minister. The term is also sometimesusedto cover the whole category
that others refer to as specialadvisers. JoanMitchell (1978), former
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specialadviserto Shirley Williams, thought that political adviser was
the parliamentaryterm and specialadviserwas the civil service term.
From 1970-4the term political secretarywas favoured, and is still used
by the Prime Minister for the NumberTen adviserresponsiblefor matters
suchas party liaison.
In his 1975 statementto the Commonwealth Heads of Government
Conference, Harold Wilson referred to, 'The "Political Advisers"
Experiment.' (see Appendix 5 to Ig GovernanceQf Britain. 1976,
pp.202-5). By then, however,as notedabove,the official guidelines
from Number Ten were alreadyusing the term special advisers. In a
Written Answer to a ParliamentaryQuestionon 10 April 1984, Mrs
Thatcher madea distinction between:specialadvisers,who 'are civil
servants', and political adviserswho, 'are not civil servantsand are
not paid from public funds.' (Official Report. Vol. 58, cols 155-6).
This distinction, however, is somewhatinappropriatebecause the only
departmental political adviser included in the list given in the
Parliamentary Answer, which coveredthe period 1979-84, was Robbie
Gilbert. He was adviserto Prior, Secretaryof State for Employment,
and he fits the abovedescriptionof a political adviserbecausehe was
still being paid solely by his employer,Shell, for whom he continued to
work part time and there was a small expensesbudgetpaid for by the
party. Nevertheless, at that time the political aspects of the
adviser's role were performedby Prior's other special adviser, Rob
Shepherd. By contrast Gilbert brought, according to Prior, the
practical experience of a managerin Shell and he commented on the
likely reactionsof industry to proposalsunderconsideration.
Other terms usedinclude: policy adviser; special assistant (the
American term deliberatelyadoptedby John Harris and later also usedby
Adrian Ham, specialadviserto Denis (now Lord) Healey in the Treasury
and by John Cope, specialadviserto PeterWalker at the DTI); economic
adviser; political assistant (the term used by Maggie Sidgreaves,
special adviser to Judith Hart); consultant adviser in industrial
relations to the Secretaryof State(the title adoptedby Roger Dyson,
special adviser to Patrick (now Lord) Jenkin at the DHSS); research
assistant(the phraseusedby severalministersincluding Merlyn Rees -

now Lord Merlyn-Rees
- andNicholasEdwards- now Lord Crickhowell).
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Some of the advisers express uneaseat the use of the term 'political
adviser' in relation to their role for senior, experienced politicians.
Evidence from the questionnaires reveals an even greater consistency in
use of the term special adviser since 1979. In this report, special
adviser will be the term predominantly used.

In 1986the Treasuryand Civil ServiceCommitteeReport listed all
the peoplethought to havebeenspecialadviserssince 1974on the basis
of information suppliedby the Managementand PersonnelOffice. (Vol. 2,
pp. xliii - liii). This showsthat a variety of peoplein a wide range
of roles have beenofficially designatedas special advisers. It
includes three peoplewho worked for the GovernmentChief Whip in an
almost secretarialcapacity:Felicity (now DameFelicity) Younge (197983); Alison Ward (1984-5); and RobinaFinlay (from 1985). Sir Robert
(Robin) Cooke is also listed. He was specialadviserfor a succession
of Secretariesof Statefor the Environment from 1979onwards and took a
special interest in the buildings of the Palace of Westminster.
According to Michael Heseltine,who appointedhim in late 1979, Cooke
was already 'actually doing thejob in an unofficial capacity and we
really legalisedit and gaveit form. ' He was reappointedby Tom King
who thought the appointmentwas 'horsesfor courses' and by Patrick
Jenkin who usedthe phrase,'an absoluteround peg in a round hole.'

Some of the borderlinecasesillustrate the breadth,and the
limitations, of thetermasusedin the official list. According to
this list Ken Griffin becamea specialadviserto Tony Benn in 1974 in
the Department of Industry despitealreadybeing an adviser to the
departmentand despitethe fact that Benn did not really regard him as a
special adviser. Griffin, a trade unionist, had been an Industrial
Adviser to the department since 1970. Recruitment of Industrial
Advisers was conductedby the existing Coordinatorof the advisers and
the departmentbut had to be approvedby the minister becausethey were
directly responsible to him. Griffin had beenproposedprior to the
1970 election whilst Benn, asMinister of Technology, was running the
department. John Davies, the ConservativeSecretaryof Statefor Trade
and Industry approved the appointment and Griffin, by this time
Coordinator of the Industrial Advisers, was still in post when Benn
returned to the department. Griffin continuedin his role as Industrial
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Adviser and maintainedthat title but also becamea specialadviser to
Benn. He felt he was much more closely involved with the Secretary of
State after he becamespecialadviserthan he hadbeenunder the Tory
ministers. Although Benn thoughtthat Griffin was making a valuable
contribution he distinguished Griffin's role from that of his two
special advisers,Francis Cripps andFrancesMorrell: 'I never put him
in exactly the samecategory
he was an adviserto the department.'
...
The permanentsecretary,the late Sir Antony Part, however, thought that
Griffin becamea specialadviserto Benn whilst remainingan Industrial
Adviser to the department.
Further examplesof fuzzy boundariesaroundthe placeoccupied by
special advisersand uncertaintiesin the definition of their role are
provided by Michael Heseltine'suse of advisers. In his book Where
There's a Will he states:
I introducedthree exceptionalmen into the world of Whitehall
to help us in specificpolicy areasfor limited periods. Tom
Baron, Peter Leveneand Ed Bermanhad each experienced the
effect of Governmentpolicies on their daily work in different
areas. They knew the limitations of the official mind, the
timidity of politicians at national and local level, the
in the Whitehall systems(1987, p.44).
weaknesses
All three appointmentswere unlike most appointments of departmental
specialadvisersin that they were for fixed periods, and, at less than
a year, they were even shorterthan the few other special advisers on
fixed period secondment.Ed Berman,having agreeda set of specific
tasks with the Secretaryof State,then had, for a special adviser,
comparatively little contactwith him. His role, therefore, was more
akin to that of a consultantor specialistappointedby a department in
a short- term contractthan it was to that of most special advisers.
Nevertheless, Baron and Bermanare the two listed as special advisers
whereasPeter (now Sir Peter)Levenedoesnot appearin the Treasury and
Civil Service Committee list. Levenedescribeshimself, during this

six month periodbefore he was appointedasChief of DefenceProcurement,
as being'PersonalAdviser to the Secretaryof State'
o's Who.
IM.
Elsewherehe is describedasHeseltine's'former special adviser',
(RIPA, 1987,para.4.23; Hennessy
1988,p.371).Heseltine'sanswer to
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the questionasto whetherLevenewas clearly a specialadviser during those
six monthswas, 'Absolutely. Exactly the sameas Tom Baron.'
Angela Byre was, in effect, recruitedby Anthony Lester in 1974 as
'special adviserto the Home Office' to give advice on the preparation
of the White Paper, Equality fQr Women (Cmnd. 5724), and subsequent
legislation on sexdiscrimination. Her namedoesnot appearin the 1986
Treasury and Civil ServiceCommitteelist and she did not regard herself
as a political appointee:'I was not a political adviser ... I was there
for a specifictask.' Nevertheless,she sharedan office with Lester,
one of the Home Secretary'stwo specialadvisers,and she was made to
feel very much part of that team.
The importanceof the aboveanalysisis that the difficulties in
defining preciseboundariesand in statingexactly who may be considered
to be a specialadviserunderlinethe comparativelyrecent development
of the role and its informality. There is probably no other categoryin
Whitehall about which there is suchuncertainty. Furthermore, a degree
of imprecision will be argued to be one of the important beneficial
features of the special advisers' system in that it provides
flexibility. The label 'specialadviser' hasoccasionallybeenused to
give an official title and thusa salaryand/or access to official
information to peoplefulfilling useful functionsfor ministers, for
example Robin Cooke, PeterLevene,and Felicity Younge. On the other
hand, the fact that the vast majority of specialadviserssince 1974are
clearly identified in the lists indicatesthat there hasbeena degree

andformalizationin theconceptwhencomparedwith the
of systemization
1960s. A wide rangeof functionsare generallyacceptedas being
legitimateactivities for specialadvisers. Thesewill be fully
discussedin Chapter6 but maybe briefly listed here in their
approximateorder of importanceaccordingto the findings of the
questionnaires
completedby specialadvisers.Thereis inevitably some
overlapbetweenvariousactivities:
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(i)

(iv)

examining papers going to the minister and commenting on
someof them;
advisingthe minister on, and involvementwith, presentation;
discussingissueswith the minister;
attending departmental meetings and visits with the

(v)

minister;
speechwriting;

(vi)

preparingreportson departmental
policy;

(vii)

attendingmeetingsof all the politicians in the department;
corresponding with party MPs and officials/attending
party meetings/receivingparty deputations,on behalf of
the minister;

(ii)
(iii)

(viii)

(ix)

preparingbriefs on non-departmental
agendaitems for
CabinetandCabinetCommittees;

(x)

attending departmental meetings/talking to groups/and
receiving deputations, on behalf of the minister or at least
when he is not present;
chasingup progresson implementing the minister's wishes.

(xi)

Terms 4f Employment.
Whereas most of the Tories' political secretariesin the early 1970s
were paid by the ConservativeParty, the overwhelming majority of
advisers since 1974 have beenpaid from public funds and become
temporary civil servants. In 1974the terms of employmentto be issued
by departmentswere setout in the memorandumof guidance issued by
Number Ten following discussionswith the CSD. Thesewere changed when
necessary.
Negotiationsover starting salary and increments,and in somecases
pensions,were initially held ad hoc betweenthe individual adviser and
the relevant department. Then approvalfor eachagreementhad to be
sought from the CSD. Ian Bancroft, former permanentsecretary of the
CSD, admits this approvalwas not 'totally automatic' and the CSD was
probably 'a bit meanerin termsof pay.' Over the years the CSD tried
to secureconsistency.
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Nevertheless, considerablevariations remained. Some of the
senior, experiencedadvisers, including some of the university
professors, were given a salaryand/or statusequivalentto that of a
deputy secretary. At the other end of the scaleat least one special
adviser was given the salaryequivalent to an executive officer.
Although some of the differencesreflected variations in age and
seniority of specialadvisers,sometimesadvisersof similar backgrounds
were treatedvery differently. The salaryand consequentstatus of a
specialadviserare thought to be important for reasonsbeyond monetary
considerations - the gradeof an individual often determinesthe units
to which he is entitled for office accommodationand furniture. In a
hierarchical organizationsuchasthe civil servicethe way in which an
individual is treatedby othersmight dependpartially upon his official
status. According to Brian Abel-Smith, 'grading is important, it
normally determineswhat accessyou have.' Similarly Barbara Castle's
other main specialadviser,JackStraw, was pleasedthat she telephoned
Number Ten and insistedthat, althoughonly 27, Straw be put on the
assistant secretaryscale. He felt it was 'a signal to the department
that I was to be taken seriously.'
Terms and conditions, and later the progress of the salary
negotiations held with the CSD, were a major topic of discussion at a
numberof the infrequently held meetingsof Labour specialadvisers. A
note produced by thesespecialadvisersabout nine months after the
initial appointmentssuggestedthat variations in terms and conditions
did not appearto be relatedin any systematicway to differencesin the
natureof particular appointmentsand responsibilitiesinvolved. There
was little consistencyin the paymentof London Weighting allowances,
thresholds and regular increments. Under Labour, negotiations over
salary increaseswere protractedand at times complicatedby the needto
adhere.to changes in the government'sown pay policy. During the
negotiations the Headof the Policy Unit, BernardDonoughue, to some
extentacted as shopstewardfor the specialadvisers. Even by the nine
months stage however, most specialadvisershad been given salaries
equivalent to thoseof either principalsor assistant secretariesand

manyof the worstanomaliesin salarieshadbeenrectified.
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Nevertheless, the full variations in treatment had not been
resolved by 1979and someof the Conservative special advisers were
similarly dissatisfiedwith the vagariesin treatmentover salaries and
pension arrangements.At one time a five per cent rule was applied to
Tory specialadviserswhich meantthat they could not be paid more than
five per cent above their previouspay and this was a source of
contentionbecausemany of the specialadviserswere recruited from the
CRD wheresalarieswere low comparedwith what most of the staff could
haveexpectedelsewhere.
Severalfactors help accountfor advisers'dissatisfactionat their
salary levels, especiallyduring the Labour Government. First, their
salary negotiationsoften took placeagainsta backdropof attempts to
restrain civil servicepay. Bancroftwas, 'not surprisedthere should
havebeenthis rumbling discontentamongstthe advisers,mirrored by the
rumbling discontentamongstthe civil servants.' Second,there was a
general feeling in somequartersof the civil service, and especially
amongst backbenchersand sectionsof the press,that far from being
underpaidsomeadvisersreceivedtoo much and the total amount spent on
them was exorbitant. This feeling is reflected in the earlier
quotations and playeda major part in the campaign against advisers
unofficially led by Ian Gow. Individual salarieswere not generally
disclosed. However, after Gow had beentold in Parliament on 5 November
1975that Kaldor's salarywas914,000, he campaignedfor other salaries
to be disclosedand on 23 March 1976intensifiedhis attack on Kaldor
and on the total amount spenton advisers:
I sometimes think that the quality of advice that the
Government have been receiving from their selected
special advisers is an indictmentof the judgment of the
Ministers who maketheseappointments. I sometimesthink that
it would be better if Ministers were to accept rather more
advice from my right hon. and hon. Friends, which they would
get free, gratis and for nothing, rather than that they should

pay out X196,000a yearto get advicethat is leading the
Vol. 908, col.
countryto economicdisaster(Official B.
365).

The rules governing the political activities of civil servants
were generally applied to specialadvisers.Several special advisers,
therefore, had to resignfollowing their selection as prospective
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parliamentary candidates. Although an initial attempt was made to
prevent specialadvisersfrom continuingto serveon local councils, Roy
Jenkins and BarbaraCastlesuccessfullyinsistedin 1974 that Matthew
Oakeshottand JackStraw shouldbe allowed to remainon Oxford City and
Islington Borough Councilsrespectively. Nevertheless,certain ground
rules were establishedto cover their activities and when, in 1984, the
Leader of the ConservativeGroup on LambethCouncil, Peter Davis, was
chosento be specialadviserto the Minister for Local Governmenthe had
immediately to resignhis council seat.
Restrictions on party political activities were probably most
strongly applied in the Heath Government,to the advisers who became
temporary civil servants- Mark Schreiber(now Lord Marlesford) and
Brendon Sewill. They were not able, for example, to go to party
conferences and, despitebeing former Director of the CRD, Sewill was
not permitted to go to the party offices. Schreiberdid, however, have
the civil servant'sright, deniedto later specialadvisers,to see the
files of previous administrations. In practice, underLabour in the
1970s, as Darlington told The Times on 1 July 1978, 'a few special
advisers ignore some of these restrictions.' About 20 advisers
subscribed to evidence submittedby JackStraw to the Committee 4li
Political Activities Qf Qv Servantschaired by Sir Arthur Armitage.
The committee agreedwith the advisersthat 'the rules applicable to
career civil servants are not applicable to Special Advisers' and
concluded, 'that the guidelinesand rules for the political activities
of SpecialAdvisers shouldbe laid down by the Prime Minister; and that
these should be separateand distinct from the rules applicable to
careercivil servants'(1978, para. 136).
Some move towardsthis position might be indicated in Thatcher's
Written Answer of 10 April 1984: 'their terms of appointmentare similar
to thoseof other civil servantsand they are subjectto the same rules

of conduct... apartfrom certainexceptionswhichreflectthe special
natureof their role.' This slightrecognitionof the specialnatureof
their position was reflectedin theletter of appointmentof some
advisersserving ministersin theThatcherGovernment. The letter
stated, as had beenthecaseunderLabour, that adviserswould be
expectedto abide by the provisionsof the Civil Service Pay and
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Conditions of ServiceCode with theexceptionof acceptanceof outside
business appointmentsafter resignationsor retirement. However, it
went one stepfurther and also allowed certainexceptionsto the rules
on political activities. Theseincludedgiving permission, subject to
the approval of their minister, for advisers:to attendparty functions,
althoughonly as observersin the caseof party conferences;to maintain
contact with party members;and to takepart in party policy reviews with
the purpose of ensuringthat thoseundertakingthe review were fully
awareof the Government'sview and their minister's thinking.
Despite suchdevelopmentsthe traditional view still prevailed in
Robert Armstrong's comment,notedearlier, to the Treasury and Civil
ServiceCommittee. Furthermore, the continuingrestriction on advisers
remaining in post if selectedasparliamentarycandidatescaused the
resignation not only of severaladvisersoncethey were selected, but
also of somewho were hoping to be selectedand did not want to pass up
good alternativejob opportunitieswhen they arose.
It was fearedin 1978that severalspecialadvisersmight have to
resign in Spring 1979 becauseof the regulationsrelating to temporary
civil servantsnot serving for more than five yearswithout recourse
to the Civil ServiceCommission(Tg Times. 31 May 1978). As a
result of the issuesraisedby the consequentinvestigation, the
Service Order
Council
8 was made. Article 1(2)(d)
_QyU
of the Order excludedappointmentslimited to the duration of an
Administration (suchas specialadvisers) from the requirementof needing
to receive a certificate of qualification from the Civil Service
Commissioners(Civil ServiceCommission, 1979). Conservativespecial
adviserswho served for more than five years,for example Adam
(now Sir Adam) Ridley, faced no difficulties in continuing in service.
Some advisers made certain conditions before accepting their
appointment. Lester set three: 'One was that I would have ready access
to the Home Secretary;the secondwas that I would have ready access to
all relevant documents; the third was that I would have adequate
administrativeback up. Thoserequirementswere met pretty well. '
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SECTION Q. CATEGORIESQF SPECIAL ADVISERS.
The two categoriesusedin Labour Party andFabian writings provide an
important startingpoint. In its evidenceto the Fulton Committee the
Labour Party advocatedthat:
Two pFficular kinds of temporary appointment should be
explicitly recognised. First expertswho are called in to
help implementthe particular policies of the government of
the day. Here we envisagethe recognitionof a limited number
of 'posts of confidence'. Theseappointmentsmust be at a
fairly high level or specialprovision must be madefor access
to the Minister .... The secondproposalwe would make is that
a Minister on assumingoffice, should have the power to
appoint a limited numberof personalassistants(perhapsup to
four) with direct accessto him and to all the information in
his department. Thesewould form his personal 'Cabinet'.
They would take no administrative decisions themselves.
(Fulton Report, 1968,Vol. 5 (2), pp.664-5).
This categorization hasnot, in practice, beenfollowed precisely by
Labour or ConservativeGovernmentsalthoughit still finds favour in
recommendationsfrom the Fabians,for example,Labour's EjW Hundred
DUI (Fimlott, 1987),and radicalson the right including John Hoskyns,
for whom the personalassistantswould be policy advisers(1982). Two
informal categoriesare often appliedto the specialadviserswho have
beenappointed: 'political' advisersand 'specialist' advisers. Such a
categorization - which hasnothing to do with the previously described
official attemptto distinguishbetweenpolitical and specialadviserswas particularly clear in the caseof someof the teams of advisers
serving Labour ministersbetween1974-9.
This distinction is consideredto be valid by many observers
including several former adviserswho haveanalysedthe role
- Roger
Darlington, JoanMitchell and Alastair RossGoobey. Brian Abel-Smith
and Jack Straw are often cited as the archetypal 'specialist' and
'political' adviserrespectively. Strawaddsweight to the distinction
by recalling that when askedto distinguishbetweenthem Barbara Castle
said, 'I've hired Brian Abel-Smith for his brainsand Jack for guile and
low cunning.' Thesetwo illustrate, however, someof the difficulties
with a simple specialist/politicaldichotomy. Abel-Smith was seenas a
committed socialist and his political role included serving on the
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Social Policy Sub-committeeof Labour's National Executive Committee
(NEC), and Straw became involved in policy discussions in the
department.
Several commentators,including somewho support the distinction
between political and specialistadvisers,believe that in practice
there is a large variety of roles that can be played and some advisers
could be classifiedas both specialistand political. Tim Boswell, for
example,hadboth worked at CRD and beena farmer prior to becoming, in
1984, adviserto Michael Jopling, Minister of Agriculture, a role which

he performedpart time whilst continuingto farm. He is now
Conservative
MP for Daventry.
The adviserswho servedin the Departmentof Prices and Consumer
Protection (DPCP) between1974-9illustrate the possiblecategories and
the complexity of the issue. JoanMitchell (an economist and former
member of the Prices andIncomesBoard) and John Lyttle worked for
Shirley Williams, andprovide perhapsthe clearest example from any
department of the specialistand political adviser categories that
Mitchell herself describedin 1978in Public Administration:
In practicethere are two kinds of advisers, personified in
the two which most (thoughnever all) Cabinet ministers were
allowed: thosewho act asan extra political arm, and those
having technical or departmental expertise, usually
economists. The specialpolitical advisersmainly function as
party and pressuregroup contactmen, as devillers chasing
ministers' needsand wishesand possibly as speech writers.
The specialeconomic(or similar) advisersact mostly as the
sieves,for papersoriginating in other departmentsas well as
the minister's own, andas policy thinkers (p. 89).
Even such a clear-cutexample,however, has atypical features.
John Lyttle had not only worked in Labour Party offices but had also
been Chief Officer of the RaceRelationsBoard at assistant secretary
level. He was, at 41, more seniorand experienced than most people
appointedto the political adviserslot. Moreover, initially there was
a third specialadviserworking for Shirley Williams. Timothy Josling
was an economistwho worked part time asdid Mitchell. But whereas
Mitchell explained that the adviserhad to insert, 'the specifically
political and social slant' on issues(p.92), Josling's role was to

brief as an experton the CommonAgriculturalPolicy (CAP). After a
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while Joslingbecame'part-time consultantto the department' although
he continuedfunctioning much as before.
Possibly of all specialadvisersJosling camenearestto being an
economicadviserto the department- ashighlighted by his later change
of title. Under Labour severalspecialistswho were economistshad the
title EconomicAdviser to the Secretaryof State. It is important to
note that they were specifically advisingtheir minister and therefore
count as special advisersin a way which economic advisers to the
departmentdo not.
Roy Hattersley, who succeededShirley Williams at the DPCP, thought
that, 'the perfect balanceis a man of someconsiderableseniority with
committed expertise- and I think that is exactly the phrase- and a man
slightly more junior who hasgot an essentially political role. '
Although in Maurice Pestonand David Hill respectively, Hattersley
thought he had this balance,he did not think the terms 'specialist'
adviser and 'political' adviser were entirely appropriate because
Peston, 'was a combination of both.' Furthermore, Hill was more
interventionist in the DPCP than Lyttle had been. Pestonemphasizedthe
political role of even the specialistadviserby drawing a distinction
between,
the professionalrole and the political role. Economists who
take leavefrom university to work temporarily in the civil
servicedo soas professionals... Their value lies in their
technical skills and their knowledgeinsofar asthey have any.
Thus, in the early 1960swhen I was in the Treasury the
Chancellor was ReginaldMaudling, but this was a complete
irrelevanceasfar as my work was concerned All this is to
be contrasted with the specialadviserwho is... a political
appointee and has a political role to play ... [special
advisersare] people who give advice, but who are politically
committed. As an exampleof the contrast, when I was at DPCP,
the departmentusedanotherprofessorof economicsto advise
as a technical expert on the CAP (Times High r Educational
Supplement(THO), 11 July 1980).
Inevitably discussionabout categoriesof advisers overlaps with
that about the definition of advisersand Peston's clear distinctions
would havebeenharderto make in the 1964-70period. In practice, the
political/specialist categoriespartly overlap with thoseadvocated by
the Labour Party/Fabiansat the start of this section. But whereas in
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Labour's evidence to Fulton it was the personal assistant who would
'take no administrative decision', that limitation has applied in
practice to both the 'political' advisersand the 'specialist' advisers.
Campbell(1987) usessimilar phraseologyin referring to the distinction
between, 'policy professionalswith partisan ties and political
operatives.' (p.266-7). He stylesthe former category 'amphibians'.
Attempts were made, for exampleby Wilson (1976 p.204) and Heclo and
Wildavsky (1981 p. xlvii), to developa three fold categorization of
advisers. Often thesewere developedon the basis of the advisers'
backgrounds rather than their roles. Whilst theseare of some value,
the heterogeneityof advisersand their roles havedefeatedattempts to
developan authoritativecategorizationinto which all adviserscould be
slotted.
Special advisers in the NumberTen Policy Unit really form a
separatecategoryand when the term 'policy adviser' is usedit usually
refers to them. The main focusof Klein and Lewis's study was on
advisersattachedto individual ministersrather than the 'special unit
at Number 10 Downing Street' because,they claimed, that unit is 'very
much the exception and no doubt reflects the special, because wide
ranging, needsof the Prime Ministerial office in recent years' (p.2).
Advisers at Number Ten are not includedin the main analysis in this
studynot only becausetheir role is in many ways different from that of
departmental special advisersbut also because,as they have usually
beenthe single largestgroup, their numberswould distort the picture.
Nevertheless, they are included in the official lists of special
advisers and have played an important role - which is specifically
examined in Chapter6, SectionB. Their contribution is also analysed
to the extentthat, for example,they were part (possiblythe centre) of
a network of specialadvisersand comparisonscan be madebetween their
role and that of specialadvisersin departments. According to Pollitt:

If the groupunderDr. Donoughueat No. 10wasgenerallywell
received,the samecouldnot be saidof all the other two
dozenor sopoliticaladvisers In sum,a distinctionneeds
10 unit andthe other political
to be drawnbetweentheNo....
The
former
advisers.
quickly stakeda firm claim to a place
in the machineryof government The role of individual
....
advisersto otherministershasbeenlesswell defined and
lesswidelyaccepted(1984,pp.110-11).
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This chapterhas worked towardsa definition of the role of advisers to
other ministers. The following chapterswill suggesttheir role is now
increasinglyaccepted.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES. MODELS
AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS.
In analysingthe placeof specialadviserswithin the British system of
government it will be of value to setit against various theoretical
perspectiveson, and descriptionsand modelsof, the roles of ministers
and the adequacyof traditional sources of support for them in
performing those roles. The analysismovesfrom a discussion of the
general issuesto an examinationof the placeof advisers. Section A
examines the many roles of ministersand their consequent requirements
for assistance.SectionB considersthe traditional sourcesof support
for ministersand internationalcomparisonsare made. Section C reviews
the relationshipbetweenministersand the most important providers of
assistance- the permanentcivil service. Of the extensive material
available the items selectedare generallythosemost relevant to the
eventual development of a possiblemodel of the place occupied by
specialadvisers. SectionD combinesthe various elementsand develops
the model.
SECTION QL ROLES QE MINISTERS.
Specialadvisersare appointedby their minister and have direct access
to him. It is, therefore,appropriateto start by analysing ministers'
roles. Ministers havea wide rangeof roles to fill and this leads to
considerablestrain on them (Kogan, 1971, p. 15 and p. 156; Headey, 1974,
p.47 and p.278; Blackstone1979; Hoskyns, 1983; Hennessy,1986, p. 184).
British ministers are active membersof the legislature, unlike their
counterparts in America or France. In some continental traditions
members of a minister's cabinetare permitted to carry out someof his
functions of reporting to the legislature(Neville-Jones, 1983, p.235).
The British Parliamentalso sits for more hours eachyear than those of
other democraticcountries(Blackstone,1979). The majority of British
Ministers haveseatsin the Houseof Commons. The UK electoral system
is not based on a list systemand so there are strong demands on a
minister from his constituency.
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British ministers who head a departmentare responsible for
providing policy leadership. In 1974Headey(p.59) reportedthat some
regardedthemselvesas having a managementrole, and probably since the
early 1980seven greaterattentionhasbeenpaid to it. Ministers have
a vast amount of paperto read, many decisionsto make and a large
numberof meetingsand visits which, especiallysincethe UK joined the
European Economic Community (EEC), may include overseas trips.
Furthermore, in the British unitary system, central government is
responsiblefor more decisionsthan in federalcountries.Their role in
a departmentis extremelyimportant to ministersbecauseas Rose (1987,
p.4) argues,ministries provide themwith a meansof satisfying their
political ambitions. A ministeralso has to defend and promote his
department, himself and the whole government. He doesso to various
audiences- Parliament,the interestgroups, the mediaand the country.
There seems to be an ever increasingdemandfrom the media, partly
fuelled by a reduction in secrecy,for explanationsfrom ministers.
Some ministers, especiallyin Labour Governments,spend time on
party committees(see,for example,Benn, 1989, and 1990; Castle, 1980,
and 1984), again in strongcontrastwith membersof American Cabinets.
British ministersalso attendmeetingsof Cabinetor its committeesand,
not only have to promote their departmentalinterests,but also have to
share a strongercollective responsibility for the decisions taken by
the Government than that in most countries(see,for example, Birch,
1964).
Alan Healey, the Chairmanof the First Division Association (FDA),
suggestedin May 1986at the Re-sidlling Government Seminar that
ministers, 'have at least five full-time jobs to perform, and almost by
definition thereforecannotperform any of themproperly. ' (Institute of
Directors (IOD), 1986, p.30). In 1970the newly elected Conservative
Government produced a White Paper, fg ReorgranisationQf Central
Government, in which it claimed, 'This Administration believes that
government has been attemptingto do too much. This ... has also
overloaded the governmentmachineitself ... the weakness has shown
itself in the apparatusof policy formulation' (Cmnd. 4506, para. 2).

Although it is widelyaccepted
thatBritishheadsof departments
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are extraordinarily busy, even compared with ministers in other
countries, one compensatingfactor is that there are far more junior
ministers in Britain than elsewhere. In 1976Britain accounted for a
quarterof the total numberof junior ministersin the world (Theakston,
1987, p. 167). How far junior ministersare themselvesoverworked, and
their capacityto relieve the burdenon Cabinetministers, are explored
later.
Given that ministershave so many functionsto carry out, Headey
argues, 'sheer pressure of work is seen as the basic reason why
Ministers are forced, consciouslyor unconsciously, to give higher
priority to some roles than others.' (1974, p.30). Ministers who
attempted fully to play all the roles open to them would exhaust
themselvesand not tackle themproperly. He identifies five main types
of ministers: minimalists; policy selectors; policy initiators;
executiveministers; and ambassadorministers. Ministerial minimalists
give priority to their parliamentarytasks and to fighting their
departmentalcorner in Cabinetand CabinetCommittees. Policy selectors
provide policy leadershipbut do so by probing for weaknessin advice
and choosing from amongthe alternativelines of policy submitted to
them. The policy initiator thinks of himself as providing policy
leadership by defining and setting his own objectives. Executive
ministersemphasizemanagementroles and ambassadorministers emphasize
public relationsroles. Someministersthought that nothing could be
neglectedand they refusedto define their priorities at all (p.65).
Headey's work contributes to the conclusion that, to varying
degrees,ministersare overloadedand do not havethe time to carry out
certain of their functions. Hennessy (1986) gathered considerable
evidence to suggest that the collective Cabinet role was one that
ministers, partly through lack of time, carried out leastwell (p. 185).
Headey's evidence, however, raises doubts about how far greater
involvement in wider Cabinet discussionwas a role that ministers wished
to adopt (pp.58-60) - this may, of course, have been an implicit
acceptanceof the lack of time.
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Nodal Point.

The large numberof roles a minister is expectedto perform highlights
the fact that he ought to maintaina relationship(entailing the flow of
information and/or influence) with many institutionsand people. These
could include: his department;other departments;the Prime Minister;
other ministers- either singly or collectively; Parliament;his party
(including the parliamentaryparty, the party in country, and the party
headquarters); pressure groups; the media; academics and other
specialists;the public; his constituency. Thesekey relationships are
illustrated in Figure 1 but variousintermediaries and people with
closest contactwith the minister will be addedto the diagram later.
Furthermore, some of the relationships are more complicated than
straightforward bilateral relations,for example,a minister may meet
representativesof an interestgroup but such a group is also likely to
have a strong relationshipwith the department. The relationship with
the departmentis the most important for a minister and officials help
him with many of the other contacts.
Simon (1976) suggestedthat theoriesof administrationshould take
decisionmaking asa central focus. He stressedthat how decisionswere
made was influencedby the information available. The concept of the
flow of information is central to systemstheory. According to Easton,
'we may visualize a political system as a gigantic communications
network into which information in the form of demandsis flowing and out
of which a different kind of information we call a decision emerges'
(1965, p.72). Within systemstheory the actual decision making occurs
inside the black box. Much of this studyfocuseson the black box and
the perspectiveof the political decisionmakers(i. e. ministers)at the

heartof thewholeprocess.
With so many relationshipsto maintain it is perhapsuseful to view
British ministers as being at the nodal point of a vast array of
information (formal and sometimesinformal) flowing in from a wide range
of sources. The buck then stops with the ministers who either
individually, or collectively, have to make the decisions and have
'unlimited liability' (Rose, 1987,p. 18) for any political mistakes
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FIGURE 1: Bilateral Relationships Maintained by the Minister.
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made.
Ministers also send information out to a wide variety of
institutions andpeople. It is important for partisansto promote the
policies oncedecisionshavebeenmade- especiallyif the decisionsare
unpopular. Hood (1983) showshow nodality is one of the key tools that
ministersand governmentpossessin carrying out the vital functions of
'detection' i. e. taking in information and 'effecting' i. e. trying to
make an impact on the outsideworld.
A personin sucha nodal position, who is overloadedwith functions
to carry out, will havevariousinterlocking requirements:
(i) Specific taskswill have to be carried out (for example: detailed
policy optionsprepared,meetingsarrangedand serviced, speechesand
pressstatementswritten) to assisthim in carrying out the functions.
(ii) He will not be ableto maintainall the contactshimself and so
intermediaries will have to conductcommunicationsfor him. In the
terminology of systemstheory the demands flow along communications
channels and at various stagesgatekeeperswinnow out certain demands.
The demands or statementsof interest are further reduced through
collection and combination into a more manageableform and issue
formulation occurs. (Easton,1965). Much of this processis far removed
from the minister but the argumentbeing developedhereis that as the
objective of all this activity is to transmitdemandsto the political
decision makers it is profitable to examine the process from his
perspective. It is possible, therefore, to seemuch of the activity as
being on his behalf and considerableliaison occurs within the political
system. Part of this is sometimesseenas brokerage. The concept of
brokerage is variously interpreted. For some, the element of
'authority' within it is important (Koganand Henkel, 1983, p. 32) and in
this sensea retiring permanentsecretary,Sir Brian Cubbon, accepted
the descriptionof himself as being the 'broker' between the minister
and the department(Ig Times. 4 April 1988). On the other hand, there
may be situations(especiallywhendealing with a rigid hierarchy such
asa governmentdepartment,or a delicateparty matter) where a minister
feels it desirableto usean informal confidantto carry out brokerage.
Whilst lacking constitutionalauthority sucha personmay be able to
carry out brokerage becausehe is known to be both relaying the
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minister's wishesand availableto take information directly back to the.
minister.
(iii) The third requirementthat a minister with suchheavy demands on
him is likely to have is for personalsupportof the type that can be
provided by an aide or confidant. Young and Sloman (1982) refer to
ministers' need for 'ego-boosting'(p.88). As part of this personal
support a few ministers may find the needfor somebody to play a
'medieval fool' role and be ableto speakmore bluntly to them than
officials think appropriatefor civil servantsto do.
The complex and potentially contradictoryrequirementsof heads of
government are examinedby Dror (1987). He claims that many of the
points are also relevantfor other ministers. The absence,he argues,
'of tension-reducingand support-providinghistorical court positions,
such as courtjesters and court priests,from the entourage of modern
rulers makes supply of emotionalsupportall the more important a
function for advisersto rulers.' This creates,however, the first in
Dror's list of eight 'inherent' dilemmasbecauseadvisersare supposed
to provide, 'objective estimatesandprofessionalanalysis,the content
of which is not adjustedto the emotionalneedsof the recipient or to
his possibleemotionalreactions.' (p. 193-4).
EscalatingRcquirements.
In the last two decadesthe demandson ministershave become greater,
and their requirementsmore difficult to meet, for various inter-related
reasons revolving aroundissuessuchasthe increase in adversarial
politics; the developmentof overloadon ministersand the breaking down
of barriers betweenexisting institutionsor roles.
It was claimed in the 1970sthat a reduction in consensuswas
occurring and that Britain was moving towards adversarial politics
following the earlier consensusof the Butskelliteera (Finer, 1975).
Where there is adversarial politics a gulf develops between the
policies of the partieswith eachundoing the policies of the former
administration when they form a new government. Such a view is
challenged by someauthors, for exampleJordanand Richardson (1987,
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p.80), who claim that the consensusof the Butskellite era is
exaggeratedas is the later conflict. They go on to suggestthat people
who claim that Butskellismhasbeenreplacedby conflict do not agree,
'as to which period is what style: usually, indeed, 'today' appears to
have adversarialpolitics and yesterdayconsensual- whenever 'today'
happens to be' (p. 80). A ministerwho believesthat there has been a
reduction in consensusand that he hasa mandateto introduce changesis
likely to put different, andperhapsgreater,demandson the system and
possibly feel that the existing system is unable to meet his
requirements. Writing in 1979Brown and Steel arguedthat since 1971
civil servants', 'ability to serveboth political parties impartially
has beenbrought into questionby the appearanceof differencesin the
parties' views on a numberof major issues,which are probably greater
than at any time since 1945' (p. 148).
Whateverdoubtsthere might be aboutthe developmentof adversarial
politics there is, as Hennessy(1986) shows,wide acceptanceof the view
put forward in the 1970sby, for example,King (1975), that the overload
on governmentis increasing. This is seenasa world-wide phenomenon;
the third Annual Meeting of the International Political Science
Association in 1986 was entitled: 'Government Overload and Recent
Developments in the Organisation of State Power.' (Peele, 1986).
Greater overload on government inevitably results in overload on
individual ministersand, aswe haveseen,the rangeof functions that
British ministers haveexacerbatesthe problems.
It is possibleto distinguishbetweenqualitative and quantitative
overload (Dror, 1987). Qualitativeoverloadis associatedwith the
growing complexity of the issuesonwhich ministers have to make
decisions: 'the issueshavebecomeso, so much more difficult. ' (Sir
Frank Cooper,quotedin Hennessy,1986, p. 177). A British minister is
less likely than many of his overseascounterpartsto be a specialistin

(Blondel,1985). This problem
the subjectdealtwith by hisdepartment
is exaggerated
by the ephemeral
natureof manyministerialappointments.
Croslandreckonedthat, 'it takesyou six monthsto get your head
properly above water,a yearto get thegeneraldrift of most of the
field, andtwo yearsreallyto masterthe wholeof a Department I
...
had four separatejobs in five anda half years,which was far too
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many.' (Kogan, 1971, pp.155and 159).
Time spentasa junior ministeris not regardedas preparation for
eventually becoming the Cabinet Minister in the same department
(Theakston, 1987). Whilst, with the exceptionof length of time in
post, thesepoints are not new, the developmentof overload makes their
impact more severe.
Quantitative overloadis associatedwith the growth in ministers'
acitivites and in the numberof decisionsthey haveto take. A rangeof
sometimes interlocking developmentsare linked to overload. They
include: the increasing range of activities for which British
Governments held themselvesresponsible (King, 1975); increasing
willingness of backbenchersto rebel and to spend time on select
committees investigating the activities of government (Norton, 1981;
Drewry, 1985); increasingdemandsfrom the mediafor explanations from
ministersof governmentactionsand proposals;increasingleaks of, and
demands for, official information; the growing number of pressure
groups (Hurd, 1986);and the increasingdemandsby party members, at
least in the 1970sand early 1980s,for a role in making the policy of
the party (Kogan and Kogan, 1982). In somecases,such as increasing
scrutiny of the executiveby Parliament,there is some erosion of
traditional boundaries.
The overloadis exacerbatedby the difficulty that ministers have
in defining their objectivesand by an attemptto maintain the myth that
ministers are instigators of all new policies (Blackstone, 1979).
Furthermore, there is a tendencyto force upwardsto ministers decisions
that usedto be taken lower down (see,for example, Hennessy, p. 193).
This partly reflects the politicization of more issues- anotherway in
which traditional boundariesare eroded.
The dangers of overloadare much discussed in systems theory.
According to Easton:
The capacityto handledemandsoncethey haveentereda system
is a function of the volume of demandsand existing channel
capacity. The membersof a systemcan cope with overload
either by reducingvolume in someway or by increasing the
capacity of the systemto handlethe existing volume ... [in
latter
becomes

the

case]theproblem
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one,not of too many

demandsandtoo few channelsbut of enoughchannels operating
so effectively that they may let too many demandsthrough. In
this caseit would not be the transmissionchannelsthat would
be overloaded but the decision-making centers themselves
(1965, pp. 119-20and 128).
Klein and Lewis (1977) suggestthat ministersmay feel 'swamped'
(p.7) and point out that: 'the emergenceof the special adviser has
coincided with the growing awarenessof 'overload' in British
government' (p.2).
It is possibleto examinethe bilateral relationshipsin Figure 1
to see whether, in the light of escalating requirements, there are
functions for a specialadviserto carry out. Before this is done,
however, it is important to examinethe categoriesof people who are
alreadyproviding assistancefor ministers, and ministers' relationships
with them. This is becauseplacesand roles for specialadvisers will
only be revealedby combininganalysisof ministers' many and growing
needs with assessment
of the appropriateness
of traditional sources of
assistance.
SECTION D;, ASSISTANCEIQ MINISTERS.
A minister needsa teamof peopleto assisthim. Even before special
advisers were appointed a British minister had many people working
closely with him, some in capacities not always found in other
countries. Figure 2 illustrates,in a very simplified way, the place of
someof the key peoplewho help their minister to maintain the flows of
information and/or influenceidentified in Figure 1 and carry out the
tasks that haveto be completedif the minister is to fulfil so many
roles. These peopleare: the junior ministers, the PPS, the private
secretaries, the permanent secretary, the information officers.
Clearly, some of thesepeople, especiallyjunior ministers and the
permanent secretary,have major responsibilitieswithin the department
and their role is more substantialthan the aspectbeing concentratedon
here - assistancegiven to the Cabinet minister.

The relationshipbetweena ministerandhis departmentis most
important and theextentto whichtheofficials' knowledgeand value
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FIGURE 2
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systems limit their minister's ability to exert his political will on
the departmentis analysedin the next section. Despitethe strengthof
the relationship that can developbetweenthe minister and both his
private office and his permanentsecretary(see,for example, Playfair,
1965; and Pooleyin Young and Sloman, 1982,p. 101), he does not rely
solely on them for liaison with his department. Often he develops
powerful links directly with high ranking officials. Kogan (1971)
discussedwith Croslandand Boyle how they might usean under secretary
as a soundingboard. Much of the policy chargein a departmentmight be
carried by undersecretariesandassistant secretaries. Unlike the
various other bodies shownin the Figure with which a minister has to
maintain a relationship, the departmentis working for him. The
administrative divisions of the department gather and filter
information; developpolicy options; and help him in his dealings with
the other groups. Therefore, someof the information and/or influence
flows will be more complexthan it is possibleto show in a simple
diagram - for examplethe findings of academicsmay be taken up by
pressure groupswho feed theminto the departmentwhich in turn relays
them to the minister.
Commenting in 1965on the absencein Britain of an equivalent to
the cabinetswhich are found in many Europeancountries Dutheillet De
Lamothewrote: 'One may wonder whetherthis difference is not a result
of the absenceof, or at least the very negligiblepart played on the
Continent by Junior Ministers (Parliamentary Secretaries) or
Parliamentary Private Secretariesand Permanent Secretaries, these
peopleassumingin the British systemtasksattributed in France, Italy
and Belgium to the ministerial cabinets'(p.366).
Although British ministershaveconsiderableassistance,the very
nature of this assistancemight generatefurther difficulties and not
entirely meetall the ministers' requirements. With a minister being
surrounded for much of his time by generalistcivil servants, it is
widely thought that the minister is insulated (Headey, p. 78) and
'isolated' (for exampleKlein and Lewis; Lawson and Bruce-Gardyne,1976;

Drewry andButcher,1988). Rose(1986,p. 19)refersto a minister as
being'an islandin a seaof civil servants.
' Two well knownreferences
to this phenomenon
areBarbaraCastle'sreferenceto, 'the lonelinessof
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the shortdistancerunner' (1973), and Richard Crossman'sdescription in
in Minister to his minister's
the first day of his Diaries Q
room as being, 'like a paddedcell', in which he sat, 'insulated from
the real world' (1975, pp.21-3).
Perhapsthe major differencebetweenthe British systemand that of
many other countriesis that, especiallyinitially, a British minister
is not surroundedin the most significantpostswith peoplewhom he has
chosen. In the US over 3,000 senior positions within government
departmentsare filled by political appointeeswith a variety of
backgrounds who are usually changedfollowing the election of a new
president(Heclo, 1977). In West Germanythe top two gradeswithin the
civil serviceare filled by 'political civil servants'. Theseare civil
servantswho are usually, but not always, recruitedfrom amongst career
officials in Federal, Lander or Local Government. They are expected to
be in full accordwith the governments'partisan goals and may be
temporarily retired at any point. When there were changesof government
in 1969and 1982almost half of thesepostswere availableto be filled
as a result of vacanciesresulting from a variety of causes: natural,
premature and temporary retirement; resignation; and reshufflement
(Derlien, 1988, p.60). In theWestminstertype systemsof Canada(David
Brown, 1986)and Australia (R. Smith, 1977;JamesWalter, 1986), with
their tradition of a permanent,neutral, civil service, there has been
an institutionalization of positionsequivalentto those of special
adviserswhich give ministersan opportunity to appoint a few of 'their
own people' as well.
In Australia, furthermore, there have been moves towards a
'Washminster' system (Uhr, 1987)in which a few senior civil service
posts have beenfilled by political appointees(Wilenski, 1986). In
France, and someother Europeancountries, ministerschoose-their own
cabinets. French cabinetsconsist of betweenten and 30 members, the
majority of whom are appointedfrom amongstcareer officials of any
department. Only a small percentageof membersbelong to a ministers
party beforejoining his Win,

and usually loyalty to the minister

and administrativecompetence
aremoreimportantthan political views
(Searls,1987).
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Cabinetsoriginatedasteamsof peopleappointedto help a minister
gain control over the powerful specialistcivil servicewhich had been
inherited from the former absolutemonarchs. In such systems, unlike
Britain, 'there was no cult of enlightened gentlemen, nor deference
towards a liberal arts-basededucation,and henceno predisposition to
reserve a specialplacefor the generalistadministrator.' (Drewry and
Butcher, 1988, p.47).
We saw earlier that British ministersmay have somecategories of
peopleassistingthem which do not exist at all, or to the same extent,
elsewhere. However, when it comesto appointing 'their own people'
British ministersare not given the samescopeastheir counterparts. A
group from the Fulton Committeevisited France, Spainand the United
States and 'in all three countries' one of the main points that struck
them was 'the extent to which Ministers choose their own immediate
staff (Vol. 1, p. 132). Many othershave made similar comments and
Ridley (1983, p.29) claimed that, 'senior officials are the close almost only - collaboratorsof a minister in Britain sincehe cannot, as
in most countries,appoint his own confidantsto policy-making posts.'
According to Walter Williams (1988, p.61) the British system places
permanent civil servants closerto the top within departmentsthan
almost any country and makesit difficult to remove a permanent
secretary.
Nevertheless,a minister in the 1960swho, somewhat exceptionally,
analysedhow to appoint a group of peoplefrom within his department to
help him control it was Denis Healey, Secretaryof State for Defence.
In his recent autobiographyhe reports,

I decidedto establisha body which
As my work-loadincreased
would serve me asa ministerin France is servedby his
'cabinet'. I calledit theProgramme
EvaluationGroup, and
formally
Chiefs
it
to
the
made
responsible
of Staff, though
this devicedid not deceivethemfor a moment. Essentially
its job wasto makesurethatI askedtheright questionsof
the ministryandgot relevantanswersin time ... It consisted
of officersfrom eachof the threeservices,with a scientist,
a civil servantandan economist(1989,p.268-9).
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Generally,however,apart from appointingtheir PPS, and sometimes
choosing, or influencing the choiceof, their own junior ministers and
chief information officers, mostBritish ministersinitially have little
say over who fills the importantpositions around them. Henderson
(1984) showshow private secretariesare usually retainedby an incoming
minister and BarbaraCastle(1984)and Jock Bruce-Gardyne (1986) have
suggestedhow difficult it is to attemptto removea permanentsecretary
or prematurelyreplacea recently establishedprivate secretary. When
the time is appropriateto makea replacement, British ministers do
choosetheir own private secretaryand may influence the choice of a new
permanentsecretary. In both cases,however, the choiceis usually made
from amongsta relatively small pool of generalistcivil servants who
are considered- by their own official bosses- to be at an appropriate
stagein their career.
In Chapter2, SectionC, the numerouspossiblefunctions of special
adviserswere listed. To help explain the origin of thesefunctions it
is important to examine in more detail the literature on the
relationship between ministers and civil servants to see what
limitations ministersmight have thoughtexistedin the services they
were receiving.

SECTION Cj RELATIONS BETWEEN MINISTERS AND
BUREAUCRACY.
The relationshipbetweenministersand civil servantsis so important in
any considerationof the placeof specialadvisersthat it must not be
assumedto be unproblematiceventhough Harold Wilson did exclude it
from the Fulton Committee's termsof reference. Many of the sometimescontradictory- modelsdevelopedto explain this relationship
explicitly or implicitly showwhere there might be a place for special
advisers (for example,Aberbach,Putnamand Rockman, 1981; Rose, 1974
and 1986; Brown and Steel, 1979; Lipsey, 1982; Walter Williams, 1988).
What determinesthe appointmentof specialadvisersis the perception

held by theministerandhere,again,thesevary.
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Important work hasbeenconductedin Australia. One of the main
themesin JamesWalter's book, Ig Ministers' Minders: rsonaladvisers
in national government(1986), is the conceptof political executives
being frustrated by permanentbureaucratsand therefore turning to
partisanirregulars. Examiningthe relationshipbetweenbureaucratsand
politicians is difficult becauseof the many interpretations.
Attempting then to fit specialadvisersinto the picture adds further
complications. Basedon his work for the Royal Commission4n Australian
Government Administration,

R. Smith had earlier argued that the

position of adviserswas anomalous:
In both normative and practical terms, relations between
ministersand their public serviceadvisersdo not provide for
the easyinter-positioningof policy orientated ministerial
staff ... in British and similar political systems... their
presence disrupts accepted patterns of bureaucratic
influence ... no matterhow skilled and tactful ministerial
advisers were, their position could not be accommodated
readily in either theory or practice. They were a responseto
anomaliesgeneratedby problemsof contemporarygovernmentand
their position was itself anomalous. (1977, pp.149-50 and

153).

An early view of the relationshipbetweenpoliticians and civil
servantswas that politicians madepolicies and bureaucratsadministered
them. This political/administrative dichotomy was most clearly
articulated in America by Woodrow Wilson: 'Administration lies outside
the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not
political questions';and by Luther Gulick who claimed, 'we are faced by
two heterogeneousfunctions, "politics" and "administration", the
combination of which cannotbe undertakenwithin the structure of the
administration without producing inefficiency.' (Both quoted in
Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman,p.4). This 'arms-length' model (Rose,
1986. p.4) was also the conventionalmodel in Britain and Continental
Europe.

Weber (1978)thoughtthattheidealrelationshipbetweenelected
politician and appointedbureaucrat
wasasdescribedabove but he
recognizedthatin realityit wasunlikely thattherelationshipwould
take that form. Today,the modelis widely criticized as being an
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inadequate account of the complex relationship. Brown and Steel
(p.201), for example,claim that it is a modelwhich, 'hardly anybody
now believes to be useful'. Suggestionsas to why the model is
inadequateandwhat constitutesa more accurateone are, however, varied
and overlappingalthoughevenwhen the neutrality of the British civil
service is questionedits non-involvementin overtly party political
activities is widely accepted.
Such is the variety of opinionson this topic that Gray and Jenkins
(1985, p. 15) claim:
discussionsof British administrationare also collectively
confused about, for example, administrators' values, the
extentof administrativeinfluencein the policy process, and
the different links administratorshavewith eachother, the
centre and outside interestgroups ... Yet the relative
absenceof evaluativecriteria makesit difficult to judge
whether we are now offered clear alternative models of
bureaucracy or the outpouringsof a tower of Babel.
...
Rose (1986) suggeststhat thereare two ideal type models of the
relationship. The 'arms-length'one describedaboveand a model of
symbiosis in which 'ministers and civil servantscombine political and
administrative skills to deal with value conflicts, problems of public
presentation and persuasion,and technical,organizational and legal
difficulties' (p.5). Such a view incorporatesthe idea of political
administration in which politicians and bureaucratsare interdependent
within the Whitehall village (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1981)and builds on
Rose's earlier work in 1974. In this he suggestedthat the relationship
could be describedin termsof an equation(p. 429) showing that the more
that is expectedfrom thoseperforming the roles of minister and of
civil servant, the more skills they must have and that loss of
effectivenessby ministersis not a gain by civil servants:
Politicians' gills xý
servants'skills = Executive leadership
Ministerial roles
Administrative roles
in government
[expectations]
[expectations]

He arguesthat theinterdependencies
and complementarities
of
politicians and civil servantsaremultipleand complex. The most
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meaningfulway to think about this relationshipis in terms of exchange
theory, that is, 'the servicesthat civil servants provide ministers,
and that ministersprovide civil servants'(1986p. 28). Many others who
do not necessarilygo this far with Rosewould agreethat ministers and
officials complement eachother (Brown and Steel,p. 201). Young and
Sloman(1982)collectedreactionsto their radio seriesabout Whitehall
called NQ, Minister. Greatestreactioncamefrom civil servantsand the
most commonreservationconcernedthe depictionthe programmes offered
of ministersand civil servantsas adversaries.They reportedthat Sir
Patrick Nairne suggested,'while of coursethere would be tensions,
fundamentallywhat you find is a partnership. The real questionis not,
"Are the civil servantsoutwitting the politicians, or the politicians
" ... but rather, "is this partnership
outwitting the civil servants?
adequately fruitful? "' (p. 100). Even somecivil servantswho tend to
see things more in terms of a dichotomyneverthelesscan argue, 'their
dutiesare complementarynot competitiveandthe functions they perform
and the qualities they needare essentiallydifferent' (Allen, 1977,
p. 136).
In this quotewe seea possiblemerging of Rose's two models. A
more fundamental criticism of the political/administrative dichotomy
comesfrom radicalswho think that far from ministersdeciding policies
and bureaucrats implementingthem, it is, in fact, civil servants in
departmentswho have their own consensusviews and frustrate attemptsby
politicians to change them (see, for example, Tony Benn, 1980).
Political figures who do not sharesucha view are awarethat it is a
view often held by party supporters. (Boyle, 1965; Hudson, 1976).
Simmonds(1988) in a pamphletwritten for the Adam Smith Institute (ASI)
before he becamea specialadviseradvocatedproposals designed, 'to
regain political control of departmentsfor the politicians' (p.29).

Taking the argumentonestepfurtherBenn and others suggestthat
certainministersare 'captured'by their departments
andbecomeactive
spokesmenfor departmental
policies. A further complicationis the
claim thatsomeofficialsin all departments
oweloyalty to theTreasury
(HecloandWildavsky).
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Brian Smith (1988) shows that concern about the power of
bureaucrats is widespread but argues that in questioning whether
bureaucratsare apolitical, and showingthat they do influence political
choices, he is not necessarilytrying to prove that the bureaucrats are
politically dominant everywhere.(p.49). Flora MacDonald claims that on
becoming Canadian Foreign Secretary, she,asa new minister in a
government of a party which had not beenin power for 16 years, needed
protective mechanisms. Without them, 'the Minister is indeed at the
mercy of bureaucratic domination, not because of some devious
manipulative plot, but simply becausethat is the way the system has
been allowed to develop.' (1980, p.29) She goes on to quote
approvingly not only from Tony Bennand Richard Crossmanbut also from
Henry Kissinger who stressedthe power of permanentofficials within the
American bureaucracy. This was also a themeof PresidentReaganwhen he
took office (see,for example,Walter Williams). The Coombes Royal
Commission into the Australian Civil Servicewas establishedby Gough
Whitlam's Labour Governmentin large part because of dissatisfaction
with the public service and the need to consider issues such as
ministerial control, accountabilityof officials to ministers, and the
democraticagenda(Wilenski, 1986,p. 184). JamesWalter arguesthat in
Australia, as in the United States,Canadaand Britain, growth in the
quantity and complexity of demandson national leadership, accompanied
by the elaborationof bureaucracy,lead to, 'the cry for sympathetic
aides to push the executive's interestsin the face of what is
experiencedasorganizationalinertia'(p.7).
Despite these examples, some authors claim that Whitehall,
'frustrates the partisan will of the political executives more
frequently and more completelythan perhapsany other bureaucracywithin
advanced democratic systems.' (Campbell and Peters, 1988, p. 86).
Another North American commentator,Walter Williams, makes similar
points when suggestingthat Britain, at least in its pre-Thatcher days,

'often camecloseto civil servicerule in part because
of a misguided
dichotomyand in part because
belief in a politics/administration
ministerseitherfled managerialresponsibilityor elsehadno notionof
how to exertit. ' (p. 171).
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Power f the Bureaucracy.
Various ways are suggestedin which the bureaucracymight be able to
gain power at the expenseof politicians. Clearly only a very limited
amount of the information availableto a departmentcan be put before
its minister and he has time to consideronly a limited rangeof options
on eachof the small percentageof issuesdealt with by the department
that are important enoughto warrant his attention. As information is
transmitted it is structured,simplified and made more precise as
ambiguities are removed. This is the vital process known as
'uncertainty absorption' (March and Simon, 1958)which Brown and Steel
(p. 185-6)suggestedcould be appliedto British Government.This is such
a valuable concept that it will be usedhere to cover most of the
activities civil servantsengagein when preparing simplified policy
options to put to ministers. Although ministersacceptthat this must
inevitably happenif they are to cope with all their business,somefear
that important information is being withheld and the list of decisions
and of options unnecessarilycurtailed with options 'unacceptable' to
the department, or even to other departments,filtered out. Richard
Crossman was one of many ministerswho haveexpresseda desire for an
extra pair of eyesand earsin the department:'the Minister needsthose
eyes and ears, thoseoutsidehelpers,in order to get his way ... Most
Ministers sacrifice those, "eyesand ears" and soon scarcelynotice that
they are going blind! ' (1972, p. 69).
The dangerof important elementsof information being lost in the
flow of information both up to a minister and from him down to his
department, are exacerbatedby the rigid hierarchy within departments.
An effective organizationrequiresboth formal and informal information
flows (Beer, 1966). Despitethe presenceof informal links within the
civil service (Drewry and Butcher,p.90) a strong hierarchy is likely to
restrict the flow of informal information. Although the principal
private secretary,as somebodywho knows the departmentand is known by
it, is likely to be a good sourceof informal information by talking, in
Crosland's words, with, 'intelligent indiscretion' (Kogan, 1971, p. 158),

he is unlikely to put hisfuturecareerwithin the departmentat
jeopardyby beingdisloyalto it.
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A strongerversionof the argumentis that by constantlyadvocating
certain options civil servantscreateconsiderable pressure on busy
ministers to follow the consideredadviceof officials. People who
question the ability of ministers to impose their will on the
bureaucracy often suggest that the bureaucracy is not necessarily
politically biasedin favour of the oppositeparty, but rather, it has,
'a political position of its own to defend.' (Benn, 1980p.62). One of
Tony Benn's political allies, Brian Sedgemore,himself a former civil
servant,believesthat, 'the minister soonbecomesawarethat there is a
departmental policy on most issuesand that somePermanent Secretaries
see their main role as sustainingthe integrity of those departmental
policies' (1980, p. 89). Reservationsaboutthe power of civil servants
are not limited to radical left wing socialists who suggest senior
officials havea classidentity which makesthem hostile to socialism.
As a memberof the Houseof CommonsExpenditure Committee, Sedgemore
proposed an alternative draft to the first chapter of the Eleventh
Report (wig QyU Service)in Session1976-77. He was supported by a
majority of Labour Membersof the Committeewho voted, and only failed
by 11 votesto 15 to receivesupportfor a strong attack on the civil
service:
There is, as shouldbe, no role in our society for people with
little to offer in a practicalway but civil servantshave got
round this stumblingblock by inventing a role for themselves.
The role that they have inventedfor themselvesis that of
governing the country .... They can and do relegateMinisters
to the seconddivision (appropriatelyenoughthey call their
own union the First Division) througha variety of devices.
Theseinclude delay; foreclosingoptions through official
...
committees which parallel both cabinetsub-committeesand a
hostof other ministerial committees;interpreting minutesand
policy decisions in ways not wholly intended; slanting
statistics... In doing all thesethings they act in what they
conceiveto be the public good. Somewould saythey perceive
that good in the interestsof their own class: others that
they seeit in termsof the tenetsand taboosof their caste.
By
In doing all thesethings there is an esprit de corps
.... however
bureaucracies
become
their very nature
conservative
radical their intake. Conservative governments who come
unstuck in the samemanneras Labour governmentsare those who
want to changesocietyin a radical direction (1977, Vol. 2,

pp. lxxix - lxxxi).
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Sedgemoreis correctto assertthat radical Tories are also apprehensive
about the power of the bureaucracy. Various commentators including
Drewry and Butcher (1988) and Wickham-Jones(1990) note that criticism
comesfrom both left and right. In his ASI pamphletSimmondscites Tony
Benn's evidence to the 1985-86Treasuryand Civil Service Committee
enquiry into the civil service,in supportof his conclusion that,
'there is convincingevidenceto suggestthat departmentsdo take a
"house" view on importantissueswhich affect them' (p.20).
Public choicetheories,especiallyNiskanen'sview of bureaucrats
as self interestedbudgetmaximizers(1971), are one influence on the
radical right. Borins (1988) spoketo Tony Jay, co-author of 1
Minister and recalls that, 'The first thing Jay said when I interviewed
him was, "Yes, indeed, you're right - public choice hasbeen a major
influence on my thinking"' (p.18).
People, therefore, holding a rangeof views have come to the
conclusion that officials tend to have too much power. This is
important becauseif ministers, for whatever reason, perceive civil
servantsto be obstructivethen they might want to appoint somepartisan
advisers.
In 1976 an analysis of the influences on policy making was
published by two politicians who were later to becomeministers - Jock
(later Lord) Bruce-Gardyneand Nigel (now Lord) Lawson. They too
believedthat, 'it is the civil servantswho (in general)acquire power
by sinking their individuality in a corporateethos:in this way they
both build up a departmentalesprit-de-corpsand limit the range of
policy options from which ministersare invited to choose ... In
general ... departmentstend to developa symbiotic relationship with
their clients' (p. 167).
The final point leadsto anotherexplanationof how officials might
gain influence. Civil servants are involved in a great deal of
discussion with relevantinterestgroupsor clients. So much so that
they are sometimesthoughtcollectively to form, in each major sphere,
'the policy community' (Richardsonand Jordon, 1979)and interest groups
becomepart of the decision-makingand implementationsystem. Policies
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are made and administered, 'between a myriad of interconnecting,
interpenetrating organizations. It is the relationships involved in
committees, the pgligy community of departmentsand groups ... that
perhapsbetteraccountfor policy outcomesthan do examinationsof party
stances,of manifestosor of parliamentaryinfluence' (Richardson and
Jordan, 1979, p.74). The policies that departmentsare alleged to
develop and defendas a result of their closerelationshipwith relevant
groupsare often 'consensus'views which they wish to changeonly at
the margin, if at all. Martin Smith (1989, and 1990), for example,
examines the difficulties of securingpolicy changesin agriculture, a
field where it is often claimeda strongor 'closed' policy community
exists.
Such thinking would help explain why radical governments and
politicians - of left and right - tend to be the ones which have
greatestconflict with civil servants. A reductionin consensusbetween
the political parties might createconditionsin which ministers will
wish to seekassistancefrom specialadvisers(Klein and Lewis) and, as
we have seen,it was claimed in the 1970sthat just sucha reduction in
consensuswas occurring.
A party in Oppositionmight particularly expect difficulties with
the civil servicenext time it forms the government. Such expectations
may be basedon a variety of factors. First, a civil service that is
being loyal to the 'Governmentof the Day', may appearto the Opposition
as if it is politically committed to that Government's policies.
Second,Oppositionleadersand supportersmay think that any failures of
the party last time it was in power were partly causedby lack of civil
servicezeal in implementingradical policies and/or by the bias in the
civil service. ErnestMarples expressedthis view after 1964 (Schreiber
interview) and Marcia Williams (1975) suggestedthat:

After 1970 nobodyin theLabourGovernmentdeluded himself
thatall thehopesof 1964werefulfilled. We did not succeed

in doing what we set out to achieve I believe that what
...
failures we hadcan be attributedlargely
to our defeats on
fronts.
One
battle
two separate
was against the Civil
Service. This was a strugglewhich we never fought with much

heartor conviction [and]waslost from the start(p.274).
...

61

Views similar to thesewere being expressedby Labour ministers even
before they lost office - see,for example,Crossman'sGodkin lectures
which although not publisheduntil 1972were delivered in 1970prior to
the election. As we havenotedthe ConservativeOpposition was awareof
such thinking.
Furthermore, there are variousreasonsfor suggestingthat conflict
betweenpoliticians and civil servantsmight be most likely when a newly
electedgovernmenttakesover after the previous party had beenin power
for a long time. First, the previousgovernmentwould probably have
played some part in shapingwhateverconsensusviews had by then
developed within each'policy community'. Second, Downs's, 'law of
compulsive innovation', statesthat, 'Newly-installed administrations
have started and
have a strong desireto reject what their predecessors
' (Quotedin Jordon and
to emphasizeprogramsthey createthemselves.
Richardson, 1987, p. 78). Third, there is a view that inexperienced
ministers might be most vulnerableto civil servicepressure:'If there
had not been the thirteen-yeargap I imagine that some people who
succumbedto Civil Servicedominationmight not have donethis quite so
easily.' (Marcia Williams, 1975, p.31). The Canadian and Australian
examples cited earlier occurredin circumstancescontaining several of
these factors. At the changeof governmentin Australia there were,
'prevalent feelings' that the public service, both in structureand in
outlook, had been deeply conditionedby the previous 23 years of
Liberal-Country party rule (R. Smith, p. 136). In Canadathe incoming
governmentwith fearsabout the bureaucracywas Conservative.
It is sometimesthoughtthat a critical massof partisans may be
necessaryto have a real party government(Rose, 1974)and to push the
machine in the direction the politicians wish (Hoskyns, 1982). Such
thinking is linked to the view that ministerstend to be isolated.
It must be stressed,however, that mostBritish ministers have a
high regardfor the civil serviceand, accordingto Young and Sloman,
'tend to marvel at the civil servants'industry, integrity and sheer
availability' (1982, p.94). Furthermore, many civil servants and
politicians disagree with the abovethesisand claim that far from
wishing to impose their will on ministers, officials are only too
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pleased if a new minister hasa clear view for them to follow (for
example, Boyle, 1965; Jenkins, 1971). From his interviews with Boyle
and Crosland, Kogan (1971) concludes'no feeling emerges that civil
servants are obstructive' (p.44). According to Hennessy,'there is at
first sight a degreeof unanimity betweenkeepersand kept, permanent
official and transientpolitician. The cliche is shared- both stress
the joy and pleasureof having/beinga strong minister.' (1988,p.490).
Many peopleagree,however,that if a minister, in the words of Jenkins,
'flutters aimlessly, the mostdominantcivil servantwill give him a
policy' (1971). This is becausethey 'abhor a vacuum.' (Lipsey, 1980).
Some commentators, including Heclo and Wildavsky, conclude that the
problem is not that civil servantsare too strong and creative in
devising public policies but that politicians are too weak. They
suggestthat not only is there little dangerof civil serviceconspiracy
but that, 'officials will initially go along with an astonishing range
of nonsense'from newly electedministers. (p. 379). Boyle (1965) and
Pliatzky (1981, and 1989)also allegethat if anything, civil servants
are too unwilling to criticize ministers' policies and to give unwelcome
advice.
Boyle told Kogan that, 'there's nothing like returning as a
Minister to a Departmentfor realizinghow fallacious it is to assume
that presuppositions,on the whole, remain the same... if only because
new officials are coming into positionsof authority and their value factor in the situation.' (1971, p. 84).
judgements
... are a
Furthermore, a new governmentmay havegreaterpolitical will than an
exhaustedgovernment and thus be ableto imposeits policies. It is
arguedthat if usedproperly the private office andpermanent secretary
provide an essentialgear-boxfor getting a departmentworking in the
direction the minister wishes (see, for example, Nairne to the
Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1986, Vol. 2, p.48). It is
sometimesclaimed that a cabinetworks like this (Dutheillet de Lamothe)
but Neville-Jones(p.236) suggeststhat at times a cabinet can become a
screen shielding the minister from officials' advice he ought to
receive.
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In A GovernmentQf Strangers(1977) Heclo questions whether the
appointment of a large numberof 'political executives'in the United
States is a satisfactoryway of controlling a permanent bureaucracy;
and, to the extentthat sucha systemcreates tensions between the
political executive and the bureaucracy,it may have a demoralizing
effect in the bureaucracy.(Schmidt, Tannerand Turek-Brezina, 1987;
Lane, 1987). RecentlysomeAmericanshave beeneven more critical of
their system. Huddleston(1988, p. 415-6)arguesthat the challenges
facing the federalgovernmentare too great to tolerate a system of
executive leadership, 'that is driven by groundless fears of
bureaucratic hegemony, a delusionary reverence for private sector
managementgimmicks and a misplacedfaith in the will and capacity of
political appointeesto channelpopularaspirationsinto public action.'
Similarly Walter Williams believes that the number of political
executives should be reducedand that seniorcareerofficials are too
isolated from the top decision making. He shows, however, that
criticisms of the Americansystemshould not necessarily be used to
justify maintenanceof the statusquo in the UK: 'The American caseis
instructive becausebringing in outsidershas gonetoo far while Britain
now errs clearly in the oppositedirection' (p. 170).
Nevertheless,Margaret Thatcher'sgovernment,in particular, it is
claimed, managedto implement many of its radical policies and thus
illustrate that the politicians can get their way: 'The,
Minis
version of how Governmentsare deflectedby the civil service does not
apply to the Thatcher Government,asa whole, although there are a
numberof exceptions.' (Holmes, 1987,p.6). This raisesanother debate
to be examinedlater, about how far, if at all, Thatcher politicized
the civil service.
A somewhatdifferent defenceof the civil servicerole is made by
people who arguethat it is good that there are permanentofficials to
test thoroughly the ideasof politicians (see, for example, Lipsey,
1982). Others takethis point so far that, in the eyesof a radical, it
would justify their own criticisms: 'It is bound to be an impediment to
any Government that wishesto make great changesin our affairs that
they are servedby a permanentcivil servicethat is by its nature a
force for consensus. While it may be an impediment to such a
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Government, it mayequally be a great comfort to the citizen. ' (Dell,
1979).
OrganizationalCulture.
Cultural explanations of organizational successand failure (for
example,Handy, 1979)are now favouredby businessschoolsand it may be
useful in severalways to apply theseto the relationshipbetween civil
servants and ministers. It would hardly be surprising if a strong
organizational culture developedwithin a permanentbureaucracyand if
it differed in various ways from that of politicians. Whilst such
thinking can lead to the view that the civil service deliberately
obstructs the politicians, it is also useful in helping to explain why
in the relationship even
there can be difficulties and misunderstandings
where there is no deliberateintention of obstruction. Handy, in Gods
Qf Management, also showsthat if different people and parts of an
organization havedifferent managementstylesthen exceptional people
may be required to play the role of liaison officers or 'integrators'.

The successful
liaisonman,'is knowledgeable
abouteachof the areashe
has to bridgeandis respected
by both [but] It is hardto sustain
...
this dual nationality. Most liaisonmenbecomeidentifiedin time with
one sideor theother, thusreducingtheir efficiencyasa bridge and
turningliaisoninto negotiation'(p.114-15).
Within a governmentdepartmentthe private secretarycould be seen
as such a liaison officer. However, asa generalist administrator he
clearly faces several problems. He is not necessarily very
knowledgeableabout the party political world in which the minister
operates,and anyway facesconstitutionalobstaclesto full involvement
in this area. There is also a dangerthat the minister will regard him
as being too identified with the departmentand part of the insulating
group referred to earlier. The private secretary might, therefore,
welcome assistancein carrying out someof the tasksand the minister
might wish to reduceany isolation he may feel.
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The secondbenefit of looking at organizationalcultures is that
such culturesfilter information and, 'establishvalues, standardsand
levels of aspirationwhich motivate action and define more or less
explicit criteria for evaluation' (Metcalfe and Richards, 1984, p. 4445). Having internalized the norms of the department it may become
difficult for officials to acceptthat they are acting in anything other
than, 'an entirely value-freeobjective way.' Therefore, Metcalfe and
Richards continue, 'some of the debateaboutpolitical neutrality and
the existenceor non-existenceof "departmentalviews" stemsfrom just
such blindness to cultural assumptions' (p.445). This may partly
explain the attitude adoptedby officials towards the overtly political
stance of partisans - especiallynon elected ones brought in by
ministers. This, in turn, helpsexplain why someministers may feel
isolated.
Having establishedthat civil servantshavevaluesthat will to
some extent be determined by the organizational culture of their
department,there is still room for debateabout what impact suchvalues
will have on the relationshipbetweenministersand their officials.
This partially coversground exploredearlier but, according to James
Walter, the writings of Weber and Michels imply that the
unresponsivenessof the bureaucracy, 'is as much to do with the
sociology of the organizationas with the ideological leanings of the
bureaucrats'(p. 14).
It is possible to arguethat civil servants have their own
knowledge and values which they usein arranging for policy to be
changed, but that, 'their views on what should be done complement,
rather than competewith thoseof politicians' (Brown and Steel, p.201).
Similarly, Kogan (1974) points out that there are differences and
commonalities in the valuesof officials and ministersand that, 'it
seems inevitable and beneficialthat two setsof values should run
through organization' (p. 110). Suchthinking fits with the opinion that
not only do officials acceptthe valuesof political neutrality and
loyalty to ministers,but also, departmentalpolicies exist and will
come into play, evento the extentof completelyfilling any vacuum that
might appearif a minister fails to imposehis valuesalongsidethose of
his department.
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However, at this stageit is usefulto develop Walter's argument
becausethis is a central featurein his modelof the place of personal
advisers to ministers. It is basedon three main themes. First, all
modern societies require institutionalized civil services to meet
leaders' needs. But:
at a certainpoint in the evolution of modern societies it
seems, inevitably, that political leadersbegin to doubt the
tractability of their bureaucracies:this is the secondtheme.
This arises becausenoneof the participantsin the policy
processcan be 'value neutral', sincepolicy deliberationsare
full of imponderableswhich can only be given definition when
facts are interpretedin the light of assumptions,and these
assumptionswill incorporatevalues(p. 111).
This will not be a problem, he suggests,if politicians believe
bureaucrats share, or take on board, their values. In such
circumstancesthe myth of thebureaucracybeing value neutral will be
preserved. Using the work of Jaqueson the dynamicsof the development
of bureaucratic units, he arguesthat this will only occur when
organizations are relatively small, and decisions relatively simple.
When the bureaucratic elementbecomescomplex and demands abstract
relationshipsand sophisticatedorganizationalstructures:

hastaughtusthatit is likely
the sociologyof organization

to developits own politics and its own valueswhich may not
be in concertwith thoseof the political leaders. At this
stagethe political leadershipwill perceivea tendencyon the
part of the bureaucracyto impedeits policies, if not by
design then by inertia. There will be a call on the one hand
for the reform of the bureaucracyto make it more responsive
to the political will of electedrepresentatives... On the
other hand there will be much greaterresort to 'irregulars',
and eventuallythe institutionalizationof systemsof partisan
advice aroundpolitical leaders:this has beenthe third theme
(pp. 111-12).

Walter claimsthesethemesarerelevantfor all westerndemocracies.He
of personaladvisersis partly a return to
notesthat theappointment
thecourtpoliticsexistingat thestartof the first themeprior to the
institutionalizationof bureaucracies:
'This assertionby political
executivesof theneedfor subordinates
whoare directly responsible,
politically responsive,and loyal appointees,also suggests the
persistenceof small-groupenterpriseat the heart of political
leadership,with featuresperhapsanalogous
to courtpolitics, even in
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the modem state.' (p. 15). Walter's work is valuablein several ways
and further elementsfrom it will be incorporatedlater, but, at least
for the UK, other factors needto be analysedbefore a model is fully
developedshowingpossibleplacesfor advisersto occupy.
The conceptof political neutrality is particularly strong in the
British civil servicebut, accordingto Hoskyns(1982, p. 14), it puts
senior civil servantsin an impossiblesituationwhere they have to
cultivate 'passionlessdetachment'rather than the commitmentand energy
necessaryto produce substantialchanges. He raisesthe question, 'how
can you havea radical government,without radically-minded officials?'
He suggests,'the commitment,the urgencyand energy must be provided by
just ninety odd ministersanda handful of specialadvisers' (pp.14-15).
Despitethe existenceof a generalcivil serviceculture it is also
arguedthat different departmentsdeveloptheir own sub-cultures (Rose,
1987) and eventhat units within a department develop sub-cultures.

S=trums &lidImages.
There are various ways of viewing much of the discussion in this
section. Probably the mosthelpful perspectivesare those that see the
relationships betweenministersand officials either asa spectrum, or
as a seriesof Images. Brown and Steelsuggestthat:
Professional experts, civil servants, Ministers, MPs, all
contributeto the considerationof a policy. So may academic
thinkers and researchworkers, membersof pressuregroups, and
pressand televisionjournalists. Their contributionscan be
arranged along a spectrum,with expertsand pressure groups
near the specific-technical-factend and politicians and
journalists nearerthe general-political-valueend (p.203).

ElaboratingBrown andSteel'sconceptit mightbe usefulto see that
there area rangeof placesthatdifferentministers,andindeed civil
servants,couldoccupyon thespectrum.Thereforethe rolesthey carry
out and the relationshipbetweenthem vary and are variously
interpreted. Thepositionsmaybe differentin different departments
and vary over time. The conceptof a spectrum,with generalist
administratorsbeing closestto ministers,helps to provide an
understanding
of theneedthatministers,situatedsomewhere
nearer the
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middle of the spectrumthan other politicians, might sometimesfeel for
direct access to either one or more of the following points on the
spectrum:
(i)

the technical/expertend;

(ii)
(iii)

policy analysis/strategicplanning;
the party political end.

(i) A commontheme in discussionsaboutthe British civil service is
that, especiallycomparedwith other countries, it has too few experts,
particularly at the higher levels (for example,the Fulton Report; Klein
and Lewis; Hennessy, 1988). The complex overlaps between the
development of specialadvisersand the increasingdemandfor, and use
of, specialists within the British civil servicewas referred to in
Chapter 2. Brown and Steelobservethat reformerswho wish to see the
position of specialist staff change,'argue that the practice of
appointing specialadvisers,many of whom are expertsin their fields,
is an indication that Ministers no longer feel able to rely upon advice
given by generaladministrators' (p. 107). Brown and Steel's spectrumis
a useful way of looking at the relationship between specialists and
generalists in the civil service. There are good reasons why
generalists, who haveto be politically sensitiveand aware of a range
of interests,shouldbe the onesclosestto ministers. They claim that,
'as long as importanceis attachedto the maintenanceof a collegiate
systemof governmentand to political accountability, so there will be a
need for general administratorsin seniorposts' (p. 120). In this
respect Brown and Steelquestionsomeof the analysis in the Fulton
Report. They suggestthat specialistsare less capablethan generalists
at assistingministersto carry out thevital function of arbitration
(i. e. decisiontaking) by making lower level decisions, narrowing the
field and sharpeningthe issues,all of which demand the ability to
compareand reconcileconflicting priorities. Neville-Jonesshows that
in some continentalsystemswith a more specialistcivil service and
cabinets,the specialistofficials tend to take the view that it is not

their job to exercisejudgment(p.238). NotwithstandingBrown and
Steel's argumentsin favourof generalistadministrators
usually being
the ones nearestto ministers,the factremainsthat some ministers
might wish more direct accessto the technical/expertend of the
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spectrum.
(ii) It hasalso beenclaimed that the generalistadministratorpays so
much attention to his minister's short-termneedsin terms of how to
defend himself againstpolitical attackthat insufficient attention is
given to long-term strategicplanning (see, for example, Hoskyns,
1982, and 1983). This is not a new argument. In what Hennessy (1988,
p. 191) calls, 'the most impressivesubmissionof all', William (now Sir
William) Ryrie told the Fulton Committee:
Far too many issuesare referredto the top not because they
are intrinsically important but becausethey could be brought
up in a political encounterin Parliament. A large proportion
of the time of Ministers is taken up in delving into small
issues for this reason,or guarding against this danger.
Consequently far too little time and energyis given to the
important work of framing basicand long-term policies and
objectives(Vol. 5 (2), p. 1088).
Ryrie also predicted the problem could get worse with the ever
increasingoverloadof businesson government. Concluding his study of
Whitehall, Hennessy similarly claims that the blemishesof the civil
service include being both, 'still too preoccupied with advising
ministerson policy and enhancingtheir performancein Parliament,' and
nothing like asgood as it shouldbe, 'at confronting hard long-term
problems by thinking forward systematicallyand strategically' (p. 687).
As Hennessyand othersnote, however, it is ministers who are, in
Walter Williams's words, 'intolerant of policy analysis,' (p.76) and
civil servants take their cue from them. Therefore, the officials',
'main emphasis is not on policy formulation, strategic planning,
performance assessment- the domain of policy analysis' (p.63). The
pressure for greaterattentionto be given to strategic thinking is,
mainly, coming from commentators, including some former advisers.
Williams admits this is a difficulty. Not only is there a problem in
creating mechanismsto conductlong-term thinking, but there is the
further question of how to ensurenotice is taken of a planning unit
when a decision maker is underpolitical pressureto find short-term
solutions.

70

(iii) Ironically, many ministersseemmore acutely awareof the need
for greateraccessto, and help in dealingwith, the political end of
the spectrum. The civil servicedoesnot provide help for ministers to
defend the policies and actionsof the departmentin party meetings,
Bruce Headeyclaims. He quotesa former Chancellorof the Exchequer:
'they expect you to manageparty meetingsby the light from heaven'
(p. 137).
Commenting from what may be regardedasthe political end of the
spectrum, Hudson, a former political secretary,suggested,with regard
to a minister, 'it seemsstrangethat in the past it was accepted that
he neededthe whole resourcesof the Civil Serviceto help him perform
the non-partypolitical side of his functions, but should have no help
at all where the party politics are concerned'(1976, p. 305).
Earlier it was arguedthat in considerationof policies, values
come not only from the politiciansbut from the civil servants too.
Perhaps, a useful way of combining the conceptof a spectrum with the
acceptanceof this point is to useKogan's concept(1971, p. 42) of civil
servants contributing low frequency policy waves and ministers
contributing high frequencyactivity.
An ambitious attemptto pull togethermany of the concepts and
opinions outlined in this chapteris provided by Aberbach, Putnam and
Rockman (1981). Their four ideal-typesor Imagesof the relationship
betweenpoliticians (only someof whom are ministers)and civil servants
not only indicate that there might be a placefor specialadvisers but
also one of their Imagesspecifically includesspecial advisers. The
central point of their argumentis illustrated in Figure 3. The Image I
relationship is the one outlined as the political/administrative
dichotomy. Image II is called 'Facts/Interests'and assumesthat both
politicians and civil servantsparticipate in policy making but that
they make distinctive contributions. Civil servantsbring facts and
knowledge; politicians interestsand values. Image III is entitled
'Energy/Equilibrium'. According to this, both bureaucrats and
politicians engage in policy making, and both are concerned with
politics. The real distinction betweenthemis that whereaspoliticians
articulate broad, diffuse interests of unorganized individuals,
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FIGURE 3,

Bureaucrats and Politicians: Evolving Roles.
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bureaucrats mediatenarrow, focusedinterestsof organized clienteles.
Politicians seekpublicity, raiseinnovativeissues,and are energizing
to the political system whereas bureaucrats manage incremental
adjustmentsand provide policy equilibrium.
Image IV is called 'The Pure Hybrid'. This imagecarries to its
logical conclusion the processseenin the other three Images of a
gradual reduction of the distinction betweenpoliticians and officials.
This 'suggests speculativelythat the last quarterof this century is
of the Weberiandistinction between
witnessingthe virtual disappearance
the roles of politician and bureaucrat'(Aberbach,Putnam and Rockman,
p. 16). In Britain, they suggest,'harbingersof the hybrid figure may
be found in the introduction of politically sympathetic,"outsiders" or
"irregulars" into positionsonce reservedfor career civil servants'
(p. 17).
Even though AberbachgI gL suggestthat thosepoliticians who are
ministers have alwaysbeenin a rather special, dualistic, position
somewhat resembling Image IV (p. 17) these Images are useful when
analysing the relationship between ministers and permanent civil
servantsas well as in suggestinga place for specialadvisers. In 1988
Aberbachand Rockmanreviewedthe Imagesin the light of developmentsin
various countries. Mrs Thatcherhad tried to dent the administrative
elite culture by simultaneously elevating officials of ambitious
temperament, 'while generallydowngradingthe role traditionally given
to the civil serviceto fulfil' (p. 18). This could be interpretedas a
move towards both Image II and ImageIV and Bulmer claims, 'the drive
towards managerialismsuggests,paradoxically, both elementsof Image U
and Image of IV' (1988, p. 45). To the extentthat civil servants are
playing Image IV type roles, there might be less need for special
advisers in theseroles. However, Campbelland Peters suggest (1988)
that permanentofficials playing a proactiveImage IV type role, 'may
want to define the perimetersof their roles more clearly and prevent

the mixing of policy makingwith explicitidentificationwith partisan
objectives'(p.96). In thefaceof theerosionof barriersbetweenthe
thatother barriers
ministersandofficials this commentmightsuggest
arebeingsoughtalmostasprotection.
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Aberbach gjnl, recognizethat at any time, in any country there
will be a variety of relationships between ministers and the
bureaucracy. This emphasizes how difficult it is to make
generalizationsaboutwho hasmost influenceon any particular policy.
Hall gl &.,,
1 (1975) were unableto derive a systematic pattern of
generalizationsfrom casestudiesof how central government policy is
made as a result of the variousforcesat work. Although they found
there was rarely a single sourcefor policy ideas,it was often useful
to think in terms of, 'the sponsorshipof issues'(p.501). Not only can
the rangeof interest groups,individuals and political groupsproposing
a reform be examined,but also the valuesand ideological preferences
behind it can be explored. Thus, for example,in a study of the
Assisted Places Scheme,Edwardsgl aL (1984, p. 136) claim that the
scheme, 'had been a limited attempt to translate the ideological
preferencesof the new Thatchergovernmentinto policy termsbut had the
advantage that groups holding rather different ideological
preferences could supportit for different reasons.' Of very many
theoretical perspectiveson decision making, Simon's concept of
'satisficing' seems particularly useful. He claims that, 'Whereas
the bestalternativefrom amongall those
economic man maximizes-selects
available to him, his cousin, administrativeman, satisfices-looksfor a
courseof action that is satisfactoryor "good enough"' (1976, p.xxix).
Implications Qf t
Officials.

Various Relationships between Ministers &nd

Before relating the various perspectives,including thoseon policy
making, to a modelof the placeof specialadvisers,it is important to
examine the rangeof possibleinterpretationsabout what the various
views of the relationshipbetweenministersand officials might mean in
terms of a needfor extra assistancefor the minister. Different actors
might think that some,or all, of the following limitations exist in the
servicesthat civil servantscan provide for their ministers:
1. insufficient willingness to deviseand implementpolicies in line
with the, possibly radical, commitmentsof the minister and his party
which sometimes entail breaking with consensusviews held by the
relevant policy community;
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2. insufficient technicalor expert advice, especiallycoming directly
to the minister;
3. insufficient opportunitiesfor long-term strategicthinking to take
place, especiallyfor officials closeto the minister;
4. inadequateattentionand sensitivityto the views and demandsof the
party, Parliament, the public, and certainpressuregroups, from the
generalistcivil servantswho surroundthe minister;
5. an unwillingnessand/or inability to carry out more overtly party
political functions which the minister doesnot always have time to
carry out himself.
The final point takesthe discussionback to the accountin Section
A of the wide rangeof ministerial roles, and it might be useful to
review the argumentdevelopedso far in this chapter. In SectionA it
was demonstratedthat ministers are overloaded with a large, and
escalating,list of functionsto perform and are at the nodal point of a
complex network of flows of information and influence. In consequence
they needconsiderableand varied assistance.SectionB examined the
range of support available to British ministers and international
comparisons revealedthe relativedearth of opportunitiesfor them to
appoint their own peopleto the positionsclosestto them. Section C
concentrated on a review of the many analyses of the relationship
between ministersand their major traditional sourceof support - the
permanent civil service. Not only might some ministers perceive
limitations in this assistance,but its very nature might generate
further requirements.
Some commentators, including Bruce-Gardyne (1986), argue that
ministersare overloaded,isolatedand find it difficult to dissentfrom
departmentalviews, but they do not think specialadvisersare much of a
solution. For others, however, the overlappingargumentsdeveloped in
Sections A, B, and C illustrate why there might be a placefor special
advisers. A possiblemodelof sucha placeis outlined in the next
section.
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SECTION D MOD

SHOWING THE PLACE QE SPECIAL ADVISERS.

It might be possibleto identify a placefor a special adviser as
somebodywho is appointedby his minister and whosepersonalloyalty and
closenessto him will be important. In practice, sucha person will
have greater freedom, both constitutionally, and because of the
informality of his role, to carry out a rangeof functions to help
sustain his busy minister who is at a nodal point in the system of
government. The minister may require the specialadviser to do one or
more of the following activities identified in SectionA: carry out some
specific tasks; maintain liaison or brokeragewith a variety of groups;
provide personalsupport. The minister may require the special adviser
to carry out one or more of the roles that might be necessaryas a
result of the potentially insulatingnatureof the assistancealready
offered to him and/or the perceivedlimitations in the servicesof the
bureaucracy identified at the end of SectionC. Furthermore, how far
the minister perceivesadvisersascontributing servicesthat his junior
ministersand PPSare not willing, able, or suitableto provide will be
further exploredin Chapter7.
Figure 4 builds on Figures 1 and 2 and addspossible places that
could be occupiedby specialadvisers. As with the first two figures it
is bestunderstoodin terms of a minister having a seriesof bi-lateral
relationships to maintain if he is satisfactorilyto fulfil all his
roles. Figure 1 showedtheserelationshipswith the minister occupying
a nodal position. Figure 2 addedthe placesoccupiedby various people
who assistthe minister in maintainingtheserelationships. Figure 4
indicatesa largepotential rangeof placeswithin which any particular
specialadvisercould be situated. Although the adviserhas beenplaced
at the minister's endof flows of information and/or influence, the
model implies he is sometimesable to move freely along the channels of
communication. Furthermore, someadvisersspenta considerable time
working, in effect, inside the departmentbut still possessingthe vital
special link with the minister which is the hallmark of a special
adviser. It is desirableto expandthe model somewhatand examine more
fully the determinantsof the placeof a specialadviser, some of the
features of the placeof specialadvisers,and someof the potential
impactsof specialadvisers.
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4 The PlaceQi1
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A range of factors influencethe place of each individual adviser
including: the wishesof his minister, the resourcesalready available
to help the minister, and the ability and wishesof the adviser. Klein
and Lewis correctly statethat, 'although personal loyalty to their
minister is a commonthreadholding the specialadviserstogether, they
are otherwiseextremelydiverse' (p.3). The role of adviserswill vary
so much becausenot only will the determiningfactorsdiffer in each
case, but so too will the interactionbetweenthem. Someof the many
theories about the relationshipsbetweenministersand officials have
already been exploredand it was noted that in severalof them there
might be a place for specialadvisers. This is becausethe minister's
opinions abouthis needfor specialadviserswill be influencedby his
perceptionof what supporthe finds, or expectsto find, already in his
department.
A radical ministerbelieving in the conflict model of civil service
obstruction might well perceivea needto appoint adviserswho sharehis
political commitments and will help him maintain the thrust of his
policies. Even for ministerswho do not necessarily suspect their
officials of sabotage,and haveevery reasonto believe they are doing
everything to help, 'the naggingdoubt remainsthat a more sympathetic
adviser would have donebetterby them. It is less a question of
officials refusingto follow the dictatesof a given policy and more of
excluding from debatethe kinds of ideasand follow-through that the
minister might havefavouredif only he had known about it' (Heclo and
Wildavsky, p.376-7). Ministers who perceiveofficials and departments
as having strongly held valuesthat will be usedto fill any vacuum
might want advisersto help dictate clearly policies for the department
to follow.

between
It is possibleto extendRose'smodelof interdependence
ministersand bureaucrats.In this modelbothrequired a range of
skills if they wereto fulfil their roles. Developingthis ideaspecial
adviserscouldbe seenasprovidingskillswhich eithera) ministersdo
not possess,
or do not havetime to use;or b) whichcivil servantsdo
not hold or feel constitutionallyableto use. Rose (1986, p.20)
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himself suggeststhat advisershelp ministersand complementthe work of
civil servants. He distinguishesbetweenpartisanadviserswho assista
department, 'by arguing its minister's casein party quarters where
civil servantscannotgo', and policy advisers. The latter can assist,
'by advising the minister to avoid pathsthat civil servants believe
dangerous, and by giving practicalcontentto vaguely expressed ideals
or aspirationsof the minister.'
The interaction betweenthe minister's perceptionof his role and
his analysisof what existing sourcesof supportare doing, or capable
of doing, will to someextentprescribethe role of the adviser.
The importance of examiningthis is demonstratedby the much
greaterlevel of supportprovided in Britain than in Australia by civil
servantprivate secretariesandjunior ministers. Someof the arguments
deployed for exampleby Walter are lessrelevantin Britain where high
flying principal private secretarieshaveoften supplieda satisfactory
level of personalsupportfor ministers.
Furthermore, once advisers are appointed their role will be
influenced by the various reactionsto them from thosealready in the
system. Some might welcomethe complementary skills advisers might
bring, whereas peoplewho perceiveaccessto, and influence on, the
minister in zero-sumterms might be hostile. Klein and Lewis (p. 10)
suggestthat in someareasthere is a 'vacuum' in which specialadvisers
operate - the extentto which this is perceivedto be the case varies
widely. The reactionto advisers,and the consequentimpact on their
role, might changeover time because,as Heclo and Wildavsky argue, 'in
time, seniorcivil servantsmay realisethe protection afforded to them

by an improvedarticulationof ministerialleadership'(p.378).
Depending upon the reasonsfor appointment,the minister's needs,
resources in the department,the department'sculture, and their own
abilities, special advisers will find they have varying degrees of
discretion to carve out a role by choosingfrom amongst the menu of
roles listed in Chapter2, SectionC.
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Meltsner (1986) showsthat the role of a policy analystin American
government departmentsis not only influenced by the client, the
organizational situationand the policy arena,but also by the analyst
himself. Analystsdiffer from eachother in their expectationsand 'in
part, the policy analystsetshis own expectations'(p.4). In Britain,
somespecialadvisers,throughtheir abilities and opportunities, might
be able to get into sucha strongposition to exploit their freedom,
closenessto the minister, and informality that they almostbecomenodal
points within the system. Ratherthan merely acting as conduits of
information, such peoplemight receiveso much information that they
become gatekeepersand decidewhat information to pass on to their
minister.
It could be claimed that there are so many theoriesbeing used to
illustrate various determinantsof the many possibleplacesoccupied by
special advisers,that noneof themhave much explanatory power. The
answer to this is two-fold. First, one of the key elements special
advisers bring to the systemof governmentis a degreeof flexibility.
Therefore, it seemsappropriatethat they could be usedin a variety of
roles to satisfy disparateperceptionsheld by ministersof their needs.
Second, such flexibility forms a centralpart of an interlocking range
of featuresof the placeof specialadvisers.

Featuresýý

Elm QfSindal Advisers.

The notionsof closenessand loyalty to a busy minister who might have
varying needs,and the informality of the role, are vital features of
the place of specialadvisers. Othersare that advisersare 'in the
know', i. e. within the Official SecretsAct, and 'on the spot'. As
Klein and Lewis state, 'a crucial elementin the relationship, most
specialadvisersstress,is sheeravailability' (p.4).
Combining a variety of ideasfrom this chapterit might be possible
to see special advisershopping freely along the technical-values
spectrum and up and down the departmentalhierarchy. In doing so a
special adviser might bring expertise,or political opinions, or the
thinking within the department,or a combinationof all these, directly

to his minister. He mightalsoassistin the processof communicating
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the minister's views to the department and/or to relevant people
outside. Sometimesit might be necessaryto takea view directly to the
minister to counteractthe considerableinfluence of the 'uncertainty
absorbers' within the hierarchy. One feature is the inevitable
potential for conflict. Much of the delicacy surroundingthe role of
special advisersinvolves the extentto which they, as the minister's
extra pair of eyes and ears, can counteract the 'uncertainty
absorption', but do so in an openway so that civil servantsare aware
of what is being sent to the minister and all the benefits of
'uncertainty absorption' are not lost.
Relating thesepoints to the wider discussionof systems theory,
adviserscan havea variety of roles. First, they provide extra channel
capacity and perform a rangeof gatekeepingand reduction functions in
relation to, for example,demandsfrom the party. Second, advisers
might sometimesbeenseenas helping ministersto cope with the volume
of demandsreachingthem for a decision. Third, given the inevitable
gatekeeping and reduction functionsof the permanent bureaucracy, and
sometimesof the whole political community, advisers can sometimes
provide ministerswith a reassurancethat alternativesthey would have
favoured have not beenwinnowed out. Fourth, advisersprovide a means
of strengtheningthe communicationschannelsfor outputs.
Dror (1987) describesseveraldilemmasin the position of advisers,
especiallythat between providing objective adviceand giving personal
support. Furthermore, we noted the difficulty of ensuring that
ministers took notice of strategicanalysisat times of pressure for
short-termaction. Brown and Steel highlight commentsfrom Sam Brittan
(1964) on how to tackle the problem. Brittan called for the
introduction of more politically committedexperts. It is possiblethat
the flexibility and closenessto the minister inherent in a special
adviser's role will provide the bestopportunity for this dilemma to be
overcome, becausein somecircumstancesthe persona minister is most
likely to take uncomfortable,objective, advice from, is a certain type

of adviser: somebody
philosophically
andpoliticallycommittedto the
minister'spolicies,personallyloyal to him, andwith the intellectual
capacityandspecialistknowledgeto conductpolicy analysis. Clearly,
adviserswho have theability to contributefrom both ends of the
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spectrumare rare.
Walter describes the type of personwho will want to become an
adviser and, using Gramsci'stheory aboutthe role of intellectuals in
society, shows how they fit into his model of the development of
personal advisers to ministersin western democracies. He suggests
there is a psychologicaland role differentiation, but also an affinity,
between politicians and, as he calls them, their minders. He attempts
a, 'more psychologicallyand sociologicallyinformed analysisof their
place in the political arena' (p. 125). Linking back to his earlier
discussion of the timelesselementof court politics in political life
he refers to, 'the ubiquitouspatternof patronageand cronyism' built
upon, 'a needsrelationshipbasedon a typological distinction between
the leaders and their personal advisers' (p. 177). Mainstream
politicians specializein adversaryrelations. They may be drawn into
politics by a desireto combineidealismwith knowledge,or to stand at
the hub of events,but, oncethere, they havenot time to think in terms
of principle or philosophybut only of conflict. Minders are also
motivated by a desireto be at the centreof eventsbut want to avoid
public displaysof aggression:
These can never standfirst in their own right, but on the
other hand they are free to stand aside from the daily
conflict, to think in abstractterms, to consider the long
term, to reinject ideals. ... Arguably, therefore,the choice
of a backroomrole indicatessomedifficulty in coping with
aggression, and a hesitanceto live with the consequencesof
actions. Both predilections could be rooted in the
predicament of the 'adult civilized' child who remains aloof
from peersbut inevitably finds somebarriersin relation to
the adults towardswhom he is orientated(p. 178).
Moving the discussionon and taking Gramsci'sargumentas an analogy, he
suggeststhat politicians, bureaucrats,and advisersall constitutepart
of the intelligentsiabut, 'the intellectualfunction of the power
elite falls to the advisers' (p. 181). The bureaucratforgoes the task
of analysisand articulation, 'to becomea supposedlyneutral expert in
"apolitical" information and administration'. Furthermore, the
politician can pay them little attention because he is too busy
surviving in political combat:
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At first, the institutional disjunctionthus caused creates
tension and strain at the institutional interface ... But at
its
the next stagethe political stratum, in order to maintain
dominance,mustdemandhelp, and thus demandsthe services of
personaladvisers,incidentally creatingavenuesfor precisely
that sectorof the intelligentsiaobsessedwith the importance
of politics but disillusionedabout the availableavenues of
electoralrepresentationor public service(p. 181).
Whatever merit Walter's ambitiousanalysis might have in the
Australian context, its applicationto the UK is limited by several
factors. Theseinclude the small numberof advisersin the UK and the
desire many of them have, especiallyunderthe Tories, not to shy away
from a front line role but to becomeparliamentary candidates. Some
believe their experienceof being an adviserwill enhancetheir chances
of being selectedfor a winnable seat. The smallnessof numbersin the
UK and yet the diversity of rolesplayed, meansthat any attempt to
apply psychological analysisto the featuresof the advisers' place
might be of limited value.
Another featureof the placeof specialadvisersis not only the
variety of positionsthey could occupybut also the insecurity of the
position - only two departments,DHSS and Education, had special
advisers continuously between 1974and 1987. If ministers are, in
Simon's terms, 'satisficers', they might be pleasedto take the extra
information that the right advisercould supply, but not feel the system
would collapse, or evenstall, without them.
The PotentialIm

Qf SMial Advisers.

One area of advisers' potentialimpact relates to the uncertainty
surrounding the preciseboundariesbetweenminister's responsibilities
and the legitimate concernsof others(including Parliament,the party,
the media, pressuregroups, and the civil service). The most capable
special advisers could potentially be useful in a number of almost
contradictory ways. First, in carrying out overtly political functions.
This allows neutralcivil servants,who are increasingly accused of
being politicized becauseof their adoptionof a 'can-do' attitude (see,

for example,RIPA, 1986,p.44), to emphasizethe boundarybetween
themselvesandpartypolitics. Second,in havingthefreedomto cross
uncertainboundariesandactasmessengers,
or sometimes
even brokers,
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for their minister in a way he could not do himself. In many ways
Figure 4 showingthe possiblepositionsof special advisers, together
with the idea of advisershopping along the spectrumand the development
the notion of boundaries being
of Image IV officials, encapsulates
crossed. Several commentatorsillustrate how advisers are seen as
having a liaison role acrosseroding traditional boundaries:
The increasingpoliticization of what were oncethought of as
administrative issues, as well as the growing burden on
Ministers, suggest that the role of the political adviser,
both in policy andprivate office functions, will become
increasinglyimportant (Brown and Steel,p. 335).
There hasalso beena markedtendencyfor the Government to
have a closerrelationshipwith its own Parliamentary party,
of which the liaison functionsof a proportion of the special
adviserswho havebeenappointedin larger numberssince 1974
(thoughthe total is not yet large) is only one manifestation
(Allen, 1978, p.7).
Similarly Walter (p. 167) suggestsminderscan havea positive role as
mediators in the groups where major political and bureaucratic
institutions intersect.
There is evidencethat thereis no setpattern as to how central
governmentpolicy is producedasa result of the various forces at work.
This would not be incompatiblewith the view that on certain issues
there is room for specialadvisersto makea considerable impact on
policies, possibly as 'sponsors'. To the extent that policy
communities exist and major changesin policy reflect changes in the
compositionof the policy community, specialadvisersmight sometimesbe
used in a brokeragerole to liaise with an interest group which the
minister, possibly at the adviser'ssuggestion,wishesto bring more
fully into policy discussion. Jordan(1990, p.474) recently admitted
that 'The existing policy community approachcan be seenas a strong
description of policy-making but asincomplete(by definition) in that
it has little to sayaboutexcludedgroups.' It is feasible that
occasionallyadviserscould have a role in helping to facilitate greater
participation by previously excludedgroups. It is also possibleto see
a role for specialadvisersacting as brokers in situations where
ministers wish to take less noticeof establishedpressure groups but
more notice of policy researchcentres.
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It might be that specialadviserswho combine technical expertise
with an ability to makea contribution from the political or 'values'
end of the spectrumwill havethe greatest potential to influence
policy. This would fit in well with the typology of policy analysts
devised by Meltsner which is shownasFigure 5. Although no analyst
exactly fitted thesecategories,Meltsner found that the typology became
a convenientway of discussingsomecentral characteristics. The role
and impact of British specialadviserswill probably vary even more than
that of American policy analystswho, althoughthey all work in a staff
capacity, are orientated specifically towards policy analysis and
information gathering. This point is well illustrated by Campbell's
development (1987) of Aberbachgl
Image IV. Campbell suggests
there are three categoriesof officials who can havean Image IV type
relationship with ministers. The mostpartisanof these,Image IV 2b
officials, he calls 'amphibians'and they are politically appointed
policy professionals. However, he makesa strong distinction between
these and political appointeeswho do not contribute substantially to
policy issuesand whom he calls 'political operatives'and who seem to
have no place in ImageIV. Despitethe lack of space for 'political
operatives'within ImageIV, it is clear that where they possessvalued
political and personalskills therecould be an importantplace for them
within a British minister's entourage.
Campbell's second categoryof ImageIV officials are traditional
line civil servants who show enthusiasmfor the policies they are
implementing. Their position raisesquestionsabout whethersomeof the
types of advisory roles are really needed. Having examinedchanges in
the UK under MargaretThatcher,Aberbachand Rockman(p. 23) suggest,'it
is plausible to argue that the penetration of the mainstream
administrative systemin pursuit of political responsivenessfrom the
traditional bureaucracy rendersa more generousreturn than would be
gainedby building new units of supportfor the political centre of the
executive.' It could be arguedthat encouragingcivil servantsto adopt

a more'can-do'attitudereducestheneedfor 'amphibians'but increases
the requirementfor 'politicaloperatives'whowill help preservethe
partypolitical impartialityof theenthusiastic
officials.
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The wide rangeof possibleimpactsthat specialadviserscould make
partly derives, as we have seen,from the variety of potential reasons
for their appointment. It is possibleto identify some types of
ministers who might want to appoint special advisers. They could
include: radical ministers; ministersambitious to carry out many
functions; ministerswho needassistance;ministerswho make a realistic
assessmentof their needs. The many specific reasonsgiven for the
appointmentof specialadvisersis examinedin the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR: REASONSFOR IHE APPOINTMENT QF
SPECIAL ADVISERS.
Talking once with a miner I askedhim when the housing
shortage first becameacutein his district; he answered,
'when we were told about it' (GeorgeOrwell, :g Road 1Q
Wigan R&, p. 57).
It is easyfor a Minister to be swallowedup in the engrossing
work of his own department. He can lose touch with
colleagues,with his Party, with the political strategyof the
Government Seeingthis happen,I tried in 1972 and 1973
...
with Mr Heath's approval to interestseveralof his senior
colleaguesin choosingpolitical or specialadvisersof their
own. (DouglasHurd, An En IQPromises, 1979, p.37)
The extent to which needsare recognizedand becomethe basisof reasons
for action varies. Having examinedthe factorsthat might, in theory,
have led ministers to think that they needed to appoint special
advisers, we should considerthe actualreasonsgiven by ministers,
to see how far the two match. Despite the difficulties this is
important becauseif the reasonsfor appointmentare established they
provide someyardstick by which to judge whether special advisers are
effective in doing what it was hopedthey would do.
The reasons for appointmentneedto be included in this study
because the decision whetherto havea specialadviser is one that
ministers still haveto make,whereasthey have no effective choice
about having private secretaries,a permanent secretary, information
officers and junior ministers. That said, it is apparent that some
ministers appoint specialadvisersbecauseit hasbecomethe thing to
do. Roy Hattersleyis a good exampleof a minister who had a clear idea
of what he wantedhis specialadvisersto do and who used them well.
Nevertheless,when askedto explain why he thought of appointing special
advisers he said that by the time he joined the Cabinet in 1976, 'I
suppose I thought of it becausewe all thoughtof it. There was no
specific thing that mademe want to do it. I just took it for granted

'
thatI would ... Standardoperatingprocedures.
Attempting to assessthe reasonsfor appointment is, therefore,
complex with a rangeof crosscutting factors to take into account.
Theseinclude:
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(i) variations in the extentto which there were clear reasons;
(ii) sometimesdiffering perceptionsheld by variousactorsas to why
ministersappointedspecialadvisers;
(iii) variations in the degreeto which ministers remember and/or
acknowledgetheir real reasons;
(iv) fluctuationsin the supplyof potential specialadvisersand the
influence that this had on the demandfor them in general, and in
specific cases.
Bill (now Lord) Rodgersinitially did not appoint a specialadviser
and his later decisionto chooseone flowed from his recognition that he
needed one. Yet, evenwherethere was sucha clear acknowledgementof
needs,Rodgersadmits that it is, 'difficult to distinguishbetweenwhat
were intended to be, and what became,the functions.' One official
suggested special advisershad beenintroducedas a solution to the
problem of getting the right peopleinto the right jobs to meet the
minister's needs. He felt it was the wrong solution to the problem, but
that a whole host of more or less usefuljobs, 'have accruedto special
advisers,' becausethey were there.
Having acceptedthesedifficulties, and to help cut through them,
this chapter will analysein SectionA reasonsrelated to ministers'
perceptionsof their needs. SectionB focuseson the commentsof others
about what ministersperceivedtheir needsto be. In Section C the
views and actionsof otherswho thoughtministersought to have special
adviserswill be examinedto seehow far specialadviserswere appointed
as a result of suchpressure. This would be either directly or as a
result of the creationof a climate of opinion. Someof the themesfrom
Chapter3 are relevantfor this discussion.
SECTION Q; MINISTERS' PERCEPTIONSQE NEEDS

There area numberof aspects
to this question:thereasonsstatedby
ministersbeforeappointments
weremade;thereasonsstatedby ministers
duringtheresearchinterviews;andhow far ministershaveclearreasons
relatedto need.
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ReasonsStatedBefore AppointmentsMade.
At some stage prior to their appointing special advisers, certain
ministers expressedthe needfor someimprovementsto be made in the
servicesprovided to them. Somespecifically advocatedthe appointment
of specialadvisersasa way of helping to achievethis. The following
extractsgive a flavour of such thinking. In all casesthe commentsare
basedon experienceof governmentgainedeither directly (Tony Benn) or
indirectly (PeterShoreasPPSto the Prime Minister and David Howell
who was influencedby ErnestMarples).
In 1966 PeterShore, having beenHeadof Researchat the Labour
Party and PPSto Harold Wilson, wrote in Entitled IQ Know,
But the most important reform of all is make the power of
Ministers more effective in their own departments. Deluged by
work, largely cut off from ministerial colleagues, separated
from supportingMPs by the Official SecretsAct, accessibleon
a day-to-daybasisonly to top officials, noneof whom they
have appointed,Ministers havea relationshipwith their Civil
Servantswhich is dangerouslyunbalancedand dependent The
..
need here is to strengthenthe power of the 'temporary
politicians', the Ministers, against the 'permanent
politicians', the civil servants. The first stepis to end
the isolation of Ministers by ensuring that top advisers,
knowing the Minister's policies and able to watch over the
main fields for which he is responsible,are brought into the
departments'(p. 155-6).
In the 1960sthe ConservativeOppositionundertook major reviews of
policies. David Howell, an MP who had formerly beenDirector of the
CRD, was an important contributor and in 1968he wrote a pamphlet,
entitled, Whose GovernmentWorks? In it he proposed major reforms
which are of particular interestgiven their similarity to Government
thinking in the 1980sand 1990s;he startedby referring to the:
growing scepticismaboutthe ability of electedpoliticians to
control the administration and to get their undertakings
carried out ... Under a more modernstructure of government
with proper managementaccounting,seniorofficials will have
to be given responsibility aswell as authority and will have

to carry thatresponsibilityin public. At the same time,
posts(thatis, directorshipsof
more senioradministrative
major governments
projects,boardsor commissionsand other
agencies)will be headedby publicly-named
andfully-qualified
men and womenwho, again,will haveto be able to justify
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their views publicly.
This kind of developmentwill at oncehave the valuableeffect
of relieving the Minister - that is, the man at the top - of
the great burden of administrative detail of his department
and giving him time to run the organisation properly with the
aid of a proper personal staff or cabinet. (pp. 5 and 16).

On 11 July 1973Tony Bennwrote in The Times:
Ministers themselvesare at presentseverely handicappedby
the traditionsof secrecythat operatewithin Whitehall which
preventthem from maintainingthe closeconnexionsthey need,
both with their colleaguesand the public, if they are to do
their job properly.
The workings of the Civil Serviceand the growing pressure in
the Labour Party for political advisers for ministers is
closely connected with this issue. The Civil Service half
consciouslyusesthe Official SecretsActs to maintain itself
as a two-way filter between ministers and the outside
world ...
Ministers have no staff specifically charged with the
development and maintenanceof the political links they need
to have with thosewho work outsideWhitehall; or even their
own ministerial colleagues...
There is no ministerial or political network comparableto the
Civil Servicenetwork - throughwhich ministers can brief each
other, politically, in advanceof the committees at which
papersare to be discussed.
These are someof the defectsin our machineryof government
which must be remediedif ministersare to be able to maintain
real contactwith eachother, real contactwith backbench MPs
and are to haveadequateconsultationwith the world outsideincluding thoseadviserswho may have helpedin Opposition to
develop the various policies, upon which the party was
elected. The problem is essentiallyone of isolation rather
than of sabotageor obstructionby the Civil Service
What is required is the open acceptance- with ...proper
safeguards- of a new categoryof political adviserswho would
be appointedto servean incoming government,and each of the
departmentalministers, and would go out of office with them.
Such advisers would have no executive power within the
department and no civil servantwould be expected to take
orders from them ...
Each minister within his own department- especially in the
economic or industrial fields - would needboth a political
adviser, and a trade union adviser,as well as an economic
adviser, all properly serviced. Parliamentary Private
Secretariescould play a much more active role within such an
advisory group.

Thesechanges,minorasthey mayappearto anyonenot familiar
thepolitical impulsewithin
with Whitehall,wouldstrengthen
Governmentwithout disturbing the sound and practical
administration
of the Civil Service.
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These extractshavebeenquotedat length becausethey reveal the
mixture of motives in the thinking of politicians, all of whom
subsequentlyappointed special advisers. In similar vein Barbara
Castle, in her Mandarin Powerarticle, arguedthe casefor the minister
to have the supportof a political cabinetwithin the department to
reduce 'the loneliness of the short-distancerunner' (1973). She
thought it important that the specialistand political advisers should
be integratedinto the structureof the departmentbecauseit was the
ministers who neededmoral, philosophical,and physical support from
people who went into the departmentsharingtheir approach. Ministers
required, 'political reminders all the time', and 'a political
conscienceat the heart of the departmentalbattle.'
Several major themesemerge- especiallyfrom the Labour
ministers. Support is needed to: strengthenthe position of ministers
in the department - especially by enhancing the political impulse;
help ministers copewith overload; and reducetheir isolation - especially
by conductingpolitical liaison.
Wider but less specific evidenceabout ministers' thoughtson the
limitations of servicesprovided for them, and their needsin terms of
extra assistance,comes from Headey'sstudy of the role of Cabinet
ministers (1974,pp. 112-13). Of the 50 ministershe interviewedwho had
servedup to the early 1970s, 18 thought the rangeof options presented
to ministers by civil servantswas inadequate. Furthermore, 18 also
thought outside expertsshouldbe brought into the civil service on
either a temporaryor permanentbasis, althoughnot all who took this
view suggestedthat there was a lack of expertise amongst the civil
servants. Nine thought that therewere, 'problemsin communicating the
ministers' objectives; Private Office needs strengthening; more
political aidesneeded.' As hasbeennotedearlier only five ministers
thought that they shouldbe spendingmore time preparing for Cabinet.
Headeyconcludes:

The casefor ministerialcabinetsis hardto evaluate.It is
only fair to saythat few Ministerswant them; for every
respondentwhowascritical of thePrivateOffice there were
severalwho statedthattheywerewell satisfiedand doubted
if comparablygoodarrangements
existedin businessand other
organisations.On theotherhand,the generalpoint that
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departmentsare not at presentso constitutedas to facilitate
or at any rate maximiseministerial andparty impact on policy
also seemsa strongone (p. 131).
This evidencefrom Headeyis important in showingthat those ministers
who were advocatingthe appointmentof specialadviserswere by no means
reflecting an unanimousview.
The ResearchFindings.
As we have seen,it is often difficult to distinguishbetween reasons
that existedat the time of appointmentand the reasonsas they are now
remembered, becauseinevitably a minister's thinking is influenced by
the functions his specialadvisersperformed. Interviews with current
junior ministersand shadowministersdo, however,usefully illustrate
the needsas perceivedby potential secretariesof state.
From the interviews it is possibleto identify a numberof specific
needsfelt by someministersand examinethe extentto which these were
generally thought by ministersto be a reasonfor appointing a special
adviser.

Theseneedsarelistedbelow, andthenanalysed,in a morespecific
way thanappeared
at theendof Chapter3:
(i)
(ü)

the relief of overload;
political supportin termsof an extra person, independent
of the department,to look at departmentalsubmissions;

(iii)

an extra pair of eyesand ears;

(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)

helpwith maintainingthethrustof party policies;
the provisionof additionalexpertise;
theprovisionof alternativeand/ornewpolicy thinking;
to playan aide/confidant
somebody
role to reducethe
isolation;
help with partyliaison;
helpwith liaisonwith groupsoutsidethe department
andthe

(x)
(xi)

party;
help with presentation;
help with preparation
for Cabinet.
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Obviously severalof thesemergeinto one another, especially from
(ii) to (vi) which are to do with development of policy in the
department. Nevertheless,certainof thesecategoriescould be further
sub-divided because respondentsdiversley interpreted them and
associateda variety of activities with eachone. In most cases a
minister had a numberof reasonsfor appointing a specialadviser.
(i) A major theme of Chapter3 was the concept of overload on
ministers. Many ministers agreed that they were overloaded but
comparatively few saw the appointmentof a specialadviseras a way of
relieving overload. Very few spontaneouslymentionedit asa reasonand
most deniedthat it was whenthe questionwas specifically put to them.
Nevertheless, some clearly did seespecial advisers as a way of
relieving overload. Bill Rodgers(1980, p.24) referred to the needfor
'anotherpair of hands.' Another minister suggestedthat, 'all the time
you are groping for things which enableyou to go to bed at midnight
insteadof 1 o'clock. ' BarbaraCastlesuggeststhat specialadvisersdo
relieve overload and that was one of the reasonsfor appointing them.
In her poly entry for 4 November 1974sheobserves:'I thankedGod for
the allies I havegot in the ministerial team and for the special
advisers. Without them a Minister is almost certainly swamped by the
sheerpressureof the top officials surroundinghim - or her' (1980).
Reservationsabout the idea of specialadvisershelping to relieve
overload take severalforms. First, if specialadvisers read through
submissionsand commentto the secretaryof stateit is claimed that
this might help to make the secretaryof statemore effective by drawing
his attention to important political points, but it adds to his
workload. This is becausehe will haveextra words to read; he still
has to read everythingput in his boxes by the private secretary.
Furthermore, of course, specialadviserscannotmake decisionson behalf
of their ministers. Second,it is felt that by performing tasks suchas
writing political speechesand liaising with the party, a special
adviser might help his minister to do things he would not otherwise have
been able to do at all, or as satisfactorily. It is not thought to be
relieving overload, however, if the minister is helpedto engagein more
activities.
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(ii) Ministers have a numberof sometimesoverlappingneedsin relation
to their departmentalrole, especiallypolicy making. Recognition of
theseneedsencouragedthem to appoint specialadvisers. About half the
ministers interviewed expresseda desire for somebody who was
independentof the civil serviceto be making an input into the process
of policy considerationwithin the department. Jim Prior referred to
the needfor somebodyindependentto give 'candid advice' and John Smith
claimed that the adviserassistedhis work by giving him, 'a source of
advice independentfrom that of the department.' The needto appoint a
special adviser to provide suchindependentadvice is felt by both
Labour and Tory ministers;and in both thesecases,and others, it was
important that the advicecamefrom somebodypolitically committed to,
and/or knowledgeable about, party policies. Leon Brittan thought it
important that, 'everything was looked at from the political angle.'
If, as a numberof ministersbelieve, politics is thought of as a
minefield then, according to PeterShore, especially when he was
Secretary of Statefor the Environment, 'one of the things you would
hope to get from an astutepolitical adviserwould be a mine detector:
"don't put your foot there becauseit will blow up."' Advisers can
carry out this role by taking part in policy discussions within the
department and by commentingon submissionsgoing to the secretary of
state.
(iii)

Several ministerssuggestedthat there was a need to appoint
specialadvisersto act, asHarold Wilson saidin his 1975statement,as
an additional pair of 'eyesand ears' for the minister within the
department (1976, p.204). The 'eyes role' can be played by reading
submissions and commentingon them in the mannerdiscussedabove. The
'ears role' goesfurther and someministerswantedadvisers to gather
information. Norman Lamont thoughtthat, 'special advisers can often
develop close working relationswith civil servantsand can discover
what is really going on in the departmentand what officials really
think. '
Similarly, Denis Healey wantedhis younger advisers,Adrian Ham
and Derek Scott, to play an intelligencerole and find out what was
being discussedat a lower level in the Treasuryand give him advance
warning about what would be pushedup. Occasionally,a minister's need
for an extra pair of eyesand earsrelatednot only to policy making but
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also to his managementrole within the department.
Whereas quite a large numberof ministers wanted independent
advicewithin the department,somewhatfewer took it a stepfurther and
saw a needfor advisersto help maintainthe thrust of their policies.
(iv)

This can take severalforms. At one end of the spectrumit is merely a
belief that specialadviserscould help civil servantsby providing a
steer on detailsof the minister's thinking or the philosophy behind
them. Other ministers, however, believed special advisers were
necessaryto provide, 'the policy enthusiasmto help ensure that
progress is made in implementingthe minister's policies and the
' When
position of the minister in the department is strengthened.
askedwhetheradvisershelpedmaintain the thrust of policies within the
department and helpedto ensurethey were introducedLamont agreed and
stressed that faced with time constraints and officials correctly
pointing out the difficulties it was often 'very useful' to appoint

specialadvisersaspeoplewith extratime and,in manycases,expertise
to considertheissues.
Whateverposition is takenalong this spectrumsome ministers feel
a need to take into Governmentwith thema researcher or expert who
helpeddeveloppolicies in Opposition.
Considerable work had beenundertakenby the Conservatives in
Opposition in the late 1960s. StephenAbbott from the CRD had been
secretaryto a successionof studygroupson industrial relations. The
shadow spokesman on Employment, Robert (now Lord) Carr was
'instinctively opposed'to specialadvisers. He stated:
in so far asan incoming minister might have difficulty in
getting his way with the civil servants,I usedto take the
view that it would not be helpedby introducing irritants into
the system. I hada feeling asa minister it was my job to
know what I wantedto do, get it doneand to have sufficient
confidence in my civil servantsto detect if they weren't
doing what they should do. On the whole I believedI was more
likely to get the help I needed to pursue my, and the
Government's,policies if I was seento trust them.
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He knew, however,and as ParliamentarySecretaryfrom 1955-8 had shared,
the long tradition of Ministry of Labour oppositionto the use of the
law in industrial relations. He assumedthat the departmental view
would still be the sameand he might havea battle on his hands.
Therefore, given that he wantedto act quickly and it was a complicated
subject, he felt to have someonehe had beenworking with, 'would be a
great comfort and help.' He had alreadysuggestedto Edward (now Sir
Edward) Heath that whoeverbecameSecretaryof Statefor Employment in
the next ConservativeGovernmentshouldtake Abbott with him becausehis
detailed knowledge would be very useful when legislation was being
planned.
Also in 1970David Howell advocatedthat Mark Schreiber should be
appointedto help maintain the thrust (a phrase,he suggests,they were
keen on in thosedays) of implementingvarious ideason reforms to the
machinery-of-governmentthey had beenworking on in the Public Sector
Research Unit. Arthur Cockfield had beencentrally involved in the
policy group consideringtaxation. Patrick Jenkin, who was Financial
Secretary to the Treasuryin 1970, recalledthat Cockfield, therefore,
'as an acknowledgedexpert in the field for whom the Inland Revenue had
a very great respect'was invited to join the Treasury as Adviser on
Taxation Policy to the Chancellorof the Exchequer.
There was similar reasoningin 1974. Barbara Castle appointed
Brian Abel-Smith who had worked in Labour Party researchgroups on the
evolution of policy. In the early 1970s Stuart Holland was an
influential memberof the Public SectorGroup of the Industrial Policy
Committee of Labour's NEC (Hatfield, 1978). The group was formed by
Judith Hart, and Holland was sooninvited to join her on the full
Industrial Committee. When she becameMinister for OverseasDevelopment
she appointed Holland to be her specialistspecial adviser, but he
initially spent about half his time working for Tony Benn in the
Department of Industry on the departmentalworking party drafting the
White Paper, ]3M Regent
Qf British Indu=y (Cmnd. 5710,1974), on
which the Industry Bill was to be based. This Bill was intended to
implementproposalsfrom the Industrial Policy Committee which had been
adoptedin Labour's Program g fQI DhIgin. 1973"
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Developmentsin 1979showmost clearly how the idea of wanting to
appoint adviserswho havea detailedknowledgeof party policy can cover
a variety of situations. David Howell was appointedto be Secretary of
State for Energy eventhoughhe had not beenthe shadowspokesman. He
thought it would be useful to appoint asa special adviser Michael
Portillo who had beenthe relevantdeskofficer at CRD. Taking over the
educationportfolio for the Oppositionshortly before the election, and
with little previous knowledgeof the field, Mark (now Lord) Carlisle
found that Stuart Sexton, who had been research assistant to his
predecessor,gave him much advice. Sexton had been involved in
developing Conservative education policies and Carlisle saw his
appointment as a way of carrying into Governmentthe work he had been
involved in in Opposition,particularly on the AssistedPlaces Scheme,
which, 'was going to requirea gooddeal of pushto get it through.'
By contrast,when the Treasuryteamof ministerswere appointed in
1979they had alreadyhad a considerablespell in Opposition developing
their policies. In this casethe situationwas similar to the examples
cited earlier from 1970when someministerstook with them people who
had been working for them for a numberof years. However, the newly
appointed Chief Secretary to the Treasury, John Biffen, neither
appointed, nor mademuch useof, any of the Treasury special advisers:
'I never behavedas thoughI had a special adviser.' Nevertheless,
although he thought the Treasury, 'acted with great propriety and
loyalty to the policy of the their new Government,' he could see that
given the radical programmethat had beendevelopedin Opposition and
'given that you were determinedto stick to it, and not to have a
repetition of the 1970-74situation, then there was merit in having
alongside you someof thosewho had toiled in the preparationof those
policies.' Three specialadviserswere appointedfrom the CRD to the
Treasury in 1979:Adam Ridley, PeterCropper and GeorgeCardona.
As part of helping ministersmaintain the thrust of their policies,
special advisers are sometimesseenas 'Keepersof the Ark of the
manifesto'. This is interpretedin severalways. Sometimesit is seen
as appointing advisersto help make sure that the minister keepsto the
policies of the manifesto. Many ministersreact negatively to such a
conceptalthoughseveralthought there was somethingin it and reference
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was madeearlier to Castle'scommentin the Mandarin Power speech about
the needfor, 'a political conscienceat the heart of the departmental
battle.' Taking over as Secretaryof Statefor Social Services after
the sackingof BarbaraCastle,David (now Lord) EnnalsreappointedBrian
Abel-Smith and Tony Lynes and thoughtthe phrasewas a 'very fair one'
and that the adviserswere a constantreminder of manifesto commitments
as well as being peoplewho could developarguments to be used in
Cabinet, Parliamentand the country. Carlisle opined that there was a
role for Sextonto play in reminding him of manifestocommitments,
and he sometimesintroducedSextonto peopleas his, 'right wing conscience.'
The other interpretationof the phrasewas to suggestthat specialadvisers
were appointedto help their minister ensure that policies were pushed
through the department. Few ministerssaw things in precisely theseterms.
The provision of expertiseis anotherof the overlapping reasons
relatedto the developmentof policy within a departmentfor appointing
special advisers. Often it is felt there is a needfor expertise that
(v)

is either missing in the departmentand/or is committed to party
policies. There is an obvious overlap with the previous points because
one aspect of expertisemight be a knowledgeof the policies of the
party. However the conceptof committedexpertise takes things one
stage further. Not only was Abel-Smith somebody independent of the
departmentwho could evaluatepolicy developmentsand bring knowledgeof
policies developed in Opposition,he could also do these things from
BarbaraCastle'sparticular approach.In appointing Anthony Lester to be
one of his specialadvisersin 1974,Roy Jenkinsselecteda person not
only committed to fighting race and sexdiscrimination, but who also had
skills in aspectsof civil law probably lacking in the Home Office at
that time. Lord Gowrie, Chancellorof the Duchy of Lancaster and
Minister for the Arts, was alsogovernmentspokesmanin the Lords on
economic affairs. As suchhe could perhaps have relied solely on
Treasury backing but wantedthe considerableexperiencethat could be
provided by appointing his long standingfriend Adam Ridley who hadjust
completedover five yearsin a role - specialadviser to the Chancellor

of the Exchequer- involving,Ridley felt, a substantialdegree of
committedexpertise.Roy Hattersley'sbelief thatMauricePestoncould
provide, 'committedexpertise'wasreferredto earlier.
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Despite the small numbersinvolved, there is, in keeping with the
heterogeneityof advisers,a surprisinglylarge range of permutations
between on the one hand, the provision of expertiseand/or commitment;
and on the other hand, filling gapsin civil servants' knowledge or
adding to their existing expertise. By 1974the ODM was well staffed
with economists but Judith Hart felt sometimesthere were aspects of
their, 'assessment
of issuesthat raisedeconomictheology that wasn't
altogether to my liking. ' It was beneficial, therefore, to have an
economist, Stuart Holland, who shared her beliefs, 'to use the
appropriateeconomicjargon' to tackle the issueas she wished it to be
approached. Initially Denis HealeyappointedNicky Kaldor because he,
'wanted somebody who was known to be sympatheticwith the thrust of
Labour policy and who was also capableof arguing on his own level with
civil servants. I would haveliked him as my economicadviserbut Ken
Berrill alreadyhad that post.' This againraisesinteresting questions
about how far an appropriatepersonin the post of Chief Economic
Adviser might obviatethe needfor Chancellorsto appoint a leading
economistasa specialadviser.
A mixture of expertiseand commitmentcan be supplied by the
businessmenrecruited. Sir Keith (now Lord) Joseph illustrated the
importance of commitment:'By 1979I was far more alive to the dangers
of devitalisationthan I had beenat the end of '70-'74 ... so when I
came back in '79, I wantedallies who would seethings asI saw them.
David Young and I worked harmoniouslytogether.' David (now Lord) Young
and his successorJeffrey (now Lord) Sterling also brought expertisenot
present in the department. Norman Lamont was Minister of Stateat the
Industry Department for four years and thought the 'different
perspective' provided by businessmensuch as Young and Sterling was
'very valuable'. He illustrated the argumentwell: 'no matter how good

civil servantsare at developingknowledgeaboutthe City, this is
learnt. Theyhavenever done it
somethingthattheyhaveessentially
themselves,andtheperspective
of somebody
whohasactuallyfloated a
companyis obviouslydifferentto thatof somebody
who has read about
it. I
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Michael Heseltine makessimilar commentson his use of experts,
which was describedearlier:
It was what I profoundly believein which is the fusion of the
talentsof the public sectorand private sector, the breaking
down of barriers
[They were introduced] to advise on
...
specific areas... I am a greatadmirer of the civil service
but you cannotexpectsomeonetrainedin the disciplines of
the public sectorto be an entrepreneurialcapitalist and if
you are trying to dealwith theproblemsof achieving results
and making things happen,you are well advised to use the
skills that are experiencedin that sort of activity.
Some of thesepoints can be relatedto themesdiscussedin Chapter 3.
In line with some British ministers, Walter suggests that a,
'generalized needfor most ministersis for expert knowledge, and for
that expertiseto be informed by philosophiesand assumptionscongenial
to the minister's politics' (p. 154). However, whereas Heseltine and
some other British ministersstressthe value of advisers in breaking
down barriers and fusing complementaryskills, Walter emphasizesthe
conflict in valuesbetweenministersand bureaucrats. He continues by
stressing the theme, 'that knowledgeand the deployment of technical
capacity are not value-neutral,and that the political executive will
frequently experiencethe valuesof their department as inimical to
their own' (p. 154).
Several British ministers, including Ted Short, made a clear
distinction between expertise and commitment. As minister with
responsibility for devolutionlegislation Shortappointed Norman Hunt
(later Lord Crowther-Hunt) to be his special adviser on devolution
issues,not becauseof his undoubtedcommitmentto it but rather because
he was, 'an acknowledgedexpert'. With encouragementfrom the Prime
Minister, Short felt Hunt, 'would be extremely useful' becausethey were
starting from scratchon the issueand initially there was a lack of
detailed knowledge aboutit amongstthe civil servants. Harold (now
Lord) Lever, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, had few
departmental responsibilities or civil servantsbut he produced many
initiatives. He appointedRay Richardson,an economistfrom the London
School of Economics(LSE). Lever, an expert in international finance,
producedpaperson economicsand wantedRichardsonto be, 'a checkerand
challengerof propositions... [because]it's very important for a non-
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economist to have an economistsay, "you can only hold x view if you
make the following assumptions"- that clarifies your thinking. ' He was
clear, however, about the limitations on what he wantedRichardsonto do
and, 'didn't appoint him to provide alternativeideas... I took enough
initiatives anywayand didn't needanybodyto suggestany.'
(vi)

There are someministershowever,who also appoint advisers to
provide alternativeand new policy thinking. This implies they feel a
need for somebody,independentof the department,to play a proactive

role in developingpolicies. In this senseit is distinct from both the
person independentof the departmentwho plays a reactive role in
examiningdepartmentalsubmissions,and the role of adviserswho come in
with knowledgeof policies developedin Opposition. However, the needs
may be linked in the mindsof someministerswho might appoint the same
person to fulfil all theseroles. Furthermore, an adviser with
expertise lacking in the departmentand/or with committed expertise is
in an ideal position to developalternativeand new thinking, although
it is possiblefor other peopleto do so. The importanceof having an
adviserto provide long-term thinking is stressedby certain ministers,
including Richard (now Sir Richard) Luce and JohnPatten. On becoming
Minister of State for Housingin 1985Patten was one of the two
ministers to appoint David Colemanand thought that the provision of
alternative/newthinking was a major reasonfor their decision: 'We were
going into a policy formulation period, we wanteda cerebal kind of
person ... someonewho was thoughtful, mature and far thinking. ' He
believed it important not only to have, 'someonethere to give you the
party political componentbut to understandthat you might be making
in policy of a very long lasting nature.'
major sea-changes

Someof the advisersappointedto provide committedexpertise
and/or alternativeandnewthinking,includingAbel-Smith, Peston and
Ridley, wereexpected
by the ministerto covera widewaterfront. The
appointment
of othersuchadviserssignalledtheminister'sintentionto
give greaterattentionto specificpolicy areas. This was especially
true of Heseltine'sappointments.PatrickJenkinappointedRoger Dyson
to provide, 'an entirelynewdimensionof expertise',whichwas related
issueswithin the NHS. When he
to industrialrelationsandmanagement
becameSecretaryof Statefor Tradein 1974 Shore appointedRoland
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Brown, who had beenengagedon trade and aid missionson behalf of the
Tanzanian Government,because,'he hadinsightsparticularly into the
trading and aid and other problemsof the developingcountries, which I
thought was an admirableaddition to the kind of thinking which I would
get in the Departmentof Trade.'
About a third of ministersinterviewed suggestedthat their
appointment of a specialadviserwas partly associatedwith their need
for an aide/confidant. Again thereis a rangeof interpretations. A
few ministersthoughtit desirableto appoint somebodywith whom issues
could be discussed when makingpolicy decisions in the department.
Respondentsalso claimed that aide/confidantsare required to combat the
(vii)

isolation ministersfeel from their political colleagues. Benn, Castle
and Shore all stood by the comments,referred to earlier in this
chapter, that were written before they appointedspecial advisers in
1974. In other cases, however, the special adviser became an
aide/confidant but, asone minister stated,the role was, 'not in my
mind originally. '
When a new governmentis formed and ministersare appointedafter a
spell in Opposition, they may want to take with them any research
assistantor party researchofficer they had in Opposition and with whom
this relationshiphad alreadydeveloped. Ted Short, for example, soon
came to think in the early 1970sthat if he went back into Government
his Rowntree Trust researchassistant,Vicky Kidd, was somebodyhe would
quite like to take with him and he thought the aidelconfidant role was,
'extremely useful'.
In their choice of adviser, ministers sometimes indicated the
importancethey were going to attachto the aide/confidantrole. Judith
Hart thought reducingthe isolation was, 'terribly important' in a role
played for her by MargaretJackson(now Beckett), Tony Banks,and Maggie
Sidgreaves. She not only looked for peoplewhom she, 'thought were
capable and intellectually high gradebut also one wanted people one
knew one could get on with. ' Interesting examples of how the
aide/confidantrelationshipcan developwhilst a minister is in post and

thenbecomea reasonfor appointment
occurredwith bothJudithHart and
LeonBrittan. Sidgreaves
servedHart asprivateoffice diary secretary
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in the 1960s and, in commonwith several other such people, moved
departmentswith her minister. Sidgreavesremained in the private
office at the ODM in 1970whenthe Labour Governmentfell and was still
there when Hart returnedas Minister in 1974. On Hart's departure from
the Governmentin 1975Sidgreavesleft the civil serviceto continue to
work for her and cameback asa specialadviseron Hart's reappointment
to the Ministry.
When Brittan becameChief Secretaryto the Treasury, Robin Harris
was already a special adviser in the Treasury and he gradually
gravitatedtowardsBrittan. On becomingHome Secretaryin 1983 Brittan
took Harris with him and thought the aide/confidantrole was important.
A further example occurredwith a minister moving in the opposite
direction. On becomingHome Secretaryin 1965Roy Jenkins appointed
John Harris whosework he knew of but whom he did not know personally
very well. However the relationshiprapidly developedand when Jenkins
became Chancellor of the Exchequerit was, as he explains in his
autobiography, six weeksbefore he was able to move David Dowler, his
long standing principal private secretary and confidant, into the
Treasury as one of his joint principal private secretaries. During the
interval, he writes, 'I was dependentfor an intimate "no secrets
barred" confidant, of which I havealwayshad great need, upon John
Harris, who had come immediatelyfrom the Home Office to the Treasury
with me and whosepolitical judgment was admirable,but who would not at
that stagehave claimed to havemuch economicexpertise' (1991, p. 221).
For several ministersthere was a link between the need to
appoint a specialadviserto help overcomethe political isolation and
the need to carry out liaison with party colleagues. They viewed
(viii)

advisers as being 'political antennae'. When Richard Luce was
appointedMinister for the Arts he thought, especiallyas the political
headof a departmentbut not a memberof the Cabinet, there was a danger
of becoming, 'rather politically isolated'. Interviewed whilst in post
he statedthat therefore, 'you shouldhavea political adviserhere who
keepshis or her tabson what is happeningelsewhereand keepsclose to
other political advisers.'
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Over a third of ministers interviewed appointed advisers to
maintain liaison with the party - especiallythe party organization.
Many Tories, including Leon Brittan, regardedliaison with Conservative
Central Office as an importantelementin keepingcontactwith the party
and their choiceof a former memberof the CRD facilitated this. For a
number of Labour ministerswho were active in internal party matters
including Benn, Castle, Hart, Shortand Jenkinsit was important to have
adviserswho could liaise with the party. Most of theseministers were
playing a major role within the party's NEC structure. Matthew
Oakeshott had beena very useful political assistantin Opposition and
Jenkins wanted him to continueworking on general political matters.
This was particularly important for Jenkinswho, thoughnot on the NEC,
was seenasleader of the pro-Europeangroup of MPs within the Labour
Party. Ministers who saw this asa major reasonfor appointmentinclude
Roy Hattersleywho said that David Hill, 'had the very special job of
maintaining my link with theparty. '
This party liaison role providesa good illustration of the central
theme developed in Chapter 3 that advisers act as a channel of
information. One of the reasonsbehind Bill Rodgers's decision to
appoint a specialadviserafter all, was the feeling that becauseof the
overload he neededsomebody,'to provide communications rather than
advice,' in relation to the political world. SomeLabour ministers also
wanted advisers who could liaise with the trade unions -a role
fulfilled by Ken Griffin for Tony Benn, and by Tony Banks for Judith
Hart. For someministers, including PeterShoreat Environment, the
need to havesomebodyto liaise with party contactslinks in with the
requirement for a personwith expert knowledgeof local government and
local councillors.
(ix)

Rather fewer ministersappointedan adviserto liaise with groups
outside the party. Again, however, for some ministers this was
somethingvaluablethat their advisers,oncein post, carried out and in
that way it becameone of the functions that ministers saw advisers in
generalappointedto do. David Ennalswas clear from the start that an
adviser was required to perform suchliaison. He appointed a social
worker, David Townsend,becausehe, 'neededsomeonewho had day-to-day,

continuing and professionalbackgroundknowledgeof the social
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services'. He desired'eyes and ears' in the social work world -a
phrase also usedby other ministersin relation to their department's
client groups. Luce wantedhis advisersto be, 'out and about a lot in
the arts world: trying to understandthe political dimensionof it and
the sensitivitiesof feelings; giving me a feedbackon what people are
saying and doing; making suremy view has got acrossat seminars and
conferences,two way flows, eyesand ears.' Jim Prior wanted Robbie
Gilbert, who had line management
experiencein Shell, where he continued
to work part time, to act as secretaryto a group of industrialists whom
Prior met regularly and privately. William Waldegravedescribedseveral
facets of this reasonfor appointing advisers. He claimed, 'Ministers
need someoneto act asa conduitfor ideas.' He too used his special
advisers, including David Coleman,as secretariesto informal advisory
groupsof seniorfigures and also felt that adviserscould, 'go out into
the pressuregroupsand reachthe parts that a minister can't usually
reachand talk to peopleand makecontactsand feed things back'. These
examplesdemonstratethe relevanceof the modeldevelopedin Chapter3the adviser emergesas a channel of information across sometimes
uncertainboundaries.
For someministersthe advisercan begin to play a brokerage role
and there is a link with the attemptto relieve overload. Hurd (1986)
stressed the extent to which increasednumbers and activities of
pressure groupsexacerbatedthe burdenon ministers. Asked, when Home
Secretary,whetherhe stoodby his 1979comment,quotedat the start of
this chapter, about the needfor advisersbecauseof the danger that
ministers might lose touch with colleagues, the party and the
Government'spolitical strategy, Hurd replied:
Yes, I seeit a bit more widely now the party is one thing
...
and that is still true. But I think that in any big
departmentthere is a greatadvantagein keeping informally in
touch with a whole rangeof people, interest groups, and
lobbies in a way which the civil servicedoesn't always find
easy ... The idea has broadenedout a bit. You have got a
skirmisherwho will operatequite widely and personally so his
reports, his information, his ideas come direct to the
minister insteadof coming up through the machine... although
usually he would copy to, and work closely with, officials.
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Some advisers appointedfor this reason,aswith some appointed for
their expertise, indicate that the minister felt he required help in
giving greaterattentionto certain aspectsof his department's work.
Thesewere topics that the minister thoughtwere particularly important,
or merited greaterattention.
Over half the ministersidentified help with presentation as a
reason for having advisers. In many casesit was the major reason.
Hurd referred to the work of his adviser as being, 'overwhelmingly
(x)

presentational'; others linked this to the minister feeling
dissatisfiedwith the servicesof his pressor information office. Thus
Lord Young (1990, p. 143)claims that when he was Minister Without
Portfolio with special responsibility for wealth creation and
enterprise, his 'PressOfficer had not worked out. ' Young was upset
because he had a numberof White Papersto launch but then, he writes,
'I had a minor brainwave. I could appoint a Special Adviser. After
all, I had once beena SpecialAdviser and asa CabinetcolleagueI was
entitled to one myself. I did not needone to help me with political
advice but with dealingswith the press.' Patrick Jenkin told the
Treasury and Civil ServiceCommitteethat, although he had a high regard
for civil service loyalty, 'far too much of the work of press and
information officers is reactive' (1986, Vol. 2, p. 124), and he felt
their role should be re-thought. Furthermore, in interview Jenkin said
that whilst he was Secretaryof Statefor Industry in 1982, 'more and
more of my colleagueswere getting political advisersand I felt I
really had to havea political adviser. I neededsomebodyto help me
' Speechwriting was identified as the most important
with my speeches.
area where help was needed by many ministers, including Hurd's
predecessorat the Home Office - Leon Brittan. This applied in
particular to political speeches,with the party conferencespeechbeing
specifically mentionedby severalTories.
Assistance could also be provided in a range of other tasks
connected with presentation. Theseincluded: preparation of journal
articles; production of White and Green papers; preparation for
ParliamentaryQuestionTime. Someministerswantedan adviserwith whom
they could discussthe beststrategyfor presenting the departments'
work and their own views. Quite a few adviserswere given a brief to
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talk to journalists on behalf of their minister. When promoted to Home
Secretary Roy Jenkinsoriginally took on John Harris very much as a
press adviser, althoughhe subsequentlyplayed a wider role. Several
ministers were disappointedthat their specialadvisersturned out not
to be as good asthey had hopedat speechwriting.
(xi)

Finally abouta third of ministersidentified assistancewith
preparation for Cabinet,and CabinetCommittees,as being a reason for
the appointing a specialadviser. A few ministers, Jim Prior for
example, acknowledgedthat althoughit had not beenan original reason
for appointment,help with briefing for non-departmentalissues coming
up in Cabinet, especiallyeconomicones,was an important service that
the adviser could provide. Rob Shepherdperformed this function for
Prior. Severalministers, for example,Michael Heseltineand Sir Keith
Joseph,did not usetheir advisersin this role.
Some ministers, especiallyLabour ones, thought that this was one
of, if not the, most important reasonsfor appointinga specialadviser.
As Lord President of the Council, Ted Short played a major role in
Cabinet and CabinetCommitteesand he wantedVicky Kidd to comment on

Cabinetpapersfrom a partypolitical view. Severalfeaturesof the
place of specialadvisersareillustratedin his view that it is
valuableto havethis performedby somebodywho, in addition to having a
political slant, is locatedin the office (andtherefore, 'on tap') and
has been positively vetted (andthus 'in the know'). Bill Rodgers
wanted to go to Cabinet meetingswell briefed and found that the
Departmentof Transport were unableto provide a fully adequate service
in this field. This was a major factor in his decisionthat he would,
after all, appoint a specialadviser. A particularly important aspect
of briefing for Cabinetmeetingswas the briefing that economists could
provide. Advisers who were appointedprimarily with this in mind
include: David Metcalf by StanOrme; and Michael Stewart, initially by
Peter Shoreand later Tony Croslandand David Owen. Perhaps reflecting
the importance of the post within the Cabinet, two Tory Home
Secretaries, Leon Brittan and Douglas Hurd, were amongst the
comparatively few Conservativeministerswho referred to the Cabinet
briefing role asa reasonfor appointinga specialadviser.
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How far dQMinistersby ClearReasons
RelatedI4 Needs?
In addition to discussing ministers' comments about individual
appointments it is possibleto identify generalcircumstancesin which
ministers are likely to feel the needto appoint an adviserto perform
specific functions. One is when a specialadviserleaveshis post and
the minister looks for anotherspecialadviserto continue performing
the samefunctions (sometimesthe retiring specialadviser is given the
responsibility of finding a replacementin his own image). A good
example occurredwhen David Young was appointedto be Chairman of the
Manpower ServicesCommissionand so could no longer continue as special
adviserin the Departmentof Industry. Patrick Jenkin recalledthat he

said to Sir PeterCarey,thepermanent
secretary,thatthey neededto
'find anotherDavid Young' becausethe departmentwas about to embark on a
major privatization programmeand required an understandingof the world
of financeand the City, 'therefore I havegot to have a special adviser
who can be our conduit in to this area.' Similarly, Young claims Jenkin
was quite upset when he announcedhis departure: '"Find me your
successor",he said, "otherwise you just can't leave."' (1990, p. 67).
Jeffrey Sterling was the man found by Young and Jenkin. Sterling
provides a good exampleof the other main circumstancesin which the
need to have a specialadviserto carry out specific functions can
sometimesbe identified as the reasonfor appointment. This occurs when
a new minister is appointedto a departmentand concludesthat the work
that the 'existing' specialadviserhad beendoing was very important
and decides to reappoint him. Sterling served seven successive
Secretariesof Stateat the DTI - his sixth being Lord Young, the man he
was recruitedto succeed. Sterling agreedto continueworking for Young
despite the idiosyncratic natureof the invitation the new minister
issued to one of his oldestfriends: '"Jeffrey, " I said, "I have never
listened to you in over thirty years. I cannotthink of a better person

to be my SpecialAdviser." Despitethatcommenthe acceptedon the
spot. This cheeredmeup' (p.236). Otherspecialistspecial advisers
who havebeenaskedto servea numberof secretaries
of state include
Robin Cooke,Tony Lynes,andBrianAbel-Smith(to whom BarbaraCastle
said, 'do for mewhatyou did for Dick', i. e. RichardCrossman).
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There have, however,beenoccasionswhere it has beendifficult for
the incoming minister not to reappointthe specialadviser. In some of
these instancesthe incoming minister was an advocateof the use of
specialadvisersand/or welcomedthe individual 'in post'. When Joseph
was replacedby Jenkinat the Departmentof Industry, Young was summoned
to Number Ten and told by David Wolfson (now Lord Wolfson of
Sunningdale)that the Prime Minister requestedhim to continue his work
in the department. The circumstancesof his reappointment were very
different from earlier: 'I hadworked for Keith for yearsand presumably
he only selectedme once he was satisfiedthat he could work with me.
Patrick, who had beenat SocialSecurity, had me thrust upon him by the
Prime Minister at the very momenthe was offered the job. No one
' (p.58-9). When Robert Carr became
refuses in thosecircumstances!
Lord Presidentof the Council he looked upon Michael Wolff, whom he knew
well, 'as part of the machinerythat I had inherited in the Lord
President'sOffice, rather than appointing my own specialadviser.' He
was, 'delighted' to find Wolff there because,as the member of the
Cabinet responsiblefor the coordinationof Governmentpolicy but having
no civil servicespecialiststaff to assistthe Lord Presidentin that
capacity, he relied on his adviserto liaise with departmental chief
information officers.
Shortly after Keith Josephtook over the Education and Science
Portfolio from Mark Carlisle he 'temporarily dismissed' Sexton (Knight,
1989, p. 164) and Young workedin a part time capacity for Joseph whilst
concentratingon Industry. Sextoncontinuedto work, now unpaid, in the
Departmentof Educationand Science(DES) but largely for RhodesBoyson,
one of thejunior ministers. According to Knight it was Boyson who
persuadedJosephto reappointSextona few monthslater.
Margaret Thatcher, especially in the early years of her
premiership, was restrictive in allowing ministers to have special
advisers. It is thoughtthat at least one minister who wished to have
one was not permittedto do so. To the extentthat ministers had to
argue their case for having a specialadviser, they were forced to
produce reasons,or at leastjustifications. Another circumstancewhich
allowed ministersto assesswhetherthey neededa special adviser was
that an increasingnumberof newly appointedCabinet ministers had been
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junior ministersin departmentsin which there were special advisers.
As a result, they either cameto the conclusionthat special advisers
were desirable, or had this opinion confirmed. Similarly, when John
Patten becameMinister of Stateat the DoE his decisionto appoint an
adviser was 'very much' influencedby the 'extremely good' work he had
seenRob Shepherdand Nick True perform for their respectiveSecretaries
of Statein departmentswherehe hadbeena ParliamentarySecretary.
Some people, however, challenge the extent to which it is
meaningful to producelists of reasonsfor appointing special advisers
that are related to ministers' needs. Several ministers took the
initiative in appointing specialadvisers,or at least, were willing to
accept them, without having a clear perception of functional needs.
Some such ministersfelt a needto takein their 'own person' without
specifically linking it to the argumentothersuse about the needfor an
aide/confidant to overcome the minister's isolation. Once special
advisers beganto be appointedthen inevitably for some ministers, as
one admitted, an important reasonfor makingan appointment was the
attitude, 'I certainly wasn't going to missout on them. If they were
going I was going to have them.'
In America, Meltsner notedthat clients differed on why they wanted
policy analysisbut, 'a few want it becauseit is fashionable.' (1986,
p. 5). Similarly in 1986a British adviser, Chris Butler, wrote: 'as
their numbersrose after that [1983] election, it becamealmost a status
symbol for secretariesof stateto possessa specialadviser' (p. 14).
Norman (now Sir Norman) Fowler, a pre 1983Tory exponent of
specialadvisers,stated: 'When you first come into Governmentyou quite
wonder what the role of the specialadviseris going to be and I think,
as my careerhas shown, I havefirmly come to the conclusionthat the
specialadviser should be a political figure. ' This quote provides
evidencethat the placeof specialadvisersis becomingmore clearly
identified. Once ministershavehad the experienceof using advisers,

they shouldhaveclearerreasonsfor makingtheir subsequent
appointments,
and someactivitiesthatevolvedaspart of thefirst adviser'srole,
will becomereasonsfor laterappointments.
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A few ministersjust wantedto appoint somebodywho was suitable,
whereasothersknew the specificindividual they wantedto appoint even
though the initial decisionto appoint was not related to functional
requirements. By 1974therewere a numberof research assistants to
shadow ministers. Some were the Political Fellows funded by the
RowntreeSocial ServicesTrust from 1972, and others were in a separate
research unit set up in late 1973and financedby Sigmund (now Sir
Sigmund) Sternberg,a London metal merchant(Darlington, 1976). Someof
the research assistantswere appointedas special advisers in 1974
without great thoughtfrom ministersabout their preciseneeds. One of
the ministers, Denis Healey, commentedthat his researchassistant was,
'largely appointed becausehe was already working with me -I hadn't
really thought it through very carefully.'
Michael Heseltine,as we have seen,appointedspecialist advisers
on short term contracts. When he was askedhow far he saw his special
advisers, at the time of appointment,aspeoplewho would talk to, and
attempt to influence, their colleaguesin the private sector, he
replied, 'I think you are inviting me to rationalizewhere there was no
rationalization. I saw someonewho knew a lot about this subject, with
a lot of ideas,a lot of energyand a lot of experience; we need these
sort of guys and that is whereyou start.' Having madehis appointments,
Heseltine, with his managerialbackground,usedhis advisers in more
specific ways than did the majority of ministers.
Adam Ridley coined the phrase,'residual legatee'to describe the
role that specialadvisershaveof filling gapsthat might appearin any
one of a numberof areaswhereservicesare provided for ministers.
This could help explain why someministers appoint advisers without
being sure which needs will arise. In a few instances ministers
appointed advisers becausepeoplewere either proposedto them by a
third party or the adviservolunteeredhis services. In the examples
referred to here there is no questionof pressure being applied to
discussionis seen
ministers. The full complexityof the reasons/needs
here because in somesuchcasesparticular ministers could see good
reasonsfor appointing specialadvisers,and other ministerswere happy
to acceptthem, eventhough the initial reasonfor making an appointment
was little more than an approachfrom outside. Examples of advisers
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offering their servicesincludeJohn Harris to Roy Jenkins;Miles Hudson
to Sir Alec Douglas Home (now Lord Home of the Hirsel); and David Young
initially to Sir Keith Joseph. In 1983the Secretary of State for
Wales, Nicholas Edwards,was offered the servicesof ChristopherButler:
'I didn't set out feeling I must havea researchassistant,let's look
for one. It happenedthat a well-qualified individual was available and
I was approachedand enquiredwhetherI would like to appoint him; so it
worked that way round.' In all theseexamplesthe minister was attracted
by the qualities of the individual offering his services. Thus Lord
Home stressed the personalnatureof Hudson's appointment. He knew
Hudson had, 'a very distinguished mind and knew a lot about
international affairs andpolicies' but 'if the whips had saidwould I
have taken somebody out of the blue, I would have hesitated a long
time.9
It was suggestedat the end of Chapter3 that a minister who
appointedspecialadvisersmight possesscertain characteristics. It is
difficult to generalize. For example,someof the new Conservative
ministers in 1979appointedthe relevantdesk officer at CRD because
they themselveshad had little or no experienceof the subjectfor which
they were responsible. Yet other ministerswith considerableOpposition
experience of the subject also appointed special advisers.
Nevertheless,someanalysisof the suggestionsin Chapter3 is possible.
Ministers who had radical proposalsfor policy changes seemedquite
likely to appoint advisers- especiallyspecialistones. Writing prior
to the 1974developmentof the systemof specialadvisers,Headey noted
that, 'policy initiators, in altering departmentalpriorities, must
expect some conflict and unpopularity with their civil servants.
Conflict is especiallylikely if, to pressthrough his initiative, the
Minister reorganiseshis departmentor recruits "irregulars"' (p.215).

Ministerswho wereambitiousto carryout manyfunctionsandplay a
largerole in Cabinetand/orthepartywerealsomorelikely to appoint
advisers. There is little evidenceto supportthe view that it was
ministers with the mostlimited capacities
who felt the greatestneed
for assistance,
andconsequently
appointedspecial advisers. Bernard
Donoughuetold theTreasuryandCivil ServiceCommittee:
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What I noticedvery much in the Labour Governmentwas it was
the best ministers, the ministerswho by outside judgment
would be the most able, who had the specialadvisersand used
them well. Ministers thoughtto be fairly marginal did not
have specialadvisers,it was the reverseof what you might
think. It was thosewho most neededthem who did not have
them (1986, Vol. 2, p. 197).
In interview Donoughueclaimedthat one or two ministers who really
needed advisers declinedto appointthem becauseit might look as if
they could not do their job. In reality, especiallyin the pre-1974
days, the appointmentof a specialadviserwas sometimestaken to be an
indication of strength:'but just as it is the weakerminister who most
needs a cabinet. so he is the leastlikely to insist on getting one and he may needto be very strong to insist successfully.' (Opie, 1968,
pp.77-8). Similarly, Headey(p.212) suggeststhat the way Jenkins took
Harris, and David Dowler his principal private secretary, from
departmentto departmentwas an indication of strength.
However, it would be incorrect to concludethat the only ministers
who declined to appoint specialadviserswere weak ministers, with
greatestneedfor assistance.William (now Viscount) Whitelaw and Peter
Walker are but two examplesof powerful Tory ministersin the post-79
governmentswho extractedthe mostout of their departmentsand who did
not appoint specialadvisers. Severalofficials at the Ministry of
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries(MAFF) at the time of the change over
from John Silkin to PeterWalker, including Terry Dawes, the press
officer, felt that the valuablerole Ann Carlton had played as special
adviser to John Silkin disappearedas Walker was his own political
adviserand rewrote draft pressnoticeshimself.
The quality of Whitelaw and Walker demonstratesthat it would be
misleading to developgeneralizedtheoriesaboutthe type of minister
who did not appoint advisers. Furthermore,both illustrate the earlier
point that when ministers 'inherit' an adviserthey sometimeskeep him.
When Whitelaw becameSecretaryof Statefor Employment in 1973, and
Walker Secretary of Stateat the DTI in 1972, they both retained the
services of the existing adviser- Robert Jackson and John Cope
respectively. Cope had only worked for John Davies for a few weeks
before Davies was moved and Copefound himself, 'in the rather odd
position of being political adviserto PeterWalker, which was at first
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sight probably the least necessaryjob in Whitehall.' In fact, Cope
commented, 'I found myself worked hard in a departmentwhich at that
time had ten ministers.' Despitethe fact that Jacksonand Cope were
well regardedin the departments,and havedemonstratedtheir political
skills by their subsequentrise to ministerial positions, it is possibly
unlikely that Whitelaw or Walker would haveinitiated suchappointments.
SECTION B MINISTERS' REASONS

SEEN$I OTHERS.

It is difficult for other peopleto know conclusively the reasoning
behind a minister's appointmentof specialadvisers. However, Table 1
shows the questionnaireanswersgiven by specialadvisers to question
14) about why they thoughttheir minister appointedthem. Most advisers
were preparedto attemptthis eventhoughfrequently the minister had
not precisely defined what the adviser's functionswould be.
Although the findings of Table 1 are broadly in line with evidence
from interviews with ministers, they needto be interpreted with care.
The following analysisis basedon evidencefrom the interviews with
advisers and civil servants,in addition to the raw statistics. One
adviser refusedto answeron the groundsthat ministersdid not think
along such systematiclines when appointing special advisers. This
view, discussedin the previous section, was one with which other
advisershad a degreeof sympathy. Furthermore,it was rare in practice
for advisersto make a clear distinction betweenreasonsfor appointment
and functions performed. Inevitably, too, someadvisers stressed the
reasons why they thought ministersshouldappoint advisers. As far as
possible this section concentrateson what were thought to be the
ministers' reasons.
Relief cf overload. Question 14a)on the relief of overload was
interpreted in various ways. Many advisers believed they were
performing tasks (especially in the party political field) which
otherwise might havebeenleft for the minister. Some advisers thought
that this did not alwaysresult in the ministers being any less
overloaded - they simply becameinvolved in extra activities. Other
advisersfelt, however,they were appointedto relieve overload. Roger
Liddle, for instance,thought that Bill Rodgerswas scepticalabout the
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TABLE 1: Questionnaire
Response.
14)

Findings on Reasons for Appointment

- Percentage

reasons have been suggested for the appointment of special
In the case of your appointment, what importance do you
advisers.
think
to each of the following:
was attached by the minister
Various

Substan
tial
a) Relieve

the overload

Consid
arable

Moder

Slight

ate

Neglig
ible

of

business on ministers

7

18

26

21

28

24

41

12

11

12

19

32

15

18

16

21

16

22

22

19

4

31

21

12

32

37

27

21

3

12

19

32

31

99

18

31

15

b) Provide political
support
within the departments

staffed by "neutral" civil
servants, to ministers
wishing to introduce
changes.

c) Fill any gaps in the
knowledge or experience
of the civil service with
experts committed to the
policies of the party.

d) Help ministers

carry

out

a more effective
collective role in cabinet.

drifting
e) Prevent ministers
from
the party by
away
liaising
with the various

sections of the party.

f) Help the ministers with
the presentation
of their
views on departmental and

general issues.

p) Provide new/alternative

policy

ideas.

h) Reducethe isolation

of

by playing
ministers
aide/confidant
role.

an

16

20

need for advicebut rather wantedmore capacityto get things done:
'Bill wantedme to help him with any task he askedme to do.' Liddle,
in commonwith severalother advisersincluding Edward Bickham used the
phrase, 'an extra pair of hands'to describea major reason for their
appointment. Another advisersuggestedthat, even thoughhis minister
might not havebeenpreparedto admit it, he fearedbeing 'swamped' by
the workload and the appointmentof an adviserwas an attempt to relieve
the burden.
Political suprt. The answersgiven to questions14b) c) and g) were
handled differently in the previous section'sanalysis of interviews
with ministers becauseit becameclear that the data were not only
overlapping but were also, especially14b), subject to a range of
interpretations. Many specialadvisersbelievedtheir minister had made
the appointmentto ensurethat policy issueswithin the department were
examined by somebody independentof the civil service and wholly
committed to the minister, and usually to the party. Part of the
required political support was often thought to be looking through
policy submissionsfor 'time bombs' (Rob Shepherd),or 'landmines as far
asthe domesticHouseof Commonssituationwas concerned' (John Harris).
Leon Brittan's stresson the importanceof issuesbeing examined from
the political perspective was echoedby one of his advisers, John
Whittingdale: 'Ministers do like to havea different sourceof advice,
someone who is seeingthe sameissuesasofficials but looking at them
from a different angle ... how we shouldstructurethings so that the
backbencherswould approve of it and generallyadvising him on the
political side of every issuecoming up.' Peter Shore's comments,
reported earlier, about the needfor a mine detector, especially at
Environment, are mirrored in his reasonsfor appointmentas seenby one
of his advisers,David Cowling:
Part of what I was aboutwas watching out for politically
sensitive areasand slappingin a paperwith some ideas and
commentson the civil serviceconclusions... acting as a bit
of a warning systemabout how the party might receive certain
things coming from the department. Not just the party at head
office but the party at local governmentlevel.
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Some advisers felt their minister appointedthem to play an eyes and
ears role. David Stephenwas selectedby the new Foreign Secretary
David Owen severalmonthsbefore he could fill the position and, 'had a
numberof chatswith him over the summerabout what he wantedand it was
clear that it was basically agreedwith the Office that I would have an
extra pair of eyesand earsrole. '
There was less agreementabouthow far this political support was
necessaryto help progressthe policies of the minister and/or the
party, in the department. Somethoughtthis was a reason,but that it
only extendedas far as familiarizing civil servantswith the policies
and/or the philosophyand argumentsbehindthem and/or the priorities
amongstthem.
Linked to this, but most contentiousof all, was how far advisers
were appointedto help maintain the thrust of the minister's policies
possibly against civil serviceobstruction. Many did not see it in
theseterms. Mark Schreiber,however,interestingly suggestedthat the
Tory politicians in Oppositionin the 1960swere awareof the views of
the Labour critics suchas Crossmanand Castlewho believed that the
civil servicehad its own long-termpolicies to which it successfully
adhered. Thought was given to ways of overcomingobstruction of the
radical changes the Conservativeswished to introduce and the
recruitment of outsiderswas seenby someshadowministersas a way of
achieving this. Having played a major part in devising the tax reform
plan launchedby the Conservativesin 1970,Arthur Cockfield claims, 'I
was brought in to ensurethat this programmewas driven through - which
it was.'
The approach adopted by the Tories at the Treasury in 1979 is
subject to slightly differing interpretations.Adam Ridley felt there
was, 'emphatically' a desirewhen they camein to sustainthe thrust of
implementing the policies on which they had been elected and that,
'special adviserssustainthe thrust becausethey know why the policy
was devised.' Furthermore, if ministerswere considering moving away
from a manifesto commitment or from a policy they had already
established, then, comparedwith the civil servants,the adviser, as a
political operative, 'has far more licenceto say, "are you sure you
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want to change that policy?"' Whilst pointing out that he did not
become a Treasury adviseruntil 1982,DouglasFrench agreed that a
reason for the appointmentof adviserswas to help maintain the thrust
of a newly elected government and sustainit when aU turn was
expected in the country. GeorgeCardonasuggestedthat the incoming
Tory advisers in 1979expectedthe Governmentto face civil service
obstruction:
I arrived at the Treasuryas a specialadviserin May, 1979,
clutching an armful of files which containedthe policies we
had worked on in the yearsof ConservativeOpposition.
I had read, and heard, aboutthe obstructionsthe Civil
Servicewould place in the way of a new Government. Books and
articles by Labour ministers and special advisers
(particularly in the Bennitewing of the party) warned me of
what to expect. I was ready to defendour policies against
the most dirty tricks. (TheTimes. 11 November 1981).
Cardona believedthat in reality they encounteredlittle obstruction,
and that althoughhe had anticipatedsomehe felt that the incoming
ministers, apart from on a few specificissues, were not expecting
resistance from the civil service. He arguedthat from the ministers'
perspective the appointmentof advisers, 'was to maintain continuity
with the policy formation which I hadbeendoing for so many years - to
seethat through.'
Several other Treasuryadvisersdrew a distinction between 1979,
when the ministersmight havebeenfeeling a needfor help to maintain
the thrust of their policies, and later years. However, according to
some, including Howard Davies, eventhat presented, 'an exaggerated
case.' Davies was a Treasurycivil servantin 1979who later left the
service to join McKinsey but in 1985was secondedfor 15 months to
become a special adviserin the Treasury. He suggestedthat other
adviserswould say,
the Treasury was trying very hard, was as political as it
really could be but nonethelessthe constitutionprevented it
from being as political asthe ministerswould really have
liked and thereforein presentationalterms, and just as an
extra pair of hands... there was a job to be done - but not a
kind of crusadeagainstthe bureaucrats.
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He went on to suggestthat there might be a greaterneed to help
maintain the thrust in departmentssuchasthe DHSS or DES where
the departmentshavea closerelationshipwith their clients.
In fact, several of the comparatively few advisers who
acceptedthe term 'Keeperof the Ark' servedin the DES. The
commentsof Mark Carlisle reportedearlier are echoedin the words
of his specialadviser, Stuart Sexton:
I saw my role as continuingto developeducation policy, to
see that what we hadplannedandproposedin the '70s was
actuallyput into effect ... I'd acceptthe phrase'Keeper of
the Ark of the Manifesto'; particularly asI would claim to
havewritten a lot of it
Mark Carlisle kindly said to me,
... this for the
'now that you've written
all
election manifesto,
you'd betterjoin me in Governmentand seethat we put it into
effect.'
When Oliver Letwin was appointedby Keith Josephhe understoodhis task
to be to help introducethe voucherscheme - 'everything else was
ancillary to that.' In performing this role he was not 'Keeper of the
Ark' but helping to pushnew and alternativepolicy thinking within the
department. The emphasisthat Maurice Pestongave to the political
nature of his role has alreadybeenshown. He had a generally, 'very
high view of the civil serviceand didn't seethe role of political
advisers,or the possiblefuture role of cabinets,as to do with lack of
expertise.' He saw the provision of political supportasvital:

Any organizationworksvia conflictandI actuallythink the
role of thecivil serviceis at least50 per centto test out
the politicians' ideas ... It was believed by the Labour
Party, as in the Tory Party, that the civil service was too
good at sidetrackingpeople; thereforethere was a need for
more political commitmenton the part of the adviser.

When askedwhethertheconceptof 'Keeperof the Ark of Manifesto' was
appropriate,Pestonreplied,'Yes, very muchso; I regardthat as the
centralrole of advisers- saying,"this is partypolicy. It cannot be
changedwithout goodcause,andcivil servantsnot liking it, is not
really goodcause." I wasa firm believerthatthatwaswhatI wasmost
however,thathis ministerswerekeen that
therefor.' Pestonstressed
the civil servantsshould not feel that they were underminedby
advisers. Perhapsthe clearestexampleof anadviserstatinghis role
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in thesetermscomesfrom Butler (1986): 'A prime function of special
advisers, and to a great extenttheir justification for existence, is
acting as "Keepersof the Ark of the Manifesto"' (pp.14-15).
We notedearlier BarbaraCastle'sbelief in the needfor 'political
reminders' and 'a political conscienceat the heart of the departmental
battle.' Brian Abel-Smith was clearly attunedto this need: 'The object
of a specialadviseris to make surethe minister is giving sufficient
time to the main policy commitmentsof the party and that they are
properly considered.' Another of Castle's advisers,Jack Straw, felt
there was more needto help ministersmaintain the thrust of their
policies at DHSS than Environmentbecause,'there was a high degree of
scepticismat a departmentallevel aboutthe policy of removing pay beds
from the NHS'.
The conceptof ministersin different departmentshaving differing
needs or reasonsfor appointing advisers,was clearly demonstrated by
Stuart Holland. As explainedearlier he was appointedby Judith Hart at
ODM but spent sometime working for Tony Benn at the Department of
Industry on the Industry White Paper. The latter casehe felt presented
an 'encounter situation' betweensomeof the civil servants and the
ministerswho, with their advisers,successfullybattled to ensure that
the committeedrafting the White Paperreflected the policy containedin
the manifesto. Holland claimed it was, 'a classicexampleof the case
for specialadvisers.' The situationwas different at ODM where, 'the
department was basically behindJudith and very glad she was there, so
it was dealing with someindividual issuesasthey came up and pushing
some individual issuesto which the department was more resistant.'
Similarly Tony Banks felt ministersin other departmentswould use
advisersto help maintain the thrust of their policies but this was not
really necessaryfor Judith Hart who was a respectedworld expert on her
subject and was on top of the department. At Industry, Holland, an
expert on the location costsof industry, showed how expertise and
commitment can be combined. He also arguedthat evenwhen a minister
has specialistknowledgeand his departmentwith him, there is still a
role for an adviser. Interviewed whilst a Labour frontbencher he
declared: 'I would want them. At the moment, my Shadow responsibility
is Treasury Affairs. I am a professionaleconomistbut however wide
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one's experienceasa professionaleconomist,there are certain areas
where you needspecialistadvice, or you shouldget secondopinions.'
Provision Q expgrIlse.Holland illustratespoints that becameclear in
the earlier discussion:the provision of committed expertise can be
linked to filling gapsin the knowledgeand experience of the civil
service and/or to commitment to party policies. Many advisers,
including Abel-Smith, Mitchell and Peston, thought the phrase,
'committed expertise'appropriate. Three further examples demonstrate
facets of this concept. Tony Lynes, author of fl
Penguin Guide IQ
SupplementaryBenefits(1972), was appointedby Labour ministersin the
1960sand '70s. He stated:'the reasonI was appointed,basically, was
that I had worked with the peopleconcernedoutsidegovernment
... one
was known to both understand,which is quite important at DHSS, and
sympathizewith, the policies.' Anthony Lester claimed that Roy Jenkins
neededsomebody,
to be in creativetensionwith the department... The immediate
issues involved sex discrimination and race relations
legislation and the policy formation on that. And that was
the areawhereI was an expert. So it was the fact that the
Home Office lackedexperiencein that areaof law, coupled
with the fact that Mr Jenkinsand I sharedcommonvalueswhich
made it a sensiblething to do ... it was the expertise of
someonecommittedto producingthe bestpossiblesex and race
discrimination legislation one could.
The experience of Arthur Cockfield provides a particularly
interesting example. Cockfield, a former postgraduate student of
Hayek, rose rapidly in the Inland Revenueto becomea Commissioner of
the Board. He thenjoined BootseventuallybecomingManaging Director.
His role in helping to deviseTory taxationpolicy in the 1960shas been
described. The policies he helpedto developwere based,he claimed, on
certain principles including a move from direct to indirect taxation.
When he became Tax Adviser, therefore, to his role of providing
political support to help drive through the policies, he brought an
unrivalled combinationof philosophicalcommitment, detailed knowledge
of the policies and an expert administrativespecialismin the subject
matter. More than anybodyelsehis role may be thought of as being Btl
generis and beyondthat of an ordinary specialadviser.
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A number of advisers,including Lynes and Peston, opined that
whilst they were bringing in expertisethis was not necessarilyrequired
becauseof gapsin the servicesprovidedby the department. Similarly
someadvisers,especiallyfrom the CRD, saw themselvesasexpertsin the
policies of the party even thoughthey lackedthe academicor business
backgroundof other experts. In Table 2 the answersto question 14 are
analysed by party in government. For a few key questions the 1979-87
results were further divided into 1979-81and 1982-87but this is not
shown on Table 2. Virtually all the advisersappointedin the 1979-81
period thought of themselvesas being in someway chosen for their
expertise - even if it was relatedto the work in Opposition on
developing party policies. This finding fits nicely with the view of
Patrick Jenkin that Mrs Thatchermadeit known in Opposition that she
was 'opposedto the idea of political advisersto departments. She was
initially very preparedto considerexpert advisers.'
Whilst Jenkin's adviserat the DHSS, Roger Dyson, was an academic
(at Keele University) his specialismwas in the practical issues of
management/industrialrelations within the health service. Through
activities suchas seminarshe had developeda large network of contacts
and claimed that, 'Patrick wantedmy expertise... and wanteda direct
line that hadn't come throughthe official channels,to some of the
senior managersin the servicewhich would havegiven more of a direct
feel for what was happening.' Dyson is, therefore, only a partial
exceptionto the generalargumentdevelopedby Tim Boswell that the Tory
expert special advisers tend to be, like him, practitioners not
academics. This constitutesone of the major distinctionsbetween the
parties in terms of advisersused.
Hew/alternative pj ies. Oneof theTory practitionerswas Tom Baron,
ManagingDirector of Christian Salvesen(Properties)Ltd. Appointed by
the new Secretary of Statefor the Environment, Baron felt that
Heseltine thought he had original ideas: '"you're the burr under the
saddle", he said.' Baron was put to work within the objectives set by
Heseltine, including getting value for money, improving and easing the
planning system,and improving the productionof housing for the bottom
end of the market. Baron's role is one of the clearestexamplesof how
the provision of expertisecan overlap with the introduction of new and
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Findings on Reasons for Acpointment-Percentage
TABLE L. Questionnaire
Response Broken Down b§yParty in Government. L= Labour 74-79 (N=40)

T= Tories 79-87 (N=29)
14)

Various reasons have been suggested for the appointment of special
In the case of your appointment, what importance do you
advisers.
think
to each of the following:
was attached by the minister
Substen
tial

a) Relieve the overload of

Consid

Moder

erable

ate

Slight

NegLig
ible

17

20

28

29

10

16

39

13

22

28

36

8

17

11

6

16

22

14

13

16

23

15

19

23

11

37

13

19

14

L6

business on ministers.

T
b) Provide political

support,

within the departments
staffed by "neutral"
civil
servants, to ministers
wishing to introduce

L
T

------------------------------------------19
47
12

changes.
c) Fill any gaps in the
knowledge or experience
of the civil
service with
experts committed to the
of the party.
policies
d) Help ministers
carry
a more effective
collective
role in

L
T

17

30

17

..........................................
26
32
13

out

cabinet.

L
T

26

21

15

-----------------------------------------16
10
32

e) Prevent ministers drifting
away from the party by
liaising
with the various
sections of the party.

L5

29

T3

.........................................
39
26

18

f) Help the ministers with
the presentation of their L
views an departmental and
T
general issues.

24

33

24

5

56

19

16

09

L

11

31

35

8

T

.........................................
26
33
30

L

18

T

.........................................
19
31
88

p) Provide new/alternative
policy ideas.

h) Reducethe isolation of
ministers by playing an
aide/confidant rote.

32

18

15

74

25

7
34

alternative thinking. Provision of suchthinking can equally be linked
to the themeof supplyingpolitical supportand doing so within the
context of the featuresof the placeof specialadvisers developed in
Chapter 3. ThusFrancesMorrell, one of Tony Benn's advisers, thought
that, 'providing political supportwithin the department was very
important - we formed a political communityround the minister
... the
essential point is to give the Secretaryof Statethe opportunity of
alternative sources of advicewithin his working life and within the
framework of the Official SecretsAct. '
Cabinet briefing. Item (g) of question14, provision of new/alternative
policy ideas,was analysedout of order here becauseof its overlap with
the linked items (b) and (c) but it is now useful to return to the
questionsaslisted in Tables 1 and 2. The answersto question 14d) on
helping ministerspreparefor Cabinet,include someby advisers whose
role almost entirely involved working on papers from their own
departmentto be discussedin Cabinet. For most advisers,however, the
briefing was mainly to help preparetheir minister for non-departmental
issues. Someadvisers,including the economistDavid Metcalf, felt this
was the main reasonfor their original appointment. In his case he
thought the minister, StanOrme, was particularly interestedin briefing
for economic issues, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
discussionsbeing very important. Vicky Kidd, echoingcommentsfrom Ted
Short, thoughtthat one of her two principal dutiesentailed providing,
'input into considerationof other departments'papersfor Cabinet and
its committees.' The greateremphasisplacedon this role by Labour
rather than Tory ministersis reflectedin the Table - it was noticeably
less important for Tories after 1981. However, there were still some
Tory advisersin this period who thoughtit was a most important reason,
including Michael Dobbs- appointedby Norman (now Lord) Tebbit. For
quite a numberof advisersthis was not a reasonfor their appointment.
Party liaison. Many advisersthoughtthat the secondpart of 14e) liaising with the party - was more appropriatethan the first part which
suggestedthat this was necessaryto prevent ministers drifting away
from the party. This probably helpsto explain why so few advisers
thought it was substantiallya reasonfor their appointment. A few
Labour specialadvisersthought it would be more appropriateto suggest
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that a reasonfor appointmentwas to preventthe party from drifting
away from the minister. RogerLiddle arguedthat, 'liaison with the
party was very muchpart of my activities but the purposeof liaison was
keepinghim in line
to do it from Bill's point of view
... rather than
with the Labour Party.' Adviserswho knew from the start that party
liaison had beena reasonfor their appointmentinclude David Hill and
David Lipsey. Hill mirrored Roy Hattersley'scommentquotedearlier by
saying: 'Correspondingwith the party was one of the things I knew I was
going to haveto do.' According to Lipsey, 'squaring Transport House
was a major part of thejob - brokering the endlessparty committees.'
Labour adviserswho thoughtparty liaison was an important reason for
their appointmentinclude: Tony Banks,MargaretBeckett, John Lyttle,
Tom McNally, FrancesMorrell, andJackStraw. Generally they worked for
the ministers, referredto earlier, who playedan important role within
the party's NEC structure. However, about40 per cent of advisers to
Labour ministersdid not think that this was at all a reasonfor their
appointment.
Question 14e) was so phrased partly to reflect the opinion
expressedby DouglasHurd in the quotation at the start of this chapter,
about encouragingministersto haveadvisersbecausehe could see them
losing touch with colleagues,the party, and the political strategy of
the Government. John Copeagreedthat liaison with the party was part
of the main reasonfor his original appointmentwhich was to assist his
minister, John Davies, with the political side of his role. The post1979 Tory advisers who felt this was an important reason for their
appointment were more likely to have a CRD background. John Houston,
for example,was appointedby the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey
(now Lord) Howe, who was generallyanxiousto retain his contacts with
the domesticpolitical sceneand specifically wantedsomebody to work
with the party in the preparationof the manifesto for the European
elections. Again, however, someof the Tories thought that the second
part of question 14e)was more appropriatethan the first. The notion

of theadviseroperatingalonglinesof communication
on behalfof his
minister was capturedin theevocativephraseof David Colemanwho
thought someministersregardedthemainfunctionof advisersas being
a, 'pot of political greaseandlubricant,relievingthem of tiresome
and time consumingchores.'
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Once again, Environmentsuppliesa clear exampleof the need felt
by certain ministers to appoint somebody capable of liaising with
councillors and knowledgeableaboutlocal government. Peter Davis
recalled that whenhe wasappointedin 1984the incoming Minister for
Local Government, KennethBaker, saidhe wantedhim, 'to liaise with
Conservative local governmentgroupsin the trouble spotsthat he was
taking on - the abolition areas,the rate-cappingareas- because he
knew that I knew a lot of the people.'
Presentation Helping ministerswith presentation,question 14f), comes
out strongly as a major reasonfor appointment. This compareswell with
the evidencefrom interviews. Onceagain the figures for Tory advisers
appointed in 1979-81are closerto thoseof the Labour advisers than
they are to thoseof the Tories after 1981. Richard Ehrman was clear
that speechwriting was one of the main reasonsfor his appointment in
1984 becauseTom King, Secretaryof Statefor Employment, set him a
selection test. Ehrmanhad to write a speech,and a job description
outlining what he thoughthe could offer. Othershavebeenclear that
speechwriting was a major reasonfor their appointment:
the basicconceptof the political adviserat that stage was
to help with speechwriting (RobertJacksonappointedin 1973
by Maurice Macmillan).
It was a political battle which was being fought through press
releasesand speeches.It was a matterof winning the battle
in the country for policies which were pretty unpopular at the
I was specifically brought in to do that. (Robin
time
Harris,...appointedin 1981by Geoffrey Howe).
Basically he said, 'I needsomeonewho can help me to write
' That was what I was takenon for. (Christopher
speeches.
Mockler, appointedin 1983by Patrick Jenkin).

Departmentswill concedemosteasilythatan adviser has a
role in helpingwith presentation
andParliamentaryaffairs.
(EdwardBickham).
I was brought in initially mainly to write speechesfor
Lawson. (RodneyLord, appointed1983).

Speechwriting is somethingwhichwill alwayscometop of the
list of prioritieswhenministersaretelling specialadvisers
what they want done. (David Coleman,appointedby Leon
Brittan, 1985).
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Several of thesecommentscorrelatevery well with the needs expressed
by ministers including Hurd, Jenkin, and Brittan. For some of the
advisers quotedabove,and others,help with presentationas a reason
for appointment meantmore than speechwriting. Michael Dobbs, who
continued to work part time asa director of Saatchiand Saatchi, was
appointedpartly to assistNormanTebbit plan how to presentthe caseso
as to changethe way peopleperceivedthe Government'srole in dealing
with unemployment. That help with presentationis now seen as being
perhaps the major reasonfor a minister wishing to appoint a special
adviser, was highlighted by a spoof 'job description' for a special
Times Diary 26 August 1988: 'Do you have a
adviser appearingin the f
keen interest in legal affairs? Are you creative? Are you tactful?
Most important, do you want to relieve civil servantsof the onerousjob
of writing speechesfor an increasingly publicity-conscious Lord
Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfern? If you fit the frame, apply to
becomethe latestof Whitehall's "special advisers."'
Aide/confidant. About a third of Tory advisersansweringquestion 14h)
thought that acting as an aide/confidantto reduce the isolation of
ministers was not in the slightesta reason for their appointment.
Furthermore, there are particular difficulties with the aide/confidant
role in distinguishinghow far it becamea function of special advisers
as opposedto being an original reason. Nevertheless,it was clearly in
the mind of Anthony (now Lord) Barber who, Brendon Sewill recalled,
telephoned him whilst he was on holiday in France and asked him to
become his 'alter ego'. Barber had not been Shadow Chancellor.
Therefore, being askedto takeover the Treasury on the death of lain
Macleod only a few weeksafter the return of the 1970 Conservative
Government, he felt, accordingto Sewill, he wanted somebody at his
right handwho knew how and why the policies were developed. Sewill was
Director of the CRD and this appointment illustrates how the
aide/confidantrole can overlap with other reasonsfor appointment.

in which a relationship
There area rangeof othercircumstances
betweenthe ministerandadvisercanalreadyhave developedand the
aide/confidantrole clearlybe seenasa reasonfor appointment. Some
advisers,including Vicky Kidd, DavidLipsey,and Tom McNally, who
worked for their ministersin Opposition,thoughtthis important, with
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Lipsey referring to, 'the ageold needfor somebody to be on the
minister's side - the totally loyal aide role.' Kidd mirrored the
comments noted earlier from Ted Short, and McNally described it as,
'just this rather intangible ... somebodyto talk to outside the
machine.'
Certain ministersappoint peopleknown to them in ways other than
through their work in the researchdepartment or on party policy
committees. Sometimessuchadvisers,including Elizabeth Thomaswho was
assistantliterary editor of the Nrm Statesmanbefore being appointedby
Michael Foot in 1976, believethat the aide/confidantrole was in the
minister's mind initially. Echoing the views of Judith Hart, her
minister, Maggie Sidgreavesthought she was appointed to continue
playing a 'confidante' role that haddevelopedover the years.
The views of three Labour ministers, Benn, Castle,and Shore, that
ministerial isolation is a reasonfor appointing advisers have been
followed through from writings prior to the appointments to agreement
retrospectively that theseopinions influencedtheir actions. Several
of their advisers also thought this wasa major reason - the most
important one accordingto David Cowling. Michael Artis, an economist
appointed for one day a weekby Peter Shoreat Trade, believed Shore
wantedsomebodywith economicstraining who was a non-civil servant and
politically sympathetic,'to discuss,in the role of a confidant, the
economic papers and his interpretationof what civil servants were
doing.' This statementreflectsa similar convergenceof themesto that
contained in Shore's 1966quotationgiven earlier. Brian Abel-Smith
argued that giving ministersthe feeling that they have a friend to
discuss things with was, 'an inevitablefunction and of courseto give
them supportand to tell them, "you were right and you had to do it. "'
Both Abel-Smith and Straw worked for Castleand Shore. Straw's evidence
is particularly interestingbecauseit combinesexperienceas an adviser

with thatof a shadowminister:
having somebody who is a confidant is important because
politics at a seniorlevel is a very isolatedbusinessand it
is egocentric. It ought not to be, but it is there, anyway
peopleare very competitive ... evenin the ShadowCabinet you
can be isolated in terms of policy decisions, but in
Governmentyou are physically isolatedfrom people.
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One of Tony Benn's advisers, Ken Griffin, also remarked on the
importance for ministers of talking with somebody who was not a
permanent civil servant. FrancesMorrell, however, observed that she
was an adviser: 'that was specifically the role -I never saw myself as
an aide.' Nevertheless,her stresson building a political community
around the minister was notedearlier.
In some instances what a minister claimed were his reasons
correlated very poorly with the perceptionsof his advisers. Overall,
however, the findings from the questionnairereinforce the picture of
ministers possessinga wide variety of reasonsand generally varying
from eachother both in specificrequirementsand in levels of awareness
of their needs.

Ministers'Reasons
as=

by Civil 3ervants.

In general, and in many specific cases,civil servants' assessmentof
why ministersthought they neededadvisersmatchedthose of ministers
and advisers. A small numberof the many examplesthat could be given
illustrate this. David Edmonds,asprincipal private secretary, was
present at the meetingwhenMichael Heseltinedecidedto appoint Tom
Baron. Edmonds argued that the new Conservative Government was
determined to havea fresh look at issuessuchas the planning system,
the way housingwas administeredand giving a bigger role to the private
sector. Baron wasappointedbecausethe contributionshe was making at
the meeting with the Volume Builders StudyGroup, 'impressed Michael
Heseltine

For a Secretary of State faced with that set of
...
objectives, the additional knowledgeand backgroundthat someone from
the private sectorcould bring we hopedwould be invaluable, and that,

in fact, provedto be thecase.'
DouglasHurd's view on theneedfor advisersto help maintain
contact not only with thepartybut also informally with interest
groups,illustratesthe modeldevelopedin Chapter3. Furthermore,Home
Office ministers (includingJenkins,Brittan and Hurd) and their
advisers(including Robin Harris, Colemanand Bickham) referred to
assistancewith presentation
asbeinga reasonfor their appointment.
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Sir Brian Cubbon, former permanentsecretaryat the Home Office 1979-88,
linked thesepoints and he agreedthat John Harris could be seen as a
precursorof the specialadvisers. He suggestedthat,
the whole accountability of ministers to the public was
transformed in the sixties; the media interest became
intense
had to have a line on everything and the old
... you
civil serviceapproachrather crumbledwhen you said, 'nothing
to do with us, it is a matterfor the chief constable'.
Ministers then, rightly, wanteda different range of, ...not
necessarily views on policy but, views on how to deal with
interest groupsaswell as the media. In my experienceof it
in the Home Office that was the trigger for the special
adviser, and in parallel, almostat the sametime, the growing
importanceof junior ministers.
Working asa Treasurycivil servantin 1979David Willetts (later a
member of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit, Director of the Centre for
Policy Studies,and ConservativeMP) thoughtadviserswere brought in
becausethey had helpeddeveloppolicy in Opposition. Ministers wanted
top grade understandersrather than second grade believers in the
permanent bureaucracy. The fear was not whetheror not officials were
believers but whetherall the civil servantswould understand, after
working for Labour ministers,what it was the new Governmentwanted to
achieve. Therefore, in 1979, there was a role for advisers to help
transmit the messageand further developpolicies.
In general, severalthemesemergequite strongly from the analysis
of officials' perceptionsof ministers' reasons. First, quite a few
ministers were thought to want to appoint somebodywho had a personal
and/or political loyalty to themand had perhapsworked with them in
Opposition. Thus Lord Brimelow, former permanent secretary at the
Foreign Office, thoughtthat the civil serviceattitude was that they
must not be disloyal to minister A, but if they were actively loyal to A
how could they be actively loyal to his successorB who might hold
diametrically opposedviews. However, 'A and B want loyalty to them,
not abstentionfrom disloyalty to them. That is the basisfor wanting
political advisers.' Second,someofficials thought it went one stage
further and that ministers,especiallyinitially, were, to varying
degrees,worried about the bureaucracy. Someofficials believedit was
outright suspicion,whilst for others, including the late Sir Hamilton
Whyte of the Foreign Office, 'ministers tend naturally to be a bit wary
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of their officials certainly when they first arrive in the department
becausethey are so heavily dependenton them, and they don't want to be
taken over by themtotally. ' Third, severalofficials admitted that
ministers wanted somebody to bring an expertisethat they felt was
lacking in the department.
Fourth, many civil servantssuggestedthat ministers appointed
advisers to inject party political thinking into policy discussions
and/or to liaise with the party. Sir DouglasWass, former permanent
secretaryat the Treasury, claimedthat,
Ministers may feel that civil service advisers, though
perfectly competentat evaluatingand implementingpolicy free
from party political considerations,needto be reinforced by
somebody,who has got a closer knowledge of what party
susceptibities might be ... It is helpful to a minister, I
think, to havesomeonewho is looking at the activities of the
department throughpolitical spectacles Of course, he's
... he doesn't have
doing it himself but he's often sobusy that
time to maintain all the contactswith the backbenches,the
party researchoffices, or with the party bureaucracy,and the
specialadvisercan do that for him.
This themepartly overlapswith the first and also with the fifth reason
mentioned by a numberof officials - help with presentation. Speeches
to political audiencesand the political contentof other speecheswere
the aspectsof presentationthat adviserswere seenas most likely to
have beenappointedto provide.
Several of theseoverlappingthemesemerged in Andrew Semple's
assessmentof why Tony Crosland,the Secretary of State for the
Environment to whom he was principal private secretary,appointed David
Lipsey. He felt that Croslandassumedas a matter of course that he
would want Lipsey to help him with the political end of his duties.
This was to deal not only with party mattersbut,
particularly with the sensitivitiesof the Labour Party in
relation to both personalities and the way policy is
developed. He was afraid he would not find within the DoE,

from the civil service,a properunderstanding
of that
There would be speecheswith a political contentto ...be
drafted And someone
to talk to abouttheway his thinking
... in
was going politicalandphilosophicalterms as well as
in practicalandimplementation
terms.
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Some officials, however, felt it was difficult to know why
ministers hadappointedadvisers. A few felt advisershad almost become
a status symbol. Yet otherssuggestedthat the main reason for
or pressureapplied to the minister
appointment was the encouragement
rather than his own assessment
of needs.
SECTION Q;. APPOINTMENT QE SPECIAL ADVISERS FDR REASONS
OTHER THAN NEEDS PERCEIVED BY MINISTERS.
In Section A we saw that it is not sufficient merely to examine the
reasons in terms of ministers' perceptionsof their needs. In some
cases a specific analysisof needswas the prime factor. In others,
consideration of needsplayed somepart, but a range of organizations
and individuals who believedministersneeded special advisers also
influenced the decision. This sectionexploresthe nature of this
influence and who exertedit.
The influence ranges from specific pressure on individual
ministers, to the generationof a climate of opinion that ministers
should appoint specialadvisersand the creationof opportunities for
them to do so. It wasprimarily associatedwith Number Ten and with the
party, but outside commentatorsand the civil service occasionally
played a role. Thesepoints are examinedin mainly chronological order
and the emphasiswill be on the assistancethat other organizations and
people thought the ministersneeded. However, it is sometimesdifficult
to disentanglethis from the reformsthat an organization,such as the
party bureaucracy,was advocatingbecauseit perceivedthem to be in its
own best interests.
In 1964 a Fabian Working Group produced a pamphlet, Ilig
Administrators. claiming that if an incoming governmentwas to be able
to, 'succeed in devising, presenting, and executing new policies'
(p.41), there was a needfor, 'explicit provision for two types of
political appointment- expertswho are called in to help to implement
the particular policies of the governmentof the day, and personalaides
to provide generalhelp to Ministers in their private office. ' (p.42)

The expertswouldbe wantedfor their expertiserather than general
political advice andmightnot evenbe associated
with the party in
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power. It was thought that there was alreadyadequateformal provision
for temporaryappointments,althoughthe Labour Governmentwould needto
make fuller useof them than someprecedinggovernments. The reasoning
behind the secondtype of political appointmentwas that ministers,
may feel the needto havenearthem personswhosepersonaland
political judgment, as well as expertise,they trust ... a
Minister would be able to make a number of outside
appointments- up to say, three or four - asassistantsin his
private office ... they would not make administrative
decisions; they would be there to assist the Minister in
making useof the machineto formulatepolicy (p.40).
The Working Group did not proposethat suchappointmentsshould be made
automatically in all departments. They also advocated greater
recruitment of specialistsinto the civil serviceand wanted them to be
more widely usedat a policy-making level.
In practice, Labour ministersappointedmany expertsand encouraged
greater recruitment and betterdeploymentof specialists. In both
cases, these were predominantlyeconomists. Only the appointment of
John Harris clearly fitted the second category of political
appointments. Paradoxically,the three ministerswho appointed him Patrick Gordon Walker, Michael Stewartand Roy Jenkins- were probably
on more harmoniousterms with their civil servantsthan were many other
ministers. This paradox,which was notedby Jenkins, shows that the
appointment of advisers should not be seensolely as a response to
presumedcivil serviceobstruction. There was no encouragementfrom the
Prime Minister for ministersto make outside appointments to their
private offices. Shortly before he becamePrime Minister in 1964,
Harold Wilson was askedby Norman Hunt whetherthere was a case for a
minister having, 'his own private little cabinet'. He replied,

My own experience,
havingtried asa ministerto bring in one
or two outsideexpertswith theright political approach,was
that I did far betterwhenI reliedon loyal civil servants
who knewwhatI wanted,in my privateoffice, andwho saw to
it thatthe restof thedepartment
knewwhatI wanted (Hunt,
1964,p. 18).
Nevertheless,someconsideration
wasgivenby variousministersto the
introductionof a politicalcabinet. BarbaraCastlerecordedin her
Diaries(1984)thaton 13 April 1970shediscussed
the ideawith a group
of civil servants.However,noneof the ministersintroducedone. The
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reasons for this were explained,andjustified, in Wilsonian terms by
the arch critic of the civil service, Richard Crossman:
The danger is, if you bring in two or three people to a
British Department, they may merely isolate you from the
Department. You sit there with them and the Department makes
sure nothing happens. A total frigidity sets in because
Departmentsare very hostileto foreign elements, and they
feel very strongly that the link betweena Minister and his
Department is not somethingthat he must introduce from
outside ... I am reluctantly convinced after six years'
experience that if you want to get your way in a Department
the worse thing you canpossibly do is to say, 'I trust you so
little that I am bringing with me four of my own people from
outsidewho will be my Private Office. ' (1972, pp.68-9).

The Labour Party, asdistinct from the Labour Government,continued
to advocate both typesof political appointment. It did so in its
evidenceto Fulton quotedearlier. The party recommendedthat ministers
shouldhave the right to appointpersonalassistantsbecausethe load on
the political headof a departmenthad grown greaterand the result was
that, 'a Minister can be a lonely man' (1968, Vol. 5 (2), p. 665). The
evidence suggestedpersonalassistantsmight havethree functions: to
help with departmentalpolicy formulation by keepingthe minister in
touch with what was going on in the department;to brief the minister on
cabinet agenda items and to liaise with members of other ministers'
cabinets and thus form a network to parallel the informal link between
officials; and to transmitthe policy impulse from the minister to
officials working in the departmentwho never saw him. The Fulton
Report welcomedthe practice of ministersbringing in a small number of
expertsbut did not lend its supportto the introduction of ministerial
cabinets(1978, Vol. 1, paras. 129 and 285).

Tory thinkingin Oppositionin the 1960saboutthe needto reform
the machinery-of-government
partlyreflectedthediscontentwith the
by someLabourministers.However, the main
civil service expressed
impulse for appointingoutsiderscamein the form of the push for the
Businessmen'sTeam to be brought into governmentand for the
of the CPRS. In 1970therewaslittle, if any, concerted
establishment
pressureon ministersto introducepolitical secretariesand it is
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difficult fully to supportRose'scontentionthat, 'the Conservative
government of 1970 moved to strengthenthe influence of party by
appointing a group of men to act aspolitical secretariesor special
advisers to senior ministers.' (1974, p.451). He also suggeststhat
they were, 'not intendedto becomeinvolved in the administration of
policies, but rather, to strengthenthe party element in the
presentation of policies and the partisandefinition of the minister's
mind within his department.' (p.421). It is correct that there had
been, as noted earlier, an unprecedented
effort by the Tories in
Oppositionto developpolicies. This work, reassessed
recently by many
of the participantsin a ContemporaryRecordsymposium(1990), produced
particularly detailedpolicies on taxation, trade union reform, and the
organization of central government. Furthermore, advisers were
appointedby ministersdealingwith eachof thesekey areas.
When these and other appointmentsare examined individually,
however,it is difficult to seethemaspart of a systematicattempt to
strengthen the influence of the party. Robert Carr's opposition to
advisers in generalwas noted, as was his explanationof the peculiar
circumstancesthat led to his appointingStephenAbbot. Carr felt that
in the ConservativeParty, there was, 'a gradual, evolutionary growth of
bringing people in, rather than a conscious policy to do so.'
Commenting on his appointmentof Miles Hudson in 1971,Lord Home said
he, 'never viewed it as part of the developmentof a system.' And
Hudson, despitehaving beenheadof overseasaffairs at CRD, said that
once he becamepolitical secretaryto the Foreign Secretary,his links
with the party machine,'were rather tenuous.' A similar point has
already beennotedin the casesof Mark Schreiberand Brendon Sewill,
and the latter was not brought in at the start of the Government. The
adviser appointedby Chancellorlain Macleod immediately following the
1970election, was Arthur Cockfield, but, becauseof his experience and
career, he felt his role bore 'little resemblence'to that of the other
advisers. Finally, DouglasHurd believedhis appointmentas Political
Secretary to the Prime Minister was much more in the tradition of
personal appointments by the Prime Minister, than it was part of the
developmentof a system.

David Howellillustratestheparadoxof advisersbeing introduced
by the party leadersin
partly to help implementpoliciesdeveloped
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Opposition, but not really being seenasa strengtheningof the role of
the party. Commentinggenerallyon appointmentsmadeby the incoming
ConservativeGovernmenthe said:
The party,in thosedaysdidn't come into Conservativepolitics
the way it cameinto politics of the left ... it was basically
an organizational ideaand what we felt we were doing was
adding an organizationalthrust... There were certain policies
which the Conservativeshad dreamedup, of tax reform, of
trade union reform, of organizationalreform
We were
...
anxious to get thosethrough, and in so far as it was felt
that the civil servicemachinewasn't going to help too much
with that, then we thought that ministersshould have extra
eyes and earsin the form of researchappointees. But there
was never a mentionanywhereof a senseof a party line, and
we havegot to get it through.

Nevertheless, in 1970,accordingto Hurd in An End IQ Promises,
there was a determinationthat there shouldnot be a repeatof what had
happened at the end of the Macmillan Governmentin 1963. Then, there
had been, 'a generalfeeling in the ConservativeParty that Ministers
had drifted out of touch with their own supporters in the country,
partly becausethere was not enoughregular contact between Ministers
and Central Office' (1979, p. 93). Machinery was establishedin 1970to
try to ensure there was not a repeatbut Hurd does not mention the
political secretariesin this context. However, he doespoint out that
the reason why seniorparty advisersalwaysfeel that their advice
begins to carry less weight when the party entersGovernment is that,
'The Official SecretsAct and (far more important) the entrenchedhabits
of Whitehall turn the familiar friend into an occasional acquaintance'
(p.94). For William Waldegrave, who became Hurd's assistant as
Political Secretaryto Prime Minister Heathand was intended eventually
to succeed, 'the key to the rise of the political adviser is the
Official SecretsAct. ' He referred to, 'the well-known phenomenon of
the party advisersbeing excludedfrom any up to date knowledge and
therefore, the rapid outdating of any advicethey gave.' Having been
close to party spokesmanin Opposition,the people remaining in CRD
resented the way they were, 'steadily edgedout by the civil service
using the secrecybarrier ... thereforethejobs were getting boring and

'
sothey thoughtcouldn'tthey getinsidethe departments
somehow.
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Perhaps it was this pressure,combinedwith both the concern to
maintain thrust and the degreeof effort devotedto developing detailed
policies in Opposition,that led to the creationof a climate of opinion
in which a numberof individual decisionswere taken to appoint advisers
in 1970-71.
One of the projectssuggestedby the Businessmen'sTeam following
the election was a review of the organization of ministers' private
offices. Behind this proposallay a desireto examinethe advantagesof
the French cabinetsystemand seewhetherprivate offices could include
experienced political aidesaswell aspermanentofficials. The civil
service, 'resisted this proposaland its supporters were unable to
persuade the Prime Minister of its desirability.' (Pollitt, 1980,
pp.88-9). Mark SchreiberandTony Hart had beensentto Paris to report
on the adaptabilityof the cabin systemto British purposes. Their
finding, according to Hennessy,'was surprisingly wishy-washy - "If
British Ministers feel the needfor some personal reinforcement
...
there are featuresof the cabinetsystemwhich could be adaptedto fill
the need" - and nothing happened.' (1989, p.238).
As notedby Hurd, there was concernin 1970that the party and the
Governmentshouldnot drift apart. Inevitably this beganto happen and
he became so concernedaboutit that he senta paper to the Prime
I4 Government. In it he
Minister entitled, Tg Patty asA
developed the theme that, 'There seemsto be greater difficulty in
getting Ministers to think politically abouttheir daily problems. As a
result there is a tendencyin the Party to criticize the Private Office
and PressDepartmentsof Ministers who sometimesappearto keep them in
a sort of cocoon, over-protectedfrom the outsideworld. ' (1979, pp.945). Hurd's anxiety about the lack of coordinationbetweenministers and
between the Governmentand the party, especiallyover the presentation
of policy, echoed earlier fears expressedby John Wyndham from
Conservative Central Office in 1951. (Egremont, 1968). In 1972-3
Hurd's concernled him, as explainedin the quotation at the start of
this chapter, to encouragemore ministers to appoint political
secretaries. He played a part in the subsequentappointment of John
Cope and Robert Jackson by John Davies and Maurice Macmillan
respectively.
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When the Labour Party produced Labour's Programme fQt Britain in
1972, its thinking was similar to before but went one stage further than
the evidence to Fulton and advocated the full French system of cabinets.
According to a party official then working at Transport House, the
introduction of special advisers, 'was part of the policy discussions
leading up to the '74 election. ' There would be a group of people, 'to
maintain links with the party and provide a form of alternative advice

to the minister. We were alreadyawarethat Cabinetpaperswere often
circulated late, and that ministerscould be isolated,becausewe found
this in the '64-'70 period.'

Barbara Castlerecords(1980) that at the very start of the 1974
Labour GovernmentHarold Wilson told the NEC of the Labour Party:
"My job is to be the custodianof the Manifesto. I have already recruited a
political teamat No. 10 which will haveaccessto all the documents. I
am asking all my colleaguesto appoint political advisers to their
private office"'. (Diary entry, 6 March 1974). It is important to assess
how, and why, the thinking in the party was translatedinto the adoption
of special advisersin 1974in a way that had not fully occurred in
1964.
One factor, again demonstratingthe appropriateness
of the 1970
starting date for this study, was that Labour noticed the developments
made by the Tories. The party official recalled, 'we were quite
impressedby the usethey madeof them.' Similarly, Harold Wilson (1976,
p.98) suggestsspecialadvisersrepresenteda formalization of a step
started under the Tories: 'Referencehasbeenmadeto Edward Heath's
political appointments,someof whom were integratedin to the official
machine as full-time, thoughtemporary, civil servants. The incoming
Labour Governmentin 1974regularizedthe position by treating them as a
specialcategoryof "political advisers."'

Perhapsmoreimportantly,a climateof opinionhadbeencreated in
which it wasfelt thatthecivil servicehadbeenpartly to blame for
between1964-70.This view was
the failuresof theLabourGovernment
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cogently expressedby Marcia Williams in the passagesquoted earlier
from Inside NumberIQ. She went on to claim:
During the Oppositionyearsfrom 1970to 1974Labour carefully
introduced into eachShadowMinister's office a political
administrativeassistant. Many camefrom the Rowntree Trust.
Others were personallyrecruited. All trained for the day
when Labour would return to power. They trained to becomethe
political earsand eyesof their Minister. Since 1974 they
have becomea formidableteamof able men and women keeping
ministersinformed of political developments,and maintaining
political contactsthroughoutWhitehall and the country, and
watching the work of their departmentsfor political content
(p.284).

It is here that the greatestdifficulty arises in distinguishing
between the generation of a climate of opinion, the creation of
opportunities and the exertion of pressure. One of the Rowntree
Political Fellows, Roger Darlington, wrote of Marcia Williams's claim:
It was not like that at all. There were almost no assistants
until 1972, and thosewho arrived then never took it for
grantedthat they would be moving into Whitehall. Indeed the
concept of Political Advisers was barely discussed ... The
surprising point is that this most important constitutional
innovationdusthappened. It was not exactly an accident,but
it was certainly not planned(p. 12).
Darlington stressedthat the impetusfor the introduction of political
advisers came from the action of theJosephRowntree Social Services
Trust in offering the Political Fellowships. Influenced by the
Secretary of the Trust, Pratap (now Lord) Chitnis, the Directors took
the view that party political spokesmenin Parliamentdid not have the
day-to-day political back-upwhich they required and that, in terms of
research,Oppositionpartieswere at a substantialdisadvantagecompared
to the Governmentwhich had the full resourcesof the civil service.
The Political Fellowshipsallocatedto the Parliamentary Labour Party
were awardedto RogerDarlington, Adrian Ham, Vicky Kidd, David Lipsey
and Matthew Oakeshott. They worked for Merlyn Rees,Denis Healey, Ted
Short, Tony Croslandand Roy Jenkinsrespectively, eachof whom joined
the Cabinet in 1974, in the post which they had been shadowing.
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Therefore, Darlington concludes,'it was a totally natural process for
these five Rowntree peopleto be taken into Whitehall as Political
Advisers' (p. 10). This implies that it was the creation of
opportunitiesto appointpeople, rather than any central planning, which
was the major outsideinfluencein theseministers' decisionto appoint
advisers.
The extentto which the RowntreeFellows expectedto be taken into
Government with their ministersvaried. WhereasVicky Kidd did not
remember the issue featuringat all before the election campaign,
Matthew Oakeshottsaid, 'we never discussedit particularly but it was
assumedthat obviously that was the logic of it. ' Adrian Ham felt that,
'it wasn't assumedto be absolutelyautomatic ... amongstthe Rowntree
Fellows it was regardedas quite a likely situation.' In early 1974
Labour politicians had not beenexpectingto fight an election - let
alone, as David Lipsey said, form a Government - and so detailed
planning had not begun. Asked whetherhe had assumedhe would take
Darlington in with him when Labour were next in Government, Rees
replied, 'I don't think I did ... I didn't think we were going to win
the next election soI hadn't really thoughtahead.'

The contrastbetweenthepreparations
made by the two Labour
politicians who both wrotein June1973of the need for political
advisers,BennandCastle,illustratesthe difficultiesin interpreting
the factors behind the expansionof specialadvisers in 1974. Two
entries in Benn's Diaries (1989) indicate the extent of his
preparations. On 17 March 1973, he wrote, Bish, Jackson and Holland,
'came in to tidy up the industrial policy paper. I had prepareda great
chart showing what our objectives were and adding equality and
redistribution of power underthe generalheadingof "A fundamental and
irreversible transferof power and wealth", as the main objective of the
next Labour Government. We have also includedan advisory structure
whereby Ministers would havepersonalcabinetsattachedto them.' Six
months later, the entry for 21 Septemberstates: 'I offered Frances
Morrell a job as political adviserin my departmentif we won the next
Election.'

Strongevidenceof thelimitationson whateverplanningtheremight
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have been comes from BarbaraCastle. Despiteher firm advocacy of
political advisersshe was not a shadowminister in the run-up to the
election and had nobodypencilled in for the slot. She was surprised
when Harold Wilson said that ministersshould make such appointments.
Jack Straw, whosenamewas suggestedto Mrs Castleby her husband, was
equally taken abackwhen first askedto fill the position.
After Harold Wilson told ministersthey should appoint special
advisers,Transport House(Labour Party headquarters)offered to second
staff (Rose, 1974). Eventually four specialadvisers were recruited
from there - Ann Carlton, MargaretJackson,Tom McNally and Terry Pitt.
However, there was no suggestionthat Transport House were exerting
pressure on ministersto adopt specialadvisers. Indeed its position
seems to have been rather ambivalent; Darlington (p.40) quoted a
newspaperreport in Autumn 1974claiming that staff in the Labour Party
Research Departmentin Transport Housefelt, 'peeved' about political
advisers and were worried that they, 'might act as a buffer between
Ministers and the generalparty.'
Harold Wilson, in his statementto Commonwealth Heads of
Government, explained that there were two main reasons behind the
political advisersexperiment. The first was the pressureof work on
ministerswhich madeit almostimpossiblefor a minister to, 'carry out
his departmental and political responsibilitiesand at the same time
sustaina detailedanalysisof all the various nuancesof policy ... he
finds it increasingly difficult to play a constructive part in the
collective businessof the Governmentas a whole' (1976, p. 202). The
secondreasonwas the natureof the civil servicewhich, becauseof its
permanence, 'can becomeisolatedfrom changesof mood and structure in
our society.' He summedup the casethus:

The PoliticalAdviseris an extrapair of hands,earsandeyes
and a mind morepoliticallycommittedand more politically
awarethanwouldbe availableto a Ministerfrom thepolitical
neutrals in the establishedCivil Service. This is
particularlytruefor a radicalreformingpartyin government,
since,'neutralism'mayeasilyslip in to conservatism
with a
small 'c' (Wilson,1976,p.204).
In addition to Marcia Williams, other key figures around Wilson who
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advocatedthe useof specialadvisersincludedhis press secretary from
1969-76, Joe Haines. In 1977he wrote, 'it is essentialto the future
of democraticgovernment,I believe, that Ministers should have access
to more than one sourceof expert advice, particularly from those who
are not civil servants'(p.39).
The pressurefrom NumberTen went further than merely generating a
climate of opinion that was favourableto special advisers. Bernard
Donoughue is thoughtto havepersuadedseveralministersin both the
Wilson and CallaghanGovernmentsto makeappointments. In some cases
ministers, including Stan Orme in 1976, readily agreed when the
suggestionwas made, but there were otherswhere Donoughuehad to exert
whateverpressurehe could before the minister agreed. He was keen that
there shouldbe advisersin asmany departmentsas possible. Some of
the Labour ministers, however, refusedto recruit. The combination of
the attitude towardsthe civil serviceexpressedby Marcia Williams and
the encouragementgiven to Ministers to appointadviserswas commented
on at the time: 'That suspicionof the Civil Servicegoesa long way to
explain why 38 political appointmentshavealready been made by Mr
Wilson and his ministers,and why all Cabinet ministers are under
pressureto follow the trend.' (Wood, 331cTimes. 10 June 1974).
The Labour Party hadenvisagedspecialadvisersbeing located in
private offices, but very few advisersformally did so. Onewho did was
Tom McNally who took over the place of Miles Hudson, his Tory
predecessor. McNally soon movedout becauseit was easierfor him to
work from a separateroom closeto the private office. In no department
did the special advisersbecomethe cabin envisaged in Labour's
Programme & Bzitain. (1972) althoughseveral ministers took steps
towardsbuilding an unofficial cabinet.

by MargaretThatcherin 1979 was
The climateof opiniongenerated
ratherhostileto political- asopposedto expert- advisers. One of
the Treasury's ministersin 1979, JohnBiffen claimed that Thatcher was,
'not a great enthusiast',and one of the department'sadvisers, George
Cardona, suggestedshe was, 'very, very sceptical at first. ' The
attitude in 1979partly reflectedthe strident opposition to Labour
specialadvisersseenon the Tory backbenchesand: 'there was a general
feeling that it was time to "clear the board" of patronage, and in
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almost deliberatecontrastto the previousLabour Government,the number
of special advisers was severelyrestricted.' (Butler, 1986 p. 13).
Furthermore, accordingto Adam Ridley, 'she saw quite rightly there was
a problem about the Governmentbringing in large numbers of special
advisers and then sayingto officials, "You are grossly overstaffed.
Cut. Cut."' Thatcherwas thought to be more concernedwith installing
ministers with political will than with changesin the machinery-ofgovernment. (Simmonds, 1988). Nevertheless,the Tories had developed
radical policies in Oppositionand, as we have seen,someministers were
keen to bring in peoplewho had workedwith them. Many people felt
that the new Prime Minister cameto office suspicious of bureaucrats,
believing they would presentobstaclesto the implementation of her
programme (Hennessy,1989,p. 627; Fred Ridley, 1983, p. 36; Hugo Young,
1990, p. 157). OtherssharedThatcher'sfears: 'Joseph,Howe and John
Hoskyns were particularly exercisedaboutthe problem' (Hugo Young,
p. 157).
There were, therefore, a variety of factorsat work in 1979 but
only a few adviserswere appointedand generallyit was as a result of
pressure from ministersrather than prime ministerial encouragement.
Since then there hasbeen, in the words of one minister, 'incremental'
growth of the system. The 1980ssaw a growing climate of opinion that
political advisers were a 'good thing'. Several of the earlier
quotations from ministers implied that this was one of the reasons
behind their decisionto makean appointment. However, it was probably
ministers themselveswho took the lead in generating the climate of
opinion. Furthermore, in most individual casesit was up to the
minister to persuadeThatcherto agreeto the appointmentof an extra
special adviser. There were only a few instances where the
opportunities createdand/or prime ministerial encouragementcould be
seen as a reasonfor appointment. Theseinclude the initial decision

that severalof theCRD officialswhohadoriginally beendestinedfor
the NumberTen PolicyUnit couldinsteadgo to the relevant departments
they had been covering. Whilst referencehas been made to
givenby thePrimeMinisterto PatrickJenkinto reappoint
encouragement
his belief in advisersby
David Young,Jenkinhadalreadydemonstrated
appointingRogerDysonat DHSS. Jenkinthoughtthat, 'she has always
beena supporterof gettingmoreinteractionbetweentheprivate sector
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and the public sector.'
It is clear that during the 1980sthe numberof special advisers
increasedand the bulk of the pressurefor this came from the ministers.
It is less clear whetherThatcher merely grudgingly tolerated the
expansion or actively welcomedit; and if there was a change of mind,
when it occurred. According to Jenkin, Thatchercame to realize, 'that
the ministerswho had themwere sometimesmore effective than ministers
who didn't ... and particularly sometimesministerswho lack some of
that political flair ... the ability to coin the phrase.' Somefelt the
tide had turned in favour of specialadvisersbefore the 1983 election
but there was almost universalagreementthat Thatcher was impressed
with the performanceof someof the advisersdrafted in to help with
that campaign. Shewas so pleasedwith the work of Stephen Sherbourne
that she recruitedhim to be her political secretary. Some think that
he was then in a position to encourageher to takea liberal attitude
towards requestsby ministers for permission to recruit special
advisers. One minister also felt that Bernard Ingham supported the
spreadof specialadvisersin somedepartments.
Many of thesepoints werebrought togetherby Tom King who provided
important illustrations of someof the general points. As Shadow
Secretary of State for Energy in the late 1970she had, as had his
predecessorPatrick Jenkin, picked up from the departmentvibrations of
unease about the role of advisers. Amongst the Tories in 1979,
therefore,
initially there had beensomeaversionto too many political
advisersbut a numberwere taken on ... Then gradually people
began to find they were very useful and they played a pretty
valuable role in the 1983election ... The Prime Minister
recognized that they did havea useful role to play in
governmentand I think also that the civil service found that
whereasthey had had someunhappyexperienceswith somein the
past, the calibre of many of the people who came in was
An important elementwas the development of the
good
Policy Unit at NumberTen. For the specialadvisersit was an
important linkage and it provided a major strata in the
political steeringof the Governmentand certainly for Richard
[Ehrman] that relationshipwas an important part of his work.
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Various advisers believed that the advisers' role in the 1983
election campaign finally convinced Thatcher of their usefulness.
Several advisersdescribedthe process,including Rob Shepherd (1983)
and Chris Butler who in 1986wrote:

The 1983 General Electionwas a watershed. Much of the
responsibility of briefing the Prime Minister before the daily
press conferencesfell on specialadvisers. They performed
well, and easily outshonetheir less experienced counterparts
in the ConservativeResearchDepartment(CRD). In the Prime
Minister's eyes, specialadviserswere now a 'good thing', no
longer an unknown speciesso cunningly conceived under
Socialism (p. 13).

Many similarities exist betweenthe factors behind the development
of special advisers in the UK and those responsible for the
transformationof the private offices of Australian ministers into teams
of personaladvisers. Perhapsthe most striking comparisonsare those
betweenthe reactionof incoming right wing governments,under Fraser in
1975and Thatcherin 1979, to the developmentof advisory systems under
their Labour predecessors.Fraserhad come to office, according to
Walter, 'with a commitmentto cutting back governmentspendingand the
ministerial staff system- particularly given its criticism fostered by
the conservativepartieswhen in opposition- seemedone of the obvious
targets.' Initially, numbersin the private offices were cut back but
grew again eventually to reachthe previous level as, 'faced with levels
of complexity and demandsfor actions ... Fraser's ministers came to
realize the value of, and needfor, private staff (pp.78-9).
In the UK a noticeablereductionin the numberof departments in
which there were specialadvisersoccurredin 1979. However useful some
civil servantshad undoubtedlyfound specialadvisersto be, there was
little encouragement from the civil service for the incoming
Conservative Government to make suchappointments. At some stages
though, certain civil servantshaveencouraged ministers to recruit
special advisers. Ian Bancrofttold the Treasury and Civil Service
Committee: 'I count it a minor triumph to havebeenone of the few
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former PermanentSecretaries(perhapsthe only one for all I know) who
persuadeda reluctantMinister to appoint a special adviser' (1986,
Vol. 2, p.251). In the story quotedearlier from the h Times D
about a specialadviserbeing soughtto work for the Lord Chancellor,
David Walker alleged that: 'It is not clear that Lord Mackay has
himself approved the idea. But his officials, who complained at a
recent internal meetingof the high level of demandsnow madeon them,
think it an excellent scheme;the minister will, as necessary, be
prevailed upon'. (wig Times. 26 August 1988).
In a very few casesan existing special adviser was able to
persuadehis minister that an additional adviserwas required. Anthony
Lester for example,was facedwith a major responsibility for assisting
in drafting the proposals for sex discrimination legislation, in
addition to acting as a more generaladviserto Roy Jenkins on Home
Office and other matters. He therefore, soughtRoy Jenkins's approval
for the appointmentof an extra specialadviserto work with him on
plans for the SexDiscrimination Bill. Paul Chapman,one of the junior
special advisersrecruited to assistBrian Abel-Smith, suggested that
his post, 'was createdby Brian Abel-Smith who said to Barbara Castle
that he needed somehelp and was it OK if he recruited someone to
provide it. '
These three sectionshave shownthat ministersdecide to appoint
special advisersfor variousreasons. In somecasesthe decision was
not solely or specifically linked to the assistancethe special adviser
could provide in meetingthe needsperceivedby ministers.
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CHAPTER FIVE. SELECTION
SUPPLY AND DEMAND.

SPECIA ADVISERS. AND

SECTION & SELECTION.
Specialadvisersare a minister's 'own people' and he is responsiblefor
selecting them. A wide variety of methodshavebeenused, but their
selection cannot be entirely divorced from the reasons for their
appointment. Sometimes the decision to recruit an adviser was
explicitly madebecausethere was an individual whom the minister wished
to bring into the department. This usually occurred when a new
government was formed. The clearestexamples of individuals being
recruited rather than peoplebeing selectedto fill an existing slot
occurredwith Michael Heseltine'sappointmentsalthough even here he was
certain there was a problem to be tackled:
I met Tom Baron at a meetingorganizedby him of the Volume
House Builders to teach,to tell and argue with ministers
about what ministersshouldbe doing in the housing policy.
This was obviously a man with a contribution to make and when
I left lunch I askedmy permanentsecretaryif there was any
way in which he could comeand work for me within the
Ministry.
In many other cases wherethe selection and the reasons for
appointment were strongly linked, it is not clear to what extent the
decision to appoint was influencedby the presence of a specific
individual ready to come in or to continuein post. Once suchdecisions
to appoint had beenmade, however,there was no questionof a selection
process; the obviouspersonwas appointed. Included in this category
were specialist special advisers such as David Young who were
'inherited'. This term was usedby a numberof ministers, including
Patrick Jenkin, who cameinto a departmentin which an adviser had
already beenworking. There was somedebateabout how far it had been
planned that the RowntreePolitical Fellows should become special
advisers; nevertheless,in practice, they were all appointed. The
ministersdo not appearto havelooked elsewherefor political advisers,
although several of them appointed an additional specialist. Roy
Jenkins said of Matthew Oakeshott,'he had beena considerable success
as a generalpolitical adviserand assistantand when I went back to
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the Home Office, I kept him on, as most peopledid. '
In June 1979not all the peoplefrom the CRD were appointed as
special advisers. However thoseministerswho did appoint advisers
mostly selectedthe relevantCRD official. Jim Prior not only appointed
Rob Shepherd,the deskofficer on EmploymentAffairs, but also Robbie
Gilbert who was Shepherd'spredecessorat the CRD. We havealready seen
how the TreasuryAffairs teamat CRD movedCablgg to become special
advisers at the Treasury, andone of the ministers, Peter (now L)rd)
Rees, said they had, 'beenpart of the furniture for a long time in
Opposition.'
Generally wherea ministerdid not consideranybody other than the
person appointed there were two possiblescenarios. If it was as a
specialistadviser then he was the obvious candidatefor the department,
and if it was asa political adviserhe was the natural choice to go
with his minister to whicheverdepartmenthe went. A slight variation
on this came from Roy Hattersley. In a thoughtful answer to the
questionas to how automaticwas his selectionof David Hill and Maurice
Pestonto be his two specialadvisers,he commentedthat David Hill was
an automaticchoice and, 'he camealong with me to the Ministry on the
first morning', but Maurice Peston,as an economist,would have been,
'the inevitable nomineefor a large numberof ministriesbut not for
every one of them.' The selectionof Brian Abel-Smith at DHSS was
almost automatic. BarbaraCastlewrote in her Djaly entry for 6 March
1974: 'I am losing no time in appointing staff. I rang up Brian AbelSmith this morning and said simply, "Will you come to me?" to which he
replied equally simply, "Of course." What a relief! He is unmatchable'
(1980). Sometimes, especially since 1983, a political adviser has
become the obvious candidateto be retainedin a department: the best
example is John Whittingdale who was appointedby Norman Tebbit and
'inherited' by Leon Brittan and subsequentlyPaul Channon. Usually when
a political adviser is inherited, his previous master has left the
Government, or in the caseof Tebbit ceased to be a departmental
minister.
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There were many caseswherethe minister had to find somebody
becausethere was no one, obvious, person. Here too there were a range
of approaches.Sometimesa minister askeda specific individual he knew
personally, for example, severalof the advisers appointed to the
Treasury were known to Nigel Lawson, including Howard Davies, a former
assistant secretary in the department,who had been the principal
dealingwith monetarypolicy whenLawson was Financial Secretary. Over
a third of the specialadvisers,however, were not personallyacquainted
with the minister who appointedthem. Someof these fall into the
category of advisers who worked for the minister's predecessorand
therefore became'the obviouscandidate',but many of them do not. A
selectionprocessthen becamenecessary. A numberof adviserssuggested
that they were chosenafter the minister interviewed severalcandidates.
This was not always well rememberedby the ministers. Names are
suggestedto ministersfrom a variety of sources. Referencehas already
been made to the important role played by Douglas Hurd and Bernard
Donoughue. Sometimesa departingminister, for exampleMark Carlisle,
recommendshis former adviser. Richard Luce recalled that when Patrick
Jenkin left the Government,and his replacementasSecretary of State
for the Environmentproposedto bring his own adviserwith him, Jenkin
telephoned sayinghe had hada very good adviser, Andrew Tyrie. After
Tyrie moved on to the Treasuryand Luce was looking for a replacement
Nicholas Edwards recommendedChris Butler, who had resigned from his
position as special adviserto the Secretaryof State for Wales to
contest unsuccessfullythe Breconby-election.
Within the ConservativeParty there is a strong network amongst
current and former membersof the CRD. Indeed, whatevertheir method of
selection,the CRD has beenby far the most important sourceof special
advisers for Conservative ministers. In the lists produced by the
1986 Treasury and Civil ServiceCommittee, this fact is somewhat
obscured; several advisers, including Tim Boswell, Michael Dobbs,
Douglas French and JohnHoustonare not recordedas having come from CRD
because they had movedto other occupationsprior to becoming special
advisers. When Keith Josephrecruited a family friend and university

don, Oliver Letwin, to helphim in theDEStherewasno opportunity for
StuartSextonhadby thattime been
him to becomea paidadviserbecause
reinstatedby Joseph.Letwin, therefore,wassimultaneouslyappointed
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to be both a specialadviserand the Educationdesk officer at the CRD
but only paid in the latter capacity- by the party not the state.
Initially he also continuedasa Cambridgefellow. Furthermore, he was
one of the few advisersnot to be a memberof the Government party at
the time of appointment. He did subscribe to broad Conservative
principles andjoined six monthslater althoughlike other advisersin a
similar position the lack of party membershiphad not beencausing him
any problems.
As Director of the CRD Robin Harris acceptedthat there was some
degree of responsibility on it, whennecessary,to help ministers find
advisers. According to PeterDavis, the normal courseof events for
desk officers is that 'they will move on after doing a stint in the
research department for two or threeyears. If they are lucky, they
will be recruited asa specialadviser.' Davis himself went from being
special adviserto KennethBakerat Environmentto becomeheadof Home
Affairs at CRD.

Severalotheradvisershavetakenposts,but not concurrently,in
the CRD, most noticeablyPeterCropperwho went from the CRD to the
Treasuryas a specialadviser, returnedin 1982asDirector, and in 1984
went back to the Treasuryas specialadviserto the Chancellor. It had
been originally hoped that there would be some cross-fertilisation
between the special advisers and the CRD. No one source was so
predominant for Labour advisers. More camefrom the universities especiallyspecialistsappointedon a part-time basis.
Ministers were not alwaysclear about the qualities they were
looking for. Even whenthey knew what they wanted, their requirements
varied considerably. This inevitably reflectedthe various reasons for
appointment and the diversenatureof ministers, who often wanted
somebodywho would be compatible. A party backgroundand commitment was
often required. Writing in 1976, Darlington claimed that sometimes
ministersand advisersdisagreedabout major issuesbut, 'on the whole,
however, Minister and Adviser are closeto each other in political

position andstyle,with the Adviserusuallybeingthatmuchmoreradical
thanhisboss'(p.33).
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Several ministers stressedthat the demandsof the job required
somebodyof high quality. Thus BarbaraCastleoutlined in the Mandarin
Power speechhow difficult it would be to introducepolitical advisers
and thought it required somebodynot only with a political background
but also sufficient self-confidenceand intellect to be able to
withstandthe pressurefrom the civil servants.
Sometimesthe minister wantedsomebodywho would standup to him.
David Metcalf was suggestedto StanOrme by BernardDonoughue. Metcalf
claimed 'he wantedsomeonewho had a track record in the local Labour
Party, which I had, and we got on very well, in large part because I
stoodup to him. ' Similarly, Harold Lever, 'askedDonoughueif he knew
a good, reliable, intellectually courageousman who wouldn't be
intimidated by me - who would challengeme.'
Advisers sometimeshelpedrecruit other specialadvisers. Several
retiring specialadvisers,including JackStraw and David Young, were
askedby their minister, including PeterShoreand Patrick Jenkin respectively,
to propose a short list or to find a successorbefore leaving. In the

few caseswherepressurefrom an existingadviserhelpedpersuade
the minister
to appointan extraadviser,it wasusuallythe senioradviserwhoproposed
the new recruit. Anthony Lester proposedAngela Byre and Brian AbelSmith proposedPaul Chapmanand subsequentlyGeoffrey Alltimes, both of
whom had beenstudentsof his at the LSE.
A few examplesillustrate the variety and lack of standardization
in the selection process. When David Ennalsdecided to appoint an
adviser with experienceof the socialwork world, David Townsend was
proposed by Ennals'sPPS. Townsend,a socialworker and former Labour
parliamentarycandidate,hadactedas pressagentto the PPS. When Bill
Rodgers was appointed to the Cabinet, Roger Liddle, an industrial
relations officer who had hadpolitical experienceas an Oxford City
councillor, was suggestedto him as a possiblespecialadviserby Frank
Pickstock, a mutual friend and former Chairman of the Gaitskellite
Campaignfor DemocraticSocialism. At that time Rodgersdid not intend
to recruit an adviser, but he soondecidedto do so and said that he
finally choseLiddle after hearingthe speechhe gave asbest man at the
wedding of Matthew Oakeshott. In anothercase the person who was
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appointedby the minister seemsto havebeendeliberatelychosen partly
becausehe would causeas little troubleas possibleto good relations
betweenthe minister and his officials.
Evidence aboutthe diversemethodsof selecting special advisers
can be relatedto the themesof the placeof specialadvisers and the
degreeof formalization in the system. As a group, specialadvisersare
probably more varied in age (from 22 to 65 when first appointed)and in
background than any other categoryin Whitehall, including private
secretaries, permanentsecretaries,or ministers. This contributes to
the fact that special adviserscan occupy a range of places as
suggestedin the model developedearlier. However, to the extent that a
higher proportion of them now havea more political than expert role
there has beena limited degreeof standardization. Nevertheless, in
terms of actual recruitmentthere was probably less standardization at
the end of the 1980sthan whenthe governmentwas newly formed and the
most obvious candidateswerepeoplewho had worked with the ministers
when they were shadowspokesmen.
CT

.&

SUPPLY AM

DEMAND.

We haveobservedthatif it is cleartherearepeopleto fill the posts
then the reasons for making suchan appointment might become more
apparent and/or compelling. With reference to the appointment of
political secretariesbetween 1970-4 Rose claims, 'the number of
appointmentswas not limited by a low demand,but rather, by the party's
inability to locatemen with the appropriatebackground,abilities and
inclination to undertakethe work on the termsoffered' (1974, p.452).
Some more recent Tory ministers,for example, Leon Brittan, have
referred to some difficulties in finding a suitable person; and in
several casespart of the reasonwhy no appointmentwas made was that
nobody with the appropriatequalificationsappeared. One minister said
that he did not think the needwas all that great but, 'if the right

chaphadcomealongI wouldhavesaid, "Yesplease,let's havehim", but
shortof thatI didn't bothertoo much.' Fred(nowLord) Mulley, 'has
arguedthata pertinentreasonwhy hedid not havea specialadviser at
theMinistry of Defencewasthatno-onesufficientlyableor experienced
in defencematterswasknownto him' (Fraher,1981,p. 18). Interviewed
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in early 1987,Chris Butler commented,'it is very difficult at the
momentto fill specialadviserplaces.' The former permanent secretary
at the DoE, Sir GeorgeMoseley, made an interesting comparison in
stating that he did not think the minister, 'could reachout and say to
somebody,aswe can do in the civil service, we will havethree or four
for me to look at next Monday.' Some special advisers had several
offers and there were some attempts at poaching. One permanent
secretaryreferred to himself and the minister 'playing in the transfer
market'. Even when a good personhasbeenidentified it is not always
easy to persuade themto accept. Initially, Tom Baron, 'was quite
horrified at the prospect,' of leaving his companyand coming to London
asan adviserfor somemonths.
By contrast, someministersfound that a numberof people offered
their services and/or individuals were proposed by third parties.
Norman Fowler believedit had becomea popular careerepisodefor some
peopleand there was no shortageof volunteers.
There is a complexoverlap betweenquestions of motivation for
special advisers. How far is the role satisfying? Does it help or
hinder a subsequent
career? Knowledgeabout the satisfaction and job
prospectsof earlier adviserscould motivate prospectiveadvisers. The
variety of motivationspartly reflects the diversebackgrounds,so that
academics and specialists might be more likely to be interested in
observing the policy making processin specific fields, and even
influencing it in certaindirections in which they believe. With his
strongviews on educationalpolicy, StuartSexton, for example, went to
considerable lengths to gain an advisory position, initially in
Opposition and then in Government. (Knight; Edwardsci a,, 1989). Many
younger political advisersviewed it asan extremely interesting job
with the advantage,noted earlier by William Waldegrave,of being inside
the Official Secrets Act, unlike the research posts at party
headquarters. Various adviserswould fit Walter's description, noted
earlier, of people motivatedby a desire, 'to be at the centre of
events' (p. 178). Butler (1986) similarly wrote that, 'the reasons why
must be their interest in
advisers put up with all the disadvantages
politics. It is one of the mostinterestingand fascinatingjobs to be
undertaken in the political world, outside of being a government
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minister' (p. 19).
One disadvantagereportedby many adviserswas the comparatively
low levels of pay and other benefits, especially considering the
insecurity. Despitecritical commentsof an 'excessive'level of pay
noted in Chapter2, moneywas not the motivationbehind most decisions
to becomean adviser. Indeedmany adviserstook the role despite, not
becauseof, the salary. This was recognizedby some civil servants,
including one time CSD official, GeorgeMoseley, who noted: 'A lot of
them, though they didn't kick up a fussabout it, were, I suspect,
considerably out of pocket. They had somedifferent motivation from
money.' Echoing theseremarks,JohnWhittingdale, who was only 24 when
appointed and thus on the equivalentof a senior executive officer's
salary, said: 'I wasn't doing thejob for the salary. It is a fantastic
job and to be quite honestI would have takena pay cut. It is the
sheerenjoymentyou get from that job. '
Overall the level of satisfactionfelt by advisersvaried. Writing
about departmentaland Policy Unit advisersin late 1976 Darlington
(p. 17) estimated, 'that at least 27 advisershavepassed through the
system in lessthan three years;that is, more Advisers have been and
gone than are currently in post. The "survivability rate" then is not
high. However, the reasonsfor leaving have beenvaried.' Those he
listed include: the minister leaving; disillusionmentwith the policies;
return to original employment;becomingan MP, or a minister in the
Lords; found to be unwantedor unsuited.
Despitethe frustrations,which are discussedin detail later, many
advisers found the job very satisfying. There is somescepticism from
outsiders about what the role could offer to academics/specialists
unlessthey were committedto achievingcertainpolicy aims: 'it is hard
to seewhat attractionssucha post, lacking both public recognition and
a career outlet, could offer to candidatesof experience and ability
unless (like Brian Abel-Smith) they had strong commitments in a
particular policy area' (Brown and Steel, p.331-2). Several academics
have, however, madeit clear that there is considerable satisfaction
beyond the ability to pushpolicy preferences:
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Who does not want to seehistory being made?... What did I
gain from a spell in governmentservice? First, an awareness
of the processof governmentwhich no book could give me
If it is the task of academicsto teachstudents about the ...
real world, a spell in governmentis invaluablefor obtaining
a deeperunderstandingof it (Abel-Smith, THES, 27 June 1980).
It must be of interest to thosewho work in the field to
examine the actualway policy is formulatedand put in to
practice (Peston,THFS, 11 July 1980).
For an academicwho is constantlyinvolved in researching and
teaching with health servicepersonnelit's extremely useful
(Dyson).

All three of theseacademicsheld chairsprior to becomingadvisers, so
they were not looking to their spell asadvisers to assist further
promotion. Overall, however,many more thought that having been an
adviser had helped their careerdevelopment than considered it a
hindrance. Severaladvisers,including David Lipsey, neverthelessfelt
that, whilst the experiencecould be an advantage,the clear association
with a particular party was sometimesa handicap- especiallywhen that
party was in Opposition. Furthermore, there were occasions on which
advisers complained they had subsequentlysuffered from having had
disagreementswith civil servants.
For some advisers the contacts gained, plus the first hand
experienceof the processof government,were extremely valuable. David
Stephen,for example,thoughtit was, 'undoubtedly' useful in his career
development: 'Clearly one gainedan experience in foreign policy
formulation in this country and contactswith peoplein other countries
doing the samething. ' Walter developsthis point much further and
links it with his discussionof the role of the intelligentsia.

Walter's views, whichrelateto all those- includingcivil servantsworking as personaladvisersin ministers'private offices, are not
generallyappropriatefor theUK. Theydo though,illustrate how the
role'spotential,especiallyif expanded,
mightbe viewed:
While thereis no securityfor theministerialstaffer,andno
institutionally prescribedcareerpath,the options facing
him/her at theendof servicearefar from limited
... the
influential
bureaucrat,
highly
to
transition ...
placed
businessconsultant,
well-paidlobbyistor senioracademicis
common ... This maybe seenaspart of a broader pattern in
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that the modem intelligentsia is characterized by
occupational mobility, but thereis much to indicate that a
trajectory throughthe ministerial staff may be the fast lane
to success.The knowledgedevelopedwithin the systemand the
contacts with thosein power, and also the networksbuilt up
through the reciprocal relations between politicians and
minderscontributeto this (p. 187).
We have seen that a major weakness of Walter's approach,
particularly if appliedto the UK, is the understatmentof the degreeto
which advisersare ambitiousto play a front line role in the political
battle. Far from becoming a special adviser because they have,
'difficulty in coping with aggression',somepeopleare motivated to
become advisersbecausethey believeit will enhancetheir chances of
being selectedto be a parliamentarycandidate. Indeed, it is widely
assumedby civil servants,politicians and commentatorsthat this is the
main motivation of most youngerpolitical advisers. Sometimes advisers
are spokenof in a highly critical, and often dismissive,way becauseof
this ambition. This is particularly so if it is suspectedthat the
advisers are, in the words of one official, 'anxious to help their
ministers, and achievegreatnessfor themselvesby the minister's rise on the coat tails.' JohnHoskyns saw a danger that young special
advisers from the researchdepartmentwho were anxious for a political
careermight lack the independenceto upsettheir ministers by speaking
bluntly. For someTory MPs this was yet anotherpoint to add to their
list of criticisms of advisers. Thus the former diplomat turned MP, Ray
Witney, in arguing the caseagainstRogerDarlington's suggestionof an
increasein the numberof advisers,wrote: 'The tribunes of the people
would bitterly - and rightly - resentthe pretensionsof a bunch of
placemen, many of whom would be (asthey are at present) aspirant
parliamentarycandidateswho havebeenrejectedby constituentselection
committees.' (Tg mss, 3 August 1978).

For ministerssuchasRichardLucethefact thattheir prospective
specialadviser,in hiscaseChrisButler, wantedto getinto Parliament
was a factorto considerfavourably. Beinga specialadviser provided
very goodexperience
andgiventhatit wasa risky occupationwith no
clearcareerstructure,somebody
aimingfor a political careercould be
well suited to it. There was a tradition that some CRD staff
successfully
soughtto becomeparliamentary
candidates,
andso the role
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now played by adviserscan be seenas a logical extensionof this.

About a third of departmentalspecialadvisersappointedsince 1970
have at somestagestood for Parliamentand others are known to have
parliamentary ambitions including probably a majority of more recent
Tory advisers. At least a further seven advisers have been given
peerages, three of whom haveservedas ministers (Lords Cockfield,
Crowther-Hunt, and Young) and two as Oppositionspokesmen(Lords Peston,
and Prys-Davies). Including those who servedat NumberTen, four of the
1970-4 political secretaries(JohnCope, DouglasHurd, Robert Jackson,
and William Waldegrave) becameministers. Three of Judith Hart's
advisers were electedto Parliament(Tony Banks, Stuart Holland, and
MargaretJackson);andJack Straw 'inherited' BarbaraCastle's Blackburn
seat in 1979, which also saw the election of Terry Davis (who had
briefly beenpart-time adviserto Albert Booth) and of Tom McNally.
In the 1987 electionthe former headof the Policy Unit (John
Redwood)and three former advisers(Tim Boswell, ChristopherButler, and
Douglas French) enteredParliament. Colin Moynihan, who had briefly
worked in a personaladvisory capacityfor Foreign Secretary Pym, was
elected in 1983, and Michael Portillo won the Enfield Southgate by
election in 1984. Robin Cookebecamean adviserafter being an MP and
Adam Fergussonwas appointedby Foreign SecretaryHowe after losing his
seat in the EuropeanParliament. Someof theseadvisers and several
others had also beenlocal councillors.
Opinions differ about how far having been an adviser assists
selection as a candidate. Echoingcommentsrecordedabove by Richard
Luce, his secondminister, Chris Butler claims: 'many special advisers
have political ambitions,and the knowledgeand perspective they gain
does help them win the confidenceof selection committees' (p. 19).
Butler was first chosento fight a by-election, aswas Michael Portillo
who believed that the experienceof being an adviser, especiallydealing
with the media, was helpful in securingselectionfor a by-election in
which much media attentionwas expected. Other advisers, including
Douglas French believed 'it would havebeenof benefit in securing
interviews.' He further thought someconstituencieswould be attracted
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by a personwho was, 'special adviserto a man who was well known, well
respectedand liked. ' Although selectioncommitteeswere thought to
vary in their attitudes,severaladviserssharedthe views of one who
believedthat most local parties 'are not particularly impressedby some
very young chapwho hasspentall his life in Whitehall with his headin
the clouds ... specialadvisersare not popular by and large with
selectioncommittees.'
Many proposalsexist for increasingthe numberof special advisers
appointedby ministers (seeChapter 10). However, any such schemewould
run seriousrisks of someunsuitablepeoplebeing appointed(as seemed
to happenin the 1980s,accordingto one interviewee,in Canada under
the Conservatives)unless therewas a large pool of good potential
advisers from which to choose. Various people, including Stephen
Sherbourne, doubt the existenceof sucha reservoir in the UK: 'You
can't have a structurewhich assumesa calibre which isn't always
available.' Demonstrating that experienceas an adviseris often of
benefit to career prospects,including enhancing the likelihood of
selection as a parliamentarycandidate,might result in an increase in
the numberof would-bespecialadvisers.
The introduction of the 'Short money' ensuresthat at any future
change of government there is likely to be an improved source of
advisers, although this was not part of Ted Short's original thinking
behind the scheme. This funding provided to assistOpposition parties
in Parliament, has led to a considerableincreasein the number of
researchassistantsworking directly to shadowministers. Stuart Sexton
was fundedin this way when he was working for the shadowMinisters of
Education. According to a Labour Party official speakingin the late
1980s,there is an assumptionon the part of shadowministers that they
are going to havea cabinetor specialadvisers,'partly because they
have all got their own little teamsof advisersthat are on a friendly
basiswith one another.'

Walter Williamsis a strongadvocate
of reform of the bureaucracy
and theintroductionof outsidersto becomepolicy analysts. Even he
recognizes,however,that, 'on the outsidetoo the supplyis thin ...
The searchwill be difficult. Politicalexecutives
arewell advisedto
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draw on civil servants as much aspossible' (p.65 and 175). He
believes, however, that the shortagescould be overcome and policy
analysts trained and developedas they were in the United States from
the mid-1960s onwards. In the secondedition of his book Meltsner
(1986, p. 300) wrote: 'With its association,journal, schools, and an
increasing membership,we shouldno longer refer to policy analysis as
an emergingprofession. It has emergedwith a defined identity and is
working towardsstandardsof performanceand practice.' Most British
advisers would not considerthemselvesto be policy analysts and this
underlinesthe importanceof examiningwhat adviserscurrently do in the
UK before considerationis given to possiblereforms.
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CHAPTER SM

FUNCTIONS Of SPECIAL ADVISERS.

SECTION Qj HOW THEY SPEND THEIR TIME.
Given the diversity of reasonsfor appointmentit is not surprising the
functions of different advisersvary enormously. In the words of Ian
Bancroft somespecialadvisersare bit players, somesceneshifters, and
others 'fairly considerableactorsin their own right. ' In the model of
the potential place of specialadvisersit was suggestedthat a key
feature was the flexibility advisersbring to the system, with their
ability to occupy a numberof possiblepositionsand informally move
along various channels of communication. The flexibility comes in
severalforms. Michael Dobbs, for example,argued how difficult it was
for civil servants,who haveto provide continuity and the same service
for all ministers, to have the flexibility to cope with the unique
demands of individual ministers. In someways it can be more easily
done by advisers. Furthermore,severaladvisersalso provided added
flexibility by each performing a range of functions, with certain
activities being more important at one time than another.
These generalcommentscan be illustrated in various ways. Thus
Butler claims the adviserpossesses
a, '"roving commission" - acting as
cement in the brickwork, as an early warning system for departmental
difficulties or political "banana skins", or as antennae for the
minister, picking up gossip from the other special advisers and
elsewhere' (p. 17). The unpredictablenatureof the role was stressed
by David Lipsey: 'It varied quite a bit as to what sort of thing one
was doing... There were core elementsto it like liaison with party
committees and certain thingsjust varied dependingupon what was on.
It was a questionof filling in the gaps.' Similarly Adam Ridley, with
the conceptof the adviserasa 'residual legatee', saw the functions of
advisers such as himself fluctuating very widely. This point is
reinforced by the commentsof ministers, including Bill Rodgers, who
stressedthe importanceof, 'the freewheelingnatureof the individual'
who was able to help out whereverthe minister wished. Two sets of
answers to the questionnaireare particularly relevant here. The
findings from questions15 (how frequently special advisers were in
contact with variouspeople)and 16 (how they spent their time) are
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given in Tables3 and 4. Theseanswersgive an overall picture and this
was usedto producethe list of functionsgiven, in approximateorder of
importance,in Chapter2. However, severalactivities that scoredquite
low were a major featureof someadvisers'work. Briefing for Cabinet,
for example,was not high in the list but, asnoted earlier, for certain
advisersit was important.
In the following analysis,evidencefrom the questionnaires is
interpreted alongside opinions expressed in interviews. When
considering Table 3 it mustbe rememberedthat aboutone-fifth of the
respondents, in both parties, were working only part time. This
accountsfor a percentageof the casesin which the adviserdid not see
the Cabinet minister, the private office or other civil servants on a
daily basis.
Half the advisershad contactwith other ministers' advisers less
frequently than weekly, and in somecasesnever. This underlines the
extent to which, to usethe words of RogerDarlington, many advisers
thought the network of specialadviserswas, 'loose and inadequate'.
The figures for contactwith backbenchMPs and with party officials are
similar to one anotherand both reflect wide variations in the extent to
which party liaison was seenas a function of special advisers.
Reference has beenmadeto Mark Schreiber'srole in helping to carry
into Government Tory Oppositionthinking on the needfor a CPRS. Apart
from him only one other had more than spasmodic,if any, contact with
the Think Tank. A few advisersreportedthat when working on specific
issues they might be in contactwith the CPRS. This finding accords
well with the CPRSperspectiveof Blackstoneand Plowden who conclude
that although there could, 'be mutual benefits in communicating and
occasionally cooperating ... Many membersof the CPRS had little or
nothing to do with political advisersof either main party' (1988,

p.68).. Although for someadviserscontactwith pressuregroups was
frequent,for the majorityit wasnot significant.

157

TABLE L. Questionnaire Findings on Frequency of Contact with Various
People - Percentage Response.

15)

Now frequent

was your contact

(either

face-to-face

or by telephone)

with:

Daily

Several

Weekly

times a

Less
frequent

Never

week
a)

The cabinet minister

63

22

77

b)

Junior minister(s)

27

49

10

c)

Parliamentary

secretary

16

29

23

d)

The private office

82

12

e)

The permanent secretary

6

41

f)

Other civil

59

y)

Advisers

68

private

22

10

25

20

8

26

4

10

1

12

9

23

40

16

Advisers to other
ministers

1

21

27

35

16

i)

Backbench MPs

1

27

27

27

18

j)

Party

4

26

26

25

19

k)

Members of the CPRS

35

61

L)

Members of relevant

25

43

27

14

12

58

16

13

19

31

35

25

17

31

19

servants

in the PM's

policy unit
h)

330

officials

pressure groups
m) Academics/other
specialists
n)

Government whips

o)

Journalists

202

05

0

8

TABLE 4:

Questionnaire

Findings

on How Time was Spent

- Percentage

Response.

16) What amountof time did you spend on the following aspects of your work.
Substa Consid
Moder Slight
Insigni
ficant
ntial
erable
ate
a)

Examining papers on departmental matters going to the
him
minister
and briefing

35

40

19

33

18

24

31

16

11

4

11

25

42

18

8

18

23

21

30

11

22

40

12

15

Corresponding with party
MPs, officials
etc. /
attending party meetings/
receiving party deputations
on behalf of the minister.

13

11

34

15

27

g)

Speech writing.

26

21

29

15

10

h)

Discussing issues with the
minister.

31

35

24

10

0

22

32

18

16

12

4

17

25

23

31

32

33

17

11

7

on them.
b)

Preparing

reports

on

policy on departmental
matters.
c)

Chasing up the progress
on implementing the
minister's

d)

wishes.

Preparing briefs on nondepartmental agenda items
for cabinet or cabinet

committees.
e)

Attending

meetings of

all the politicians
within the department.
f)

i)

Attending
receiving

meetings, visits,
deputations -

other then party ones with the minister on
departmental business.
j)

k)

Attending departmental
meetings and receiving
deputations - other
than party ones - on
behalf of the minister.
Advising the minister on
(and involvement with) the
presentation of departmental
policy and the minister's
general views.

Outside the department,journalists were the peoplewith whom, on
average, advisershad most frequentcontact. This is consistent with
'helping with presentation'being the reasonfor appointmentcited most
often as being substantial. It is perhapssurprising that contactwith
journalists was more frequentthan that with party officials or advisers
to other ministers. This degreeof contactalso indicatesthat for a
numberof advisershelpingwith presentationamountedto more than just
speechwriting.
The pattern of frequencyof contactwith the listed categories was
broadly similar for 1974-9Labour advisersand 1979-87 Tories, but
there were a few significant differences. Thosecorrelatewith findings
from interviews and other tables. Interviews, for example, revealed
even lesscollegial activity by Labour advisersthan by Tories and the
number of Tory advisershaving weekly, or more frequent, contact with
advisersto other ministerswas almosttwice as high (at 64 per cent) as
for their Labour counterparts. Half the 1979-87advisers had contact
with party officials either daily or severaltimesa week, whereas from
1974-9the figure was a fifth. This possibly reflects the importanceof
the CRD backgroundin the recruitmentof Tory advisers. Only 15 per
cent of Labour advisers,as opposedto 54 per cent of Conseravtives,had
contact with GovernmentWhips weekly or more frequently. This again
partly reflects the greaterimportanceof the party liaison role for
Tory advisersand correlateswith their spendinga greaterproportion of
their time in prayer meetings,i. e. gatheringsof all the politicians
attached to the department,and which, for Tories at least, often
included the relevantWhip. The samefactor may partially explain why
at 41 per cent the figure for daily contactwith junior ministers was
over twice as high for Conservativesas for Labour.
Before examininghow advisersspenttheir time it might be useful
to list Harold Wilson's sevenexamplesof advisers' roles in his 1975
Statementon Political Advisers (1976, pp. 203-4):
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1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

A 'sieve'
A 'deviller'
Medium - and long-termplanning
Contributionsto policy planning within departments
Liaison with theParty
Outsideinterestgroups

7)

Speechwriting and research

In the questionnaire,and interviews,an attemptwas madeto examine in
rather more detail how advisersspenttheir time. Often there was not
much differencebetweenthe patternof responsesfrom the two main sets
of advisers. Examining submissionsto the minister and briefing him,
16a), was the major way in which many advisers spent their time.
Several advisers thought 'commenting' a more appropriate term than
briefing. There was no consistentpatternas to how advisers received
submissions. A few of the senioradvisersachieved the position of
having materialrouted throughthem. Roy Hattersley regarded Maurice
Peston as playing almosta deputy secretary role. Many advisers,
however, receivedcopiesof submissionsfrom civil servants- especially
after a working pattern had beenestablished. Thomas Brimelow argued
that not only can political advisersnever cover the whole field but,
also, especially in Foreign Affairs, issues come up unexpectedly.
Therefore, the department has to know when to alert the political
adviserto take an interest in developmentX. The generalrule towards
Tom McNally was, 'be helpful to the man'. McNally saw the situation
similarly and thought the secretfor the political adviser, 'is to make

thathe or sheseesall the key
sure that thereis an understanding
papers.' In somedepartments
guidelineswereissuedindicatingthe area
of particularinterestto theadviser(s).
Where a strong relationshipdevelopedwith the private secretaryhe
made sure the advisersaw copiesof any submissionnot copied to him on
which, as private secretary,he knew the minister would value the
adviser's comments. Severaladvisers,again especiallythose with a
close relationship with the private office, looked through the
minister's box and read anything they thought they ought to see.
Advisers such asJohn Cope, John Harris (at the Home Office and the
Treasury), and Miles Hudson,who sat in the private office, saw things
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as they went through. Sometimesministersaskedadvisersto read and
commenton a particular submission.
The type of commentsmadewere often political. In this way the
adviser was carrying out the 'mine detector' role that even such an
experiencedpolitician asJim Callaghantold Tom McNally he wanted from
him. Someministersalso expectedadvisersto commenton what the party
had said about the subjectdealt with in the submission. Bringing the
two points together,and linking with one of the reasonshe gave for
appointing advisers,David Ennalssaid that Mike Hartley-Brewer reminded
him where the party stoodor the political implications missed by the
civil servants and, 'he sniffed out potential trouble and traps.'
Hartley-Brewer was one of the adviserswho spentmore time on examining
submissionsand briefing than on any other activity. A good example of
how an adviser could makepolitical comments on submissions, and
consequently have someimpact on the policy, came from John Houston.
Over many monthshe criticized the lack of awareness,in the Foreign
Office submissions,of the public's concernabout the failure of foreign
diplomats to pay parking fines. His role was recognizedin a newspaper
profile of Geoffrey Howe which claimed that Houston, 'gives him advice
the Foreign Office doesnot alwaysrelish. It was Houston, for example,
who arguedthat the political advantageof punishing foreign diplomats
stationedin London who refuseto pay their parking fines outweighedthe
risk of retaliation againstBritish diplomatsabroad' (unday Times, 6
April 1986).
Advisers also mademore substantivecomments,largely depending on
the extent to which they were specialists. This was taken to
exceptionallydetailedlengthsby Stuart Sextonat the DES who acted as
a first filter for all the proposals for Section 12 and 13
reorganizations,underthe 1980EducationAct, of schoolswithin a Local
Education Authority (LEA). He not only read the large reports but sometimes
also talked to officials in central and local governmentbefore producing

for thejunior ministerwho commentedon
a two to threepagememorandum
the reportsbeforetheywent to theSecretary
of State.
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Many adviserscommentedon only a small proportion of the papers
they saw. Nevertheless,as Chapter4 revealed,ministersoften thought
it was of greatvalue to have somebodyindependentof the department,
and politically committed andaware, to go through submissions. In this
way the adviser was acting in the 'sieve' role described by Harold
Wilson: 'a "sieve" examiningpapersasthey go to Ministers, drawing
attention to problemsand difficulties, especiallyones having Party
political implications or electoralconsiderations,and looking for
"landmines" - especiallyin politically sensitiveareas' (1976, p.203).
Some advisers, for example John Cope, stressedthat the type of
political commentmadecoveredmore thanjust potential landmines:
if there was somepolitical initiative that I thought could be
taken, or insufficient being madeof somethingpolitically, or
political danger in someproposedcourseof action, or a
political elementin a choicebetweenoptions, then I could
add my pennyworth to the advice that was going to the
minister.
Time spent by adviserson readingsubmissionswas necessary not
only for themto be able to brief the minister, but also to enable them
to fulfil other roles, including more generallydiscussingissues with
the minister and helping with presentation. If he was to be 'on top of
things for the following day' RogerLiddle worked most evenings from
10.00 p. m. to 1.00 a.m. readingboth departmentalsubmissionsand papers
for Cabinet and its committees,and writing briefs. Even so he had to
be selective and decidewhat was politically important. He claimed
that, 'as time went on I got a better senseof when you should do a
written brief and when you shouldjust havea word. '
Briefings or commentsfrom adviserscould be madein a variety of
ways: in discussionsbetweenthe adviserand the minister or ministerial
team; in meetingswith the minister and officials; and on paper. A few
advisers, including Jeffrey Sterling, rarely put things on paper. Ann
Carlton consistentlydiscussedpoints with Tony Croslandand John Silldn
but met with disapprovalearly on at the DoE. A permanent secretary
told her she 'was an unsatisfactoryspecialadviser.' In explanationhe
said, 'you don't put things in writing and Mr Lipsey is so much better
and puts everything in writing. '
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One reason why many advisers, including Liddle, preferred to
produce written briefs was so that they could copy them round the
department. According to Liddle, and others, copying minutes was
important, 'in terms of maintaininggoodrelations with officials. What
they don't like is the thoughtof you secretlygetting the minister on
his own and giving him lots of steersaway from what's being said
without them being in a position to challenge what you're saying.'
Similar points were madeby David Cowling and both of them gave credit
to Jack Straw at the DoE for suggestingthe bestway to behave as an
adviser. Straw and othersalso sawit as enlightenedself interest to
copy round: 'it was a two way process. What is the point of not copying
if they had an interestin it and they copiedstuff to me?' When Straw
startedin the DHSS the pattern of keepingofficials informed was setby
the experiencedadviser, Brian Abel-Smith. In his opinion, 'it didn't
matter what you saidas long as you said it in writing and they got a
copy.' Not only was this goodfor officials and the adviserbut also it
was 'good for the Secretaryof Statefor the officials to think out what
the difficulties were in what the adviserwas proposing.'
Many others stressedthe importanceof officials being consulted
and warned in advanceso that, in the words of Adam Ridley, 'they had a
chance to stop us doing somethingdisruptive out of ignorance or
misjudgment.' Quite apart from theseargumentsfor not going behind the
civil servants'backs,Miles Hudson felt, 'it's not the way Alec would
like to carry on.' A few ministerstook a contrary view. Thus Tony
Benn stated, 'I would not expect specialadvisersto give copies of
briefs suppliedto me to the civil servants. They had no responsibility
to the department,the responsibilitywas to the minister.' Often it
was difficult to makean absoluterule covering all situations. Jim
Prior saidhe would generally 'expectthem to circularize anything
...
but they might then write me a very private note saying, for example, "I
think you ought to be sayingsuch and sucha thing but I know that X
civil servantwill not like it. "
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Where there was a group of advisersthey would sometimescopy their
commentsto eachother, althougheachof them, such as thosein the DHSS
under Labour, or in the Treasuryunder the Tories, tendedto specialize
on certain topics or activities. Paul Chapman, however, the first
assistant recruited by Abel-Smith, worked mostly to him rather than
sendingmaterial to the Secretaryof State.
Whereas in question 16a) the emphasis is on reacting to
departmental submissions,the focusin 16b), the preparationof policy
reports, is on the proactive function of advisers. The distinction is
not always clear cut. Sometimesan adviserproduceda policy report in
responseto a departmentalsubmission;at other times when briefing on a
submission an adviser developed alternatives and went beyond the
reactive mode. Nevertheless,most advisersspentless time on writing
policy reports than on reading submissionsand briefing the minister.
Some reports took the form of 'think' pieces; others developed the
party's election commitments. Oliver Letwin claimed that his main role
at the DES, working with Stuart Sexton, was to develop workable
solutions to the obstaclesconfronting the introduction of educational
vouchers. He was, 'constantly writing papersto Sir Keith, copied to
officials, saying, "officials haveidentified this problem, let us deal
with it this way."' The officials would knock his ideasdown and he
would keep trying somethingelse in a process described by Halcrow
(1989, p. 173) asa 'stately quadrille'. Heseltinegave Tom Baron major
problems to examine, and he produced reports containing proposed
solutions. Sometimesadvisersproducedreports following meetings with
groups or visits either domestically(for example,David Coleman) or
abroad (for example,David Stephenwho was able to make some trips, such
as to Namibia, to report on the SWAPOguerilla campaign, which would
have been more difficult for somebody with a formal position).
Specialist advisers who had helpeddeveloppolicy in Opposition were
well placed to producesubstantial reports detailing proposals to
implement the policy once the party was in power.
Various other occasionsgive advisersa greateropportunity to do
long-term thinking and produceproactivepapers. Sometimeswhen a new
minister takesover in a departmenthe welcomesfresh thinking. When
Leon Brittan becameHome Secretaryin 1983Robin Harris put in several
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long papers on the review of the criminal justice system. Frances
Morrell and Francis Crippsproducedvariouspolicy papersfor Tony Benn
but a particularly important one camesomemonthsafter they moved to
the Departmentof Energy. Sometimesthe ministers, seniorofficials and
special advisers of a departmentspentseveral days - perhaps at
Sunningdalein September- consideringthe strategyof the department.
Certain advisers, including David Metcalf, produced papers for such
meetings.
There were two views asto whenproactivereports shouldbe copied
to civil servants. Some advisers and ministers felt it was
inappropriatefor the departmentto receive,and perhapswork on, policy
proposals that did not havethe minister's approval. Others thought
that officials should havethe opportunity to examineanything that went
to the minister.
Although the term 'report' is not quite appropriate to describe
White and Green Papersand Circulars, a number of special advisers
played a part in drafting them that went far beyond examining and
commenting on departmentaldrafts. A good example,to be examined in
detail later, is the work of Anthony Lester and Angela Byre on the Sex
Discrimination White Paperof 1974, EQuality&I Women (Cmnd. 5724).
Work on White and GreenPaperswas includedby someadvisersas part of
their involvement in helping ministers with presentation. Again,
however, Jim Prior demonstratesthe difficulty in drawing a preciseline
around advisers' roles. Commentingon the work of his adviserson Green
and White Papersat both Employmentand the NIO he said, 'it would be a
little bit more drafting andpresentationthan it would be substancebut

becausethere was.'
I wouldn't saytherewasno impacton substance,
Sometimes
advisersplayedan importantrole in producingGreenPapersor
other policy statements
whichthengot overtakenby events, such as
play a substantialrole in
electoraldefeat;adviserscouldsometimes
writing statementswhichcivil servantsfelt uneasyabout handling.
Stella Greenallwrotemuchof the OrangePaper,Progins in Education
(DES, 1979), whichreviewedtheLabourGovernment'sachievementsand
plansin Education.
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Although Wilson included the role of acting 'as a "deviller"
chasingup Ministerial wishes', in his list of possiblefunctions, this
was not somethingon which many advisersspentmuch time. The role of
the private office helpsexplain why this activity was not important for
most advisers. Advisers, including Jack Straw, realized that the formal
relationship betweenthe minister and the departmentwas best left to
the private office. Strawagreed,however,he had a role: 'I might
say to Barbara, "Look, I think, you really ought to causea fuss about
the fact that this hasn't come out; you haven't had a submission on
this." And Barbarawould say, "OK, tell Norman [Warner]", or she would
sayto Norman, "I think we ought to do somethingabout that."'
Preparing briefs on non-departmentalmattersarising in Cabinet
(question 16d) did not occupy any time for a third of the special
advisers. As notedthis was a less important reasonfor appointmentfor
Tories, especiallyafter 1980. From his investigations Alastair Ross
Goobey reported in interview that he had concluded Labour special
advisers, 'felt that most of their time was spenton Cabinet warfare of
one sort or another.' There was rivalry even amongstthose who were
allies in Cabinet. As Bill Rodgerssuggested,ministerswanted to be
more effective in Cabinet than eventhoseof their colleagueswho were
friends. The proportion of advisers who spent a substantial or
considerable time on briefing for Cabinetwas twice as high, at one
third, for Labour as for Conservative.

OpinionsdifferedabouttheCabinetagendaitemswith which it was
appropriatefor advisersto becomeinvolved. Question16d)referred to
briefing for non-departmental
matters,but someadviserswerealso, or
primarily, involvedin preparingbriefsandspeakingnotesfor ministers
issues.This becamea traditionin theDHSSteam under
on departmental
Labour, with Brian Abel-Smithdescribingit as condensingwhat the
officials hadwritteninto eithera speakingform thatwasmost likely
to convince Cabinetor somethingthatBarbaraCastle could modify.
These adviserswere heavilyinvolvedin briefing during the Public
ExpenditureSurvey Committee(PESC)round of discussions,including
thosein Cabinet. Someadvisersalsoplayed a role in canvassing
supportfor their minister'sline by briefingotherministers'advisers.
because
Jeffrey Sterling's role wasexceptional
accordingto a BBC

165

profile he sat 'on two secretCabinetcommittees,one on broadcasting
and the other on privatisation' (Fryer, 1989). At both Industry and
Energy Tony Bennwas also unusualin using his advisersto write papers
for Cabinetand its committees. Their role in the disputesover nuclear
reactors was particularly controversialand is chronicledin detail by
Sedgemore(1980) and in Benn's Diaries (1989, and 1990).
More frequently advisers were usedto brief ministers on nondepartmental issues. Again Tony Benn is a prime example with the
economistFrancis Cripps sayingthat, in practice, his mainjob was 'to
do research and write the papersto exposeTreasuryquestions from a
non-Treasuryminister's point of view in Cabinet'. Other economists who
spent much of their time on this included Joan Mitchell, Michael
Stewart, David Metcalf, and - once he becameadviserto Lord Cowrie
Adam Ridley. Someof the other adviserswho briefed their ministers
more generallyon non-departmentalissuesincludedJohn Lyttle and Vicky
Kidd, who spentmost of her time doing this. The range of activities
that could be involved in the Cabinetbriefing role are well illustrated
by Rob Shepherd. Jim Prior explainedthat not only might Shepherd give
him an independentbrief on someissues,but he might also approach
people suggestedby Prior - especiallyeconomists- to discuss the
issuesin generalterms without letting on it was coming up in Cabinet.
Shepherd could in addition makea political input in the briefings and

on oneoccasionobtainedtheelectionaddresses
of several ministers,
thus arming Prior for a Cabinetbattle(describedin Prior, 1986) in
whichhe wasableto helpdefeata proposedbenefitcut by pointing out
thatthe ministershadpromisedto maintainits value.
The procedureadoptedby someministerswasto select the nondepartmentaltopicson whichthey wantedbriefing. Otherministers let
theadviserstaketheinitiative; sometimes
a mixtureof approacheswas
used. .Someadvisersprovideda commenton virtually anything, others,
including Anthony Lester, concentratedon non-departmental
matters
within their knowledgeandcompetence.Someministersexpectedthatthe
adviserwouldcontactotheradvisers- especiallyin theleaddepartment
- whenpreparinga brief. The extent to which this occurred was less
than severalministers seemedto assume.
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Question 16e)causedsomedifficulty. Certain advisers reported
that they attendedall of the prayer meetings,but that they did not
occupy much time. Thesemeetingstendedto be more frequently held by
Tory ministersand, at 45 per cent, the proportion of Tory advisers who
spent a substantial or considerabletime on them was twice that of
Labour. As noted, the Conservativeswere more inclined to include other
political figures; often the relevantWhip, the PPS and the CRD desk
officer attendedat leastsomeof thesemeetings.
In some cases, most noticeablythe Treasury since 1979, these
meetings havebeensignificant, lasting anything from half an hour to
over an hour, and advisersplayed a full part. No civil servant was
presentat Treasuryprayer meetingsand it was the responsibility of an
adviser to produceminutesreflecting as much as the Chancellor wished
to be reported. Practiceelsewhere varied widely: some advisers,
including Peter Davis, told the private secretary what had happened
rather than producingany minutes;as private secretary,Norman Warner
attended the DHSS meetingsbut JackStraw wrote the minutes; in other
departments, including the Home Office, the private secretarymade the
record. Sometimesadvisers were given work to do arising from the
meetings. Thus not only did JohnCope minute the DTI meetings but he
was also left with the action column, and particularly if one of the
numerous ministersin the departmentwas not there, Cope had to inform
him of relevantmattersor discussthem. David Townsendreportedthat it
was at the DHSS meetingsthat it was sometimesdecidedan adviser would
do somethingfor ajunior minister. In somedepartments,including the
Treasury, they were held first thing in the morning, but in others,
including the DHSS under Mrs Castle, they were at lunchtimes. Some
ministerspreferredad hi& meetings.

Partyliaison, 16f), did not occupyanytime for overa quarter of
special,advisers.Againthereis a partydifference,with three times
as many Tory advisers(42 per cent) spendinga substantial or
time on it asLabour. In bothpartiesthe largestresponse
considerable
wasin the moderate
category.This is perhapssurprisinggiventhe way
this activity hasalmostbecomesynonymous
with specialadvisers.There
areseveralpossibleexplanations.First, asEdwardBickhamargued, it
wasimportantbut did notoccupymuchtime, typicallyconsistingof four
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or five telephonecalls a day to Central Office. Second,to be in a
position to conductat least someof this work, the adviser must spend
time on other activities including readingsubmissionsand attending
departmental meetings. Third, political liaison is often an activity
which civil servants would not perform and, therefore, it is more
clearly identified as a 'special adviser'sfunction'. Thesefinal two
points illustrate the model developedof an adviseras somebody,'in the
know', who is closeto the overloadedminister and able to operate,
often informally, on his behalf along variouschannelsof communication.
Therefore, in the words of Adam Ridley, 'the adviseris uniquely well
placed to act as a channelof communications,if he is reliable and
trusted.'
A

variety of activities, some of them unglamorous chores,
contribute towards party liaison. Some,according to Coleman, 'are
potentially important, othersastonishingly trivial' (1991, p. 422).
Overall, despite overlaps, these matters can be split into two
categories. Many of them related to the minister's departmental
responsibilities; but to varying degreesministersalso wantedhelp in
liaison for their wider political role. The many aspects of party
liaison on departmentalissuesinclude letters, telephone calls and
meetings with a wide rangeof peopleand groups. Someadvisers helped
with letters - especiallypolitical ones, including those from MPs and
party supporters. This activity, which a few advisersregardedas the
baneof their lives, could involve: replying on behalf of the minister;
drafting replies for ministers; drafting paragraphs to be used in
standard replies written by officials; and/or checkingcivil servants'
drafts.
Some Labour advisers,including Ann Carlton and Elizabeth Thomas,
who was working for the Leaderof the House, liaised with backbenchers.
However, Tories did this more frequently. By virtue of their research
role in Opposition,advisersfrom both partiessuch as Carlton, Miles
Hudson, Adam Ridley, and Stuart Sextonhad developedclose links with
MPs particularly interestedin their field. Sometimes advisers, for
example Hudson, approachedbackbenchersto find out what was behind
particular ParliamentaryQuestions. Where adviserswere well known to
them, backbenchersmight contactthe adviseron a point, knowing it
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would be easier to get through to them than to the minister. Whilst
some Tory advisers attended the weekly meeting of the relevant backbench
committee, a CRD official would be present to take the minutes and
report back. One adviser, therefore, felt that some of his colleagues,
'used to go to those meetings because they wanted to get personally
known to as many MPs as possible. '

Generally advisersspentmore time on liaison with party offices
than with MPs, but accordingto a Labour official, 'there was no
coherence in approachbetweenministersand us - it depended on the
personalityof ministersand advisers.' In the two parties the liaison
worked both ways betweenadvisersand party headquarters.Chris Butler
was one of several advisersto refer to themselvesas 'lightning
conductors' betweenthe minister and the party structure, often dealing
with minor matterswithout thesehaving to go to the minister. For
post-1979 Tory adviserswho had worked in the CRD, it was natural to
have links with party officials. One role played by Tory advisers,
which was particularly important in the Treasury, was preparing the
Central Office briefing for backbenchersbefore major debates. Several
Labour advisers, including Brian Abel-Smith, Tony Lynes and Stella
Greenall, were membersof sub-committeesof the NEC prior to becoming
advisers. Many othersinvolved themselvesin the work of committees
relevant to their minister's departmentin a way that the minister did
not havetime, or in a few casesthe inclination, to do. They saw their
role as being to inform, explain and, wherenecessary,defendthe views
and policies of eachto the other, thoughmost gave priority to the
policies of their minister and the Government. Tom McNally went from
being InternationalSecretaryof the Labour Party to being adviser at

the ForeignOfficeandattendedall the meetingsof the International
Committeeof theLabourPartyuntil theyaskedhim to stop:
I attended
I spoke
asan observerbut I think it wasbecause
too much ... andsomeof themfelt I wasbeing used as an
understudy
andthis wasbeneaththeir dignity ... The original
intentionwasthatJim Callaghan
wouldattendall meetingsof
the party's InternationalCommitteebut it becameless and
lessrealisticfor theForeignSecretaryto be present.
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Someadvisersmet party groupson behalf of the minister. Obviously
care was needednot to offend peoplewho thought they should see the
minister. A good exampleof how the advisercould operatewas given by
David Owen. He met pressuregroupsand party groups concerned with
human rights in particular countriesthe first time they requested a
meeting. Thereafter,he suggestedif the group wished to contact him
their usualroute shouldbe via David Stephen,his specialadviser and
an expert in humanrights issueswith particularly good links with Latin
America.
Often adviserswere usedto gatherinformation or as messengers,
possibly either at the minister's requestor becauseparty people would
contact the advisers- sometimesif they could not get through to the
minister. Such an 'intelligence gatheringservice', as Bill Rodgers
called it, was frequently important for ministerswho had to deal with
local councillors. Consequently,mostadvisersworking in the DoE,
including David Lipsey and PeterDavis, were amongstthosewho regarded
this as being one of their major occupations. Chris Mockler, also at
Environment, said it is 'not thejob of special advisers to tell
ministersthe facts of life on politics ... but there is quite a lot of
information in circulation which they need someone to assessthe
importance of, or judge, and bring to their attentionif needbe, and
to liaise with Central Office very closely and with councillors.'
Advisers were well placedto gatherinformation that could be useful in
negotiations and also to talk to leaders of minority groups on
councils.

Liaison with theWelshandScottishpartiesplayeda part in some
advisers'work - includingtwo at theWelshOffice. Gwilym Prys-Davies
issueswith theSecretary
of the WelshLabourParty,
regularlydiscussed
MPs formeda distinctgroup,
andfor ChrisButlertheWelshConservative
with whichhe thoughtit importantto remainin closecontact. Part of
Vicky Kidd's work for Ted Short, minister with responsibilityfor
devolution, involved attendingScottishLabourPartyand Trade Union
meetingsandconferences:'I wassentoff ashis eyesandearsto come
backandpreparea report.'
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Many ministers travelled the country on trips combining
departmentalandparty meetings.Such trips were particularly common for
ministersdealingwith local governmentand the arrangementsespecially
complex, because,for example,the advisermight be involved in helping
the private office arrangewhich of the party's councillors in the town
visited shouldbe invited to meetthe minister on the official part of
his trip. Certain advisers,for exampleDavid Lipsey, assistedwith the
arrangementsfor party trips, or the political elements of official
visits. This is moving into the field of assistingthe minister with
party liaison in his generalpolitical activities.
For ministerson Labour's main NEC there was considerablescope to
use advisersto makearrangements,liaise, and provide briefing. Thus
Banksand Margaret Beckettsaid that the party liaison work they did for
Judith Hart involved her wider role on the NEC in addition to ODM
issues. The two elementsof party liaison were seen perhaps most
clearly in the work of Shirley Williams's advisers. Whereas Stella
Greenallcontinuedher membershipof the EducationSub-committeeof the
NEC, and was asked by Hugh Jenkins(now Lord Jenkins of Putney),
Minister for the Arts, to attendthe Arts Sub-committeeas well, John
Lyttle spentmuch time liaising on generalpolitical issues. This went
far wider thanjust NEC liaison. There was closecontact with Roger
Liddle who, in turn, spentconsiderabletime, 'being
between Bill Rodgersand our faction.' This entailed
work within the Manifesto Group of Labour MPs
parliamentary, Campaignfor Labour Party Victory. A

the link man
organizational
and the extra
similar function

had earlier beenperformedby Matthew Oakeshott,accordingto whom the
Jenkinsites, 'were quite a closeknit group'; in keepingin touch with
them he was continuinga role he hadplayed in Opposition. The MPs
concernedwere not necessarilyparticularly interestedin Home Affairs,
but rather were the pro-European group. Oakeshott conducted much
liaison with Brussels,especiallywith the cabin of George Thompson
(now Lord Thompson of Monifieth), and was heavily involved in the
referendum campaign. On the other side in that campaign Frances
Morrell, Tony Banksand JackStraw were called 'our permanentofficials'
by Tony Benn (1989, p. 363). Benn's Diaries not only record the
considerablerole of Morrell in that campaignbut also her work for Benn
in the 1976leadershipcontest. Similarly Jim Callaghan relates how
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three of his former PPSs'rallied at onceand with Tom McNally, my
Political Adviser, formed a small inner teamto conductthe contest on
my behalf (p.392). The delicatenatureof some of this political
activity was demonstratedin a minute from Harold Wilson which,
accordingto Darlington, statedthat advisersshould not be involved in
the leadershipcampaign.
Speechwriting, 16g), was a major occupationfor almost half the
advisers. There was a markedparty differencein the proportion of
advisersspendingsubstantialtime on this - Labour 11 per cent, Tory 45
per cent. However, the most striking distinction was between advisers
appointedafter 1980, and the rest. Of the former, 55 per cent spent a
substantial time on speechwriting as against22 per cent (two out of
nine) of thoseappointedin 1979-80. This correlates both with the
analysis of the figures on reasonsfor appointmentand the statements
quotedearlier from Patrick Jenkinabout the developmentof the system.
Some of his advisers,including Stephen Sherbourneand Christopher
Mockler, were amongthosewho spentmost time on speechwriting. Others
for whom it was a major occupationincludedHome Office advisers Edward
Bickham, David Coleman,and Robin Harris. BrendonSewill estimatedthat
three quartersof his typed output consistedof speechesand briefing
for broadcasts. For someadvisers,readingsubmissionsand attending
meetingswas primarily essentialbackgroundwork for this activity, but
Treasury advisers found that presentationalwork could give them a
reason for having good accessto, for example,budget discussions and
for others, including EdwardBickham, it provided a 'justification for
dabbling in more things than otherwise might have been possible.'
Bickham thought it was impossibleto divorce the substanceof policy
from its presentation:
If you are trying to build a strategyand framework within
which to presentpolicy you haveto have regardto the merits
and the detail of that policy. Although I tended to play
quite a large part in the writing of speechesand had a
generalpublic relationsrole I would also usually attend all
his [DouglasHurd's] substantivepolicy meetingsand aim to
makea contribution.
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Some advisershad to havea row with the department to establish
that they were not going to spendall their time on speechwriting, and
others were unhappy at the extentto which they spent longer than
anticipated on, to quote one, 'the wretchedspeech writing business,
which is a bug bearof a whole hostof specialadvisers.' The tension
is perhapsbestillustrated by the departmentin which officials were
told that adviserswould occasionallypreparemajor speeches,but speech
writing was not a major part of their work; nevertheless,they wantedto
see copies of all draft outlines and full draft speeches,and would
adviseon the proposedcontentof speechesand on presentationalaspects
of particular occasions.
This illustrates someof the many ways advisers contributed to
speeches.Sometimesthey producedthe first draft, especiallyfor party
political speeches.On other occasionsthey commentedon, or redrafted,
speechesprepared by civil servants. This was at the request of the
minister or as a result of officials copying speechesto the adviser. A
few advisers,including Mockler, had prime responsibility for the full
range of the minister's speeches
outsidethe Houseof Commons once he
had made it clear what he wishedto talk about. For others, such as
Brian Abel-Smith, it came to be acceptedthat they would coordinate the
speeches. For a generalspeechon the National Health Service (NHS)
this might include taking variouscontributionsin different stylesfrom
the civil servants and rewriting themto provide a common style,
memorablephrases,an introduction and conclusionas well as finding the
basis of a presshandoutin it.
Many other advisers were responsible for inserting political
paragraphs into departmentalspeeches.Often there was close liaison,
with civil servants and adviser usually recognizing that it was
important that anything relating to the minister's departmental
responsibilities should be checkedby officials. However, for Jim
Callaghan's first major speech,as Foreign Secretary,to European
ministers, Tom McNally was askedto preparea text basedon the party's
manifesto;it was not well receivedin somequarters. The requirements
of ministers, and their degreeof involvement, varied widely. Some
preferred to speak from brief notesand the adviser's role was to
discussthe main themesfor the speech. Others, or the sameminister on
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other occasions,wanteddetaileddrafts which they might read and return
for alteration, until they were satisfied. Advisers also sometimestook
part in discussionsof the themesthe minister should develop in
speechesover the coming months.
Two thirds of advisersclaimed to spenda major part of their time
discussing issues with the minister (question 16h). The interview
evidencesuggestssomehavepossiblyexaggeratedthe time spenton this
role. This might reflect the importancethey attachedto it and also
indicate an overlap with other functions. Nevertheless,it was clearly
the most important activity for Ray Richardsonabout whom Harold Lever
said, 'his main role was to discussissues with me but Ray won
considerable respectat the Treasuryand he often discussedmatters in
detail with Treasuryofficials. He had a cooperative,not combatative,
relationship with them.' If the adviserhada set time for seeing the
minister it was usually first thing in the morning or in the early
evening. Sometimesdiscussionsbetweena minister and his adviser were
related to specific issues,including presentationand policy decisions,
but for many ministersthe adviserwas a confidant with whom he could
hold wide-rangingdiscussions. This is well illustrated by Tony Benn's
Diary entry for 18 February 1975: 'I talked to FrancesMorrell about all
sorts of things' (1989). When interviewedBenn agreedwith the comment
of Morrell, that advisersattemptedto help form a 'political community'
around the minister. For other advisers,including Brendon Sewill, the
wide ranging early eveningchatswere often an opportunity to review the
day's eventsor decisionsover whisky.
How far the private secretarywas a party to discussions between
the minister and his advisersvaried. Someministers had a small group
of confidants,often including specialadvisers,private secretariesand
the chief information officer. Somereferred to them as a cabin , or a
'mafia'. Various advisers, including severalwho worked for Nigel
Lawson, saw their role in discussingissuesas being one voice amongst
severalin a central core around the minister. Thus during some crisis
weeks Howard Davies referred to being part of 'a sort of rolling
meeting', and at Energy, Lynda Rousesaid that at 'meetings with Mr
Lawson at 6.30 or 7.00 in the evening, when the whisky was out, it would
be the chief pressofficer, the private secretaryand me.' In other
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instanceswhere ministers, including John Silkin and Roy Hattersley,
spent time talking things over with a close-knitgroup, the advisers
would, in addition, havefrequentopportunitiesfor private discussion
with the minister and there was more scopefor playing an aide/confidant
role.
Discussing issueswith the minister overlapswith 16i), attending
meetings,visits and receiving deputationswith him - anothermajor way
in which advisersspenttheir time. They generallyhad free access to
departmental meetings with the minister, sometimeschoosing which to
attend and at other times being requestedby him to appear. Where there
was a teamof advisers,for examplein the Treasuryafter 1979, some
meetings including budget ones, might be attendedby more than one
adviser. Rob Shepherdand Stuart Sextonare amongstthoseadvisers who
said that their ministers deliberately brought them into the
discussion at somemeetings. Other ministers, including Tony Crosland
and Merlyn Rees,did not expecttheir 'chocolatesoldier' (i. e. former
Rowntree funded researchassistant)to start arguing on substantive
points with seniorofficials. Irrespectiveof how involved they had
beenin the discussion,someadvisers,including David Lipsey, Elizabeth
Thomas, and John Whittingdale, frequently remainedwith the minister
after meetingsto considerthe decision, the politics involved, and/or
how it should be presented.How far adviserswere invited to meetings
between the minister and other Cabinet ministers, or distinguished
guestsfrom outsidethe department,varied but could be controversial.

Ministers who travelledextensivelyoften took advisersalong.
This could be domestically, for exampleKen Griffin accompanied Tony
Benn, when he was at Industry, on industrial visits including his
meetingswith workers. It wasparticularly important for ministerswith
many overseasvisits and negotiations. SeveralForeign Secretariestook
advisers with them, including Alec DouglasHome who was accompanied by
Miles Hudson to Rhodesiawhere he would be 'the sort of fellow on whom
you could sharpenyour wits'. Ann Carlton was regularly in Brussels as

part of JohnSilkin's teamwhenhe wasMinisterof Agricultureand Tony
Banks,MargaretJackson,andMaggieSidgreaves
all, at different times,
in Brusselsor for
JudithHart on trips, or to negotiations
accompanied
theadvisercould act as a
the Lome Convention. On suchoccasions
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sounding board and provide an immediate opinion about the likely
political reactionto the negotiatingposition and also be, in the words
of Judith Hart, 'someoneto blow one's top to. ' Furthermore, in the
case of Carlton, the adviser was able to get points out of the
negotiations to peoplesuchas the fishermenfor an instant reaction.
Since 1979there have beenmuch greaterrestraintson the foreign travel
of advisers.
Question 16j) proved to be ambiguous. A few advisersthought they
had done things 'on behalf of the minister' including: attending
departmental meetings; receiving deputations; presenting conference
papers;and talking to pressuregroups. David Coleman,for example, was
sometimesaskedto 'field' groups, especiallyon the political side, who
wished to seethe minister whenhe was particularly busy and, according
to John Patten, Colemansometimes,'spoke at conferences,as it were,
with my voice.' The accountby Edwards al. (1989, p. 36) of Sexton's
role in promoting the AssistedPlaces Scheme illustrates how this
activity could be seenas an exceptionthat proves the rule: 'far from
remaining discreetly in the background,as political advisers were
generally expectedto do, he appearedincreasinglyas a public spokesman
of the Party's commitment,often deputisingfor Carlisle at official
functions both before and after the Election.'
Generally the responseto this questionwas low, partly reflecting
the ambiguity of the phrase'on behalf of - especiallyin relation to
adviserswhosestatusis somewhatunofficial. Only rarely did advisers
attend departmentalmeetingsor receivegroupsin a clearly deputizing
role for the minister who would normally havebeenexpectedto do it.
Some advisersattendeddepartmentalmeetings,but they were generally
ones the minister would not haveexpectedto attendbecauseof lack of
time and/or it would havebeeninappropriate. This was a method by
which someadvisersfulfilled the 'eyesand ears' role, althoughit was
sometimes made clear to themthat they shouldnot immediately report
everything to ministersbefore the departmentwas ready to present its
submission. How far advisers' attendanceat departmentalmeetingscould
be interpreted asbeing on behalf of ministersvaried. In one sense
virtually everything doneby most advisers, as personal appointees,
could be thought of as being on behalf of their masters. Sometimes,
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however, ministersexplicitly statedthat advisers,including Sextonand
Anthony Lester, had a specific brief to work alongsideofficials on the
production of White Papersandplans for legislation. Some actedin a
liaison capacityfor the minister with the department's Planning Unit
and sometimesadvisers were askedto represent the minister on a
departmentalworking group.
On other occasionsadvisersattendeddepartmentalmeetings on a
more ad lid basis, or evenat the requestof civil servants. Several
permanent secretariesinvited advisersto the permanent secretary's
policy group meetingswith deputysecretaries,at which they examined
the policies being developed. In explaining to colleagues why he
intended to askMichael Portillo to the permanentsecretary's steering
committeein the Departmentof Energy, Sir Donald Maitland
argued that it would be very much better for the political
adviser, who was an utterly discreetperson, to hear our
discussionsand how it was we decidedon our advice. I thought
he would be an ally if he had taken part in the discussions,
and felt able to subscribeto the advicewe were offering.
Alternatively, if we were going off the political rails, he
would be able to alert us.
Ann Carlton and Maggie Sidgreavesattendedthe meetingsat MAFF and
ODM respectively and Derek Scott, Denis Healey's adviserin the late
1970s, attended the equivalentmeetingin the Treasury, called the
Policy CoordinatingCommittee. GeorgeCardona(1981), one of his Tory
successors,thoughtit a pity they did not go to it.
Aspects of the independentwork of adviserswithin departments on
behalf of their ministersare both complexand controversial. Thus, on
advisers attending interdepartmentalofficial committees, Mitchell
wrote: 'Harold Wilson saysfirmly they do not. This is not literally
so, occasionally they havedone so, but only at lower working party
levels.' (1978, p.95). Mitchell, for example, attended some
interdepartmentalmeetingson energypricing by nationalizedindustries,
and advisersfrom other departmentswere present. Anthony Lester was a
member of two interdepartmentalcommittees- on nationality and on the
legal protection of humanrights. Advisers were officially encouraged

deliberations
to join in departmental
on mattersbeing preparedfor
submissionto theministers.
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A further reasonwhy many advisersreplied that they spentonly a
slight or insignificant amount of time acting on behalf of their
minister was becausethe questionreferred to departmental meetings.
Many spentmore time tallcingto officials on an informal basisthan they
did at formal departmentalmeetings. An advisersuch as Brian AbelSmith argued that he was too busy to spendperhapsthree hours at an
official meeting. Rather, he would wait for a copy of the submission
and spend an hour or so commentingon it, informally discussing the
issuewith officials whennecessary.
Sometimes a minister askedhis adviserto talk to a civil servant
and perhapsexplain the minister's thinking on a particular issueor his
comments on a submission. Geoffrey Howe requestedAdam Ridley to do
this a numberof times and Normanlamont stated,'if I am uneasy about
somethingI might aska political adviserto think about it and discuss
it further with the department.' Occasionallyministersaskedofficials
to talk to the adviserfor a fuller explanation of the minister's
thinking than the latter had time to give. In the above cases the
discussionscould be regardedasbeing on behalf of the minister. More
frequently the meetings were initiated by the adviser or by the
official.
Somepermanentsecretarieswere unhappyat specialadvisers,in the
words of one, 'getting at subordinatestaff. ' Furthermore, several
officials felt it was inappropriateto suggestthere was a role for
advisers to play in helping to convey the ministers' policies into the
departments. However, the subtlety of the additional nature of the
adviser's contribution is demonstratedin the following quotations,
starting with Donald Maitland referring to circumstancesin which Tom
McNally madehimself useful:

One would be where the party view representedquite a
departurefrom previouspolicy, in whichcasepeoplehadto be
coachedin that. Althougheveryonehadreadthe manifestoand
in the detailed
knew what was entailed, nonetheless,
Tom
McNally
have thought it
that,
of
might
well
application
helpful for peopleto geta bit of guidanceabout the way
ministerswantedto play it.

178

When I arrived at the DoE I was astonishedby the word perfect
way in which seniorofficials could recite our programme. I
spenthappy hoursinstructing themon the correct exegesis of
someof its less pellucid passages(Lipsey, 1980).
I was not really there at the beginning when Keith Joseph
first handeddown his readinglist of about a dozenbooks....
That was the methodthat Keith choseto ensurethat his civil
servants madepolicy suggestionalong lines that were likely
to be acceptableto him and his colleagues. I ended up
...
with an additionaljob, as for many monthsafterwardsI acted
as a sort of unofficial interpreter. I was alwaysbeing asked
what would be the monetaristline on this, or where shouldthe
line be drawnbetweenthe stateand the private sector (almost
invariably thosein the Departmentwantedto do too much) or
how should we express this or that in a minute to the
Secretaryof State(Young, 1990, p.37).
These quotationsgive only a flavour of the diverse reasons for,
and nature of, the informal contactsbetweenadvisers and officials.
The advisersmight initiate the face to faceor telephonediscussionsto
emphasizepoints in the manifesto,or as Lipsey did, to explain the
philosophy behind it. They might wish to advocatethe addition of extra
options in the submissionbeing plannedby the officials. Tony Lynes,
especially after he became based in the Supplementary Benefits
Commissionrather than the DHSS's main offices, spent more time talldng
informally to officials at meetingsthan most advisersdid. He thought
it important, 'to persuadethe official that evenif you are not right,

at leastyou havegot a serious,arguable,point of view thatshould be
incorporatedin the advicetheyaregiving.' Advisers also initiated
contactwith officialswhentheywerehelpingtheir ministerto pursuea
particular strategyand whentheyhad useful information from the
political field. ThusJim Prior stated:
We used to havea weekly meetingwith the officers of the
backbenchcommittee. Civil servantswould neverbe presentat
that meetingbut Rob Shepherdand RobbieGilbert were there.
They would tell the departmentwhat went on
The meetings
...
with the backbenchcommitteewere very important and bound to
have an effect on policies pursuedwithin the department; but
without a specialadviserthere is no way the department can
find thesethings out. I supposea minister can always tell
the departmentwhat the political nuancesare, but ministers
are fairly busy people.
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A rangeof civil servantsinitiated contactswith advisers. At the
DoE, Ian Bancroft, 'usedto havea regular weekly chat with David
Lipsey.' A similar procedurewas adoptedin the DHSS under Labour by
the permanentsecretaries.The advisersinvolved in thesemeetingswere
also amongstthosewho, in the words of Mike Hartley-Brewer, acted as a
'conduit from assistantsecretariesand principals to the minister. '
David Ennalssaw Hartley-Breweras his eyesand ears across the whole
field, and the conceptimplied hereof an adviseras somebodycapableof
hopping up and down the hierarchy of the departmentand acting as a
channel of information fits with the model developed earlier.
Furthermore, given the informality of their position, advisers, in
discussionswith officials or at formal meetings,could do as Maurice
Pestondid: 'I would always makeit clear if I went to a meeting, that
if the meetingcameto someconclusionI certainly didn't regard myself
asnecessarilycommittedto that conclusion,becauseto me it wasjust a
meeting at which we were discussingthe issues;and therefore none of
this agreedview stuff would I ever go for. '
Civil servants,to varying degrees,are underpressureto support
the agreedline containedin the submissionto the minister which helps
explain why assistant secretariessometimesseek out advisers.
According to David Stephen, 'Officials use the specialadviser to say,
"look the papercoming up saysthis, but we think that." There was
quite a lot of what the StateDepartmentcalls "the Dissent Channel"
there and I had to be very careful not to becomethat. I wasn't a
Dissent Channel.' Stephen,and many other advisers,believedthere were
other, more common, reasonswhy officials approachedadvisers including
to increasetheir understandingof the political perspectives involved,
and to get a steeron the minister's likely reactionto their planned
submissions. Occasionallyofficials turned to advisersfor guidance as
to why their submissionhad beenrejectedby a minister. The full
variety of reasonsthat officials had for viewing favourably the
opportunitiesto discusspoints with adviserswill be examinedlater.

From her perspective
of havingbeen,at different times, diary
describedseveralways
secretaryandspecialadviser,MaggieSidgreaves
in whichadviserscouldsometimes
explicitly do thingson behalfof the
minister. Periodicallyasdiary secretaryshewouldput the advisersin
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to see Labour Party peopleif Judith Hart becameinvolved with other
matters and was, at the last minute, unableto meet them. When she
became an adviser Sidgreavessometimesexplained points to civil
servants on behalf of the ministerand sheaccompaniedHart on her
overseasvisits. On suchtrips sheoften had her own programme of
events and sometimes, for example,visited refugee camps and made
contactsit would havebeendifficult for either ministersor officials
to have made. Occasionallyit was alsoplannedthat she would open
things or meet peoplewhenHart had a full programme and could not
perform thosetasks.
Some advisers went on trips without their minister, but often
accompaniedby officials. Gwilym Prys-Davies,for example,spent three
days looking at the Islandsand HighlandsDevelopmentBoard with a civil
servantfrom the Welsh Office when they were developingideasabout the
proposed Mid Wales Rural DevelopmentBoard. In addition to travelling
extensively with the Foreign Secretary,severalspecial advisers made
visits on the minister's behalf: JohnHarris to Vietnam, Miles Hudson
to Rhodesia, and David Stephennot only went alone on fact-finding
missions for David Owen to various countries, including Mozambique,
Zambia, Namibia, and SouthAfrica, but was also usedat times as an
emissary, in Belize, for example, meeting the whole Cabinet for
discussionsin June 1978.
Part of question 16j) included a reference to receiving
deputations, other thanparty ones,on behalf of the minister. A few
examples were given above;however,it was sometimes difficult to
distinguish between party groupsand groupsof people not officially
from the party but consistinglargely of people from one political
persuasion. The phrase 'on behalf of again caused difficulties.
Despite allowing for this, the interview evidencesupportsthe picture
given by Table 3 that evenwhen the wider conceptof any contact with
membersof relevantpressuregroupswas considered,for many advisersit
was not an important activity. Over 60 per cent had suchcontact either
less frequently than weekly, or never. One areawhere the contact was
least obviously 'on behalf of a minister was where it was initiated by

the groups. The point is illustratedby successive
advisersappointed
to the DHSSin 1978and 1979. MalcolmDean,havingbeen a journalist
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specializingin socialpolicy, was appointedby David Ennals. He found
that many groupsthat he had written about contactedhim believing they
now had a friend at court. Although Roger Dyson thought that the
gathering and relaying of information from the field was something
Patrick Jenkin wanted, it got rather out of hand: 'I found myself
continually got at, soughtout, and invited to do activities all over
the country, far more than I could manage.'
One variant of the contactbeing initiated by groups is the
expandedrole of political lobbyists. Increaseduseof specialadvisers
by lobbyistswas advocatedby Miller (1987) and in Business Magazine,
'Scrutator' wrote: 'Political lobbyiststhesedays often refer to the
importance of makingone's numberwith specialadvisers' (1987, p.22).
Jenny Jeger, a political consultantor lobbyist with experience of
having previously worked at the Number Ten Political Office under
Labour, also stressedthe importanceof having good contacts with
political advisers. In addition to the regular two-way liaison she
thought the contactscould prove particularly important in "'cases of
desperation"whenyou havegot to speakto the minister.' If you had a
political point to make it was much betterto go to the political
adviserwho had direct accessthan filtering it throughelsewhere.
John Whittingdale, whilst specialadviserat the DTI, was in
contact with pressuregroupsand industrialiststhree or four times a
week. He would listen to them, find out if they had a case, usually
discuss it with officials, and seewhat the Government'sline was. If
it was appropriatehe, 'would sayto the Secretaryof State, "I have
been contacted by so and so and he hasgot a case,why don't we do
something?"' He also felt that advisershad become, 'one of the prime
targets for political lobbyists they were constantlyringing me up
...
and would regard me asa route in to the minister.' At least for
advisers servingup to 1987Whittingdalewas unusualin having so much
contact with groupsand lobbyists. This was probably a reflection of
his working at the DTI but suchactivity has increasedin importancefor
adviserssince 1987. Lobbyistscan sometimesbe of value to adviserswho
wish, for example,to find out the facts behind an argument, or gain
information quickly aboutan issuethat is just breaking.
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As noted earlier, DouglasHurd, and other ministers, came to
realize the value of having an adviserwho was able to, 'do a little
skirmishing work of the kind the civil servantsalso do, but he can do
it a little more freely, a little more loosely.' His adviser, Edward
Bickham, agreedhe spentquite a lot of time talking to groups including
ones concernedwith broadcasting,and the National Associationfor the
Care and Resettlementof Offenders. He would convey their ideas
directly back to the minister and/or the department. Other aspects of
this role that ministersappreciatedinclude the advocacyperformed by
someadvisersand their ability to assessthe likely reaction to planned
proposals- especiallyany political dangers.Liaison with trade unions
was performedby severalLabour advisers. Amongst the Tory orientated
groups Richard Ehrmantalked to whilst he was Tom King's adviser at
Employment were the Centrefor Policy Studies(CPS), the Institute of
Economic Affairs (IEA), and the IOD. He relayed their views; told them
of, and justified, King's policies; and tried, 'to influence their
policies and the tone of their publications.'
Sometimesadvisersalreadyhad clear links with groupsrelevant to
the minister's portfolio - in some cases it was a reason for
appointment. Certainadvisers,for exampleTom Baron, could talk to the
group with which he had good links andplay a numberof the aboveroles.
Several of the Treasuryadvisers,including Peter Cropper, Douglas
French, RodneyLord, and Alastair RossGoobeyhad good links with groups
in the financial and/or taxationfield. However, the necessarysecrecy
surroundingactivities suchas the preparationof the Budget meant that
sometimes more emphasiswas given to bringing ideasdirectly in to the
Treasury ministers, than advocating proposed changes to outside
audiences.
One of the reasonswhy contactwith groups was generally not
important, and thosewho did engagein it were often very circumspect,
is that leadinginterest groupsoften had very good links with officials
and a deputation from such a group would expectto meet a minister
and/or senior officials. According to Clive Booth, former principal
private secretaryat the DES, if a group suchas the Committeeof ViceChancellors and Principalscameto meetthe Secretary of State, 'it
would be unthinkableto say, "the Secretaryof Statecan't make it, but
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the special adviser is here."' Advisers were sometimes seen as
attempting to dilute the strengthof the traditional relationships
betweendepartmentsand establishedinterestgroups. Thus in respectof
the DES Kogan suggests,'Advisers are broughtin to help cause radical
change. Their concernis not with the practitioner networks and the
more enduringachievementsand liabilities of the systembut with ways
of dislodging them' (1987, p.230).
For ministers wishing to challengethe existing policy community
and bring a wider rangeof interest groupsor policy think tanks into
the discussions,adviserscould play an important part. Advisers played
a variety of roles: encouragingministersto develop suchconsultations;
encouraging groupsto be more forthcoming; facilitating links between
the groupsand the minister and his officials; and acting asa conduit
for the ideasof the group or think tank. Perhapsthe clearest example
comesfrom MAFF where, asnoted in Chapter3, a strong policy community
exists. John Silkin's adviser, Ann Carlton, wrote in Farming News on 27
January1989:

in 1976thecivil servantssuggested
thatthe new minister,

John Silkin, should meetthe NFU. They were surprisedwhen he
also wantedto meetthe fishing industry's representativesat
the earliestpossibleopportunity. Similarly the idea that he
should meetconsumergroupsand the agricultural unions had to
come from the minister or his adviser and not from the
permanent civil service. This was not because the civil
servantswere malevolent;but becausethey were going by past
precedent.
The pressofficer at MAFF, Terry Dawes, suggestedthat Carlton
had an important role in liaising with some of these groups especially, for example, with the owner-skippers in the fishing
industry, in particular during negotiationsat Brussels. Not only did
Carlton play a part in the liaison, sometimesfacilitating it, she also
felt that in somecases,suchas with consumer groups, she had to
encourage the interest groupsinto greater activity. She claimed,
'maybe the civil servantscould havedone that but they wouldn't have
had the will to do it, or the contacts,and I don't think the minister
would have had the time.' This is partially compatible with Martin
Smith's argumentthat, 'in British agricultural policy the existence of

a closedpolicy communityanda firmly established
agendalimited the
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role that excludedpressuregroupscould play in raising new issues ...
The difficulty of challengingthe agendafrom outsidemeansthat often
the pressurefor changewill only come from within government.' (1989,
pp.163-4 and 161). However, whereasSmith stressesthat major changes
generally did not occur in agricultural policy until the 1980s,and did
so then becauseof the emergenceof new external problems, Carlton
emphasizesthe importance of the role in the late 1970s of various
individuals - the minister, backedby both his adviserand changes he
forced through at seniorlevels in MAFF.
Helping with presentation,16k), occupieda great deal of most
advisers' time (almost two thirds spenta substantial or considerable
time on it), and encompassed
more thanjust speech writing. Advisers
could be involved in: discussingthe strategyfor presentation;talking
to journalists - especiallypolitical ones; drafting and/or redrafting
press releases;organizing the releaseof political speeches;drafting
articles for the minister; preparationfor ParliamentaryQuestion Time;
briefing the minister before televisionand radio interviews. John
Harris and Michael Dobbsare examplesof adviserswho were effective at
presentation and yet never, or in the caseof Dobbs rarely, became
classified as speechwriters. They illustrate, however, that
involvement in presentationoverlapswith the roles described earlier
because, for example,both were heavily involved in discussing with
their ministers presentationalstrategyand the handling of specific
issues.

Discussingthe wayto presentan immediateissuecanitself be part
of crisis management.When the DHSS was split into two departments in
1988 Margaret Thatcher said in QuestionTime on 26 July that the
burden of the two departmentswas, 'more than one person could
legitimately undertake'(Official $e=. Vol. 138, col. 251). It is,
therefore, perhapsnot surprisingthat Norman Fowler, who was Secretary
of State at the DHSS for five years,describedthe key role of Nick
True, his adviser, as helping with crisis managementand that in most of
the criseshe facedhe required help with presentation,'particularly in
to the minister quickly. Speedis of
getting draft statements/speeches

' Similarpointsweremadeby Labouradvisersat the DHSS.
the essence.
'Jack[Straw]wasvery goodat presentation
Brian Abel-Smithcommented,
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and he was much better than I on thinking how to react to a minicrisis.' Mike Hartley-Breweralso felt there was a role for advisersin
helping to handlethe many crisesthat besetthe department. According
to Francis Cripps there is often a needin politics to respond very
quickly, for example,by sendingout pressreleases;but it is not just
a question of presentation: 'creative thinking in a hurry is
required ... [as] lines get developedto respondto emergencies'. Tony
Benn's Diaries (1989, and 1990)record many examples of Cripps and
FrancesMorrell discussingaspectsof presentationalstrategy- both in
crises and, more generallyto expoundhis position during disputes
within the party and the Government. Assistingwith crisis management
could combine severalof the activities describedearlier with some
presentationalonesand againdemonstratesaspectsof the model of the
place of advisers. It showswhy they haveto be on hand, close to
ministers, and perhaps flexible enoughto be free from too many
compulsory,routine activities.
There was similarly a rangeof motives amongthose advisers who
spokefrequently to journalists. Often adviserstalked most frequently
to political correspondents.JohnHarris evenretainedhis lobby card.
However, a division of responsibilitieswas again clearly seen between
Shirley Williams's advisers: StellaGreenall talked to educational
correspondentsand John Lyttle to political ones. In talking to
journalists, often over the phoneor at lunch time, advisers might
provide the backgroundbehind recentspeechesor policy developments,or
trail certain storiesin the press. Having talked to a journalist an
adviser sometimes suggestedto his minister that he should meet the
journalist. Severaladvisers,including EdwardBickham, also talked to
journalists working on the increasing number of current affairs
programmes. They would 'have a background,off-the-record chat about a
subject rather than wanting to work on a news story.' Some advisers
spend a considerabletime briefing the press about their minister's
position on departmentaland generalissuesand this fits with the view
of advisers as people who assist ministers in their continuous
competition with colleagues. One Labour adviser, whilst admitting to
someliaison with the press,said, 'I wasn't the constantcall box that

a numberof my colleagues
were.' A permanentsecretarysuggestedthat
one of the mainrolesof theadviserin hisdepartment
was to ensure
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that the minister receivedbettercoveragein the Guardian than other
ministers.
Advisers who hadbeenjournalists were in a goodposition to assist
with presentation. Thus one of Malcolm Dean's activities was to draft
articles for his ministers. In helping prepareministers for interviews
some adviserswould play the part of 'a nastyleft wing interviewer. '
Similarly, many advisers,including Lynda Rouse,were part of the team
which helpedpreparetheir minister for QuestionTime.
In addition to all theseactivities adviserssuch as Abel-Smith
were, as notedabove, involved in drafting or amendingdocuments coming
out of the departmentfor public consumptionincluding Green Papers and
Circulars. Where, however, advisers became directly involved in
journalism, there could be controversy. Thus Tony Benn's Dry entry
for 11 March 1979reads: 'I had a note in my box that the Prime Minister
wants to talk to me aboutFrances'swork on j&bQu Activist, saying that
she is in breachof her statusas political adviser' (1990). On the
other hand it was recentlyconcededofficially that advisers were
entitled to be involved in somecontroversialareasof presentation. In
1990 a memorandumentitled CostingQfJg Policies Qf
sition
Parties was submittedby the Headof the Home Civil Service, Sir Robin
Butler, to the Treasuryand Civil Service Committee for its Fifth
Report, Session1989-90:Tg Civil ServiceEU and Conditions Q Service
Code. In it he explained the role that civil servants could
legitimately play and statedthat, 'When the factual material has been
provided, it is for Ministers (assistedby their special advisers) to
determine the form of presentation.' (1990, p.30). Advisers such as
Nicholas True had beeninvolved in this activity prior to the 1987
election.
Another long-standingareaof controversyand discontent referred
to earlier is coordinationof governmentpolicy. Michael Wolff assisted
with this in the early 1970s. In 1986Butler wrote, 'This Government
has had immense difficulties in coordinating its actions and
presentation ... Attempts havebeenmadeto cast special advisers as
"banana skin spotters", and to makethem pool timings of all major
departmentalmanoeuvresandpolicy announcementsinto a central clearing
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house' (p.20).
To varying degrees,advisersalso performeda similar range of
roles for junior ministersalthoughin most casesthey spent far less
time working for them. We have seenhow Norman Lamont valued the
assistanceof the advisersat the DTI, and when he was a junior minister
at the Departmentof Energy he thoughtMichael Portillo was 'excellent'
at providing speeches
and felt free to approachhim whilst recognizing
Portillo's first loyalty was to David Howell, the Secretary of State.
Someadvisers,including Stuart Sexton(especiallyafter Mark Carlisle's
departure) although attachedto the Secretaryof State, carried out
various functions for certainjunior ministers. In the DHSS under
Labour and the Treasury underthe Tories the existenceof a team of
advisersmadeit easierfor assistanceto be given to junior ministers.
In particular, severalDHSS advisers,including David Townsend, found
themselvessupplying specialadviserservices for junior ministers,
especially Alf Morris, the Minister for the Disabled. This involved
discussing issues,attendingmeetings,writing speeches,and briefing
directly on submissions. The Welsh Office covers a wide rangeof issues
and both Gwilym Prys-Daviesand Chris Butler sometimesworked for the
junior ministers with responsibilities in particular fields. On
becoming an adviser in 1974Prys-Davies,who had chaired the Welsh
Hospitals Board since 1968, was especially active in advising the
ParliamentarySecretarydealing with healthmatters.
In keepingwith the wide ranging natureof the role described at
the beginning of this section, someadviserswere involved in more
activities than would fit neatly into eventhe exhaustivelist covered
in the questionnaire. Theseincludedhelping to prepare the election
manifesto and occasional work in relation to their minister's
constituency. Again there could be overlap with other activities. Thus
severaladvisers,including Derek Scott and Roger Liddle, travelled with
the minister to his constituency,taking the opportunity to discuss
departmentalor other issues.
Whether advisers had any involvement with election manifesto
preparation,and even the election campaign,dependedpartly on the time
at which they served. Suchactivity could necessitateconsiderable
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liaison with the party. John Houston spent70 per cent of his first
year working for the Foreign Secretaryin preparing for the 1984
Europeanelections. An interestingexampleof how work on the election
manifesto links with the role of someadvisersin attempting to ensure
policies were developedin the departmentin line with the manifesto
commitments came from Gwilym Prys-Davies. Basedon his experience as
specialadviserin the Welsh Office from February 1974, he felt it would
be useful if there was a strongercommitmentto a Mid Wales Rural
Development Board in the October 1974manifestoso asto help overcome
resistanceto the idea from within Whitehall. He helpededit the Welsh
Labour Party manifesto for Octoberand was therefore able to draft
appropriate changes to strengthenthe wording that had been used in
February. SeveralLabour advisers,including Malcolm Dean and Vincent
Cable, referred to working on manifestopreparationin 1979, with David
Lipsey playing a coordinatingrole. In the Tory Party in 1982, Geoffrey
Howe invited Conservativesto serveon nine groupsconsideringdifferent
aspectsof policy which crosseddepartmentalboundaries. Their remit,
was lessto suggestitems for the manifestothan policies for
the longer term, i. e. five yearsahead. The reports were
collated by Peter Cropper (Director of the Research
Department)and Adam Ridley (Political Adviser to Sir Geoffrey
Howe) and submittedto Sir Geoffrey Howe, to Cecil Parkinson
('to reassureministersthat the political factor would not be
neglected'), and to FerdinandMount, the headof the Prime
Minister's Policy Unit. In effect this was to be the
manifesto drafting team ... The first completedraft of the
document which took account
of new ministerial proposals was
written by Ferdinand Mount and Adam Ridley (Butler and
Kavanagh, 1984, p.39).
The role of advisersduring election campaigns varied enormously
but in general if they becameactively involved, they had first to
resign their special adviser'sposition. The value placed by Mrs
Thatcheron the contribution of Tory advisershasbeendescribed. Again
this demonstratesthe ability of advisers- in this caseones who have
just resigned their posts- to crossboundaries. According to Adam
Ridley, the role of briefing ministers for press conferences and
respondingto leak storieswas very complex and required a knowledge of
official business,election timetables,and how public relations works.

189

Many other items accountedfor a small part of certain advisers'
time, for example,several,especiallyin the DHSS, were consultedabout
appointments such as thoseof chairmanof healthauthorities. A few
other advisersplayed very different roles from thosedescribedso far
in this section. When he moved to the Supplementary Benefits
Commission, Tony Lynes almostbecame,unofficially, specialadviser to
the chairman, David Donnison, who greatly valued his assistance
(Donnison, 1982).
The impressionthat adviserswere very busy is reinforced by the
record of a month's work for one advisercomplied by his secretary at
the time. During the month the adviserwrote: 65 minutes (covering 131
pages);56 letters; eight draft ministerial letters; two speeches(and
substantial modificationsto speechesdrafted by officials); two press
releases;and sevenother papers. He spent63 hours in meetingsand his
secretaryarranged196outgoing telephonecalls in addition to those he
made himself. The wide rangeof individuals to whom the items,
especially letters, were sentis in keepingwith the model set out in
Chapter3.
SECTION $; ROLE QE

MINISTER'S POLICY UNIT.

When he returnedto NumberTen in March 1974, Harold Wilson not only
permitted his ministersto appoint specialadvisersbut also established
his own Policy Unit underBernardDonoughue. The Policy Unit has
remained in existencesince 1974- which is far longer than any of the
earlier attemptsto establishan equivalentunit that were described in
Chapter2. The Policy Unit, as its nameimplies, concentratesprimarily
on policy whereasmore overtly party political functions are mostly
dealt with by the Political Office and Political Secretary.

brief history,threeclearperiods were
Despite its comparatively
identifiedby DavidWilletts(1987)in an authoritativearticle: 1974-9;
1979-83;and 1983-7.In 1987Donoughue
gavea detaileddescriptionof
the recruitmentandroleof the unit from 1974-9in his book, pri
inister. He wasresponsible
for recruitingtheunit's members. In
this way the selectionprocesswassimilarto thatof only those very
few of the departmental
specialadviserswho were recruited by the
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senioradviser in their department. All the membersof the Policy Unit
in 1974 were specialadvisersand Donoughuewas offered the title,
'Coordinator of the SpecialAdvisers', but declinedon the grounds that
he did not wish to be responsiblefor people (the departmentaladvisers)
over whom he had no control. This is important becauseit is the first
of a numberof points in this sectionthat reinforce one of the central
features of the model of departmentalspecialadvisers,which is that
they are the minister's 'own people'.
The members of the unit were mostly chosen for their policy
expertiseas well as their political commitment. Wilson describedtheir
role to the CommonwealthHeadsof GovernmentConference:
They adviseme directly on the immediatedecisionsto be made,
whetherin Cabinetor elsewhere,and on longer term issuesand
developments.They work closelywith my Private Office staff
as well as with the network of SpecialAdvisers serving other
Ministers and with the CPRSand the CabinetSecretariat, and
keep in touch with thinking outside Government through
contactsin universities, industry, trade unionsand pressure
groups. The purposeof this Policy Unit is not only to bring
in expertsto extendthe rangeof policy options from which
the Government- and particularly the Prime Minister as head
of the Government- has to choose. The Policy Unit was set
up, and its memberswere selected,to provide a team with
strong political commitmentto adviseon, proposeand pursue
policies to further the Government'spolitical goals. For
policies without politics are of no more use than politics
without policies (1976, p.204).
Some people thoughtthis was rather an idealizedpicture, but, to the
extent that prime ministers gaveit its head, others believed it
operated effectively. When interviewed Donoughue felt there were
considerable similarities between the work of special advisers in
departmentsand the Policy Unit in: acting as the minister's 'eyes and
ears'; looking for landmines; and making suggestionson policy
initiatives. The conceptof assistanceto the personat the nodal point

is againappropriate.Donoughue
negotiated
goodaccessfor membersof
the Policy Unit to a rangeof committees
and they spent much time
monitoring whatwashappening
andin giving thePrime Minister policy
advice. Mike Hartley-Brewer,whosewife ElizabethArnott wasa member
of the unit, thoughtthatto theextentthatadviserswereproviding a
andtechnicallycompetentinput to
politically sensitive,independent,
policy issues,their role wassimilarto thatof effective membersof
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the unit. Furthermore, the unit was well placed to be highly
influential becauseof the power of Number Ten.
It was not alwayseasyfor the unit to obtain information from
departmentsunder the British system,which is 'very tribal', in the
words of the former CabinetSecretary,John Hunt (now Lord Hunt of
Tanworth). He observedthat the Policy Unit members, 'fairly rapidly
found it was asdifficult to get information out of specialadvisers in
other departmentsas out of other civil servants because a special
adviser owed his allegianceto his own minister and not to Bernard
Donoughue.'
Under Margaret Thatcher the Policy Unit was reduced in size.
Initially there were only two members- John Hoskynsand Norman Strauss.
Although a civil servantwas soonsecondedto it from the Department of
Industry, it remainedsmall and was essentially concerned with key
strategic objectives to do with, Hoskynsclaimed, 'the economic turn
around'. They briefed the Prime Minister on these. Thatcher soon also
appointedher own EconomicAdviser, Alan (now Sir Alan) Walters, who was
not a memberof the unit but worked closely with it at times (Burch,
1983). Although not responsiblefor devisingit, Hoskyns played an
important role in supportingthe Medium Term Financial Strategy(Hoskyns
interview; Thain, 1985).
Willetts suggeststhat, 'Under the leadershipof FerdinandMount in
1982-83, the Policy Unit went througha period of transition with the

new styleemergingclearlyunderJohnRedwoodwhoarrived in November
1983 and becameHeadin January1984' (p.446). The unit expandedespeciallywith the abolitionof the CPRSfollowing the 1983election and included severalpermanentcivil servantson secondmentfrom their
departments. In interview Mount, Redwood,and Willetts all stressedthe
extent to which the post-1983election Policy Unit should be seen as
successorto the CPRSas well as to earlier Policy Units and that it was
the abolition of the CPRS that allowed a cost-consciousThatcher to
expand the unit. With its larger size and new style the unit aimed to
cover virtually all areasof domesticpolicy. It played both a reactive
role in commenting in papers going to the Prime Minister from
departments, and a proactiverole in making policy proposals to the
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Prime Minister, and in working with the departmentson suggestionsthat
had the Prime Minister's backing. The presenceof careercivil servants
in the Policy Unit highlightsthe importanceof making a distinction
betweenthe unit and other advisers. According to Redwood, 'the Policy
Unit isn't like the departmentaladvisersfor a numberof reasons. The
first, and most important, reasonis the Policy Unit is a group of
people who are part of the civil serviceand work as career civil
servantswould work. '
Mount emphasizedthat on their own the small group in the unit
lackedthe capacityto generatemany new ideas. However, they were in a
position to talk to policy researchcentresand, when they thought their
ideas were good, feed them into the Prime Minister and eventually
sometimes to departments.The policy researchcentres- including the
CPS and the IEA - often includedacademicsin their research groups.
Mount agreedit was appropriateto seespecialadvisersand the unit as
brokers for ideasproducedby thesecentres. He commented: 'to think
purely in terms of specialadvisersasisolated beings underestimates
the extent to which they must feed off the humusoutside.'
An important sourceof policy ideas,accordingto Kavanagh, 'has
been policy - brokerswho operatebetweenthe political and academic
worlds' (1987, p.68). He examinedthe role played in developing
Thatcherism by variousindividuals and groups, including the ASI, CPS,
IEA, IOD, and the Social Affairs Unit. More recently he re-examined
someof the ideasproducedby thesegroupsand claimed that,
Reforming ministerscould usetheseideasto challenge 'yes
minister' officials in their departments. Members of Mrs
Thatcher's Policy Unit kept in touch with the think-tanks and
helped her in battlesagainstallegedly status-quo inclined
departments
There is an impressive overlap between
...
members of thesethink groups, Conservative MPs, special
advisers to ministersand desk officers in the Conservative
ResearchDepartment. Membersof think-tanks get appointed to
Conservative policy groupsand consult with special advisers

to ministers(1992,p.27).

It mightbe appropriateto adapta figuredevelopedin the United
Statesby Sundquist(1978p.127)andapply someBritish labels to
illustrate howpolicy research
brokerssometimes
couldoperatein the
('A' in Figure6) to the
processof transferringideasfrom researchers
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politicians and seniorofficials ('D' in Figure 6). David Willetts, as
Director of CPS, thought adviserswere one of their target audiencesand
The Economist (6 May 1989)referredto the Policy Unit as being 'a
conduit' (p.28) for research centre ideas. Figure 6 is an
oversimplification and many ideasmay get through to the politicians and
senior officials directly, without going through the Policy Unit and
advisers, but, on occasions, there is no doubt that the unit and
adviserscan havean important brokeragerole. It might be arguedthat
the policy researchcentresare really the researchbrokers. Given the
links betweensomegroupsandcertain individuals in the Policy Unit it
is perhapsmore appropriateto view it asa continuum. However, in his
article Sunquistreferred to: 'the staff units or individuals who serve
Presidents, departmentheads,bureauchiefs, congressionalcommittees,
and individual membersof Congressaslinks with the academic world.
They carry many titles - economicadvisers, research and statistics
offices, policy analysts,legislativeassistants,and many others. They
needa generic title and "researchbroker" is as good asany.' (p. 127).
The Policy Unit could also be seenas a broker in those cases,
highlighted by Redwood,wherethe unit had a role in bringing the views
groupsinto play
and interestsof variouspreviously under-represented
in Whitehall. Redwoodarguedthat his slightly enlargedgroup was too
small on its own to provide a seriouscritique of all the material
coming from departments,sothey relied on gaining information from
business, interest groups, policy researchcentres,and academics and
specialistsoutsideWhitehall.
Severalaspectsof the Policy Unit's post-1983changein style were
important. Greater emphasiswas given to the detailsof a range of
policies rather than a concentrationsolely on strategy. Furthermore,
it played a more active part in discussing policy issues with
departments. This went far wider than just involving the departmental
special advisers but they could be an obvious point of contact for
membersof the Policy Unit and somestrong links were formed. This was
perhaps symbolized by the exceptionalrole of Oliver Letwin in being
simultaneously an adviser to Keith Josephand a member of Margaret
Thatcher's Policy Unit - only possiblebecauseof the extraordinarily
close relationship betweenthe two. Within the unit Letwin also had
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responsibility for Employmentmattersand this department provides a
good exampleof the Secretaryof State(Tom King), his adviser (Richard
Ehrman), and the relevantPolicy Unit member,all emphasizingthe value
of the link betweenthe departmentaladvisersand the unit.
According to Ehrman the liaison took severalforms including trying
out ideasfrom the minister on the unit which would be able to give the
adviseran indication of the likely responseand any possiblere-shaping
that might be desiredby NumberTen. The unit could sometimes play a
central role in helping to resolve inter-departmental wrangles by,
'being the broker almost, in the caseof someonelike Oliver, who was
very effective and workedvery closely with John Redwood who was an
equally effective headof the unit. ' By operating with them Ehrman
would be ableto inform King of the likely attitude of Number Ten in the
dispute. The unit did not deal with Northern Ireland, therefore, Ehrman
believed, when he movedwith King to the NIO one reasonfor his reduced
effectivenesswas that he lost much of his clout and usefulness because
he was much lesspart of the network with the Policy Unit.
Similarly, Tom King believedthat when he was developing new
policies it was useful for the adviserto liaise with the Policy Unit.
The unit would havethe freedomto say whetheror not they thought the
policy was going to run and they would havethe broaderview and know
how the proposal might fit with othersfrom elsewhere: 'it was very
helpful to havethesesoundingboardsat a lower, more informal, level. '

Letwin viewedthe situationin thesameway andcommented:
In many ways we enhancedthe position of advisers I had in
...
the end a closerand more openrelationshipwith the advisers
than with anybody else in the departmentswith which I
dealt it was only with the adviserI didn't feel any kind
...
of distance. I thought we were part of the sameteam trying
to achievethe samethings always. Sometimeswith ministers
there would be a distancebecauseI was the servantof another
I was on the 'phonevery frequently to advisers
minister
in all the...
ministrieswith which I dealt ... It was a common
enterprise. They would ring and say, 'look my minister is
coming forward with this, it has got this sentencein it.
What do you think?' ... andvice versa we were always trying
to make sure that ministerscame forward with planswhich the
Prime Minister would accept.

195

The Treasury and DTI were other departments where several of the post
1983 advisers, including Howard Davies, Rodney Lord, and John
Whittingdale referred to the existence of close links with the Policy
Unit. Links between the Policy Unit and departmental special advisers
were not always good; certain Policy Unit members regarded some
departmental special advisers as being uninformed about policy
developments in their own department and, therefore, not of great
influence or help. Despite the post 1983 changes, neither Mount nor
Redwood saw themselves being the coordinator of a network of special
advisers any more than had Hoskyns. Similarly, most departmental
advisers, including Lord, did not see the unit as playing a coordinating

or focal role amongstthe advisersin the various ministries. Apart
from Letwin and Lipsey there was virtually no interchangeof personnel
between the advisorateand the unit between1974and 1987. Throughout
its history, relations between different ministers, departmental
officials and the unit have varied. Letwin believedthat the presence
of an adviserin a departmentwas a necessary,thoughnot on its own a
sufficient, condition for a good relationshipbetweenthe departmentand
the unit: 'The biggestdifferencewas betweenthoseministries that had
advisersand thosethat didn't. '
A former member of Mrs Thatcher's Policy Unit, Christopher
Monckton, wrote of John Redwood: 'He was a devastatinglyeffective head
of the Policy Unit and, like other special advisers throughout the
Government,was quick to learn how to overcomethe inertia, obstruction
and obscurantismthat is still endemicin the civil service.'
vening
Standard, 10 May 1988). Such thinking would clearly not endearthe unit
to Whitehall. Whereassomeministersand officials regardedthe unit as
uninformed and. meddlesomeand somethought it uninfluential, others
have viewed its contributions as effective and constructive.
Frequently, but not invariably, the relationship between departmental
specialadvisersand the Policy Unit reflectedtheir minister's attitude
towards the unit. This is yet anotherreinforcementof the concept of
the specialadviseras the minister's 'own person'. One official agreed
that the advisercould be a contactpersonwith the relevantPolicy Unit
person: 'Yes, that is right, "find out what he is up to and stop him.
Let's muzzle it. " It was fascinatingto see the special advisers
operating as civil servants, protecting the minister ... the
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departmental minister is still the great power in the land.' In the
late 1980sthe role of the Policy Unit was at times more publicized and
controversial.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: INFLUENCES QN
ROLE QE SPECIAL ADVISERS
_In
AND HOW FAR A PLACE HAS EVOLVED FOR THEM
IHE SYSTEM.
It was establishedin Chapter4 that not all ministershad clear reasons
for appointing advisersand, evenwhen they did, thesewere not always
firmly linked to a perceptionof needs. Furthermore, the functions
carried out were not alwaysstrongly tied to reasonsfor appointment or
an analysis of needs,and even wherethere was a link, the functions
appropriate to fulfil a particular reason could be variously
interpreted.
Many advisersat the time of appointmentwere not exactly clear as
to the functionsthey were expectedto perform - only a quarter said
that they hada formal job descriptionor terms of reference. Many
people opined that the role of eachspecialadviserevolved. A number
of overlapping and interacting factors influence the process of
evolution. They include:
(A) the minister's developingwishesand needs;
(B) the capabilitiesof the adviser;
(C) the capabilities,expectationsandattitudesof peoplealready in
post; and the extent, therefore, to which there is a place for
advisers;
(D) the exercise of discretion by the adviserin the light of
other factors.
This list is similar to the one, already describedin Chapter3, Section
D, that Meltsner usedwhendiscussingthe influenceson the role of
policy analystsin America. He did, however, also include 'the policy
arena' (1986, p.4) and in his 1988review of JamesWalter's book he was
critical of the failure to addressthis issue,claiming:

we mustconsidertheeffectsof thepolicy area,becausesome
essentialaspects
of advisorybehaviourarelikely to differ
by the typeof policy. Somepolicy areasmay have a great
deal of knowledgethatsupportsa political consensusabout
the design and choiceof policy; other policy areas have
little knowledgeandpolicy mayhaveto be formulated under
conditions of political disagreement. With different
knowledgeandpoliticalconditions,advisersmay haveto use
differentskillsanddo differentwork (pp. 227-8).
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Whilst this issue will be further examinedwhen the impact of
adviserson policy is considered,the small numberof British advisers,
and the variety of roles most performed, make clear generalizations
difficult. Several ministerswho challenged the existing consensus
found advisers valuable, but the analysis in this chapter will
concentrateon the four points listed aboveand end with an examination
of the evolution and formalization of the role.
SECTION AT, THE MINISTER'S DEVELOPING NEEDS AND WISHES
The functionsperformedby specialadviserscorrelatefairly well with
reasonsfor appointment. This might indicate that the minister's wishes
do exert considerable influenceon their functions. This was most
obviously demonstratedin many of thosecaseswhere, sometimes despite
the lack of a formal job description, the adviserfelt at the time of
his appointment that the functionshe was expected to perform were
clearly defined. The letter of appointmentreceivedby many advisers
stated that their dutieswould be 'thoseset down by the Secretary of
State'. The evolution of an adviser'srole was frequently dictated by
functions his minister wished him to perform. Even with a minister who
was as clear about the needfor advisersasTony Benn the adviser could
initially still feel unclearabout her precise role: 'we political
advisers had no job description. It was like being put into the army
and having to work out what your dutieswere in the middle of a pitched
battle, shellsfalling overhead' (Morrell, Guardian,25 March 1980).
Despitethis she felt, asdid many other advisers,that their role,
'was determined by the needsof the minister.' Such an opinion was
generally shared by many ministersand officials with Clive Booth
stating: 'You could define the specialadviser's role asbeing entirely
that which the minister who has appointedthe specialadviserwants it
to be.' The generalrule and the way it operates,is well illustrated

by the exceptional
positionof PaulChapman,oneof the few adviserswho
wasbasicallyselectedby anotheradviser. Justasmostadvisersworked
to the minister,Chapman,in practice,workedto the senior adviser.
His role was neverformallystated:'it wasvery muchon an ad IMF,
basis, respondingto whatBrian [Abel-Smith]wanteddoing, which could
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be anything, evento delivering things to the minister.'
Even when it is assertedthat a rangeof factorsinfluence the role
of advisers,it is often acceptedthat the ministers' wishesand needs
are the major determinant. In his pamphlet,Darlington lists a wide
range of roles played by advisersbut stressesthat not all advisers
played all the roles. The choiceand balancein any particular case
depended on: 'the nature of the Department, the seniority of the
Secretaryof State,the abilities and interestsof the Political Adviser
and, aboveall, the requirementsandwishesof the Secretaryof State'
(p. 30). Darlington's minister, Merlyn Rees,also felt that the role of
the adviserdependedupon what the minister wanted.
Evidenceto supportthis point comesfrom advisers,including John
Whittingdale, David Coleman,and Stuart Sexton,who servedmore than one
minister and found that their role varieddependingon the requirements
of the different ministers. Whittingdale served three successive
Secretariesof Statefor Trade andIndustry and not only thought that
each required him to fulfil a somewhatdifferent role, but also found
that as he gainedmore experienceand knowledge of the department's
affairs he was increasinglyable to brief his ministers on them. The
further factor sometimesthought to influence the role and impact of the
adviser is the natureof the policy issuewith which he is dealing.
Coleman felt that whereasboth the ministersof statefor whom he was
working wantedhim to be involved in political work, he had a slightly
different role in relation to the policy matterswith which each dealt.
William Waldegrave,as Minister of Statefor Environment, put particular
emphasis on his assistingin maintainingcontactswith outside bodies
and bringing in new ideas. In housing, for which John Patten was the
minister, there was a major review of policy and thereforea substantial
role for the adviserin participatingin far-reachingdiscussions with

the minister and officials andin scrutinizingand commentingon
from officials.
submissions
Even when an adviserwas servingthe sameminister, he often found
that the minister's requirementsevolvedas circumstanceschanged and
the minister becamemore awareof his needs. Sometimesministers, for
exampleRobert Carr, found there was less needthan they had anticipated
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and the adviser's role diminished. More usually, however, the minister
became aware of new demandsand the adviser, being 'the minister's
person', and alwayson the spot, was often amongstthe first to be asked
to respond to them, even if, later, more permanentand official ways
were developed. Ministers often discovereda needfor contact, perhaps
of an informal nature, to be madewith people within the party or
pressure groups, and the adviserwas on hand to provide it. The
minister, for exampleBill Rodgers,then sometimesrealized, especially
if he had dealingswith local councillors, that it was useful to ask the
adviserto developthis function. Similarly, many ministers found they
wanted extra assistancewith presentationand again relied on the
special adviser. Although involvementwith presentationwas often a
major reason for appointment,someadviserssaid that speech writing
became a more important function than they had originally expected.
This was the casewith severaladvisersat the DHSS including Nicholas
True and Abel-Smith. The latter said, 'most of my time was spent
presentingpolicy, either writing White Papersor writing speeches,and
I hadn't realized that this would be a major part of the time compared
with that spentdiscussingpolicies.' Treasury ministers after 1979
(according to Hennessy,1988,in commonwith other ministersand their
officials) found that the developmentof the new select committees of
the Houseof Commonsinvolved them in more work. Consequently, there
was a role for advisersin preparatoryactivities.

Despite the importanceof theminister's wishesand needs in
determiningthe roleof advisers,therearelimitations. In describing
the influenceson theministerialstaff in Australia,R. Smith (1977),
coversa similar list to theonegivenabove. He goeson to argue that
they did not form a rigid framework: 'Within the boundariesof the
specificsituationsin whichministerialofficersfoundthemselvesthey
hadimportantopportunities
for definingtheir own roles. Indeed, this
becamea responsibility,for if theydid not do so, manyministersdid
not havethetime andskill to definetheir role for them' (p. 145-6).
In the UK a few adviserswere critical of their minister's
inability to definetheir role or to usethem properly. But before
consideringthe degreeof discretionadviserscan exercise,other
influencesmustbe examined.
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SECTION B. CAPABILITIES QE SPECIAL ADVISERS.
Although it is difficult to distinguishcapabilitiesfrom discretion, the
aim in this sectionis to considerhow far advisers'abilities determine
their role. In the selectionprocess- especially of specialists ministerschoosepeoplewith certain talentsbecausethey want specific
roles fulfilled. Here, the concernis more to examine how advisers'
capabilities interact with other factorsin the continuingevolution of
their role. Inevitably ministerssometimeswished their adviserto be
more involved in certain activities becausethey noticed the adviser's
successin fulfilling that task. For example,ministers who found an
adviser, suchas Tim Boswell, to be good at speechwriting usually asked
him to write more. Conversely,adviserswho did not perform well in
certain areaswere lesslikely to be usedagain in that role. Several
ministers found that their adviserswere not asgood at speech writing
as they had hoped.
Efficacious advisers generallyfound that their role expanded.
Perhaps the bestexampleis David Young. Keith Joseph recalled that,
'he was given a cubby hole somewhereremote in the departmentuntil by
sheer force of nicenessand effectivenesshe was given a proper office
near me.' In his autobiographyYoung describeshis transformation from
a specialist role to taking 'a wider interestin the work of the
Department' and actually becominga specialadviser. (p.45). Various
other adviserswhoserole was initially seenin rather specific terms,
including Roland Brown, John Harris, and David Metcalf, were, according
to their various ministers, increasingly brought into departmental
affairs becauseof their capabilitiesand inclinations. Also advisers
with specialistknowledge,thoughrecruitedto play a generalrole, may
find themselves, as happenedwith David Stephen and Latin American
issues, increasinglydrawn into discussionson substantive matters in
their specialistarea.

Civil servantsaswell asministersmaymakeincreasinguseof an
obviously capableadviser. Someof the youngerpolitical advisers who
provedthattheycouldusuallybe reliedon to give an accuratesteeras
to their minister'slikely reactionsto a proposal,and/orthepolitical
constraintsin a situation,cameto be consultedmore frequentlyby
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officials. Examples include Edward Bickham, Ann Carlton, Richard
Ehrman, Robin Harris, David Hill, David Lipsey, Tom McNally, Michael
Portillo, Roger Liddle, Rob Shepherd,StephenSherbourne, Jack Straw,
and John Whittingdale. This is extremelyimportant. It links back to
the earlier discussionon the informal role of talking to officials and
thus addingflexibility to the systemby being an additional channel of
information in the way proposedin the model showing the place of
advisers. Out of many possiblesupportingquotationsthe following give
a flavour of the arguments,starting with Tom King who believed that
they not only appliedto his advisersbut were also relevant when
Michael Portillo became adviserto David Howell who was appointed
Secretaryof Statefor Energyin 1979after King had beenshadowing the
department:
I encouragedofficials, if they couldn't get hold of me or the
ministers, to talk to a specialadviserif they wanteda steer
as to what was the backgroundto party policy or the attitude of
governmentsupporters. The adviserwould be able to say, ' ...
if you put that up to the minister he'll chuck that out
becausehis backbencherswill rubbish it. '
He got on immenselywell with the civil servants. They very
quickly found that he was an ever-opendoor to which they
could go and try their ideas: 'How is the Secretaryof State
going to react if we saythis? How shall we put it. ' ... [He
got on well with both the private office and] with assistant
secretariesand seniorprincipalsand people of that level who
suddenly found that they had access,a short cut, to the
political top of the departmentwithout having to go up
through the whole rigmarole, and the whole thing being done on
an official level (PatrickJenkinon StephenSherbourne).
I don't think at the beginningwe had quite thought of the way
that David would be involved with the department as things
were worked up... becomein a sense,a sort of political
adviser to seniorcivil servantsaswell ... pointing out to
them the constraintsof party policy and pressuresthat they
would haveto allow for (Andrew Sempleon David Lipsey).
Towards the end of the three years,under secretarieswould
seek him out and say ... 'could he just look at this note
before they put it up' (Roy Hattersleyon David Hill).
He wasn't long there before peoplein the Foreign Office were
coming to him and saying, 'look, there is this problem, we are
thinking of putting this proposition, what do you think?' I
would sayhe was in many ways the ideal special adviser ...
They were absolutelydelightedto have somebodylike that they
could try things out on before they got to the minister. It

was like litmuspaperreally. (Sir Tom McCaffrey, Head of
ForeignOfficeNewsDepartment,1974-6,on Tom McNally).
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Sometimesit was felt that the adviser, for exampleLipsey, madean
effort to demonstrateto officials that by involving the adviser in
their deliberations,and taking note of what he said, they would enhance
the likelihood of a favourableresponse from the minister. This
illustrates the subtleprocessesof interaction between the various
factors. Thus Jack Strawrecalledthat a civil servanttold him they
had expected him to be a conduit from the minister to the department
but, 'as things had turned out it was also the other way. ' The role
evolved, Straw thought, depending upon one's skills and people's
judgment abouthow useful you were going to be: 'The key was what use
you were to the minister you were working for and how far the department
saw that the minister thoughtyou had a use.'
There are further considerationswherethere are several special
advisers,eachwith a rangeof capabilities. When he became Chancellor
of the Exchequerin 1983Nigel Lawsoninherited Adam Ridley, took with
him Lynda Rouse who had beenhis adviserat Energy, and brought in
Rodney Lord. Lord felt that, 'the job to someextent develops rather
according to one's own interestsand talents and of course one's
minister's requirements'. Lord wasbrought in chiefly to write speeches
for the Chancellor,but soonRouseleft and, 'when Michael Portillo
arrived, he took over that role. ' Lord was also the main adviser
concerned with public expenditurematters, his area of specialist
interest. When Rousewent, Lord, 'was askedto take a close interest in
tax policy', which hadbeenRouse'sarea. PeterCropper later filled

the place of thedepartingRidleyand, 'he took over the tax role
'
becausethatwasvery muchhis scene.
SECTION
CAPABILITIES. EXPECTATIONS AND ATTITUDES QE
PEE
PEOPLE ALREADY III POST: HOW FAR IA
PQR ADVISERS?
The extent to which an adviser'srole is influencedby other people is
complicated. To somedegreethe useof advisersimplies that others are
not allowed to, or are not totally capableof, satisfactorilyperforming
certain functions. Partly, therefore, the adviser's role is prescribed

by the gaps thatareperceivedin theservicesrenderedby others.
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However, especiallyas it becomesmore formalized, other people might
have expectations of the role an adviserwill fulfil, or, by their
positive attitude, encouragethe adviserto work with them in particular
activities. Furthermore, officials might encouragean adviser to
perform sometasksasa way of preventinghim from having the time to
perform more sensitiveones.
In Chapter3, Figure 2 showedthe placeof many of the categories
already assistingthe minister. Figure 4 showedthat someof the areas
in which advisers might operateare already fairly crowded. The
question must therefore ariseasto how far there is room for the
specialadviser. As Blackstoneasked(1979, p. 8), 'How far then can it
be said that this new animal doesanything more than poke its nose in a
variety of other areas whereother people were already doing an
effective job?' These issueswill be explored with each category,
although, as Bickhamclaimed, there is a casefor having one person
performing the rangeof tasksthat constitutethe adviser's role, even
if, in someareas,the adviseris merelyproviding somethingsimilar to
existing services:
For many yearsothersdid work that advisersdo. The fact
that ministers felt the need,however, to bring in special
advisers suggeststhat perhapsthey weren't doing it in as
coordinatedor effective a way ascould havebeenpossible
I wasjust an extrapair of handsfor certain duties; an extra...

mind that wasn'tweigheddownwith departmentalwisdom, to
look andbe somebody
takean independent
elsetheycould rely
on.

The categoriesto beconsidered
are:
(i)
(ii)

The private office
Other civil servants

(iii)

Junior ministers

(iv)
(v)
NO

Parliamentary
privatesecretaries
Thepressoffice
Partyofficials
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(i)

'ýh Privatý ýffi ýg

Relations with the private office althoughoften good, were
occasionally difficult. Someadviserswere physically located in the
private office and others regardedaspart of it by ministers and
officials including someservingRoy Hattersley. A few were seen as
'the political private secretary'. Referencewas madein Chapter3 to
the difficulties facedby someoneliaising betweenpeople, or parts of
an organization, with different organizational cultures. It was
suggestedthat sucha personmight welcomeassistance. Many private
secretarieswere glad that the adviserwas there to carry out tasks
including party political liaison, letter writing, and speech writing.
They often gratefully encouragedadvisersto be involved.
Interview evidencesupportedthe picture revealedin Chapter3 of
practical, constitutional,and time limitations on the private office
staffs ability fully to servicetheir minister in some of these
activities - especiallythe party political ones. On the other hand,
before the adventof specialadvisers,ministersand private secretaries
coped. There is someevidencethat in the pastthe demandswere not so
great. Sir Geoffrey Otton, a DHSS secondpermanentsecretary,suggested
there is a dimension of activity, 'which is better done by noncivil servants,and indeedin propriety I think ought not to be done by
civil servants.' Having specialadvisers, 'helps to unravel someof the
conflicts of responsibility that arise at thesetop levels for permanent
secretariesand private secretaries,in a world which has become
increasingly political. ' He did not think people 30 years ago had
worried about theseissues;even when he was private secretary in the
Home Office he could not recollect having much to do with party
organizations. This suggestsincreasingdemandshave resultedin gaps
appearingin the private office's ability to respond.

As principalprivatesecretaryto the Secretary
of State for the
Environment,AndrewSemplecontrasted
the situationunderGeoffrey (now
Lord) Ripponwith thatonceTony Croslandtook over in 1974and brought
in an adviser,DavidLipsey. Planningthe programmefor a visit, for
example,for Ripponmighthaveinvolveddiscussionwith the minister,
the constituency
secretary,andCentralOfficefor theparty political
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part and inevitably the PPSwas not alwaysimmediatelyavailable. Under
Crosland, the presenceof an advisermadeit easierthan it otherwise
would have beento sit down togetheranddevelopa single programme.
Similarly, as private secretaryfor a Labour Secretaryof State, contact
with the party, without Lipsey,
would all have beenvery awkward and we'd have had to have
made Croslandmakehis own calls. We'd haveinevitably been
dragged in, you alwaysare at the margin;
far
... It was
know
liaison
directly
to
that
easier
party
was not our
business and that there was somebodywho actually understood
it and would do it.
The party offices too, regardedit as generally easier and more
satisfactoryto liaise with a minister throughthe specialadviser than
theprivate office directly.
Responsibility for preparationof speechesstraddles many people
within a departmentespeciallygiven the multi-modality of speeches.
Again there are grey areas surrounding the extent to which the
department andprivate secretarymay help gatherand collate material
for a speech to a party audienceor on general political matters.
Sometimes the private office is left with the task of rewriting
departmental speechesso that they are more to the minister's liking.
Clearly ministersoften explicitly wantedadvisersto help fill some of
the gapsin the speechwriting services,but private secretaries too,
frequently welcomedand encouragedsuchinvolvement of advisers. Thus
Sir John Graham,principal private secretaryat the Foreign Office said
that Miles Hudson, 'did increasinglyturn to writing speechesand that
certainly was a burden off one's back.' At the DTI an official claimed
the private office was glad to haveStephen Sherbourne to prepare
speeches. NormanWarner at the DHSS felt that althoughcivil servants
had always written speeches,the issuewas the time the ministers or
private office had to rewrite them. The advisers,he thought, made that
processeasierand probably enabledthe minister to take on more, major
speecheson policies. He statedthat given the existing staffing levels

in theprivateoffice, 'it wouldhavebeenimpossiblefor me to provide
to the ministerthekindsof servicesthatwereprovidedby Jack Straw,
Brian Abel-Smith,andTonyLynes thequalityof the briefing, the
...
speeches,the materialthatwasprovidedto Mrs Castlewasmuch higher
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with them than it would havebeenwithout them.'
Evidencefrom David Willetts perhapsbestillustrates that there is
a role for advisersevenwherethe private secretaryis explicitly both
politically and personally sympathetic to the minister. Willetts
briefly servedasa Houseof Commonsresearchassistantto Nigel Lawson
prior to becominga civil servant. He was later at an appropriatestage
in his career to be appointedprivate secretary when, as Financial
Secretary to the Treasury,Lawson was looking for a new one and chose
him. Despitehis background,Willetts felt there was still a place for
advisers because, for one thing, he did not attend the ministerial
prayer meetings. Furthermore, he continued:
Private secretariesare often personally close to their
ministers but it still leavesa whole host of jobs for the
specialadvisers,simply becausepeopleare all very busy ...
you are not fighting demarcationdisputes trying to keep
peopleoff your patch. If anything, what you are trying to do
is to unload someof this work on to somebodyelse to help you
do it, otherwise you are not going to get home until
midnight ... if the advisercould possibly do that speech
writing rather than the hard pressedofficial or the hard
pressedprivate secretary,you were grateful.
In severalareasrespondentswere lessagreedabout the needfor an
adviser to fill gaps. This raisesquestionsabout how far there is a
role for advisersto play in assistingwith the traditional private
office role of progresschasingand of helping to make the minister's
mind known in the department. The limitations on the advisers' role in
progresschasingwere discussedearlier as was the scopefor advisersto
talk to officials in departments. It is in the latter case that
possibly the greatestdifficulties arise in distinguishingwhat advisers
are for, as opposedto what they can usefully do. Some officials
believe that if a minister feels his mind is not being madeclear to the
department, he shouldchangehis private secretaryrather than appoint
an adviser. Some intervieweescriticized the idea that advisers are
better able to advocatea minister's policies within his department
becausethey are committedto them.

The earlieraccountof discussions
betweenofficials and advisers
revealedmany strandsin suchcontactandthat there were aspects,
including political sensitivities,andthe backgroundto manifesto
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commitments, where adviserscould havea depthof knowledge which it
would be unreasonableto expectprivate secretariesto have developed.
Advisers sometimeshad accessto meetings,for exampleDavid Hill to Roy
Hattersley's prayer meetings, denied to private secretaries.
Furthermore, many officials saw advisersas a valuableadditional, but
secondary, source of information - more usually on how the minister
might react, than on the policy commitmentsof the incoming minister.
At Energy Donald Maitland saw Michael Portillo as, 'an additional
channelbetweenthe political headand the departmentas a whole.' The
private secretaryand other officials were the main link but, 'the fact
that there is this other channeldoesnot diminish the channel of
communication of Secretaryof Stateto his private secretaryor to his
officials. ' Similarly Sir Michael Palliser thought that Foreign
Secretariesfound it useful to haveadvisers(for exampleDavid Lipsey
and David Stephen), in addition to private secretaries, as two way
channelswith the Foreign Office.
In some instancesministersfelt that even private secretaries
found it beneficial to discussthe minister's priorities with advisers:
A lot of officials at middle level would actually regard the
advisers as soundingboards. Is the minister really set on
doing this? in that senseit is a two way flow rather than
...
one of the advisersgoing to the appropriatecivil servantand
saying sheis absolutelydeterminedto do this thing ... one
way in which they were very helpful - even in relation to the
private offices - was in being able to say to the private
office, 'she really doesmeanthis.' (Judith Hart).

Thegeneralpictureemerges
of advisersplayinga role in this areathat
is at leastasmuchaddingto existingresources
asfilling gaps. To
this extenttheprivateoffice is not exercisinga major influence on
therole. A furtheraspectof this, however,is the argumentthat most
the minister's policies,
advisershavea freedomto pursueandadvocate
irrespectiveof thetraditionalvaluesandconsequent
policies favoured
by the department. This links with anotherdisagreement- how far
role becausethey
ministerswish advisersto play theaide/confidant
believeadvisershavea soleloyaltyto theminsteadof the dual loyalty
of theprivatesecretaries.Most peopleacceptthatprivatesecretaries
have a dual loyalty. Thereis perhapsa greaterdiversity of opinion
aboutwhetherthis is detrimental.Generallythestrongerthe belief it
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is bad, the greaterthe feeling that the balanceof private secretaries'
loyalties lies too much in favour of the departmentand the permanent
secretary. The point can be illustrated from various interviews
commencingwith Francis Cripps who thought the private office could not
perform the samerole as advisersbecause:
They are civil servants- they spy on the minister. They have
divided loyalty
they are incredibly tactful, very nice,
...they
helpful
but
are briefed by permanent secretaries
very
to
try
to guide the minister in particular
almost non-stop
directionsby sabotagingappointments,manipulatinghis diary,
in the interestsof preservingthe department'spolicy line.
Whilst I don't hold the Tony Bennview aboutdivided loyalties
and sabotageand all that, you always feel that private
secretarieshave a vestedinterestin telling the permanent
secretarythings that you may not want the permanentsecretary
to know (Roy Hattersley).
It is a big problem they've got ... althoughI think to be
fair we had two private secretariesduring thosethree years,
both of whom were excellent,extremelygood, extremely able,
very easyto work with, played it straight and well. Did a
very goodjob of balancingtheir minister versusthe permanent
secretary(David Hill).
Mostly it's true that a private secretary,if you like, has a
divided loyalty, but his main loyalty will be to his
minister ... And there is a positive advantageto a minister
in having
a private secretarywho doesthesethings for the
department,knows how to operatewith the departmentto their
minister's advantage(Sir KennethClucas, permanentsecretary,
DPCP whilst Hattersleywas the Secretaryof State).
The special advisers were personally committed to the
minister, so that the minister felt when shewas talking to
them, that thesepeoplewere wholly on her side. When I was a
private secretary ... primarily I was there to help my
ministers, but my ministersalso knew it was my duty, they
wouldn't have had it otherwise,to represent my permanent
secretary's views and the views of the department.. a good
private secretaryhasgot to be an opendouble agent (Patrick
Nairne).

Thesediversecomments
revealhowgapsin the serviceprovidedfrom the
private office mightinfluencewhatministersrequirefrom advisersto
satisfythe needfor personalsupportdescribedin Chapter3.
Further clear analysisof how this impactson the adviser's role
comes from Bill Rodgers:
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A busy minister leading a very hectic, emotional life,
therefore needs somebody around with whom he feels
comfortable. A private secretarycan do this but he has
executive responsibilities and cannot share your party
political views and exhilarationor sadnessat by election
results etc. Ministers needsomebodyto talk to, drink with,
without cutting the private secretaryout ... civil servants
are very adaptablebut you cannotexpectthem to be totally at
homewith you and shareyour political role.
Rodgers's comments highlight the importance of the triangular
relationships between ministers, private secretariesand advisers.
Usually the adviser'srole was seenasthe subsidiary one and often
private secretariesthought it was important that they controlled even
the advisers'accessto the minister's room. Many private secretaries
believed that they could havemadelife difficult for the special
advisers had they wished to do so. Some appreciated, however, that
getting on with somebodyin whom the minister already had confidence
could be useful for them. There was an elementof this in the Foreign
Office when Tony Crosland and David Lipsey arrived from the DoE.
According to SusanCrosland,her husband'sformer private secretarytold
his new one, "'he has his extendedfamily to which D. Lip. is admitted.
Don't you attemptto mix personaland official life. "' She continued,
'except with D. Lip. and Margaret [his diary secretary] he drew a
boundary round himself which the sophisticatesof private office were
very hesitantto cross' (1982, pp.322-3).
Most advisersfelt that a good relationshipwith the private office
was crucial if they were to function effectively and receive key papers.
The relationship could not only influence the type of activities
advisers engagedin, but also the depth and effectiveness of their
involvement in key issues. Good relationswere highly desirable where
the advisersat in the private office. Alec DouglasHome's belief that
there was a good accordbetweenhis private secretariesand his adviser
was shared by John Graham,who referred to 'total trust', and Miles
Hudson, who thoughtthat Graham'sattitude was very important. Although
Tom McNally moved out of the private office after a while, he stood by
his remarksto the Re-skilling GovernmentSeminarin May 1986:
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the five yearsthat I did spendas a political adviser in
Whitehall were both enjoyableand educative. This was helped
by the attitude of the two private secretaries I
encountered... there is a lessonthere in how to make
political input mutually advantageous;if the civil servants
themselvesare receptive and constructive, the idea of
political advisers in Whitehall can be made to work (IOD,
1986, p.9)
As permanent secretary in the Foreign Office at the time, Thomas
Brimelow also felt that, 'if the political adviser is to work
effectively he has to work in harnesswith the private office. ' As a
result of their expertisein the relevantfield, at leasttwo advisers,
Tom Baron and Vincent Cable, initially knew the private secretarybetter
than they knew the minister. Both greatly valued the assistancethey
received from the private offices. It hadbeen arranged that John
Whittingdale should take up his appointmentas specialadviserto Norman
Tebbit on the Monday following the 1984 Tory Party Conference.
Whittingdale thought that the private office was very helpful to him in
the exceptionalcircumstancesof his commencingwork whilst his minister
was in hospital following the IRA bomb. Furthermore, he established a
very good, cooperative,relationshipwith a seriesof principal private
secretariesfrom which he, and they, benefitedand he suggested that
that relationshipwas, 'the key to thejob'.
The attitude adopted by private secretarieswas not always so
positive and could vary within one department. Thus Willetts suggested
that someTreasury private secretarieswrongly regard special advisers,
'as a threat and try to keep them out of the way
... unfriendly private
secretaries who just want to keepspecialadvisersdown because they
regard them as amateurs.' Sensible private secretaries, however,
cooperateand find advisersuseful: 'they can exchangeinformation, and
the specialadvisercan do the tasksthat the private secretarydoesnot
think it is quite proper for him to do.'
This is but one exampleof the widely, but not universally, held
view that the roles are complementary. The strong relationship formed
betweenRoy Jenkinsand his principal private secretaries,David Dowler
and Hayden Phillips, underlinesthe argumentthat the aide/confidant
role can be played by civil servants. Nevertheless,Jenkinsalso found

it very usefulto haveadviserswhocouldplay this roleandprovide a
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political dimension. He regardedDowler and Harris as being equally
important to him in providing advice, but both could perform tasks he
could not expectfrom the other. JohnSmith believedthe roles to be
complementarybecause although the private secretariescould help
sustain the Secretary of Stateand be loyal they may not share the
political commitment of the minister. Therefore there is 'room for
somebodyto look at departmentalaffairs from a political standpoint...
a Secretary of Statecan cometo grief if he relies totally on civil
servants.' BarbaraCastledemonstratedin her Diaries (1980) how good
private secretariesand good adviserscan work well together with a
positive attitude towardseachother's role. Top quality ministers,
respondentsfelt, can get the bestout of their private secretariesand
their specialadvisers.
The principal private secretarywith perhapsthe most extensive
experience of working with specialadvisersis Callum McCarthy who
served both Roy Hattersleyin 1976-7and Norman Tebbit between 1983-5.
He felt that whilst the private office could have been run without
advisers it would have beensomewhatlesseasy and he would have
missedthem. Oneprincipal private secretarycommented:
I never felt when I was doing thejob of principal private
secretarythat the specialadviserwas in any way a threat to
my position and I actually felt that I could do my job very
much better, and the Secretaryof Statecould do his job very
much better if there was a good specialadviserworking in the
right way.
For Keith Joseph the roles were not complementary, but 'quite
different'. The private secretary'srole was, 'service to the minister,
not service to the minister's ideas ... They can't provide that
particular pepper and salt that the adviserscan.' Such an approach
leadsto an examinationof the role of other categorieswho work for the
minister, and who might influencethe adviser's role, starting with
departmental officials whosetraditional roles have included servicing
the minister's ideas. The remaininggroupswill be looked at in less
detail than the private office, which for most advisers was the key
relationshipafter that with their minister. Furthermore, it is to the
private office that reformers usually look whenconsidering where an
expanded group of ministerial staff should be located; combining with
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traditional private office dutiesa capacityto servicethe minister's
ideas,is often the central focusof suchschemes.
(ii)

Other

iv' Servants.

In the first edition of his book, Meltsner (1976) suggested that
American policy analysts,aspractitionersof an emerging profession,
were more shapedby the forcesaround themthan were membersof a mature
profession. This was oneof the factorsbehind his view that policy
analystswere very susceptibleto bureaucraticinfluences. Although, as
we saw in Chapter5, by 1986he thoughtpolicy analysis had, 'emerged
with a defined identity' (p.300), his original comments still have
validity for the UK. We saw earlier that advisersin the UK have a
wider rangeof roles than even the diversepolicy analysts. It is not
surprising therefore, that as Klein and Lewis observe:
To the extentthat specialadvisersplay a role complementary
to the officials, as they do in their quasi-political
activities, so they may evenbe welcomedby civil servants,
who may be relieved that they are not askedto carry out tasks
which might endangertheir neutral stance. But to the extent
that special advisers play a role competitive to that of
officials, as they do when they challenge the department's
monopoly of advice-givingon policy issues,there is a much
more direct conflict (p.22).
Inevitably in discussingcivil serviceinfluence on the role of
advisers,evidencecan be drawn from earlier points relatedto both the
constitutional limitations on civil servants assisting with party
political activities, and the place of specialists in British
government. The role of mostadvisersinvolved some combination of
party political and policy makingactivities. JackStraw felt that as

it becameclear in
the relationshipwith histwo ministersdeveloped
eachcasewhat additionalskills he couldbring to anyparticularpolicy
question,andwhereit becameobvioushewasduplicatingwhat officials
were doinghe woulddropout. Strawshowedhow, for a non-specialist,
therole couldbe influencedin both majorfieldsby the activities of,
and/or gaps left by, officials. Giventhatthe administrativecivil
to be politicallyneutral,he stated: 'There are
servantwassupposed
things thatadviserscando thatofficialscan't do ... I wasbound to
have a deeperknowledgeof the LabourPartythanthey were and just
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bring a different perspective.' On at least one policy, removing pay
bedsfrom the NHS, there wasdepartmentalscepticism:
'so I got heavily involved in that, redrafting the consultative
document, and things like that. It could havebeendone by officials
but I think that was an illustration of whereyou had a very contentious
policy it was useful to have somebodyaround who was willing to do the
redrafting.'
Advisers were more likely to find gaps,or certainly be more likely
to be encouragedby officials to fill gaps, in the political activities
than the policy makingones. An official believedthe Department of
Employment was much more receptiveto Rob Shepherd'spositive comments
about how to get the policies through than it was to Robbie Gilbert's
questioning of substantivepoints containedin the submissions to the
minister. The picture is slightly muddiedby the suggestionsfrom some
witnesses that officials worked more readily with advisers whom they
could recognizeasbeing knowledgeableabout the department'sfield.
Labour ministers believed that the DHSS more readily accepted
specialistadvisersthan political ones. Even on policy matters, Klein
and Lewis thought, 'there is a subtle and complex two-way trading
relationshipbetweencivil servantsand specialadvisers. They are both
adversariesandallies' (p. 11). There is evidence,however, to support
their propositionof a greaterwelcomefrom officials for the political
role of advisers. Certainly somecivil servantsthought that advisers
should (or did) concentrateon the political aspectsof the minister's
life rather than getting too involved in the department. Many ministers
felt the departmentcould not provide adequateassistanceto meet their
requirements for political speechesto be producedand party liaison
maintained. The greaterfreedomof advisersto liaise informally with
party offices and local politicians, is appreciatednot only by
ministers but often by officials. By carrying less authority than
ministers or officials, adviserssometimesgain valuable information,
for example, that a local council's private position in negotiationsmay
be different than the one it feels obliged to adopt in a meeting
attended by neighbouringauthorities. Officials usually wanted their
ministers to be as well informed and prepared as possible, without
having to endangertheir own political neutrality. Some of the best
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examples of appreciatingthe valueof this come from the DoE:
David [Lipsey] had a different dimensionand it's a dimension
the civil servant doesn't properly understand ... civil
servantssay, 'Ah but you know that won't go down well in the
House' or, 'Will the Party like it?' but we are talking, not
from ignorancebut from semi knowledge;whereasthe political
adviser ought to have a genuinefeeling for the party policy
and for, just as important, the workings of the party; who
matters, who doesn't (Andrew Semple).
He had extraordinarily good antennaeand contactsin not only
the Labour political world but in the socio- political world
generally and was able to paddleoff to meetings of this,
that, or the other and bring back bits of information relevant
to Crosland, and to the department,which no civil servant
would have beenablein any proper way to get hold of, and
which no politician in ministerial office would havehad the
time to get hold of ... the main thing was to ensure the
minister was properly serviced and there are nooks and
crannies to do with the responsibilitiesof the very big
departmentswhich no civil servantcan get anywherenear (Ian
Bancroft).
It is easierto show there might be a place for advisersin filling
gaps in the servicesprovided by officials, than it is to suggest
officials have a positive influenceon the role of advisers. There are
someexamplesof the latter. PeterDavis, again from Environment, found
that he was able to usehis contactswith leadersof the Conservative
opposition in variouscouncils which were opposinggovernment policies.
He was able to feed his minister with the inside information he needed
to do his job. Davis statedthat oncecivil servantsfound he had all
the channelsand could get good information, 'they were very keen to tap
in on it and I had civil servantsapproachingme.' They would ask if he
could get specific papers.

Someinterviewees
how far thereweregapsthat required
questioned
filling. In response,othersarguedthat even if officials could
perform the political liaisonandinformation gatheringroles, the
advisershad a differentmodeof operationwhich resulted in their
specializingin this typeof activity, ratherthandabblingin it as
bureaucratstendedto do asoneof their manyduties. Ironically, it
was aspectsof the advisers'generalmodeof operatingthat were most
liable to be influencedby the bureaucratic
environment.Advisersoften
foundit desirableto adoptcertaincivil servicetraits. Malcolm Dean
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recalls that as ajournalist he was used to discussing ideas with
colleagues, but soondiscoveredthe importanceof the memorandum. The
point is developedby Anthony Lester:
The longer I was there, the more I becamea civil servant and
the lessI was a specialadviserin the political sense. That
was becauseI learnt you could only get things doneby working
with the grain of the civil serviceand not always againstthe
grain. Thereforea conflict developedbetween the original
job specificationto makea nuisanceof myself for my minister
and my wish to get thejob doneproperly ... I was determined
to be professionaland to adoptthe sameethosas the civil
servants while I was there, otherwiseit seems to me they
would havegroundsto complainand I wouldn't be able to be
effective.
By saying that being professionalmeantadopting the civil service
ethos, Lester showsthat advisersin the UK have not even started to
emergeas a separateprofession. According to Tom Baron, 'six months is
long enough. At the endof that time you end up talking, writing,
thinking like a civil servantand that is the last thing the minister
wants - he's got hundredsalready.'
Lester and Baron are prime examples of specialist advisers
appointed to help developradical policies. How far there are gaps to
fill and placesfor expert specialadvisersto occupy raises issues
about the role of specialistswithin the bureaucracythat have already
been examined, including the argumentthat if there are any gaps they
can be filled by the departmentappointingtemporaryoutsiders. It was
claimed, though, that key featuresof the place of expert special
advisers are the direct link with a minister, and their commitment to
and/or understandingof, his policies and philosophy. Many officials
seempreparedto acknowledgeand/or acceptthat central elementsof the
advisers' role distinguishedthem from other specialists. A former
permanentsecretaryfelt that when ministersrecruitedexperts, 'it was
usually because they wantedto bring about somechange in attitude.'
Given the conservativenatureof mostprofessionsit was, therefore, not
surprising, 'they would really want to handpick their people.'

A seniorofficial at theDoE thoughtthereoughtnot to be a need
for outsidersto provideprofessional
expertisebecausethe department
ought to supplyit, but Tom Baronbroughtin businessexperience and
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status in relation to what he was saying. Furthermore, he said, 'when
the departmenttakeson an adviserit feels free to ignore his advice,
but if the Secretaryof Statebrings in somebodyhe has his endorsement
and the burden of proof is on the department.' This highlights the
potential significanceof the role someexpert adviserscould play, but
Baron showshow the departmentcan shapethe parametersof the role in
that to preservehis credibility he thoughtit important not to get
caughtby arguing too strongly in an areaoutsidehis expertise: 'if you
venture away from the subjectthat you're an expert in, then they run
rings round you and that debasesyour expertise.'
Most specialists,including Lester and Baron, believed they would
have been in a much weakerposition had they been appointed by the
department and not hada direct line to the minister. As seen earlier
(Chapter 2 SectionD) however,Timothy Josling was partial exception.
When he moved from being a specialadviserto being a consultantto the
same department,he experiencedno great changealthoughhe might have
beenin a weakerposition hadhe startedas a consultant. Accessto the
minister was somewhatless but accessto information was better as the
role becamemore formalized. This is perhapsexplainedby the part time
nature of his role andby his concentration on only one, highly
specialized,part of the department'swork. Josling stated: 'No one in
the departmentcould havefulfilled the role I was playing ... I wasn't
coming in and doing their job. ' An official thought that Maurice
Peston'srole as a specialistwith direct links to the minister was not
resented by civil servantsbecausethey could accepthe was looking at
issuesfrom a political perspective. Similarly, speakingof Peston,and
his predecessor,JoanMitchell, the former permanentsecretary, Kenneth
Clucas, said, 'it was useful to havea couple of economists who were
very much gearedin to the politics. '
Where officials welcomedthe adviseras a specialist, they could
have an influence on his role by generallyencouraginghim to become
more involved in the department'saffairs. Furthermore, officials might
requestthat advisershelp them tackle specificproblems. At the DTI a
senior official thought that David Young was 'good news' for the
department in providing an input that they lacked, and developing the
capacity of the department. A permanentsecretaryin the department,
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Sir Brian Hayes, said in the BBC profile of Jeffrey Sterling: 'He zooms
in when he's invited to zoom in and the great advantageis that we know
that Jeffrey's on tap, he's willing to help and when we needhis help,
we seekit and we invariably get it. ' Fryer, 1989).
This sub-sectionillustratesthat interactionsat the point where
the administrative and political systemsmeetare complex, but the
partnershipmodelsdescribedin Chapter3 may be at least as applicable
as the conflict ones. Nowhere is this clearer than in the previously
described regular meetingsheld betweensomepermanentsecretariesand
the special advisers. However, that advisers had different, and/or
possibly greater, knowledgeand skills than thoseheld by officials in
specific areasof a department'swork certainly did not guarantee that
the civil servants would reactpositively. In some such cases the
influence of officials on the adviser'srole was an attemptto curtail
it. Thus Patrick Jenkin thoughtthat RogerDyson, 'got across ... the
industrial relations people in the DHSS because it quickly became
apparenthe knew vastly more abouthow it actually worked on the ground
than they did. ' The experienceof Dyson, and others, suggeststhat
officials have a particularly strong potential to exert negative
influence when an adviserbecomesinvolved in what the department
regards as its managementrole. The dividing line between management
and managementpolicy is narrow. Jenkin, Dyson opined, 'conceivedof me
as filling a gap, I think, in other words providing somethingthat civil
servants didn't provide, rather than doing somethinginstead of them
doing it. '
Finally, whereas ministersrecognizedthat departments had well
developed links with many client groups, new ministers often wished to
establishrelations with other, possibly more radical, groups or policy
think tanks, or strengthenrelations with a particular group. Advisers
were sometimesable to do this and on occasionshave almost a brokerage
function with outsidegroups, sometimesevenwhere there were already
good relationsbetweenthe departmentand the group. Examples include
David Young and Jeffrey Sterling with 'the City', Tom Baron with the
Volume HouseBuilders Study Group, Stuart Sextonwith public schools,
and Ken Griffin with trade unions. In eachcasethe adviserwas able to
talk to the group in a way which would have been impossible or
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inappropriatefor officials. Here again, advisersare seenas the ideal
people to liaise acrossuncertainboundaries. Such thinking is not,
however, universaland othersbelieve that betweenthem officials and
junior ministers and the PPScan provide all the liaison a minister
should needwith pressuregroupsand political figures.

(iii)

JuniorMinister

The greaternumberof junior ministersin the UK than elsewheremakesit
pertinent for Theakstonto observethat, 'The proliferation of special
advisers in recent governmentshasbeeninterpretedas evidence that
Cabinet ministers are failing to use their existing resources of
political supportas fully as they might' (1987, p.98). How far there
is a place for advisersto fill gapsthat otherwisecould be occupiedby
junior ministers will be examined,before the potentially positive
influence of junior ministerson advisersis considered.
Theakston claims one reasonwhy governmentsin Germanyand France
are smaller than thosein the UK, 'is that in thosestates top civil
servantsare politicized' (1987, p. 178). Robert Jacksonhas servedas a
political adviser; asa member,and director, of cabinetsin Brussels;
and most recently as a junior minister. He believes that, 'the
functions junior ministersperform are in many ways similar to those
that membersof the cabineton the continentperform ... [but]
... they
do have, becausethey're political figures, an independentpolitical
position, and a high profile political role, or public relations role,
that members of the cabinet don't have.' His experience as a
parliamentaryunder-secretarysuggestedto him that despitehis earlier
support of cabinets,'if you thoughtof the ministerial team as like a
cabinet and stressedits collegial aspects,you could do without a
cabin .' Perhapsone or two adviserscould be appointedto work with
such a team.

Specialadvisersremain,however,'an understandably
attractive
of state.' (Theakston,1987,p.99). In contrast
optionfor secretaries
to mostjunior ministers,they owetheirpositionandinfluenceto their
personalloyalty to him; theyaremorereadily available;and they
sometimesoffer impressivesubjectexpertise.Much of the evidence
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gathered in this study supportsTheakston'sview. But respondentshad
diverse views aboutwherethere were gapsin the services provided by
junior ministersthat could be pluggedby advisers. Thus Jackson still
thought there was some role for advisers, partly becausejunior
ministerswere unlikely to provide a briefing serviceon Cabinet items.
Similarly, whilst Michael Heseltinearguedthat a minister did not need
political advisers,he did appoint severalexpert specialadvisers.
When ministers want to introduce more capacity for specialist
adviceto be given directly to them, they are not usually able in the UK
to selecta suitablejunior minister to do this. SometimesMPs possess
expertise in the field for which they are given ministerial
responsibility, and very occasionally a non-parliamentarian with
relevantknowledgeand/or experienceis ennobledand thus available for
ministerial appointment. Heseltinehimself was involved with one such
instance when the ConservativeLeader of Leeds City Council, Irwin
Bellwin, was given a peerageand ministerial responsibility for local
governmentwithin the DoE. Generally though, Heseltine, in common with
others, felt specialistadviserscould make a contribution in a way that
ministers could not: 'The junior ministershaven't got the time and

is
fusion of
theyoftenhaven'tgot theexperience
... andthat why the
is sovaluable.
'
talentsandexperiences
Theakston also referred to junior ministers' lack of time. There
used to be a contrary view, expressedfor example by Boyle (Kogan,
1971), that there were too many underemployedjunior ministers. This
opinion is still heardbut many think therehas beena change in the
last two decades.Thus BrendonSewill suggestedthat it was only as
government grew more complicatedthat junior ministers developed their
own empires, neededto spendmore time in the Housedealing with the
increased volume of legislation, acquiredtasksto fulfil and talks to
give and, therefore, were not alwaysavailable for chats with the
senior minister. Brian Cubbonfelt that the development of special
advisers happened at the sametime as the role of junior ministers
expandedand, as explainedin Chapter4, SectionB, there were the same
forces behindboth. Indeed, Cubbon's department,the Home Office, was
one in which in the late 1980sjunior ministersfelt very busy. So much

so that far from believingadviserswereusurpingtheir role, they
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joined with the Home Secretaryin successfullyarguing for an extra
adviserto be appointedto help them and relieve the considerableburden
on the one existing adviserwho hadbeenassistingthem in addition to
fulfilling his commitmentsto the Home Secretary.
Some still believe thatjunior ministersare not usedproperly, but
this ideais not necessarilyincompatiblewith the idea that they are
too busy. John Hunt claimed they were 'too busy openingthings', but he
thought the adventof advisershad not beenresponsiblefor the lowly
status of junior ministers, which had recentlyimproved. The majority
view is thatjunior ministershaveneitherthe time to perform the full
range of advisers' tasks- especiallyonerous ones such as speech
writing - nor the availability to be 'on the spot', as and when
required. This is consistentwith our model of the placeof advisers.
The conceptof the adviseras the minister's 'own person' was also
a major elementin the model becausejunior ministers are not usually
selectedby the seniorminister. They may evendislike him and/or be on
the opposite wing of the party. The argumentwas strongly put by one
official:
I couldn't underlinetoo strongly how ineffective were the
ministerial teamsthat I observedin the 60's and 70s - very
much people who wantedto get on and do their own things;
pretty awkward at working together; morejealousiesand back
biting than cooperation It ought to be that a special
...
adviser is your personand offers you total loyalty and
doesn't havean independentagendaof promoting him or herself
on the political stage.
However, the case for sayingthat there could be a place for
advisers in addition to junior ministersgoeswider and is valid even
where relations are much better. Favourably disposedjunior ministers
will still usually have their own careersto think about. Thus a junior
minister might not have the time to play an aide/confidant role.
Richard Ehrman suggested,'the specialadviser is in the personal
service business,and the junior minister isn't. ' Ministers who have
been demonstrably happywith their ministerial teamshave still been
keen to appoint specialadvisers. The bestillustration that even the
presence of a strong friend and confidant in the ministerial team does
not necessarilyobviatethe needfor adviserscomesfrom Roy Jenkins.

222

Despitehaving his former highly-valuedspecialassistant,John Harris,
in the Home Office with him asMinister of State, he still appointed
special advisers in 1974. Oneof thoseadvisers, Matthew Oakeshott,
felt thejunior ministerscould not servethe Secretaryof Statein the
sameway because,'they are not on call when you want them in the way a
special adviseris. ' Jenkinsassertedthat there was still a role for
advisers to play and he showedHarris could not play the role he had
done in the 1960s: 'apart from anything elseJohn Harris was only
dealing as Minister of Statewith about one third of Home Office
affairs ... and obviously without upsetting the whole ministerial
hierarchy you couldn't bring him in on that which was the business of
the other Minister of State, or evenof the Parliamentary Secretaries.'
Referring to theseissuesin his recentautobiographyJenkins observes,
'Lester camein May, and helpedto fill severalgaps. John Harris was
not lost to the Home Office, but he had beenhalf lost to me on the
formation of the Government' (1991, p. 375).
Several ministers stressedthat the adviser's role was of a
different order and lower status(if not alwaysinfluence) from that of
most junior ministers. Many advisersbelieved,in the words of David
Cowling, that much of their work was, 'mundane,menial stuff, ' which
ministers would not have done. He went on to claim, in common
especially with others who dealt with local government, that young
researchers in party offices or peoplein local authoritiescould talk
to him more easily andinformally than they might to ajunior minister.
Not all agreed. But perhapsa more contentiousissue is the provision
of political advice, especiallyon departmentalissues. It is here that
the argumentwas most strongly put by somerespondentsthat a minister
should rely on his ministerial team, rather than young political
advisers. Heseltinelinked it to a discussionaboutprayer meetings:

I usedPPSs,andinvited theWhipof the department
into the
driving
department
for
the
the
policy
coreof
morningmeetings
[of ministers]
for me that open approach is a
...
strengthening approach
and I found it immenselyvaluable and
to me removedthe needfor political advisers... the best
political advisersare in the Houseof Commons. They have a
combination of talent and antennaewhich add up to the
political adviceyou want.
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It is difficult to generalizeaboutthe extent to which ministers
who involved junior ministers in prayer meetings also appointed
advisers. Perhaps the two bestknown and successful examples of
extensiveuseof prayer meetingsare the Walker-Heseltinetradition and
the Treasuryteamunder the Tories. The former have madelimited useof
political advisers; evensuchan influential special adviser as Tom
Baron was not invited to the prayer meetings. The Treasury ministers
have made greateruseof advisersthan any of their colleagues since
1979and advisersplay an important role in the prayer meetings. These
contrasting examples raise doubtsabout how far the role of junior
ministers, or a particular model of their use,is a determinantof the
role of advisersin general,beyondconfirming the case developed in
this sub-sectionthat there canbe an important placefor both junior
ministersand specialadvisersif the senior minister wishes.
There is a little evidence,however,that junior ministers can
influence the specific role of individual advisers. Some junior
ministers encouragethe adviserto provide supportfor them; others do
not. Stuart Sexton'srole, especiallyunderKeith Joseph,was strongly
influenced by junior ministersin that some,especially Rhodes Boyson
and Robert Dunn, were keen to involve him, and others were not.
(iv) ParliamentaryPrivate Secretaries.
The central finding of our analysishereis similar to that for junior
ministers. Namely, it is evident that there is a place for advisers,
despitethe existenceof PPSs,but not so clear that the latter play an
important part, in general,in shapingthe parametersof the advisers'
role. This arisesbecausevariations in the role of advisers do not
correlate consistentlywith the degreeof involvementof the PPS. It
was possible for a minister, for exampleGeoffrey Howe, heavily to
involve his PPS in the political teamin the department,and yet also
make extensiveuse of specialadvisers.

The difficulty of makinggeneralizations
abouttherole of PPSs was
by thosewhoarguedthatnot only did ministersusetheir PPSs
stressed
differently but also diversePPSswantedto slot into a variety of
roles. Two of Tony Benn'sPPSsillustrate some of the different
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approaches.Benn recordsin the Diary entry for 4 December1974: 'Frank
McElhone said I didn't seeenoughof him and I didn't care aboutthe
...
PLP. He criticised Frances Morrell for being "an intellectual
influence"' (1989). By contrastBrian Sedgemoreworked closely with the
advisers in a way envisagedby Bennin his 1973 article quoted in
Chapter 4 SectionA. Writing of his experiencesSedgemoreincluded as
one of the good things, 'the enjoymentof the companyof his [Benn's]
two distinguished"political advisers"' (p. 10).
Whether advisersoccupya uniqueposition that is not really the
preserve of the PPSwas doubtedby several interviewees. There are
unquestionably similarities betweenthe roles: the appointments are
personally made by the minister; there are no formal duties; and, in
practice, a wide variety of functions evolve. In advising businessmen
on lobbying government,Miller (1986) frequently bracketsthe advisers
and the PPSstogetherinto one category. This is symptomaticof the way
they are perceived. Somethink there is considerable overlap between
the job of the PPSand that of the political, if not specialist,
adviser. Ted Short, for example,thoughtthat the PPS's role was
nearestto that of the adviser.
It was more widely believed, however, that their tasks are
distinct, if complementary. This is examinedby looking first at the
departmentalrole played by somePPSsand then at their more traditional
backbench liaison role. It was claimed PPSs were not playing the
departmental/speechwriting role filled by advisersbecause they were
not 'on the spot' anddid not havethe time. This also limited their
ability to act asaides/confidants. Further, being outsidethe Official
SecretsAct, they lackedthe routine accessto information that advisers
officially enjoyed. In the Rehr Qft CommitteeQf Privy Counsellors
QII Cabinet DocumentSecurity (Cmnd. 6677,1976, para 12), for example,
the specialadviserswere includedas a categorywhom the minister could
instruct were to receiveCabinet papers,but there was no mention of
PPSs.
Margaret Beckett movedalmost directly from being Judith Hart's
specialadviserat ODM to becomingher PPS. Although shefelt her role
hardly changedat all, becauseshealready knew all the people, she was
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no longer in the departmentall the time and could not travel with Hart
in the sameway, so there was still room for a replacementadviser, Tony
Banks, in addition to Stuart Holland continuing in post. The
distinction betweenthe roles was clearerto Michael Portillo who also
moved rapidly from being adviserto backbencherto PPS - but in a
different department. He observed:
When you are a PPSyou are not part of the department, you do
not have accessto the papers. You don't go to meetings and
therefore you can't perform asa special adviser. You are
not devoting one hundredper cent of your time to the job, you
havegot lots of other things to do and when the Secretary of
Statewants you to bangoff a speechor give him somethoughts
on something, you just don't have the background that the
specialadviserhas becausehe is there full time.
It was seenat the start of Chapter4 that one of the original
argumentsusedby ministersin favour of the developmentof adviserswas
that, partly becauseof the needto operatewithin the Official Secrets
Act, they were isolated. Occasionally,though, PPSswere involved much
more in departmentalbusinessandat their minister's behest gained
access to somepapers. Severalpermanentsecretaries, including Ian
Bancroft, thought PPSshad beenusedto a much greaterextent before the
development of specialadvisers. He was not sure whetherthe role of
PPSs, 'got attenuatedbecauseof the presenceof special advisers or
it becameattenuatedand therefore specialadviserscame in. ' Sometimes
ministers who hadbeenactively usedasPPSs,including Robert Carr,
made active useof their own PPS. Carr suggestedhe now realized Sir
Anthony Eden, as Foreign Secretary,appointedhim to be one of his PPSs
because Eden wantedhim, 'more asa specialadviser', to be somebody
with outsideindustrial experienceand in the 'one nation' tradition on
social policy, rather than being somebody who would perform the
traditional PPS role of talking in the tearooms. Carr's PPS at the
Home Office, Nicholas Scott, was more readily available than most to
write speechesbecausehe was one of the few PPSto havea room in the
department. Coincidentally,but almost symbolically, when Roy Jenkins
succeededCarr, this room wasoccupiedby Matthew Oakeshott,his special
adviser. Despitetheseargumentsit is clear that since the advent of
advisers, however much ministersinvolve their PPSssuch as Sedgemore,
they do not seethem asinvalidating the needfor advisers.
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Shifting the focusto the primary sceneof PPSactivity - being the
ministers' eyesand earsand mouth amongstparliamentary colleagues reveals a different picture. Generally it emerged that ministers
considered that the major role of representing their interests in
Parliament shouldremain with PPSs. There was somebackbench disquiet
at the activities of advisers- especiallyin 1974- with some MPs
resenting the advisers' privileged accessto the minister and to
information. Furthermore,in the wordsof one minister, 'MPs are funny
creatures and they deal much more readily with someonewho is an MP. '
It is not surprisingthat someministersregardedthe PPS's work as
being distinct and it was obvious to the adviser that he was not
expectedto be involved in this area. A few advisersthought that their
minister's PPS was not very active and thereforethere was a role for
the adviserto play in liaising with Parliamentand providing political
support. Some PPSs had a positive attitude towards advisers and
encouragedcloseco-operationwhich was seenasa way of enhancing both
roles. In such situationsthe role of the adviser was occasionally
influenced by the activity level of the PPS. One long serving adviser
found it much easierto liaise with the most active of the minister's
PPSs on, for example,finding out what was behind a Parliamentary
Question, than he did with the lessactive PPSs,when he had to do much
more suchwork directly himself.
Certain advisers had more contactwith backbenchersthan most;
usually they had developedsuchcontactswhilst working for the party in
Opposition. Theseadvisers,including Ann Carlton, could work closely
involvementof Ian (now Sir Ian)
with the PPS. The above-average
Stewart, Geoffrey Howe's PPS, in Treasuryaffairs, including the prayer
meetings, demonstratesthat greaterthan usual liaison between some
backbenchersand advisersneednot be relatedto any gapsappearing in
the services that individual PPSswould be expectedto provide. The
advisers, especially Adam Ridley, worked closely with Stewart.
Nevertheless,they felt that evenwith the information gainedat prayer
meetings,there were issueson which the PPS could not aseasily as the
advisers havethe sustainedlevel of debatewith MPs that depended on
intimate knowledgeof what was going on in the department. Ridley also
argued the PPS could not, 'get back to the minister in the quick way
that we could.' Stuart Sextonalso referred to the importanceof being
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able to talk to MPs from a basisof knowledge,and thought he was often
functioning almostas an additional PPS.
Theseexamplesare consistentwith the modelof advisersbeing able
to act as channelsof information acrossvariousboundaries. Generally
such instances strengthen the picture of complementarity between
advisers and PPSs,with the PPS having the statusin the Houseand the
feel for the Commons,and the adviserpossessingthe information and the
position within the department. They could work together by, for
example,the adviserdevisingParliamentaryQuestionsto be planted and
handing them to the PPSto passto a suitable backbencher. When
meetings were being arrangedbetweena minister and backbenchers,the
adviser, for exampleDenis Healey's Derek Scott, might be in a better
position to help organizethe meetingat the private office end, but the
MPs would probably expectto be invited by the PPS.

(v) 'ýh P

Office.

The theme of complementarityis again significant. It is easier to
analyse this and suggestthere is a placefor advisersthan it is to
develop any consistent pattern of the influence exerted by chief
information officers on their role. Someministersused advisers to
assistwith presentationbecausethey thoughtthe information office in
the department was not very satisfactory. A few information offices
were thought by advisersto be mainly concerned with keeping their
minister out of the newsor satisfiedwith taking a reactive rather than
proactive role towards publicity. A number of chief information
officers agreed that the standardof information offices varied with
somebeing poor, and agreed,when the propositionwas put, that in such
circumstancesadviserscould help:
in somecases,if there was an inadequateset up in the press
office a specialadviserwould haveto carry an extra burden
in this respect(Donald Maitland).

It seemsto meentirelyplausiblethat, depending
on just how
feel
goodotherpressofficersare, ministersshouldsometimes
is
thattheir pressoffice not sufficientlyeffectiveand the
political adviser,whois moreof a political animal, should
be ableto do it a bit better(HamiltonWhyte,Headof Foreign
Office NewsDepartment,1976-9).
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It is impossibleto makegeneralizedcorrelationsbetweenthe use
of advisersfor assistancewith presentationand the abilities of the
press office. A contrastto the abovescenariowas the experience of
John Harris, probably the advisermostsynonymouswith having made a
positive impact on presentationon behalf of his minister. The Headsof
News Departmentwith whom Harris operatedin the 1960sincluded some of
the highest rated onestwo of whom, Donald Maitland in the Foreign
Office and Tom McCaffrey in the Home Office, went on to headthe Prime
Minister's press office. Illustrating there was room for Harris,
McCaffrey said, 'People would try to get from John a bit more
information than they could get from meor others - he didn't usurp my
role, which was to explain the policy; but when you came to the
infighting and the intrigue and the political thing he of course dealt
with the lobby. '
This also illustratesthat the roles can be seenas complementary
and that whilst there might be someoverlap, the advisersare generally
thought of as making a real contribution rather than duplicating the
press office's work. In addition to the specifictasksof information
work including sometimeskeepingministersabreast of likely public
reaction to policies, somepressofficers have become very close to
their ministers andacted asaides/confidants,if not actual political
advisers. However, this doesnot happenconsistently,nor meanthere is
no placefor advisersto play theseroles. Indeed, somepress officers
found that the adviser's stresson the importanceto the minister of
presentation made their voice even more influential within
department.

the

The ways in which adviserswere involved in presentational work
were discussed earlier. Often this was complementaryto the work of
press officers, sometimeson departmentalissuesworking in the way
describedby Roy Hattersley:
The refusal to allow an increaseat the Ford Motor Company was
a Cabinet decisionon a paperfrom me; it was a political
decision soyou would expectMike Garrod would be talking to
the industrial correspondents,you would expectDavid Hill to
be talking to the political correspondents;in fact both of

themoverlapping.

229

Not only could there be a distinction betweenthe political and
specialist journalists, but also, asMcCaffrey showedabove, the same
correspondentmight hopeto go further into the party politics of an
issue with an adviser. According to one minister: 'being a little
freer than the chief information officer, the advisercould say to a
journalist, "well you know [the shadowminister] madean assof himself
on that and the real point is this ... " whereas a chief information
officer hasto be just that much more circumscribedand mustn't get too
political. '
There are other ways in which advisers can go further than
officials. A former chief information officer claimed, 'advisers are
useful for floating ministers' ideasand trial balloonsin a way that no
forger marksshow in a way that you wouldn't use, if it was highly
...
political, your pressofficer. ' The conceptof advisers being freer
than civil servantsto be political fits in with the model of their
place, as doesthe idea that advisersare often engaged in activities
because their ministersare too busy to do them. The two points were
combinedby Howard Davies:
I did have a slightly freer reign, by agreement with the
Chancellor and with the knowledgeof the pressoffice, to do
things like backgroundbriefing for Weekend World
... and
political commentators... the sort of thing really that very
few other peoplecan actually perform. The pressofficer is
the spokesman,therefore what he says is on the record
normally; other officials wouldn't really want to do that. The
Chancellorcould easily but he doesn't have the time'.

Like Davies,MichaelPortillo felt thepressoffice wasquitehappy for
him to play sucha role. He sawthe rolesasnot entirely overlapping
since,
when they were talking to the pressthey couldn't really get
in to the political aspectsof the policy, whereasthe special
adviser can quite happily ... in a way the special adviser
getssenton the riskier missionstoo, you can trail something
in the press without dragging the press office into
difficulties
... I was really struck by how willing the press
officers were to work with the specialadvisersrather than to
seehim as a threat .. or being in conflict.
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The potential complementarityin the roles is demonstratedby the
numberof adviserswho felt the pressofficers were quite happyto have
othersperforming the more political tasks. There was a proviso, though
this strengthensthe notion that the roles were complementary: as far
aspossiblethe advisershouldtell the pressofficer when he had talked
to a journalist. Michael Dobbs worked closelywith the pressoffice and
regardedhimself as the 'political pressofficer'. He was succeededat
Employment by Richard Ehrman who felt the department in general,
including the press office, 'was well usedto dealing with special
advisers and had them fitted in to its way of doing things.' At the
Foreign Office John Houstonthoughtthe News Departmentwas, 'extremely
good'. However, when they were, for example,rehearsingthe type of
questions likely to be raisedin a television interview, his role,
unlike that of the News Department,includedconsidering, 'how is this
going to effect Geofffrey Howe as a politician?'
Some pressofficers expressedsupportfor the presentational work
of advisers. Hamilton Whyte, commentedthat David Lipsey and David
Stephen, 'were both helpful and valuablein that area
... they were
allies.' At MAFF the pressofficer, Terry Dawes, and the adviser, Ann
Carlton, had adjoining roomsand would knock on the wall if they wanted
to contactone another. They often discusseddraft press notices and
she would add political elementsto statementsthe minister was going to
make in the House. Daweswas, 'glad to have her political reaction' and
felt 'she had a lot to do with political correspondentsas well as
getting to know senioragriculturalones.' She always told him of
conversations with agricultural correspondentswhen they contacted her
and, 'that was one of the reasonswhy we got on so well. ' Similarly
Carlton believed that Daweswas delightedshe was there and stated,
'quite often I briefed the press,but the pressofficer and I at MAFF
worked very well together, he never compromised his civil service
impartiality. '

One indicationwhy somepressofficersmay welcomethe activities
of certain advisers,and believe there is a place for them in
presentationalwork, canbe seenin theconcernexpressedabout the
position of civil servicepressofficersin recentTreasury and Civil
Service Committeereports(1986,and1990). The 1986 report proposed
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that, 'ministers who require their pressofficers to do more than
presentand describetheir policies should makepolitical appointments'
(Vol. 1, pars 5.20). In its 1986response,the Governmentasserted that
press officers could go further than presenting and describing provided it was Government,and not party, policies:
Civil servicedepartmentalpressofficers are in exactly the
same position asany other civil servants:they may properly
be called upon to presentand describethe policies of the
Minister, and to put forward the Minister's justification and
defence of these. They may not properly be called upon to
justify or defendthosepolicies in party political terms, or
expressly to advocatepolicies as those of a particular
political party. Ministers who wish to presenttheir policies
in a party political dimensionhave other meansand channels
availableto them for doing so (Cmnd. 9841, para. 29).
Advisers, by being in practiceone of 'the other means and channels'
might well be seenas not only occupyinga separatespacein the system,
but also helpingto maintainthe position of the civil service press
officers. Dawes, for example,claimed that the presenceof the special
advisers meant he, 'could standback from any politically sensitive
issue and say, "that is Ann's job not mine."' In general he believed
that advisers helped civil servants maintain their neutrality by
'providing the servicethe particular minister wants.' This theme will
be developedat greaterlength in the final chapter,but for some, the
combination of specialadvisersand civil servicepress officers was
much preferableto a politically appointedpressofficer, although there
have beensomevery good onesintroduced, for exampleby BarbaraCastle.
Not all however, seeit this way. Somepress officers believed
that the adviserswere interfering with their work and at times there
was angerat seriousmistakesmadeand failures to tell the pressoffice
about contacts with journalists. Furthermore, although advisers'
discussionswith journalists were, on average,more extensivethan with
any other group outsidethe department,only just over a third had such
contactmore frequently than weekly. Someadviserskept well away from
journalists. Clearly the bulk of a department'scontactwith the press

was maintainedby thepressoffice, evenwherethe adviser was also
activein this field.
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(vi) P=y Officials
Traditionally, there was thought to be somedecline in the role of party
officials when a party changedfrom Opposition to Government. The
developmentof specialadvisershas both accentuatedthis and alleviated
the consequentdifficulties. Writing about the CRD in The im on 15
October 1987, RonaldButt commented,'Its young officials have less
contact with ministers than their predecessorsbecause ministers'
specialadvisersare alwaysat handto write the speechesthat once came
from the ResearchDepartment.' This suggestsadvisers are partially
occupying a space previously occupiedby CRD officials. A similar
comment came from BrendonSewill, former Director of the CRD, but he
also showedone reasonwhy adviserswere thought to be in a stronger
position: 'I felt a bit sorry that we were taking ministers' time that
otherwise would have beenspentwith the CRD officers, but we were
inside the Official SecretsAct. ' Quotationsearlier from Douglas Hurd
and William Waldegrave(in Chapter3 SectionC) illustrate that the
difficulties of being outsidethe Official SecretsAct were one of the
factorsencouragingparty researchersto pressfor advisory positions to
be established. Many respondents,for exampleNicholas True, referred
to this as a reasonwhy party officials could not fulfil the role of
advisers.
The official sanction given by Sir Robin Butler to advisers'
involvement in the controversialareaof askingcivil servantsto cost
Oppositionpolicies, has beenreportedin Chapter6 SectionA. Butler
referred to advisersassistingministerson, 'identifying the text of
commitments togetherwith any further interpretations and assumptions
necessaryto allow the commitmentsto be costed.' (Treasury and Civil
Service Committee, 1990, p. 30). True suggestedthat as an adviser
examining the Opposition'spolicies, 'having the ability to have these
costed and checked, and knowing what is going on in policy in the
department, you are able to seewhat is significant rather faster than
somebodywho just camein asa researcher.'

Otheradviserswho hadworkedin their partyofficesandfelt that
thesewerenot ableto fulfil the samerole, includedAnn Carlton,Lynda
Rouse,andJohnWhittingdale.Rousesuggested,
'they are complementary
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roles and certainly fully understandingand explaining the Government's
policy is jolly difficult if you are not seeingthe papers.' She added
another dimensionto the discussionby stressingthat ministers, 'set
store by the personal relationshipwith their own person in the
department.' This meant, however,that although Michael Portillo,
adviserin the Energy Departmentwhenshe was the correspondingCRD desk
officer, was, 'very good', he concentratedhis efforts primarily on the
Secretaryof State. Therefore, althoughthejunior ministers sometimes
used him, they also turned to her for assistance. The valuable
flexibility inherent in the placeof advisersis seenin many activities
where the adviserswere believedto be in a position to be helpful. One
example was the earlier commentsfrom Andrew Semple concerning the
adviser being in a betterposition than central offices to help plan
ministers' visits.
Whatever resentment there may havebeen about advisers gaining
greater access to ministers, thosewho remainedon, or newly joined,
their party's staff soonrealizedthe adviserhad a different statusand
could thus be usefulto them. Many saw the roles ascomplementary and
although party officials perhapsrarely influencedthe advisers' role,
they welcomed being kept in the picture by them and found some to be
very useful contactpoints in a department. Sometimes when advisers
were on holiday, party officials were askedto provide some of the
political supportthat ministershad cometo rely on from the advisers.
SECTION D,. ADVISERS' EXERCISEQE DISCRETION.
This fourth influenceon the functionsperformedby an adviseris of a
different kind from the previous three which all imply to varying
degrees that the adviser'swork is determinedby factors beyond his
control. The position occupiedby a specialadviserhas been described
as being a perch on which he sits and carvesout a role, rather than a
niche in to which he is slotted. Whilst it is true that there are no
tightly defined nichesfor advisers,the extentto which an adviser's
role is carved out for him by the forces described above varies
enormously. One of thoseinfluenceswas, of course, the adviser's own
capabilities, but the questionhere is: given the adviser has certain
abilities, how far is he free to define his own role? The most capable
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advisers were perhaps more likely, as was David Young, to be in a
position to exercisediscretion. Similarly Maurice Pestonclaimed, 'I
was a bit of a free wheelerin the sensethat I did what interested me
and on the whole if somethings didn't interestme, I managedto neglect
them ... indeedit's hard to seemy role asformal in any sense.'
Generally the degreeof discretionis a productof the interaction
betweenthe adviser's capabilitiesand wishes,and the other influences
examined. Smith's commentsthat ministers' advisersin Australia often
influence their own roles, were notedearlier. Walter believes that,
'the absence of job descriptions and the centrality of personal
relationships meanthat, in the first instance,adviserroles are open
to negotiation, and to the adviser's own decisions (drawing on
establishedskills andpreferences)'(1980, p. 142). Even Meltsner, who
thought there were a numberof factorsinfluencing the role, suggests,
'the bureaucraticcontext has sufficient discretion or slack to allow
the mutual expectationof both client and analystto operate' (1986,
p. 12). He also states,however, that, 'the bureaucratic context does
not allow the analystto act like other intellectuals' (p.8).
When academic researchersbecomespecialadvisers there can be
difficulties over the degreeof discretion they expectto enjoy. Denis
Healey felt that Nicholas Kaldor was an outstanding economist but,
having appointed him, he soonrealized Kaldor was, 'basically an
academic economistwho treatedgovernmentas a laboratory to carry out
his experiments.' Healey recordsin his autobiography:'in the end I
did not discouragehim from going back to academiclife' (p.391). Some
of the greatestdifficulties with adviserscome when they have somewhat
different ideological preferencesand agendasfrom those of their
minister and are determinedto pursuethem. A small numberof advisers
had sufficient discretionto perform taskstheir ministers did not wish
them to do and fail to carry out someduties the minister had expected
them to do.
For many advisers there was a degree of discretion but this
entailed working closeto, and in the interests of, their minister.
This was well capturedby Butler:
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When I was appointedspecialadviserin the Welsh Office the
civil servantswere particularly wary of me becausethey did
not know what I was going to do: but, neitherdid I. What
happensin practiceis that specialadviserscarve out a niche
around their ministersoncethey havecome to know them and
their individual requirements(p. 17).
He felt there was considerable'self starting' and particularly in
relation to party liaison he would often 'pick up the ball and run with
it'. Tim Boswell thought that as an adviser, 'basically you are your
own man,' and thatjust by being around things tendedto start flowing.
A private secretarydrew severalof thesethemestogetherin his comment
on advisers:
You haveto prove yourself, you haveto earn the respect of
other peopleon every transactionfor a long time before they
automatically seekyour advice no amountof rules will
help you round it; you do it by... making yourself useful,
making yourself accessibleand he did that. They can haveas
large a role as they are preparedto take on, and the
minister and the departmentare preparedto let them have.
Someadvisersconsideredthat they had rather more discretion over
particular subjectson which to get involved and, for example,brief the
when it cameto deciding
minister on a submission,than they possessed
the type of activities in which to engage. Care is neededto avoid a
dichotomy betweenthe conceptof an adviserassistingthe minister in
dealing with overload - and thereforenot being an extra burden whose
work needs supervising - and being 'on tap' to meet the minister's
needs.
Advisers who volunteeredtheir servicestendedto be more free to
take initiatives to developtheir role. Miles Hudson emphasizedthat as
a political secretary he did not haveany constitutional duties to
perform and Sir Alec DouglasHome did not expect him to perform any
specific duties.
There are indicationsthat certain advisershave had only a limited
degree of discretion. Somewere overwhelmedwith work and found it
difficult to establishclear areason which they could concentratetheir
effort. Others remainedmarginal and lackeddiscretion to move into
activities that were more important. In generaladvisersfound pressure

of eventsforcedthemto be lessproactiveandmorereactivethan even
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someseniorfigures had originally envisaged.
Some advisersreferredto having many tasksthat their Secretary
of State soon establishedas functions which were the adviser's
responsibility, for example, speeches,letters, and party liaison.
Where the adviser had perhapsmore discretion was in agreeing, or
refusing, to perform functionsat the requestof junior ministers or
civil servants. One adviserfelt there was a quid pro quo by which in
return for the drudgery of speechwriting and party liaison he was
allowed someinvolvementin policy work.
The role of specialadvisersin briefing ministersfor Cabinetis a
useful example to usewhenanalysingthe interaction of many of the
points raised in the four sectionsof this chapter. In line with
Hennessy, the Treasuryand Civil ServiceCommitteeconcludedthat this
was, 'arguably the function that ministersperform least well. ' (1986,
Vol. 1, para.5.23). There is insufficient spaceto analyse the full
range of theories and discussionsabout the nature of Cabinet
Government, and how far ministersare permittedand wish to become
involved in issues outsidetheir departmentalconcerns. (See, for
example, Hennessy,1986; and Burch, 1988). For the present study the
important considerationis the lack of consensusabout thesepoints and
the corresponding inconsistency in the extent to which ministers
originally appointedadvisersto perform this function. Furthermore,
some ministers who had not originally perceivedit asbeing a reason
came to seeit asbeing useful. It was an extremely difficult task
and adviserswith the ability to do it satisfactorilywere more likely
to be requestedto do it again.
Generally ministersfelt it was not an areain which they were well
served by officials. This was partly becauseoften the department did
not attempt to perform the function - limiting themselves, where
relevant, to a commentof 'no departmentalinterest'. Furthermore, even
when officials attemptedto do it, albeit reluctantly in the caseof one
permanent secretarydescribedby Bruce Headey(p. 118), ministers have
not always beenhappywith the results. Sometimesit is suggestedthat
it could be performedby civil servantsif more manpowerwas devoted to
it. Ted Heath suggestedto the Treasuryand Civil Service Committee
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that a private office shouldcontaincivil servantsto advise on nondepartmental cabinetitems (1986, Vol.2, p. 118). Commenting on this,
Douglas Hurd told the 1986RIPA conference,'I doubt somehow whether
this would in practice work very well' (p. 12). Hurd not only felt this
was somethinghis adviser, EdwardBickham, could be more effective at
doing becausehe would be more preparedthan civil servants to chance
his arm and he would be able to contact counterparts in other
departments, but Hurd alsobelievedthere was a gap created by the
demise of the CPRS. Heclo and Wildavsky claim that, 'Politicians'
collective deliberationson allocatingpublic money are rarely serviced
by their department'sofficials' (p. 141).
When considering whetherthere is a gap for special advisers to
fill, several features of our modelagain appear appropriate. The
permanentsecretaryat the Foreign Office, Sir Michael Palliser, thought
that there were economicallyliterate officials in the Foreign Office
who could haveprovided the type of briefing on economic matters for
David Owen that his adviser, Michael Stewart, supplied, but,
it wouldn't havebeenseenas an appropriatefunction for a
Foreign Serviceofficer and it would have causedproblems in
Whitehall becauseit would havebecomeknown Mr X was advising
the Foreign Secretaryon the Chancellorof the Exchequer's
paper ... it would havebeenseenaswholly inappropriate to
second a Treasuryprincipal to the Foreign Serviceto advise
the Foreign Secretary so that he could criticize the
Chancellor of the Exchequerin Cabinet- in that sense you
neededMichael Stewartto do it.
The themeof the advisersbeing better placedthan officials to do
this briefing becauseof their flexible, independentstatus was also
thought to be importantby advisersat the DHSS including Brian AbelSmith and Mike Hartley-Brewer. The latter thought that even if
officials had the combinationof intellectual ability and political
sensitivity and antennaeto do it, there is no way, 'to insulate them
enough to make them independent.' Officials providing such briefing
would be answerableto the permanentsecretary,who in turn would be
likely to adhereto the line agreedamongstthe permanentsecretaries.
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One more way in which officials might influence the role of
advisers in this field was suggestedby one adviserwho commented that
briefing as a result of contactingother advisersthrough the network,
'is the thing the civil servantswill alwaystry to get a special
adviser in to do becauseit is a wonderful way of neutralizing him if
they want to do that.' This is a minority opinion.
How far advisershavediscretionin performing this role can be
examined at severallevels. First, the choiceof topic is sometimes
left to the adviser. Second,for someof the generalpolitical advisers
it seemedto be somethingthey did if they had time. Despite strong
contrary opinionsit is often seenas somethingadvisersought to do.
In interview John Hunt felt this was a role for advisersto play and as
far back as 1977, he had told the ExpenditureCommittee:
Most Cabinet Ministers havenow got one or two political
advisers. This is very muchone of the functions they are
supposedto be there for ... departmentalMinisters seem to
have more and more pushed
on to their shoulders
...
dischargingtheir collective responsibilityand getting advice
on their colleagues'policies is a very real problem but this
is something where I think the introduction of political
advisersought to havehelped(1977, Vol. 2 (2), p. 758).
Many official reports andcommentatorsalso seethis as a major role for
advisers.(See, for example,Klein and Lewis, 1977; Mitchell, 1978;
Shepherd,1983; andall the proposalsoutlined in Chapter 10, Table 8).
How far advisersare expectedto perform this, and other functions,
leadsto the questionof whetherthere hasbeenany formalization of the
role of specialadvisers.

SECTION

,

EVOLUTIONAM FORMALIZATION.

There is a dichotomybetweenthe conceptof the gradual evolution of the
role of the specialadviserinto a fixed pattern which amounts to
formalization, and the idea of continuedevolution of the role which is
inherent in the modelof the adviserasan independentindividual whose
informality and flexibility are important. This sectionconcentrateson
how far the role has beenformalized. There are severallevels at which
this could occur: the individual adviser; advisers in a particular
department;and the systemof specialadvisers. Any formalization must
be largely a result of evolution becauseit hasbeendemonstrated that
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the introduction of adviserswas not well plannedin 1970,1974 or 1979.
The role of individual advisersfrequentlyevolved. But it may
reach a stagewherea minister and his departmenthavea clear picture
of the adviser's main dutieseventhough he retainsgreater flexibility
in his role than existsfor mostpermanentofficials. Several private
secretaries,including NormanWarner, who were appointedafter certain
advisers had beenin post for a while referredto the role of those
advisers as being clearly established. To someextent they had to
accommodateto it.
At the departmentallevel referencewas madeearlier to how several
advisers in departments, including the DHSS, the DoE, the Foreign
Office, and the Departmentof Employment, suggestedthat their task was
madeeasierbecausethe ground had alreadybeenbroken for them by their
predecessors. Despitesomeattempts,however, it was often difficult
for an incoming adviserto gain much benefit from discussing the role
with his predecessor- especiallyif he was attempting to establish
himself in a new department. Where an adviserhelpedin recruiting the
new adviser, and explaining the role, this was naturally more feasible;
and in several of thesecases, including David Cowling and John
had broken the
Whittingdale, incoming advisersfelt their predecessors
ground. David Cowling commented: 'I had the great benefit of following
not only Jack Straw but also David Lipsey and both of them are
formidable men who had carvedout a relationship with the departmentand
who gainedrespectin the department. I was very consciousthat I was
inheriting the good will that they hadcreated.' Cowling, who seemedto
retain this goodwill, illustrated how this would help in practice: 'the
principle had been acceptedto copy quite a few things to me, not
becauseI was David Cowling, but the specialadviser.'
At the DTI Whittingdale thoughthis 'predecessorshad beengood and
had got on well with officials. ' The adviser, Michael Dobbs, who
proposed him to the minister, and who in fact continuedto advise part
time, also provides an exampleof how goodwill can be passedon in a
departmentthrougha seriesof advisers. Dobbs's successorin his first
advisory position at the Departmentof Employment was Richard Ehrman
whose comments about the departmentbeing used to accommodating the
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adviserswere reportedearlier. Dobbs took over from Rob Shepherdabout
whom he said, 'Rob had brokena lot of the ground, so I felt no
resistanceat all in the department.'
Another circumstancewhich gives an adviser the opportunity to
benefit from examiningthe role of his predecessor,occurs when the
incoming adviser had beenthe relevantcentral office link with the
adviser. Lynda Rousestatedthat at the CRD she 'had alwaysworked with
the political adviser, making sure the messagewent to the backbenchers
and party publications.' Sheagreedthat the relationshipbetween the
minister and adviserwas important in helping to determinethe reactions
of officials, but, continued, 'I didn't know Nigel Lawson when I joined
and they [civil servants]were helpful and friendly right from the
start. I think I was much more helpedby the bridges that Michael
Portillo had built up.'
Where there were teamsof advisers,especiallyat the DHSS and the
Treasury, there was a somewhatgreaterneedto attempt to establish
formally eachindividual's responsibilitiesand when newcomers joined
the team, otherscould help orientatethem. Many of the DHSS advisers
paid tribute to Brian Abel-Smith's role in establishing both a
substantial place for advisers and a pattern of good working
relationships with officials. Paul Chapmanreferred to Abel-Smith's
position amongstthe advisersasbeing pivotal and commented:'I always
felt he got on with the permanentstaff extremely well and madea point
of doing that. ' In the Treasury since 1979there have consistentlybeen
three advisersdespitenine changesin personnelup to the election of
1987. Immediatelyit was known that a vacancywas going to arise steps
were taken to fill it and maintainthe teamat full strength. Within
this framework, however, there was someflexibility with the major
topics on which eachwould concentratebeing partially reallocated
depending on the strengthsof the new recruit. This flexibility was
illustrated when Howard Daviescompletedhis 15 months secondment; he

was replacedby anotherspecialadviserandeventuallya departmental
speechwriter.
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Some advisers, including David Stephen, made an important
distinction betweenconditionsof work and preciserole. They thought
ground rules had beenestablishedin the departmentin terms of access
to papers and treatmentto expectfrom officials. However, the role
their minister wishedthem to play was not necessarilythe sameas that
performed for his predecessor.Sometimesincoming advisersdeliberately
wished to establisha different pattern of working from that of their
predecessors. The role that David Hill had pre-determined with Roy
Hattersleymeantthat Hill wantedto be much more involved in discussing
and examining the policies of the DPCP than his predecessorin the
political adviser's slot, John Lyttle. Hill believed, however, that,
'after the initial period of fencing and working out everyone's
position, my role in the departmentwas properly understoodand worked
pretty well. ' The functionsperformedfor Ted Short by Vicky Kidd did
not really relateto his role asLeaderof the Housebut were associated
with his responsibilities as Lord President of the Council. When
Michael Foot succeeded,muchof ElizabethThomas'swork for him was
linked, by contrast,with the duties of Leader of the House.
Many departmentsoperatedfor a while without advisers,and someof
thosewho camein after a break reportedthat ground gainedby previous
advisers had beenlost. Despitethere being a successionof special
advisers to foreign secretariesin the 1970s,Lord Carrington did not
appoint one and Colin Moynihan only briefly assistedFrancis (now Lord)
Pym, in a very part time capacityand was not formally a special
adviser. Appointed to serveGeoffrey Howe in 1983, John Houston felt he
was breaking new territory: 'there weren't any tracks there when I
arrived. ' He suggestedit was amazinghow many officials, 'cooperated
to a reasonableextent, given that no one in any seriousway attempted
to organize them to cooperate... Nothing is ever done officially to
slot the special adviser into the system.' A principal private
secretarywho serveda minister who had an adviserand his successorwho
did not, thought being a specialadviserwas, 'like rowing a boat
through weeds;the momentyou stop rowing, the boat stops. You have to
makeall the rowing yourself.' A contrastemergesbetweenthe sometimes
ephemeral nature of the advisory role and the great continuity and
momentumof the department. Whilst officials in many departments found
advisers useful, this did not meanthat the role had become such an
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integral part of the departmentthat adviserswere particularly missed
when new ministerscamein without them, especiallyin 1979. There
were, however, exceptions. In the DHSS, for instance, advisers had
perhaps consolidatedtheir position to a greaterextent. Roger Dyson
agreed that officials had their perceptionof the role and coming in
part time he could not be, 'an academic adviser in the Abel-Smith
model.' The Chairmanof the SupplementaryBenefits Commission, David
Donnison, writing about his first meetingwith the new minister, Patrick
Jenkin, said,
I also intendedto pressgently for the appointmentof special
advisersto replacethosewe hadjust lost. Tony Lynes, David
Metcalf and Malcolm Deanof the Guardian (along with Brian
Abel-Smith ... ) hadtogetherbeenone of the best teams of
advisers assembledto adviseany Minister. For the future I
had my eye on two excellentpeoplewho had been working on
social policies in the ConservativeCentral Office, and was
pleased to find that both permanent secretariesseemedto
supportthe idea (p. 163).
Although Dyson's successorat the DHSS, Nicholas True, was full time
even he felt that working on his own it was hard to meet all the
expectations that some civil servants had about special advisers
providing political inputs to policy developmentsand forward-looking
strategic analysis, in addition to performing the presentation and
political liaison roles.
The reduced role of advisersin 1979 is also relevant when
examining the degreeof formalization in the system. It inevitably
interrupted the processof formalization becauseMrs Thatcher, and some
colleagues, deliberatelywantedto make a break with what they saw as
excessive use of political appointeesunderLabour. By the late 1970s
it had seemedasif the system was becomingwidely accepted and some
ministers, including Bill Rodgers, believed that development and
formalization would continueto a greaterextentthan has occurred. The
current of opinion at that time is capturedin the following quotations:
We believe that the installation of special advisers should
become an acceptedfeatureof administration. Only with the
assistanceof such adviserscan Ministers maintain a level of
political control over an increasing Civil Service
(ExpenditureCommittee, 1977, Vol. 1, pars 148).
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There is now little doubt that specialadvisersare here to
stay. They haveprovedto be a lasting featureof successive
administrations,a real assistanceto many cabinet ministers,
and broadly acceptableto the career Civil Service.
Nevertheless,the specialadvisersystemis still evolving and
its potential has not yet been fully developed (Roger
Darlington, The Times 18 July 1978).
this system has gainedwidespreadacceptance (Brown and
Steel, 1979, p.330 - seealso their commentquotedin Chapter
3, SectionD).
Following the partial hiatusin 1979, however,and increasingly in
recent years, the systemhasbecomeformalized in a number of ways.
First, there is a greaterdegreeof similarity, although by no means
uniformity, in terms of the advisers'ageand functions. Second, there
are advisersin more departmentsthan ever before and it is very much
regarded as standard practicefor a minister to have one. In 1987
political advisers arrived for the first time in the Scottish Office
and, if Peter Levene's six month spell as personal adviser is
discounted, the DefenceDepartment. The position has now been reached
where severalpublications (see,for exampleMiller, 1987; and Vacher's,
February, 1987) statethat in somedepartmentsin which there is no
specialadviser, the post is 'vacant'. Third, the current advisershave
been specifically selectedto fill a slot, asopposedto being people
taken in almost automaticallyby an incoming governmentin the manner
analysed earlier. Fourth, new ministers have increasingly had
experience of servingasjunior ministersin departmentswith advisers
and so know what to expect from them. Similarly many civil servants
have now hadconsiderableexperienceof working with special advisers
and havedevelopedexpectationsof what the role entails. A permanent
secretarytoday would not have the sameexcusefor misunderstandingthe
natureof the role as did the permanentsecretaryat the DoE in 1974who
thought David Lipsey shouldbe placed in the department's Central
Planning Unit.

The evidencefrom DavidHowell is very importantin the discussion
abouttheevolutionof the roleandthe diverseforcesat work. He was
keenon the development
but by the
of advisersin the 1970-74Government
mid 1970swasawareof a contraryfeeling:
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which perhaps explained why I didn't have a candidate lined up
in '79, and that was that we shouldn't go too much overboard
on political advisers. The best personal advisers to senior
ministers were junior ministers and PPSs in Parliament and
there was a mythology that Ted Heath had fallen because he had
got out of touch with the Parliamentary party and had relied
too much on special advisers and civil servants and so on; and
therefore ministers should be careful to make sure that their
first line of personal advice was people rooted in the
Parliamentary party.

In 1979he was appointedasSecretaryof Statefor a department,Energy,
which he had not beenshadowingand therefore,as we have seen, despite
his sceptismaboutthe needfor an adviserhe acceptedthe offer of the
service of Michael Portillo, the CRD desk officer on Energy, who had
originally been destinedfor the Policy Unit. Howell felt that Mrs
Thatcher's attitude towardsadviserschanged:'She started very much
with a view that adviserswere supernumerarybut obviously with the
growth of the Policy Unit shebeganto realize that they had their
uses.' He had a similar changeof opinion: 'We came in thinking there
wasn't a role for advisersand then we found there was, and they
helped'. Furthermore, he is now one of the former ministers who,
reflecting on the work of advisers,are able to specify the role and
assesshow well their own performedthe varioustasks. He thought that
in addition to playing the aide/confidantor 'soulmate' role, and being
proactive in somepolicy formulation, Portillo,
performed the modernroles of researchadviser excellently: he
wrote speechesfor me; he liaised with the party, the party
machine,and the researchdepartment;he kept me in touch with
the bushgossipand messages
of Whitehall and Westminster; he
knew what was going on from his talks with other personal
advisers around Whitehall; he knew what was going on in the
department. Altogetherhe performedadmirably.
The reduction in numbersin 1979did not prevent observers from
continuing to think of the systemasestablished. In 1981 Heclo and
Wildavsky wrote, 'By now the systemof specialadvisers has probably
become a permanentfeatureof British government.' (p.xlix). Since
then, the developmentsmentionedabovejustify the references, for
example, by Rose(1986, p. 50) and Drewry and Butcher (1988, p. 50), to
acceptanceof the system. Butler (1986, p. 20) observed that, 'an
individual specialadviser'sposition may be tenuous,but the future for
specialadvisersas a speciesis assured,underany government. Indeed,
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the immediateprospectis for their numberto grow gradually, and with
it for their role to develop'. In keepingwith this, the Treasury and
Civil Service Committeereported: 'none of our witnesseswas against
Ministers having their own advisersaroundthem.' (1986, Vol. 1, para.
5.21). Widespread, though not universal, agreement with this was
revealedby the presentstudy. As the Committeealso emphasized, there
is supportfor a further expansionof the system. Before scrutinizing
plans for reform, the effectivenessof the current system must be
examined.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: ASPECTSOF EFFECTIVENESSAND LIMITATIONS.
A major problem facing specialadvisersis the lack of a
defined role. Without sucha description it is hard to
measureyour achievementor to know what is expected of you
(Butler, p. 17).
Assessingthe effectivenessof ministerial advisers is not
easy. No straightforwardmeasuresof effectivenessexist ...
As experienced administrators and politicians know,
practically anything can, after a fashion, be made to work.
Preferencesfor one setof arrangementsrather than another
cannot, however, be groundedeasily in an understandingof
what is betterand what is worse. In the caseof ministerial
staff this is mademore difficult by the diversity of their
work (R. Smith, 1977,p. 133 and 154-5).
Given the great difficulty in measuringeffectiveness,it is appropriate
to examineseparatelya rangeof specificcontributory items. This is
being left to the last
attempted in Chapters8-9, a final assessment
chapter. In makingjudgmentsit will be necessaryto rely mostly on
opinions, in particular, thoseof ministers, advisers and officials.
Some outsidecommentatorsalso havevalid views and there are several
more independentindicators, including how far ministerswho used an
adviser subsequentlyappointedanother. Probably the opinions of the
ministers are the mostimportant becausearguably the major aspect of
effectivenessis how far advisers satisfactorily perform what the
ministers wished themto do. This is an important questionin several
of the substantiveareasto be consideredin this chapter:
A)
B)

Activities in which adviserswere effective overall
Effectivenessof the network

C)
D)

by advisers
Limitationsexperienced
Ambivalentattitudesadoptedtowardsadvisersby politicians
difficulties
andconsequent

E)

Responseof the civil service
Ambiguities in the role

F)
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SECTION j ACTIVITIES I
OVERALL.

WHICH ADVISERS

EFFECTIVE

Generalizations are difficult becauseministersand departmentsvaried
in their requirementsand advisersin their abilities. Evidence from
question 17) of the questionnaireis set out as Table 5 showing
advisers' opinions as to the extentto which their contribution was
effective in various aspects of their work. Despite additional
evidencebeing available from interviews, interpretationof the figures
is particularly awkward for variousreasons. Fewestadvisers answered
this and they regardedit as the hardestto answer. Generally the
answers mirror thosegiven to questionsabout time spent on various
functions. Someadvisersspecifically gave this as the answer to the
question. This means, of course,that where an activity was an
insignificant part of an adviser'sactivities, the answers somewhat
misleadingly suggesthe was ineffective in this field. Nevertheless,
ministers and civil servants broadly agreed with the pattern of
effectiveness suggestedby the table. On some questions no further
discussion has beenaddedto the evidencefrom the table, especially
where the answers are very much in line with the time spent on the
activity.
Examining submissionsOd commenting. Answersto question 17a) showed
the most significant differencesbetweentime spentand effectiveness.
This probably partly reflectsthe natureof the 'sieve' role in which
advisers had to read a great deal of material but only a small
proportion contained anything on which they would want to brief the
minister. Referencehasbeenmadeto the way in which many ministers
greatly appreciatedhaving a politically committed and awareloyalist to
check through submissions, evenif they found nothing on which to
comment. A few officials, especiallyin departmentsdealing with local
politicians, suggestedthat they were relieved to know that their
materialwas passingthrough the handsof a politically astute adviser.
The difference between advisers'perceptionsof time spent, and of
degreeof effectiveness,possibly also reflects the time advisersneeded
to spendon reading submissionsin order to carry out other functions
including speechwriting, discussingissueswith the minister, attending
meetings,and helpingwith presentation.
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TABLE 5: Questionnaire Findings on Effectiveness
- Percentage
Response.
in the following
17) To what extent was your contribution
effective
job:
aspects of your

a)

22

23

30

11

14

Preparing

13

23

22

22

20

5

18

12

27

38

6

21

19

22

32

13

25

29

14

19

8

25

19

19

29

10

12

ably

Modere Slightly
tely

Insignif
icantly

ministers on them.
reports

on policy

on departmental matters.
c)

Consider

Examining papers on
departmental matters
going to ministers
and

briefing
b)

Substan
tially

Chasing up the progress on

implementing the minister's
wishes.
d)

Preparing

briefs

on non-

departmental agenda items
for cabinet and cabinet
committees.
e)

Attending

meetings of

all the politicians
within the department.
f)

Corresponding

with

party MPs, officials
etc.
/attending party meetings/
receiving party deputations
on behalf

of the minister.

g)

Speech writing.

34

24

20

h)

Discussing issues with the
minister.

32

36

19

13

19

20

14

34

23

18

45

23

7

14

i)

Attending
receiving

meetings, visits,
deputations -

other than party ones with the minister on
departmental business.
j)

85

Attending departmental
meetings and receiving
deputations - other than
party ones - on behalf of

86

the minister.
k)

Advising the minister
on
(and involvement with) the

presentation of departmental policy end the
minister's general views.

29

27

Cabinet Briefing. The responsesto question 17d), briefing on nondepartmental issues for Cabinet,are difficult to analyse. We saw
earlier the very strongvariations in the extentto which respondents
felt that advisersshouldbrief ministerson non-departmentalCabinet
agenda items. They were mirrored in equally strong divergences of
opinion (among ministers, officials, and advisers) about how far
advisers effectively performed this function. Some, but not all,
members of Labour's Cabinetwho were interviewedagreed with Bernard
Donoughue'sassessment
that:
The introduction in 1974of specialadvisersworking to most
Cabinet Ministers was another factor which improved the
quality of Cabinet debateat that time. It meant that,
ideally, Ministers receivedhigh-level briefing on fields of
policy outside those for which they were departmentally
responsible. This was especiallyimportant during the IMF
crisis, when it was striking how wide a range of Ministers
contributed to the discussions. This applied to the younger
onesin particular - Hattersley, Owen, Rodgersand Williams but includedmore seniorspokesmensuchas Lever, Shore, Benn,
and of coursethe Prime Minister, all of whom were assistedby
qualified economistsas specialadvisers. By contrast, the
majority of Ministers who were often silent - including Peart,
Mason and Mellish - had in general chosen not to employ
special advisers. Indeed, the regular civil servantsin the
Private Office often mentionedto me that the introduction of
a system of specialadvisershadalteredthe way in which
Cabinet worked by producing much wider debate.... Having
economics policy analysts as special advisers certainly
enabled non-economistMinisters to participate intelligently
in Cabineteconomicdiscussions(1987, pp.36-7).
Severalintervieweesthoughtthe crucial factor was the propensity
of ministersto participatein Cabinetdiscussions,and that those who
were most likely to want to contributewere often also, therefore, the
ministers who could seethe desirability of appointing advisers. This
highlights the difficulty of isolating particular factors. Whilst
believing his own adviserhad beenof assistance,as had several other
special adviserswho were economists,one minister suggestedthat some
of his colleaguescould havebeengiven Keynesasadviser and still not
had anything useful to say. PeterShorecommented,'I do think the
economic backgroundministerial experienceis crucial if you are going
to have any influence in Cabinetand that to have your backgroundtopped

economicadvice,by goodpeopledrawnin from academia
up by independent
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or elsewhere,was also very helpful.'
In general, just asbriefing for Cabinetwas a more important
reasonfor the appointmentof Labour advisersthan Tories, and occupied
more of their time, so too were 1974-9adviserssomewhatmore likely to
think they were effective in the role. Overall, however,the patterns
of ratings for effectivenesswere similar to thosefor time spent, but
rather lower. Various civil servantsquestionedthe value of the
advisers' activities in this field. Most adviserswho were performing
the role asone of manyactivities, felt limitations on time precluded
them from providing the servicethey would have wished. Furthermore,
they were frequentlytrying to commenton issuesabout which they did
not necessarilyknow a great deal.
Ministers often seemedpleasedwith the briefings from advisers.
David Ennals, for example, found it 'very valuable'. One of his
advisers,Mike Hartley-Brewer, knew that Ennalswas using his briefs as
the basis of his contributions,becausethey were the ones that bore
Ennals's annotations. Even whereadvisershad not beenrecruited with
this function primarily in mind, ministerswere often pleasedwith the
assistancethey received. Where it hadbeena major reason ministers
were usually very satisfiedwith the servicesprovided by the likes of
Michael Ards, Francis Cripps, RogerLiddle, Vicky Kidd, David Metcalf,
Maurice Peston, Adam Ridley and Michael Stewart. The flavour of the
argument is well captured by David Owen's comment, in his recent
autobiography,on the activities of Michael Stewart: 'As a result I felt
more confidentparticipatingin domesticCabinet economic discussions
and in the mysteriesof internationaleconomics. His expertisewas also
very helpful when the Prime Minister invited me to the seminars he
chaired on monetaryand exchangeratepolicy' (1991, p.263). Stan Orme
thought Metcalf was 'invaluable' and said, without him he 'wouldn't have
been so well briefed for Cabinet.' He felt that 'initially the Civil
Servicedidn't like him becauseit was an extra political animal as they
saw it; not a Brian Abel-Smith, but somebodywho was coming in to brief
me about other aspectsof Government.' Eventually they acquiesced and
Orme was convincedthat Metcalf, with his Labour Party background, could
provide the briefing he wantedin a way officials could not. On
various issues Orme was thoughtto have made an impact in Cabinet
discussions (see,for example,Barnett, 1982). Likewise, Peter Shore
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commented:
Civil servants don't find it all that easy to contribute
independently on issues before Cabinetwhich are not the
issues of the department. It doesn't meanto say you won't
get a departmentalbrief on a submission from another
department but it tendsto be one that hasbeencleared with
that minister's office - unlessthere is a real dispute and
they are on one sideof it and you are on the other. So I
think the independenteconomicadviseris a very valuable
personto have ... [As departmentaleconomicadviser] we had
Professor Peacock, and I had no difficulties with him in
personalrelationshipsand he wrote somevery good pieces,but
in no way was he in tune with my priorities and thinking.
Similar points were madeby other ministers, including Tony Benn at
the Departmentof Industry andRoy Hattersleyat DPCP. This illustrates
two themes. First, the interest shown by ministers from economic
departmentsin having their own adviserto brief on economic issues
wider than their departmentalconcerns is compatible with Burch's
conceptof there being domainsof interest in mattersreaching Cabinet.
Rather than dividing issuesinto departmentaland non-departmental,
Burch (1988) thought it more appropriateto stressthat there were areas
of interestand ministersmight contributeparticularly in an area such
aseconomicpolicy. Second,and broadeningthe argument, someadvisers,
such as Roger Liddle, were able to provide a generalist briefing
because,according to Bill Rodgers,they could cross boundaries and
discussissuesmore widely.
Ministers often valued the assistancethey receivedfrom advisers.
They did so even if, like Bill Rodgers,they would have welcomed more,
and despiteevidencethat many adviserswere aware of the limitations of
such a serviceand officials sometimesdoubtedits efficacy. Both of
Edward Bickham's ministersfor instance,Jim Prior and Douglas Hurd,
valued the help provided by advisersand Bickham believed he could
perform the function in 'a more structuredand political way' than
officials, eventhough he was acutelyawareof the limitations imposed
by often receiving papersfrom other departmentswhich were not only
late but also lacking in detailedinformation. The views of several
advisers are well illustrated by the opinion of Lynda Rousethat Nigel
Lawson valued her contribution, relative to that of the officials, more
highly in this field than he did on most departmental policy matters.
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An analysisof the role of ministersin Cabinethelpsexplain their
positive attitude. In Cabinet,ministersare expected,often briefly, to
look at issuesfrom a wider political perspective. Here somebody who
has a political backgroundand sharestheir values, has an independent
status,is 'in the know', and hassometime available,can be invaluable
in pointing out to ministersfactors they may wish to consider and
raise. Shirley Williams usedboth her advisers,John Lyttle and Joan
Mitchell, at DPCP for this. Shetold the RIPA (1980, p. 100) it was,
'one of the important functionsof political advisers' and in answer to
a questionabout having advicedirect from the departmentconcerned,she
demonstratedthe minister's role:
no, I would very much not want to have that. You may say,
becauseyou'd rather live in a statewhereignoranceis bliss;
I don't think so. I think in many ways one of the most
effective roles of Cabinetis in a senseto put the detail of
knowledge and understandingand commitmentof a Minister to
his department and his department'sbrief to the test; you
cannoteasilyput it to the test if you yourself are no longer
expressingthe commonreactionof other peoplein Parliament,
or of the public, but are beginningto be coloured by the
department'sown setof attitudes(1980, p. 100).
In explaining why he originally appointedAdam Ridley, Lord Gowrie
statedthat one reasonwas,
I wantedto talk over the policy aspectsI was unhappy about
because I wantedto arguemy casewell in cabinet when need
in Cabinetwithout portfolio I could take a
I
be
... as was
fairly
wide ranging position on things. I wasn't shooting the
department'sline
It was betterto have had Adam because
...
I don't think a Treasury civil servant, other than on
financial aspects, would havebeenso happyadvising me on
things outsidemy responsibility.
Furthermore, althoughGowrie was also pleasedto discussCabinet issues
with his private office, they clearly could not devotethe time to it

thatan advisercould. Therefore,he believed,Ridley, 'savedan awful
lot of time of my sweatingup the stuff I didn't know; I knew it from
like anybodywould, but he
thepapersandordinarypolitical discussion
gave me insightsthatwouldhavetakenmedaysto cover. It was like
having a very clued-uppersonhelpingyou with your homework,and that
wasa greathelp.'
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The DHSS under Labour standsout as the departmentwhere ministers
and advisersalike referred to the importanceof assistanceprovided by
advisers both during the public expenditure round, and when the
department'sown paperswere being preparedfor Cabinet. There was felt
to be somecivil serviceuneaseat the attentionpaid to the advisers'
briefings. Norman Warner, however, acknowledged they were,
'particularly effective at public expenditure time' because, for
instance,they appreciatedthe needto be brief and to add the political
dimension - such as lists of new hospitalsto be built in Cabinet
ministers' constituencies,which would be threatened by DHSS cuts.
Barbara Castlewrote in her jimmyentry for 9 January1975, 'one more
victory to make the departmentwonder how I get away with it. (In fact,
I do it by very careful preparationand very well-prepared arguments.
This is wherepeople like Brian A-S, and Tony Lynes are so valuable)'
(1980). Perhapseven more revealingis the entry for 4 March 1976which
describes a Cabinetdiscussionon a non-departmentalpaper shehad not
had time to readand on which, becauseJack Straw was indisposed, she
had no briefing: 'This, as Norman [Warner] agreed, was just another
example of how indispensablepolitical advisersare. Jack would have
read it all and alertedme to any dangers'(1980).
Prayer meetings. For question 17e), the slightly higher figures for
effectiveness than time spentreflect the consideration that advisers
are often actively involved in meetingsof all politicians in the
department, but they do not occupy much time. The importanceof these
meetings in the Treasury,and the advisers' role in them, was stressed

by Campbell(1983) but rather dismissedby Bruce-Gardyne(1986).
SeveralotherTreasuryministersthoughtthe meetings,andtheadvisers'
Chancellor
role, werevaluable. Describingthesemeetingsin the
,
programme,PeterCroppersaid:
it washelpfulfor theChancellor,who, afterall, had known
us as peoplefor aboutfive years,to havearound him some
people whohadgrowninto his wayof lookingat things, who
hadsharedcommonpastexperiences,
whocouldsharea few injokes
It wasreally all a matterof the Chancellorbeing
idea
being
to...
try

able
out an
or a reactionon us, and
either
encouragedor discouragedif we cameout with the same answer
as he did (Young and Sloman, 1984,p. 38).
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Given the determination of the Chancellornot to have civil servants
present, the involvementof adviserswas importantin allowing the meetings
to be serviced. Severaladvisersrecognizedthere was somecivil service
fretting about this but, accordingto David Willetts, the attendanceof
advisers and not officials gavethe former, 'extra authority' and meant
officials neededto contactthem:
Part of this operatingin Whitehall is being able to trade
information and influence, and if you know things that, maybe,
would be useful to other people, it puts you in a much
stronger position for getting information out of them ...
becausespecialadvisershad beenpresentat thesediscussions
and had known what had goneon, and the minutes were quite
rightly brief to the point of being elliptical ... they had
information that might be of help to officials in preparing
their advice.
liaison. The higher figures for effectivenesson party liaison
than for time spent, question 17f), reflect an opinion shared by
ministers and officials. A range of points were made in this
connection. Ministers who played an active role in party affairs much

Ply

appreciated having somebody near to them who was both more
knowledgeable, and less restricted,than civil servantscould be in
this field. The role of adviserson Labour's NEC committees and subcommittees was particularly valued,as shownby the action that was
taken to allow this activity to continuewhen it was felt to be under
threat of a ban from Harold Wilson. Barbara Castle wrote to him
pleading that they be allowed to continueattending. Liaison with the
party machinewas valued by ministersactive within the NEC and some,
including Bill Rodgers,who were not. Rodgerssaid of Roger Liddle's
role: 'I was detachedfrom the NEC Transportgroup and he helpedin this
field which I would haveneglected. He encouragedme to write reports
and he representedme at meetingsof the NEC group. He did the party
briefing on the White Paper.'

A numberof Tory ministersequallyvaluedthe party liaison role
playedby advisers- especiallythosewho hadcomefrom theCRD. Again
comefrom ministersconcerned
goodexamples
with localgovernment,with
PatrickJenkinsayingof ChristopherMockler: 'he wasable to be a very
groupsin Labourheldcouncilswho felt
useful channel for Conservative
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that they could havea direct ear to the Secretaryof Stateby ringing
up Christopher and saying, "look, Patrick might like to know what is
happeninghere."' Similarly William Waldegravethought that PeterDavis
was a highly effective sourceof political intelligence:
he was a provider of materialof a tough, political kind that
the civil servicecan't gatherand won't gather ... not policy
adviceas suchbut saying, 'this is what is actually happening
out here, this is what the Labour Party are going to do and
this is their weak-spot,and this is what is worrying our
councillors'. And he did that extremelywell.
Some ministersthoughtthat officials valued the advisers' liaison
work and certain civil servantsemphasizedthis as the prime role of the
advisers.
5gCCQhwriting. The evenhigher figures for effectiveness, than for
time spent, on speechwriting, question 17g), reflect the widespread
feeling of ministers, officials, and advisers,that speech writing is
somethingthat many civil servantsare not particularly good at, and/or
are pleasedto leaveto adviserswherepossible. The differencebetween
the parties when examiningtime spentis accentuatedwhen analysing
effectiveness. Of the 1979-87Tory advisers55 per cent believed their
contribution as speechwriters to be substantially effective - five
times the Labour number. Many of the youngerTory political advisers
were valued aseffective speechwriters by ministers and officials.
They included: EdwardBickham, Richard Ehrman, Robin Harris, Michael
Portillo, Rob Shepherd,StephenSherbourne,Andrew Tyrie, Nicholas True,
and John Whittingdale. The importanceof speechwriting in the work of
Home Office advisershasbeenhighlighted and Brian Cubbon thought that
most officials in the departmentwould identify it as an area where they
valued the role of advisers.
Examplesfrom the DHSS demonstratewhy adviserswere often thought
to be effective in this field in ways officials sometimes found
difficult to match. Mike Hartley-Brewer was thought by advisers,
ministers, and officials alike, to havea dynamicwriting style. Malcolm
Dean illustrated the point by sayingthat Hartley-Brewerwould be very
good at putting lines into a parliamentarystatementto get cheers from

the backbenches
andthusbolsterthe minister. In addition to being
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more free to draft party speeches
and the political elements of other
speeches,someadvisersrecognizedthe potential significanceof speech
writing. Whilst, accordingto oneprivate secretary, civil servants
often viewed speechwriting as, 'a bit naff, adviserssaw the possible
importance of speeches
in settingthe agendain certain fields. Brian
Abel-Smith's role hasbeendescribedand the DHSS permanent secretary,
Patrick Nairne, provided theexampleof a major speechmadeby Barbara
Castle at Oxford. For its drafting, 'insteadof turning to boring old
civil servants,she had Abel-Smithand he was able to do it from a much
richer vein of knowledge and understanding,plus, of course, his
political sympathieswith the Labour Party.' Dependingon the nature of
the speech,Nairne was often keenfor it to be drafted by Abel-Smith or
Jack Straw. Abel-Smith himself commented,'the outside academic may
well find he has a skill in drafting which is of more use to the
27 June 1980).
politician than that of the averagecivil servant'(,
Lord Home describedvariousaspectsof the value of Miles Hudson's
role in this field. Civil servantswere glad that usually for speeches
with political content, 'they could shift quite a lot of the
responsibility for the speechon to him.' In particular, for
parliamentary speecheson Rhodesia,'he was quite good at spotting
points that might be madeor points that might be omitted'. Home faced
the same,potentially explosive, issueat party conferencesand Hudson
was, 'a useful fellow in thosecircumstances'.
There are, naturally, exceptionsboth ways. Someadviserswere not
as effective at speechwriting asthe minister had hoped; and a former
civil servant, Howard Davies, becamea specialadviser and was most
adept at speech writing. Furthermore, there were occasions when
officials felt advisershad mademistakesby interfering and trying to
alter policy through the content of speeches.

Discussingissues.This wasthe activityin which, overall, advisers
consideredtheir contributionto be mosteffective. Strikinglyfew of
the advisers(10per cent)answeringthis questionthought they were
only slightlyor insignificantlyeffective. Thevarious circumstances
already identifiedwhenministersparticularlyvaluedthe presenceof
advisersto discussthings,included: travelling and/or breaksin
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negotiationsabroad; makingdecisionsfollowing meetingswith officials;
and reviewing or previewing the eventsof the day. Often, though not
always, this involved playing an aide/confidantrole. Various features
of the model of advisershelp explain their effectivenessin this.
Theseinclude: being inside the Official SecretsAct, available, and the
minister's 'own person'; and often possessingpolitical knowledge and
sympathy and/or subjectexpertise. Thus in the words of Keith Joseph,
David Young was a 'friend and confidantand a sharerof perceptions' who
was highly effective in two ways: 'one, he was a strong ally in
private discussionon policy. ' A similar picture often emergesin Tony
Benn's Diaries. StanOrme explainedthat as somebodywho left schoolat
14, without therefore an academic background, he valued Metcalf's
ability to clarify issueson paper. In addition, Orme, who was widely
admired by advisersand officials, shrewdly observed,'I am the sort of
person who really neededoral briefings and we would sit down in the
eveningsand havea think andgo through it. '
Despite these and other important examples described earlier,
doubts remainabout how far ministersoverall saw this asthe area in
which advisers' contributionswere most effective. It is easier to
accept that it seemedto advisersto be of greatest significance than
that most ministers thought this. In at least one case a junior
minister thought the Secretaryof Stateusedthe adviserasa punch bag,
and yet that adviserhadthought his effectivenessin discussing issues
was considerable. A partial explanationof the general discrepancy
perhapscomesin the commentof anotheradviser, Brendon Sewill:
it was more a questionof him finding our discussionsof value
when he was makinga decisionrather than him taking notice of
what I said. A senor minister is in a lonely position: he
cannot try out his ideasor his argumentson his officials,

for fear of ridiculeif theyarenot well founded. So he
needsan intelligent and well informed, but loyal and
discreet,sparringpartner.

Depart,mental mrAjUL The lower ratings for effectiveness than time
spenton attendingdepartmentalmeetingsand visits with the minister,
question 17i), has severalprobablecauses. First, the frequency with
which many advisersfound themselvesattendingmeetingson issues with
which they had little previous involvement, and the concernexpressedby
severalnot to lose credibility by commentingin areaswhere they lacked
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knowledge. Second,the extentto which their presenceat such meetings
was relatedto performing other functions. Third, the comparativelylow
status special advisersoften felt they had when attending meetings
between the minister and seniorofficials, and the varying degrees to
which advisersfelt comfortableaboutparticipatingin such meetings.
Tony Lynes recalled he was not good at large meetingswhen the Secretary
of Stateturned to him and said: '"Tony, what do you think?" That is not
the way I find it possibleto give usefuladvice. I want to go away and
think about it and preferably put it on paper; so that wasn't a role
that I found I was really good at, whereas Brian Abel-Smith, for
example,was superbat it. '
minister's behalf. The low figures for effectiveness
again reflectsthe belief that much of the liaison between officials
and advisersis conductedinformally, and not specifically on behalf of
ministers. The effectivenessof someadvisers at doing this was
demonstratedby the way this function became increasingly important.
Activities Q It

This supports the comments from William Plowden:
The major contributionsof policy advisers, specialist or
political, are that they help ministersto feel less isolated
in the face of their departments;and that they can greatly
extend the number and range of the minister's effective
contacts with his department. They thus improve
communication in both directions and, I believe, ministerial
effectiveness(1985, p.534).
The effectivenessof someadvisersin liaising on behalf of their
minister with outside groupswas also analysed earlier. Although
advisers could be very effective at this it was an activity engaged in
regularly by only a minority. Someministersappreciatedthe ability of
advisers sometimesto crossboundariesin ways that would be difficult
for others. On one occasiona minister was able to usean adviser to
arrange pressure from a union againsta project which he no longer
wished to go aheadwith on a matterof principle. There were demands
from other departmentsto proceedwith the project; he wantedto be able
to say to ministersthat they could not becauseof the union reaction.

He felt he couldnot havearrangedtheunionpressurehimselfor asked
junior ministersor civil servantsto do it. The importanceattachedby
Jim Prior to receivingadvicefrom a rangeof people, not only on
industrial relationsbut theeconomyandindustrygenerally, has been
258

noted and, without advisers,he, 'certainly wouldn't havebeenable to
keep as close a contact with outsiders.' According to William
Waldegrave one of an adviser'smost important functions is to act as a
representative, 'who can go and talk to the pressure groups and the
outside policy groupsand who can be trustedas your eyesand ears ...
David [Coleman] wasgood at going out and you could send him off to
placesand peoplewould take him seriouslybecausehe was a heavy weight
character.' Both Prior andWaldegravesuggestedthat it would havebeen
difficult to haveusedofficials in the way they usedspecial advisers
as secretariesto their informal advisory groups.
Presentation.The answersto question17k) correlatewell with the high
level of effectivenessat speechwriting and the extent to which
presentational work was an important useof advisers' time and a major
reason for appointment. The Tory adviserswere even more inclined to
believe their contribution was effective. Whereasa quarter of Labour
advisers answering this questionfelt their contribution had been
insignificantly effective (and only eight per cent said it had taken an
insignificant amount of time), noneof the Tory advisers gave this
reply. Tory ministers, for exampleNorman Fowler, often felt the
adviser's contributions had been very effective and in Fowler's
autobiography (1991) most of the referencesto his adviser's role
concern speechwriting or other aspectsof presentation. His adviser
for many years,NicholasTrue, observed:'one of my long running efforts
that did eventuallyprove successfulwas to createa new information
system on the hospital building programmewhereby politically useful
information was brought up to ministersin advanceon a regular basis.'
Somedoubtswere expressedby officials about the degreeof involvement
and/or the effectivenessof advisersin pressactivities. Illustrating
the latter point an official from a different department alleged that
advisers, 'talked to the pressincessantly,much too much, and gave away
a lot of stuff - someof it intentional, someof it unintentional.'

General. The effectiveness
of advisersin thesevarious activities
partially depends
upontheability of ministersfirstly to decide the
functionstheywish to be carriedout by advisers,andsecond,to select
an advisercapableof performingthosefunctions.A few adviserswere
critical of the minister'sability to usethemproperly.
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SECTION $1 EFFECTIVENESSDE

ADVISERS' NETWORK.

The developmentof an effective network amongstpolitical secretariesis
a key featureof the Finnish equivalentto the UK system of special
advisers. This is demonstratedin the title of Westerlund's book
describingtheir role: Political Secretariesin Finnish Departments:J
Informal CoordinationMechanismgf ft Cabinet (1990). The UK, however,
did not seethe emergenceof a network as effective as some people in
both parties had hoped. Analysis of the interviews revealsfewer than a
third of advisersthoughtthat overall the network was effective, but it
is difficult to be precisebecausethe diverseaspectsof the network
were variously viewed. Generally,bilateral contact,or (especially in
the caseof Labour) small group meetings,were seenas more effective
than meetingsof all advisers.
Attempts were madeto organizea network of advisersin eachof the
three periods since 1970,but the regular meetingsof Tory advisers in
the early 1970sonly beganas the crisis winter of 1973-4developed:'As
things became desperate,the newcomersbeganto join the veterans in
occasional meetingsin my office at NumberTen. It would be absurd to
claim that we mademuch difference, thoughwe would have mademuch more
difference if as a teamwe hadcome in to being earlier' (Hurd, 1979,

p.38).
There were only infrequent meetingsof all Labour advisers. Most
of the early meetingswere on salariesand conditionsof employment and
accordingto Darlington:
thoseon policy havebeencomparativelyrare. So far, policy
meetings have beenconfined in the main to economic policy
(and especiallypublic expenditure)although there have beena
number of other meetingson such subjectsas devolution and
humanrights
On the one occasionwhen advisersas a group
...
invited
to
were
an outsidemeetingHarold Wilson vetoed the
It
proposal.
was in October1975when Geoff Bish tried to
convene a meetingof Political Advisers and Transport House
researchersto discusseconomicstrategy(1976, p. 52).
Monthly lunchtime meetings for Tory advisersand the CRD were
organized by the Director of the CRD but they petered out. Stuart
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Sextonstartedorganizing monthly/six-weeklylunchesfor advisersat his
large office at the DES. Through their commonbackgroundin the CRD
many Tory advisersalreadyknew one another,and the Sexton lunches
proved to be a good opportunity to meet others thereby facilitating
future bilateral contacts. Adviserswithout a CRD background recruited
to play a political adviser'srole, including David Coleman, found this
particularly valuable. However, the luncheswere generallynot felt to
be very useful in termsof discussingpolicy. There were grumblings
that the meetingstendedto be dominatedby Treasury advisers. Later
there was an attemptby StephenSherbourneto organizeweekly meetings
at Number Ten but it was impossibleto find a time when everybody could
be sure of turning up and they fizzled out. After Stuart Sexton's
departuremeetingswere organizedby Robin Harris, Director of the CRD,
but they too peteredout.
There continuedto be a network, however, with ChristopherMonckton
(1988) referring to a 'spider's web of young special advisers'.
Monckton was an adviserat the Policy Unit, the staff of which were very
much part of the network, aswas the political secretaryat Number Ten.
IndeedBernardDonoughueand StephenSherbournewere at different times
seenas being at the network's centre.
Severalfunctionscould, with varying degreesof effectiveness, be
performed through the meetingsand/or bilateral contacts. It was rare
for an agreedpolicy, or strategyline, to be hammeredout at meetings
of advisers,other than occasionallyon issuesof pay and conditions.
Nevertheless, particularly for advisers working alone in a
department,it could be valuableto shareexperiences. The cohesionand
effectiveness of the network tendedto improve in the run-up to
elections; the role of advisersin assistingwith manifesto preparation
was described earlier. The network could be effective in connection
with the advisers' role in drafting political speechesto party
audiences. Advisers to ministers who wanted help in pushing a
particular policy could ask colleaguesto include suitableparagraphsin
their drafts. Alternatively, when they were composinga wide ranging
political speech,or if the minister wantedto cover a particular topic,

an advisercouldcheckthe detailswith his counterpartin the relevant
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department. Sometimesadvisers could use the net when there were
bilateral negotiationsbetweentheir departmentsand ministers. To do
this effectively requiredadvisersto be both skilful and trusted, but
it is now recognized aspart of their role, and in at least some
departmentscivil servantsare recommendedto contactadvisersif it is
felt that they could usefully take informal soundings of other
departments' views. This was appreciatedby advisers such as Tim
Boswell who claimed, 'the existenceof a separatespecialadvisers' net
comparable to the private secretaries'net can again be useful to the
department in removing or smoothingoccasionalroadblockswithout loss
of face.'
The network could be important for advisersengagedin briefing on
non-departmentalCabinet items. Somethoughtit worthwhile to contact
their colleaguein the 'lead' departmentto get a feel for the reasons
behind a recommendedcourse and the drawbacks behind alternative
options. Whilst some advisersconsideredit was also valuable to
telephone colleagues occasionally to 'plug' the line of their
department, at least one Tory adviser claimed not to pass such
information on to his minister. Nevertheless, some ministers,
especially groups of Labour ones, undoubtedlyvalued the ability of
their advisersto keepin touch - particularly over issuescoming up in
Cabinet. According to Roy Hattersley,David Hill would tell him that
David Lipsey, '"wants you to know that Tony doesn't agreewith this and
he will have to tell you he disagreeswith it in Cabinet", or "Tony
wants you to know he is pushingthis, can you supporthim?" That sort
of thing would certainly happen.'
One of the contentiousissuesover which the political advisers'
network was mobilized was the choice in the mid 1970sof which type of
nuclear reactor to order. The role of Benn's advisersin helping to
produce the Departmentof Energy's papersfor meetingsof Cabinet and
its committees,was referred to in Chapter6 SectionA. The CPRS became
involved in the issue on the sideof the Prime Minister and the
Department of Energy's officials and, 'engagedin extensive lobbying
throughout Whitehall', to suchan extentthat JamesCallaghanlater told
Blackstone and Plowdenit, 'had gone rather beyond its proper role'
(p. 81). Commenting on the supportreceived from other ministers for
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Benn's position in this intenseconflict Sedgemorewrote: 'This may be
due to the fact that Tony's political advisers had spoken to the
political advisersof the various ministersbefore the meeting. They
really are doing an excellentjob' (p. 116).
It was not only in contentiousissuesthat adviserscould attempt
to use the network. Lord Gowrie thought that Adam Ridley, who was
'built into, and knew, the network so well, ' was a great help in getting
tax changes on charitablegiving acceptedby other ministers through
contactingtheir advisers.
Notwithstanding theseand other examples,most advisers were not
entirely happywith the effectivenessof the network. Various problems
were identified including its incompleteness.SeveralLabour advisers,
for example,would havevalued having a colleagueat the Department of
Employment, and it was notedearlier that BernardDonoughuewas keen for
there to be advisersin all departments.However, the major reason for
the chronic weaknessof the network lies in the natureof the adviser's
role. The adviseris primarily the minister's 'own person'. His first
loyalty should be to his minister. Networking effectively assumes,
therefore, accordingto Bill Rodgers,a 'commonality of views on all the
issuesand a single destiny of purpose.' Many advisersfelt that such a
situation did not exist, but, althoughthere were difficulties, Adam
Ridley commented, 'in generalwe had enoughcommon interest for the
systemto work. '
Despite the undoubteddepartmentaltribalism of civil servants,
which modifies the constitutionalnotion of the unity of government(and
there are even divided loyalties within a department),there is probably
greater cohesion amongst the bureaucracy than exists between
politicians. Heclo andWildavsky (1981) have also demonstrated the
existenceof considerableloyalty to the Treasury throughout Whitehall.
The policy and personalitydifferencesbetween ministers, and their
conflicting careeraspirations,restrict the degreeto which advisers
could have a loyalty to the collective entity. Furthermore, some
advisers recognized that ministers,and others, might think advisers
were getting abovethemselvesif they becametoo organized. In the
words of one adviser, they tendedto act like 'squirrels' with their
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hoards of information. Speaking about their rather unsuccessful
attempts to organizemeetingsof advisers,Sherbournereferred to the
unwillingness of peopleto talk and their lack of clarity about what
they shoulddo collectively, and Harris observed:'by the nature of the
way they are chosen and by their contract, they are bound to a
particular minister, they are not bound to the Government... currently
all the forces are decentralist.'
Jack Straw believedthe networkof Labour advisers provided an
additional channel and was certainly useful, particularly where
ministers were trying to follow a certain line in relation to the Common
Market, economic policy or other internally controversial issues.
However, it was not as useful as he would have liked: 'I sometimes used
to think there ought to be more cooperationbetweenus, but the truth
was there could be no more cooperationbetweenus as advisers, than
there was betweenthe ministerswe worked for, becauseour only loyalty
really was to our minister.'
It is significant that the run-up to electionswas the time of
greatest effectivenessfor the network, becausethesewere the periods
when the commoninterestwas prominent. Severalformer advisers and
reformers hoped that the network could be improved in future
governments. Strawbelievedthat the network developedbetweenresearch
assistantsto the ShadowCabinetin the 1980swas more cohesive than
that of the 1970sadvisersand he hopedthat under a future Labour
Governmentthe network would be better.
SECTION C;, LIMITATIONS AS EXPERIENCED X

ADVISERS.

Overall it is perhapsa little surprisingthat the special advisers
thought their effectiveness
waslimited to sucha smallextent by the
various factors includedin question18)of the questionnaire.The
findings from this questionform Table6 andvery little was written
into the 'other' limitationsrow includedasquestion18k). The results
from questions18a-d) reflectwell upon:thewillingnessof the civil
service to make the systemwork; the importanceattachedby many
ministersto ensuringthat their adviserswere accepted;and the
abilities of the advisers.Thereis some interview evidencethat
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TABLE 6: Questionnaire
Findings on Limitations
Percentage
Response.
-

18)

To what extent

was your effectiveness

Substan
tially

a)

information.

e)

office.

Inadequate active support
from the rest of the
civil service.
Inadequate experience

g)

h)

i)

j)

Slightly

ely

Insig
nifie
antly

134

17

75

248

26

60

139

23

64

65

12

28

49

29

24

29

36

53

22

19

51

12

83

of

the way the department(s)
operated.
f)

ably

Moderat

Inadequate active support
from the private

d)

Consider

by the following:

Inadequate access to

official
c)

limited

Inadequate access to the

minister.
b)

on Effectiveness

The tack of a proper
position within the
administrative chain
of command.
Difficult
relations with
junior ministers in the
department.
Inadequate knowledge of
the policy issues.

014

3

10

14

17

56

out all the tasks.

20

20

22

14

24

Absenceof research
staff.

17

16

13

9

45

Inadequate time to carry

certainofficials felt they could, when necessary,by-passor neutralize
advisers. However, with over 90 per cent of advisers reporting that
their effectiveness wasonly slightly or insignificantly limited by
inadequateaccessto the minister, question18a), a somewhat different
picture emerges than that sometimesassociatedwith advisers as
portrayed by Frank Weisel in 1 Minister (Lynn and Jay, 1984). A few
part time advisersfound difficulties in alwaysgetting access on the
day(s) they were in; the problem for Gwilym Prys-Davieswas exacerbated
by his working in theWelsh Office at Cardiff whilst the Welsh Secretary
was in London for mostof the week.
Whilst advisers generally thought that inadequate access to
information, question 18b), was not a great problem, a numbermade the
point that if paperswere not being shownto them, they might well not
know of their existence. Oneadviserclaimed, in answerto a question
about the typesof information to which he was not allowed access:'What
the department, or individuals within it, did not want me to see.
Reasonswere thought up later'. He felt he risked being overloadedwith
uselessbumph and deprivedof interestingmaterialbut his minister was
able up to a point to stopthis happening by, among other things,
insisting on consultationwith the adviserbefore a decisionwas taken.
Severaladvisersmadea guaranteeof good accessto the minister, and to
information, a condition before they agreedto accept the position.
There were a numberof initial disputesover access to information;
sometimes the minister had to makeit clear that advisers were to
receivevirtually all information going to the minister, apart from that
of the highestsecurityclassifications,commercial information about
individual companies,and mattersrelatedto civil servants personally.
Several morejunior adviserswithin teamsexperiencedsomedifficulties
when materialwas copiedonly to the senioradviser. In their accounts
of their experiencesboth Butler and Cardonaregretted, as have some
other advisers, that they receivedcopiesonly at the end of the
process, when papers were submittedto ministers. They would have
preferred to have beeninvolved at an earlier stage. Sometimes this
was, in fact, officially encouragedbut adviserscould run the risk of
getting overloadedwith preliminary papersand deliberations.
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Advisers often relied on private secretariesto copy key papers to
them if their namehad beenleft off the list. This underlines the
picture portrayedin answersto question 18c). It correlateswith the
earlier discussionaboutthe generallygood relations advisers believed
existedwith private offices, and how most recognizedthe importance of
good relationsbecauseprivate secretariescould have madetheir lives
more difficult (Chapter7 SectionB (i)). Private secretariesoften,
but not always, took their cue from the minister and were usually,
therefore, positive about advisers,evenif, privately, somewished they
were not there. However, they would block accessif they consideredthe
minister did not want it. Occasionally,evenwhere the minister backed
the adviser, the private office was unhelpful. Oneadviser felt the
private office initially regarded him asan alien intruder to be
frustrated: 'an attemptwas madeto freeze me out.'
Generally adviserswere slightly more limited by a lack of active
support from the rest of the civil service,question 18d). Here, as
with severalother limitations, the post 1979Tories felt the limitation
to be marginally greaterthan did Labour advisers. This is perhaps
surprisinggiven the reputationof someLabour advisers,and the belief
that there had beena growing formalization and acceptanceof the
system. It is possiblethat expectationshad risen and/or that the more
recent the experience,the more vivid the memory of any difficulties.
More important, however, is that over three quarters of advisers
considered this to be only slightly or insignificantly a limitation.
Advisers sometimes found particular officials or parts of the
department, less cooperativethan the rest. Several advisers felt,
perhapsnaturally, that it was generallythe most capableofficials who
could take advisersin their stride.
Several of the most effective, heavyweight,advisers with strong
ministerial backing experienced some difficulties with officials,
especially when they proposedradical changes. Tom Baron considered
resigning because he thought he could not get his ideas through.
Various people, including the private secretaryand a colleaguein the
building industry, helpedpersuadehim to stayand he had successesand
developed a relationshipof mutual respect with officials. Anthony
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Lester thought there were considerableproblems with some civil
servants, especially in the period up to the October 1974 election,
after which the situationeasedas it becameclear the Labour Government
would remainin power. Evidencewas given by Home Office officials to
the Select Committeesestablishedin both Housesto considerthe AntiDiscrimination Bills in 1971-3(see,for example,Special Report from
the Houseof CommonsSelectCommitteeon the Anti-Discrimination (No.2)
Bill, Session1972-73,Vol. 1, pp. 15-25). Suchevidencelends credence
to Lester's commentsthat officials:
didn't really like the policy and they were minimalists and I
was a maximaliston the policy and so we had that argument.
They were not sufficiently self-confidentto play it with all
cards on the table. So they manipulated, unsuccessfully.
That is wherebeing ableto work to the Home Secretaryin the
end wasdecisive ... The deviousnessof behaviourwas no more
than you find in any large organization,it seemsto me. The
politics of the bureaucracyis not confined to the civil
service.
A minority of other adviserswere never able to tackle the
obstaclesplaced in their way or overcomethe lack of positive help from
officials. This was sometimeslinked to one of the comparatively more
serious limitations - inadequateexperienceof the way departments
operated, question 18e). The longer an adviserstayed,the less of a
problem this became.
Lack of a proper position, question18i), was only slightly or
insignificantly a limitation accordingto 70 per cent of advisers. This
raisesdoubtsabout the argumentthat the position or statusof advisers
within the departmentneedsto be enhanced,perhapsby putting them in
to the private office. Someadvisersspecifically commentedthat it was
an advantage not to havean official statuswhich might tie them too
rigidly to, and in, the hierarchy. There were undoubtedly some who
believedtheir effectivenesswas limited because,in the words of Robbie
Gilbert, 'You are a transplantedorganand the body is constantly
trying to reject it - it is not conscious,it is an unconsciousthing
because you are not part of it
I don't think there was any
...
deliberatehostility - it's just that you're not part of the machineand

you tendto getignored.'
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themselvesaspolitical adviserswere not expectedto be contributing
policy expertise. Lack of time, question18i), was consideredto be the
most significant limitation. Although perhapsit was the easiest to
state as being a limitation becauseit implies criticism of nobody, it
doescorrelatewell with the answersto the questionabout hours worked.
About 40 per cent of the full time advisersworked 60 hours or more a
week and someof the 'part time' advisersworked 40 hours. This raises
interesting questions about the position of special advisers. They
might havebeenunderparticularly strongtime pressuresbecause,almost
to the same extentas ministers, they were at the point where the
political and administrative systemsmet and often had to produce
comments rapidly on an issue that was new to them. Although,
conversely,a few adviserssuggestedthat unlike the civil servantsthey
did not havea responsibilityto 'spark' on every issuethat camebefore
them, thosewho played a sieverole often had to spend a considerable
time perusing submissions. Tony Lynes describes the role well by
suggestingthere was 'an irreducible minimum of perfectly uselesspaper'
you had to wadethrough to ensureit was useless. It was difficult to
ignore any paperand say:
'well, I don't think that is important enoughfor me to bother
about', or, 'I don't think that is somethingI know enough
about to makeany useful input' ... becauseyou felt it was
actually your job if ministerswere being asked to make a
decision within your field of competence,then you must try
and read all the papers.
How far the adviser felt time to be a major limitation was
partially linked to the type of role adopted. Where an adviserhad wide
ranging roles, suchas the adviserwhosediary of a month's work was
reproduced earlier (Chapter6 SectionA), the adviser might be more
likely to comment, 'I have this self-pitying feeling of being grossly
overworked most of the time. ' If an advisoryrole was seenas full time
it proved a limitation to perform it on a part time basis. When Maurice
Pestonchangedfrom full time to part time, he felt this diminished the
effectiveness of the role he could play, a view shared by Roy
Hattersley: 'I think you needhim to be always there... looking at
things on his own initiative, turning things over himself.' Roger Dyson
explainedhe could not meetthe civil servants'expectationsof the role
as it had beenperformedby Brian Abel-Smith:
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a senioradviserwho is full time and who works with officials
becomesa sort of deputy secretaryin all but name ... a part
timer cannot fit in to the civil service deputy secretary
model because a part timer isn't there when he is wanted,
isn't in the room when he can be called to a meeting and
therefore his contacts with civil servants become
formalized doing one day a week officially, you can't work
...
in the civil service
mould.
Sometimesadvisers,including David Metcalf, startedon a full time
basis, and when they becamepart time they felt they had developed
sufficient knowledge and contacts to ensure that by establishing
priorities they could still cover the important tasks. Such an approach
endorses the advice containedin the Fabianevidence to the Fulton
Committee: 'Experiencesuggeststhat the irregular in an administrative
post or in a "research"or "policy planning" job is wise to begin his
period of work on a full time basis' (1968, Vol. 5 (2), p.562). Two
Labour Secretariesof Statefor Trade, PeterShoreand John Smith, and
their advisers, Michael Artis, Vincent Cable and Michael Stewart,
believed that performing the advisoryrole on a part time basis was a
limitation. After servingin a part time capacityfor several years,
Michael Dobbsargued for John Whittingdaleto be brought in, 'to broaden
the scope of the operation.' Dobbscommented: 'Part time is not
satisfactory; it is not somethingthat I would particularly recommend
becausebeing a political adviseris not an easyjob anyway.'
Somefull time adviserswho worked alone in a departmentopined that
the time pressureson a singleadviserwere too great. Darlington
wrote: 'The volume of work and the paceof eventsis such that one
Adviser can only provide a limited servicebasedon a narrow selection
of the most politically important departmental and non-departmental
issues.' (1976, p. 51). However, perhapsthe key factor in determining
how far time pressureswere regardedasa limitation was the extent of
the role that the adviserwas expected,or wanted, to play. The
advisers who thought inadequatetime was a substantiallimitation were
almost equally divided betweenworking alone, and having at least one
colleague.

The largestresponses
to question18j)wereat the two extremes,
reflecting a markeddivergence
of opinionaboutthepotentialvalue to
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advisersof researchassistance.Discussionin the interviews broadened
into a generalassessment
of how far the help provided for advisers
matched their requirements. Severaladviserswere severelylimited by
having no secretarialprovision or having to rely on private office
staff or a generaltyping pool. Many adviserswere satisfiedwith their
secretaries,even if, as in somecases,it took a while to secure them.
Sometimes there were problemswith the work they could perform, with
disputes,for example,over whetherit extendedto filing in addition to
typing. A few advisers were provided with assistantsor private
secretaries. Describinga period sometime after he became a special
adviser, David Young writes, 'By now I was spendingso much time with
ministers that I was given new quarters. Now I had a ministerial suite
on the seventhfloor, a large room with windows on three sides, and next
door I now had my own private office. My first Private Secretary came
from Treasury' (p.53).
The pattern was retainedat the DTI of having somebody to link
betweenthe advisersand the department,and 'flag' paperson which the
advisersmight wish to comment. In the Foreign Office, Michael Stewart
initially thought not having an assistantwas a limitation and after a
while, with the supportof David Owen, an assistantjoined Stewart from
the economic section.
Generally, adviserswho felt that the lack of an equivalent person
in their departmentwas a limitation, would havepreferred an assistant
to a researcher,andwould have favoureda civil servant- perhaps at
executiveofficer level - rather than the arrangementat the DHSS where
Brian Abel-Smith had anotheradviserworking to him. It was felt that
although a civil servantwould be restrictedfrom performing overtly
political tasks, this would be outweighedby their knowledge of, and
acceptability to, the department. Othersfelt it was advantageousnot
to have an assistantbecausethey would not havewantedto have spent
time organizing such a person'swork.

One reasonwhy, aswith theirpay, therewerelimitations on the
thatcouldbe devotedto adviserswasthe constantdangerthat
resources
there would be complaints,especiallyfrom MPs, about the favourable
treatmentafforded them. On 29 July 1974,for example,a Government
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backbencher,JohnPrescott,complainedto the Leaderof the House about
the secretarial allowances and facilities for MPs in the following
ironic terms: 'does he agreethat this also means that political
advisers,who get more for their secretariesand their facilities than a
Member of Parliament, contributemore than we do to the political
system?'(Official $,

Vol. 878, col.34).

Severaladvisersthoughtit was a limitation their office was not
nearerto that of their minister, so that they would be immediately
available and more awareof comingsand goings. Others, believing it
would be a limitation not to be nearthe minister, successfully fought
battles to securean appropriateoffice. Oneadviserwas installed on
the morning of his arrival in an office next door to the minister and
the private office. After lunch, the permanentsecretarycame in to
apologize for a 'very embarrassing'mistake. He then conducted the
adviser to an enormousoffice one floor down; the adviser wistfully
commented, 'I remained there, underprotest after the implications
became clear.' For a few advisersthe problemsover an office were an
aspect of the limitations of being part time. Michael Artis thought
that, 'the system wasn't setup to provide for this requirement of
having a room nearthe minister once a week, not always on the same
day.'
A few advisers,including John Copeand Miles Hudson, thought it an
advantage to be inside the private office but Tom McNally saw it, on
balance, as a limitation and movedout. Brendon Sewill also moved out
of the private office, but into a room closeto Tony Barber who had a
buzzeron his desk with which he frequently summonedhis adviser. Most
advisersexpresseda preferencefor their own room asclose as possible

to the minister's. Since1974,over two-thirdsof advisershavehad an
office on the samefloor astheminister,with abouta third of those
beingoppositeor adjacentto him.
The debateabouttheimportanceof thepositionof the office is
George Cardona's
sometimesconductedin terms of Yz fir.
referenceto his mistakenlyexpectingto be obstructedon becominga
Treasuryadviserwasquotedearlier. In his articlein MMTimeson 11
November1981he continued:
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I soon realizedthat the Treasurycivil servants had also
absorbed the 'Yes Minister' myth that officials obstruct
ministersand advisers. An importantpart of the myth is that
an advisermustbe given an office near the minister, and that
the Civil Servicewill do its best to prevent this happening.
I realized how powerful the myth was on my first contact with
the Treasury. I was telephonedby the Establishment Officer
who said: 'A room is ready for you. It is very near the
Chancellor.' The securityguard who met me at the door, and
the messengerwho took me to my room, expressedtheir delight
that I had beengiven an office near the Chancellor. So did
the womanwho brought me tea severaltimesa day.
By contrast Ann Carlton had two very different experiencesof
rooms. She was happywith the 'strategicallyplaced' room at MAFF on
which shehad insisted,but had beendissatisfiedat having inherited a
room at the DoE severalfloors below the minister and had 'camped out'
in the private office for muchof the time. In Tribune on 19 December
1986shewrote:
In Dorothy, the Prime Minister's adviser, the script writers
Minister, have
of the BBC Televisionprogramme,Y-caPie
created a characterwhosetacticsaspirantadvisers to the
next Labour governmentwould do well to study. The first
thing to learn from Dorothy is that the location of the
advisers' rooms is very important. It is essentialthat they
are very neartheir Ministers so that the advisersknow what
is going on all the time. The civil servicewill want them as
far away from Ministers aspossible.
A few other limitations were causedby particular circumstancesof
the department or the adviser. Some advisers, including Roger
Darlington, felt that their age wasa disadvantage.Although academics
possibly found it easierthan someothersto spend a few years as
advisers - full time or part time - someencountereddifficulties and
Blackstone (1980) analyses various reasons why United States
administrations recruit so many more academicsthan those in the UK.
Finally the particular limitations of being an adviser in the Welsh
Office are describedby Thomas(1987):
an adviserin the Welsh Office is likely to be frustrated if
the ministry's own civil servants are not themselves
sufficiently involved in the early stages of policy
formulation. The breadthof functions in the Welsh Office
will also be a problem ... An adviser (like a minister) who
wanteddistinctive Welsh initiatives would threatento upseta
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Whitehall consensusas well as creating additional work
(p. 173-4).
It is evidentfrom this section,and earlier chapters, that the
attitude adoptedtowardsadvisersby politicians and bureaucrats varies
enormously. Someof thesediverseviews, and the impact they have on
advisers,are now examinedin detail.
SECTION DI THE AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE ADOPTED TOWARDS
ADVISERS BY POLITICIANS AND CONSEQUENTDIFFICULTIES.

Ministers.
Some ministers were not keenon appointing advisers and yet were
prevailed uponto do so. Where this reluctancecontinued, or when, as
happenedin a few cases,the minister became disillusioned with the
adviser, it was soon detected by officials and the adviser was
marginalised. According to one permanent secretary some of his
colleagues reportedthat their ministersregardedadvisersas 'monkeys
on their back'. Another permanent secretary suggestedthat some
ministerswere alwayssuspiciousthat it was anotherminister's adviser
who was responsiblefor leaks. However, he stated, 'I don't think it
was that source'. Sometimeswhenadvisersbecameinvolved in issues
involving other departments,ministersin thosedepartmentsdisliked the
advisers' activity. Oneadviserreportedthat a Minister of Statein a
different department unsuccessfullyaskedhis Secretary of State to
dismisshim over somedispute.

An adviserwhose activitieswerestrongly criticized by other
ministerswasthe 'precursor'of theadvisers,JohnHarris. According
to Roy Jenkins'sbiographer,JohnCampbell,in the mid-sixtiesHarris,
'was assiduous
andextraordinarilyskilful in promotingJenkinsin the
press as Labour's one successfulMinister in a general picture of
incompetenceand economicfailure. His activity was not unnaturally
resented by Jenkins' seniorcolleagues'(1983, p. 99). The diarists
Richard Crossman, Barbara Castle, and, according to his wife's
biography, Tony Crosland,all recordedcritical commentsabout Harris's
role. On 22 November 1968, Crossman,for example,reportedon a Cabinet
meeting: 'on the whole there was a universalconviction in that room
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that John Harris hadbecomeRoy's evil geniusand that Roy was sitting
in an ivory tower with John Harris and David Dowler, cut off from the
rest of the world, planning Roy's political future' (1977, p. 269).
Harris arguedthat althoughhe retainedhis lobby card and talked to his
friends in the lobby, he did not get in the way of the department's
'very good' information officer, Tom McCaffrey, and that, 'if Roy
Jenkins got a goodpress,it was becausehe was a damn good minister.
Harris also stressedthat his role was much wider thanjust being the
public relations officer his critics liked to portray.
There is an important reasonfor this referenceto Harris's perhaps
exceptionalrole. It highlights the difficulty of generalizingfrom the
statement that 'advisersare appreciatedby the minister receiving the
services they can successfullysupply', to the proposition that, 'they
are appreciated throughout the system of government for the
strengthening they provide to the effectivenessof the Governmentas a
whole.' Nevertheless, in somecasesministerswho did not appoint
advisersacceptedthat others might find themuseful.
Parliament.
Backbench MPs haveat timesbeenhighly critical of special advisers,
with a number of Tories, along with some newspapers,running what
amounted to a campaignagainstthe newly appointedLabour advisers in
the mid 1970s. As seen in Chapter2, Ian Gow asked a series of
Parliamentary Questions on the subject. Tories were concerned about
both the cost (in particular the use of public funds to provide
political advice) and the Government's refusal to provide either
information on individual adviser's salariesor a copy of official
guidancegiven to ministerson the useof advisers. Furthermore, on 21
June 1976, Gow, aspart of a question,askedCharlesMorris, 'whether he
is satisfiedthat noneof the leaksto which my hon. Friend has referred
came from those specialadvisers?' Included in his reply Morris said:
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The hon. Gentlemanhastabledover 30 Questions on special
advisersin recentmonths. In addition he has askeda host of
supplementary questions, and on 23rd March we had an
Adjournment debate initiated by the samehon. Gentleman in
respect of specialadvisers. With the greatestof respect I
appeal to the hon. Gentleman,without infringing any of his
parliamentary rights and responsibilities, to bring this
squalid campaignagainstspecialadvisersto an end so that
they can get on with the job (Official Report. Vol. 913,
col. 1091).
Uneaseabout the role of adviserswas not, however, confined to the
Opposition benches. According to Margaret Beckett, some in the
Parliamentary Labour Party were strongly againstadvisersbecause they
believed backbencherswere left out anyway, and this would make it
worse. Opinions were divided and support for advisers came, for
example, in the 1977report from the ExpenditureCommittee which, as
notedpreviously, called for the expansionand acceptanceof the system.
Nevertheless, the generallyhostile atmospherethat prevailed at times
in Parliamentprobably contributedto the restricteddevelopmentof the
systemafter an explosionin numbersfollowing the election of the 1974
Labour Government. IndeedKnight (1990, p. 105)even claims that, 'The
Callaghan Government(1976-9), asa result of fierce Tory opposition,
reduced the number of thesepolitical apparatchiksfrom 29 to 24.'
During BusinessQuestionsin the Houseof Commonson 27 June 1974 the
Leaderof the Opposition,EdwardHeath, requesteda parliamentarydebate
before the rules were alteredto allow specialadviserspaid from public
funds to standas candidatesfor Parliamentor local authorities. Ted

Shortreplied:
the Governmentintendtomorrow to table an amendment to the
Servantsof the Crown Order to the Privy Council. This is an
amendmentto the 1960Order, which is a prerogative order, and
no parliamentaryaction is required. Out of courtesyto the
Opposition, I told the right hon. Gentleman about this
amendment ... We take the view that as these advisers are
political, it is ridiculous to try to prevent their having

normalpolitical rights(Official Rem. Vol. 875, cols 17289).

His refusalto allowdebatebeforethe amendment
wasput causeda
storm of protest from all sidesof the House. Subsequently,Heath
intervenedyet again:
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The right hon. Gentlemanis thereforeoverriding the views of
the Leader of the Oppositionand his colleagues and the
Opposition as a whole. He is now overriding the views that
are expressedby someof his hon. Friends. I must again ask
him to postponethe order tomorrow and to let the Housedebate
the Order first ... it affectsa group who are at a high level
in the Civil Service and in the closest contact with
Ministers. This breaks the whole tradition of the Civil
Service (Official Report. Vol. 875, col. 1734).
The criticisms continued,with Membersreluctantto let colleagues
move on to other subjects;but it was only after Heath moved an
emergency debateunder StandingOrder No.9 that Short backeddown, and
agreedto defer laying the order for a month to allow the opportunity to
find time to debatethe issue. Short describedthese events as the
'biggest row I'd beeninvolved in. ' The matter was dropped by the
Government, but hasbeena sourceof continuedirritation to Tory and
Labour advisers, although someministerswould not have wanted their
advisersto havebeendistractedby nursing a constituency.
Whilst the attitudeof Parliamenthasprobably contributed to the
curtailment of the system'sdevelopment,William Waldegraveastutely put
the issue in a generalorganizational context. He observed that
backbenchersand sometimesjunior ministersresentednon-elected young
people getting more accessandinformation than they had, 'but it was
the perennialcomplaint of junior membersof an organizationagainstthe
staff officers.' In Australia, Smith reports, 'some Labor backbenchers
thought the experiment was a failure, for reasons similar to those
advanced by backbenchersin Britain. Ministerial acceptancehad to be
balanced against an amountof backbench discontent.' (1977, p. 155).
Policy analysts and advisersin America are, often characterized as,
'something almost illegitimate, as grey eminences,working in shadow
governments, or as bureaucratic mandarins usurping the rightful
functions of clients' (Meltsner, 1986, p.300).
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The Prime Minister.
The hostility liable to flare up in Parliamentagainstadvisers partly
explains the ambivalenceof variousprime ministers towards advisers.
This is becauseit was sometimesthe premier who had to face critical
questioning about them. Tom McNally said of Jim Callaghan: 'like Mr
Wilson he was cautiousabout the systemgetting out of hand, sensitive
to questioningabout how much specialadviserswere paid, how much it
coststhe taxpayer.'
According to John Hunt, 'Prime Ministers, again of both parties,
have always severelylimited their role. ' (1987, p.67). Perhaps the
ambivalence of Labour Prime Ministers is illustrated by the lack of
consensusamongLabour advisersas to the attitude, if any, Number Ten
adopted towards them. BernardDonoughue'srole from the Number Ten
Policy Unit, in encouragingand assistingministersto appoint advisers,
was describedearlier. Even as late as 1979, Vincent Cable thought that
Number Ten welcomedhis appointmentto a departmentthat had not had an
adviser for severalyears: 'John Smith had regularizedthe position by
bringing one in; I think that was how they saw it. ' Many believed,
though, that prime ministerswantedto restrict development of the
system despiteHarold Wilson's initiative in establishingit. Perhaps
the major reasonfor this cameasan inevitableconsequenceof the role
of advisersas loyal servantsof departmentalministers. The resentment
generated by Harris's activities on behalf of Jenkinsin the 1960s led
to jealousy that was, in the Prime Minister's case, according to
Campbell, 'verging almoston paranoia' (p.99). In the 1970sTony Benn
felt the Prime Minister had somedoubtsbecausea minister with a team
of advisersmight be a potential centreof oppositionto policies, if
the minister opposed the Prime Minister. The major area of prime
ministerial concern was often thought to be the role of advisers in
briefing ministers for Cabinet. There was both agreement and
disagreementwith SuzanneReeve'sassessment
at the May 1986Re-skilling
Government Seminarthat one of the two great sourcesof opposition to
Barbara Castle's teamof adviserswas, 'the Prime Minister himself,
partly becauseher executiveoffice actually struck at his political

business.He did
powerbaseaswell asat his management
of government
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not want a Chinesewarlord who was actually pointing out where he was
going astray and stoppinghim from doing what he wanted' (IOD, 1986,
p. 39).
Mrs Thatcher'smore fundamentalreservationsabout the desirability
of putting adviserson the public payroll resultedin a contraction of
the system in 1979. How far her subsequentattitude changed was
discussedearlier but Butler arguesthat advisers have been called
'Maggie's Moles.' (p. 14). He goeson to suggestthat, 'since they are
personally known to her, gave her a good servicein the 1983 Election,
are "Keepers of the Ark", and are generallydiscreet, she relaxes in
their presenceand calls them "her boys"'. (p. 16). Most interviewees
did not believeThatcher hadgenerallyencouragedthe expansionof the
system since 1979, and they did not seethe majority of advisers as
'Maggie's Moles' or 'Mrs Thatcher'sboys'. One adviserhighlighted the
central issueby stating, 'the only adviserswho can be describedas Mrs
Thatcher's boys were thosewho were working for Ministers who were Mrs
Thatcher's men.' If advisers becameseenas agents of the Prime
Minister it might reducesomeof the limitations that currently exist
becauseof the unwillingnessof prime ministers to see the system
develop rapidly; but it would changethe whole conceptof the special
adviserand give rise to new limitations. As was argued at the start of
this sub-section,if a minister is seento be unenthusiasticabout his
adviser, the latter's position soonbecomesuntenable.
SECTION ;. RESPONSEQE

CIVIL SERVICE.

Although questionnaireevidencesuggestedmany advisersdid not think
their effectivenesswas limited by civil serviceattitudes, there were
considerablevariations in the opinionsexpressedby officials about the
system. It is difficult to categorizethese,given that each official
might, have different views about: the various advisers with whom he
comes into contact; the severaltypesof advisers; and the diverse
activities in which they are involved. Furthermore, a growing
acceptancemay be detected,and certain ranks of civil servants are
sometimes thought more likely to adopt a favourableattitude. This is
an issue on which, despiteWhitehall's reputation for uniformity of
outlook, views differ widely and no consensusemerges.
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Generally, the more hostile the civil service, the more likely this
is to imposelimitations on the effectivenessof advisers. However,
there is insidious dangerthat the impact of an advisercould also be
blunted by incorporationand the 'bureaucraticembrace': 'the normal
Foreign Office tendencywill be to embracenewcomers rather than to
reject them, a bear-hugthat may neverthelessbe suffocating for the
newcomer' (Henderson,1984, p. 121).
Categories4f Responses
from Ciyil Servants.
This sub-sectionattemptsto categorizethe rangeof civil service
responsesto the development of special advisers and record the
approximatestrengthof four typesof reaction.
(i) Someofficials adoptedan attitude of outright hostility and saw no
room or role for advisers,arguing that the civil servantspossessed
all
the expertiserequired, and politicians who becameministers should not
needpolitical advice. This is now a minority, if strongly held, view.
However, Heclo and Wildavsky, basedon researchthey first reported in
1974, claimed that suchan attitude was prevalent:
Ask any minister abouthis experiencewith outside advisers,
and you are likely to hear a biological analogyin which a
self-contained system rejects foreign elements. 'Alien
bodies', 'expelled like white corpuscles', 'considered bulls
in the civil service'schina shop', 'they castrate you,, these are the expressionsusedby four ministers. Tensions
and rivalries are inevitableat this level. Even the most
successfuloutsideadviserscan be expectedto survive little
more than two yearsbeforebeing enveloped,rejected,or worn
down by the establishedCivil Service (p.378).
Their evidencewas collectedprior to the expansionof advisers in
1974, and although some respondentsagreed there were inevitable
frictions with the advisersintroducedfrom 1964onwards, the general
impression from the interviews is that the reaction was not as extreme
as it was portrayedabove. Nevertheless, the widespread scepticism
about the desirability of introducing outsideadviserswas reflected in
the commentsLord Roll reportedhe was ableto makeonce he had left the
civil service: 'I expressedconsiderabledoubt about the value of a
major extensionof, and relianceon, this methodof bridging the gap
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betweenpolitics andadministration' (Roll, 1985,p. 188).
Even according to someofficials who held advisers like Brian
Abel-Smith and Jack Strawin the highest regard, the expansion of
numbersin 1974hada 'shock effect'. One thought, 'this suddeninflux
of peopleworried civil servantsquite a bit. ' Resistanceto changewas
probably inevitable, especiallywhen it threatenedthe existing power
structures, and seemed,as it did to some,to challengethe underlying
values of a politically impartial civil servicewhich thought itself
capable of meeting the needsof all politicians. This issue was
discussedin Chapter3 and the view of someofficials is illustrated in
the words of a principal private secretaryat the time of the change in
Government in 1974: 'A lot of seniorcivil servantssaw this as an
intrusion in to the system,and a very difficult one to handle because
they had been usedto being regarded,and accepted, as politically
neutral in their advice; and here was somethingsuggesting that they
weren't.'
Young and Slomanclaim, 'Whitehall, of course, saw no need for
these politically motivatedinvaders' (1982, p. 89). They suggest that
the value setsmotivatingadvisersand officials are very different.
Advisers, 'were an affront to everything the civil servicestands for:
committed, loyal to a party, prejudicedin favour of Yes not No to what
the minister wants ... At first Whitehall saw this experiment as a
threat, and thereforefroze it out' (pp.89-90). The political commitment
of advisers makes thema slightly different case from some of the
earlier specialists, but parallelscan be drawn in the way officials
reacted. In the words of JoanMitchell, the specialadviser who had
earlier written a history of British economicplanning:
It was not unknown, after all, for the samesort of hostility
(though greatly magnified) to be shown to statisticians,
economistsand similar interloperscoming in during the Second
World War, and towards the scientists and operational
researchers,then or later. The special advisers probably
represent far less of a revolution in government
administration than the economistsand scientists coming in
(p.97-8).

Even somewho thoughttheattitudeof thecivil service had been
very negativebelievedtherewassomesofteningin attitude. Following
their commentsjust quotedaboveYoungandSlomanadded, 'But later
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Whitehall got wiser and evenbeganto find merit, of a strictly
peripheral kind, in specialadvisers' (p.90). Perhapsone reason for
the initial disquiet,and for its subsequentdiminution, lay in the
fear, so far groundless,that the introduction of adviserswas only the
forerunner for more radical changes. Antony Part stated:
Onceone startstalking aboutspecialadvisers,of course, the
spectre of French type cabinetsis raised; and there were
certainly a numberof civil servantswho felt, well we don't
want to get on a slippery slopeaboutthis - oncewe start on
special advisers, where will it end?So should we start at
all?
Whilst the generalattitude in the civil servicetowards advisers
has mellowed aspart of a growing acceptanceof their role within the
system, there are still critics. Hostility rangesfrom officials who
dismissadvisersas being unnecessaryand having nothing to contribute,
to thosewho still seeadvisersas a potential and undesirable threat.
One official claimed:
The appointmentof specialadvisersis an unsatisfactory and
unsuccessfulattempt to overcomethe difficulties faced by
ministers when they get into someof the awkward and often
technical details of policy which, when processedby their
officials, tend to influencethe kind of policy advice they
get ... the solution, that is specialadvisers,to the genuine
problems of time and legislation, hasbeen worse than the
diseaseand creatednew problems.
Sometimesofficials took the opportunity of a changeof minister to
suggest to the incoming one that he did not need an adviser. One
instanceof this, alludedto earlier, occurredwhen Keith Josephentered
the DES and is describedby his biographer:

The Josephregimegot off to a curiousstartwhichdid nothing
to offsetthe Secretary
of State'sreputationfor beinga soft
touch for civil servicemandarins.When he arrived, the
apparentlycamefrom theofficials thatSexton had
suggestion
his
purposeandcouldbe dispensedwith. The new
served
Secretaryof Statedid not demur,indicatingthathe was in
favourof savingon thesalarybill (Halcrow,1989,p.172).
Linking the officials' reactionsto either the conflict or
partnershipmodelsexaminedin Chapter3 is complex, but overseas
bureaucracyis likely to be
examplesdemonstratethat a permanent
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somewhatantagonistictowardsthe introduction of advisers. Commenting
on the Australian equivalentsto advisersin the UK, Walter observes,
'as a group they are disliked by the public service' (p. 132).
Nevertheless, the Australian advisers' views on their working
relationship with the public servicemirror those of their British
counterparts,with almost 90 per cent thinking it was good, very good or
excellent (p. 136). Evidencefrom the survey conductedfor the Royal
Commission on Australian Government Administration suggested that
officials adopteda similar rangeof opinionsabout advisersto thoseof
the British civil service (1976, Appendix Vol. 1). In Canada the
equivalents to advisers are called executive assistants. Recent
research on the relationshipbetween Canadian ministers and their
permanent secretaries(called deputy ministers)cites evidence which,
'puts at 30 percentthe proportion of caseswhere, "the assistant has
created enormousproblemsand greatly harmedthe relations between the
Minister and Deputy Minister"' (Bourgaultand Dion, 1990, p. 169).
Quite a few officials were preparedeither to accept, perhaps
sometimesgrudgingly, or at least not oppose,the idea that there was a
place for advisers. However, evenwithin this secondcategory there was
a broad rangeof views. Generally,the acceptancewas provided, first,
the role was limited to servicing the minister (especially in party
political and speechwriting activities) and/or second,it was tightly
(ii)

restricted. There is someoverlap herewith the earlier discussion
about officials being more likely to welcomeactivities in the political
field than the policy arena. One private secretary, for example,
suggestedthat civil servantscould accommodateirritations when they
were to a purposeand althoughhe could not seethe purposewith someof
them, he acceptedthat a minister might needsomeonewho was partisanto
be a bridge to the political world. Antony Part commented:
In theory a departmentis there to servethe minister, it's
there to servethe Governmentof the Day, and it's there to
help ministers move in the direction in which they were
electedto move ... I rather doubt if the civil service would
ever positively suggestthat there shouldbe specialadvisers,
becausein someways they would think that if they were doing
their job properly they would be able to do the whole thing
themselves. They can appreciatethat if the Secretary of
Statethinks there is a gap then there is no particular reason

why they shouldopposeany suchappointment.Civil Servants
wouldacceptspecialadvisersasa fact of life andwould try
to weld themin to theteamasfar aspossible of course
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they didn't alwayswantedto be weldedinto the team.
Part's notion of welding the advisersinto the team was not
entirely sharedby all in this category. Someemphasizedthe conceptof
an adviseras somebodyworking primarily with his minister rather than
the rest of the department. Thus a permanentsecretary described the
usefulnessof the adviserto the minister as a political leg-man or in
direct talks with his minister, but stressedthat the adviser would not
be advising the department directly. He also suggestedthat the
attitude other permanent secretariesrecommendedadopting in 1974
towards the influx of Labour advisers was one of 'benevolent
neutrality'. Another agreedthat, 'benevolentneutrality' was a fair
indication of the generalattitude, although initially some worried
about the numbers. In 1976DouglasAllen told a seminarat the LSE that
'the presence of specialadvisersin departmentshas not created the
kind of internal strife which many peopletend to assume must have
occurred' (1977, p. 144). Yet anotherpermanentsecretaryin 1974thought
that a certain amountof outsideinput was a good thing but he believed
that if one wantednew ideasbrought into the civil service it was
better to have someonebrought in to the establishedstructure. He
stressedthat the advisers,'were very much helping the minister to do
his job. ' Clive Booth felt that advisersare, 'never going to be taken
into the bosomof the civil service', but neverthelesscommented, 'I
don't know any reasonto saythey haven't beena generally helpful part
of the system... in their presentrather muted form I think they have
probably got a role to play. ' This belief, held by many officials, that
adviserscan play a helpful role, links into the next category.

The third type of civil servicereactionwasto consider that
specialadvisersplayeda usefulrole for their ministersbothin their
party political and departmentalactivities. These officials
thatit couldbe usefulfor the department
to havea special
appreciated
missthemwhenthey werenot there
adviser,but theydid not necessarily
nor advocatethata ministershouldhaveone. Whenaskedwhether he
felt officials foundit of valueto haveadvisersin the department,
KennethClucasreplied,
(iii)
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Yes, we found it was useful to have the adviserswe had under
the Labour Governmentbetween'74 and '79. Did I miss them
from '79 onwards? The answeris no, becausethings were done
in a different way
a useful contribution,
... they can make
but if a minister doesn't
seea needfor them, then you don't
miss them, provided he is communicative,hasother ways of
handling the sort of things that political advisersmight do.

Pragmatismis often seenas a featureof the British civil service,
and someofficials sharedthe view of one who worked with Jim Prior's
advisers at the Departmentof Employmentthat the advisers were, 'an
extra resource - it would havebeensilly not to have used it. ' A
similar argument, and one that was referred to with the previous
category, is that a major part of the ethosof the civil serviceis that
they loyally serve the Governmentof the Day. Therefore, if ministers
wish to haveadvisers,it is up to officials to make the system work.
In the words of ThomasBrimelow, 'if this is what ministers want, we
are here to serve ministers; OK, in they come, we get on with them and
help them to do their job. '

in 1988theformer Head of the Home
Addressingan LSE audience
Civil Service,Lord Armstrong,said: 'That ministersshouldhaveaccess
to political as well as administrativeadvice and opinion is
incontestable,and I havenever seenany objection to the appointmentof
what we havecome to call specialadvisers;indeed I have welcomed it
and regard it as a useful developmentin government.'
There are variousways in which officials believe, if advisers are
appointed, they can be of value to private secretariesand other civil
servants. Someof thesewere describedearlier, and many of the views,
perhaps in an even strongerform, are sharedby those in the fourth
category.

(iv)

Someofficials positively welcomedthe appointmentsand/or
advocatethat ministersshouldhavean adviser. The welcome given in
theDepartmentof Industryto DavidYoungandJeffreySterlinghas been
referred to, as has Ian Bancroft's opinion that certain large
departmentsshouldhavea specialadviserto ensurethatthe Secretary
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of Statewas properly serviced. A later permanentsecretaryin the DoE,
GeorgeMoseley, similarly commented:
Given the right sort of personis chosen, I think it is
entirely to the advantageof the permanentstaff that there
should be thesepeopleavailable,in some circumstancesto
provide lines of communicationin depth that perhaps don't
always emerge in thebusy day to day business. It is so
useful for civil servantson a policy desk to be able to take
soundingsof the political implications from somebody that
they know is well regardedby the minister, trustedby him and
is like a soundingboard.
The DHSS has also beenidentified as a department where the
advisers' role was appreciated. RogerDyson's statementthat, coming in
as a part timer in 1979he was unableto meetthe expectations of the
officials, hasbeennoted. On the socialsecurity side, where there was
not even a part time adviserappointedby the Tories, the second
permanent secretary, Geoffrey Otton, said, 'it is a pity they didn't
continue with it ... there were somestrong doctrinaire strands of
policy which were quite difficult for departmentsto come to terms with
and I think might havebeeneasedif there had been that kind of
lubricant in the system.' Patrick Jenkinalso opined that the permanent
secretary, Patrick Nairne, 'thought it was a pity' he did not have a
political adviser. Thesecommentssupportthe view noted earlier from
David Donnison. Furthermore, both Nairne and Otton believedthat most
other officials were not opposedto advisers. In response to the
question about his attitude towardsadvisersOtton said, 'this is the
boring consensusthat you are probably encountering,but on the whole,
it worked rather well. ' He was awareof a danger of portraying an
unrealistic picture of harmonywith the advisersbetween 1974and 1979,
but thought that was the position: 'It's all madeto sounda bit too
cosy, isn't it? But actually it seemsto me, in my experience,that it
added a dimension to the good functioning of the top levels of the
department, and there wasn't any unease,but I bet there was in other
places.'

Foreign Office officialstoo, havesometimeswelcomedadvisers.
David Owenfelt thatMichaelPalliser,thepermanentsecretary,was in
it. With his
favour of his havinga politicaladviserandencouraged
DonaldMaitlandconsidered
thatwhateverthe
wide rangeof experience,
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given relationship within a departmentbetweenthe minister and his
officials, the situationcould neverbe madeless satisfactorywith an
adviserthan it would be without. He stated:
I am absolutelyin favour of specialadvisers,whether their
role is a major or minor one; ... the bottom line will show
that the effectivenessof the department,and the minister's
performance,is better if he hasa specialadviser, regardless
of the other circumstances,than if he doesn't. Does anybody
disagreewith that?
From his wide perspectiveas former CabinetSecretary John Hunt
also stated:
Comparedto ministersanywhereelsein the world our ministers
are thoroughly overworkedand try to do too much ... anything
which can be doneto improve the serviceto them, and give
them the opportunity to think mustbe a plus; no doubt about
that. Then I acceptthat any large bureaucratic institution
has an inbuilt inertia, inbuilt conventionalview more than
inertia, that certain things will work and certain things
won't work and it is helpful to ministersto havea few people
who they can really call their own, who owe their loyalty only
to the minister, not to the civil serviceat large ... I don't
think you can expectthis suddenlyto solve all our problems
and transform governmentbut I think it is desirable. It
would be a great pity if it was droppedaltogether.
Advisers as Allies.Qf Officials.
In addition to believing adviserscould be useful in performing tasks
such as speech writing, political liaison, and the provision of
specialistknowledgeand contacts,adviserswere sometimesthought to be
of assistanceto officials in more subtleways. Referencewas made in
Chapter 7, SectionC, to Klein and Lewis's view that adviserscould be
both allies and adversariesof officials on policy matters. It is
probably relevant to considerthis within the framework described in
Chapter3 of both the partnershipmodelbetweenministers and officials,
and the placeof advisersas the ministers' trustedconfidants. Based
on his experience of how policy analystscan operate in the United
States, Walter Williams thoughtthat in the UK, 'in small quantities
competent policy advisers may evenbe considered valuable by civil
servants in helping ministersto rid themselvesof nonsenseand to
understand the framework and argumentsusedby the civil servants'
(p. 173). He felt that the notion of confidencewas very important and
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was alwaysdouble-edged.Therefore, as somebodyloyal to the minister,
and trustedby him, the expert specialadvisercould sometimes ensure
the minister was madeawareof the right information; but, on other
occasions could sayto the minister, that the officials had not looked
in sufficient depth at a certain alternative. Similarly, in Australia,
Smith includedas one of the advantagesfor departmentsof the work of
policy orientated ministerial staff, their ability to, 'translate
departments' problems in to forms that ministers would appreciate'
(1977, p. 152).
Whilst suchideaswere not widely held in the UK, where they did
exist they were most likely to be associatedwith the third and fourth
typesof civil serviceresponse.Dyson thought that one of Brian AbelSmith's roles at the DHSS, 'was to concentratethe Minister's mind, when
it needed to be concentrated,to do somethingthat the civil service
felt needed to be done.' David Metcalf believed that the permanent
secretary, Patrick Nairne, occasionallyhoped he could use the adviser
to assistthe minister to take on boardparticular points - perhapsfrom
a civil serviceperspective. Nairne thought his weekly meetings with
advisers, especially, underBarbaraCastle,with Abel-Smith and Jack
Straw, were useful in this regard. He explainedthat aswell as being,
'a very helpful additional way in which the political emphases,
anxieties, and nuanceswould be conveyedto us officials, ' the meetings
might also give him opportunity to appealto the advisersto, 'try to
get her off this one.' To play this delicate role effectively required
a skilled adviserto havea good relationshipwith both minister and
officials. Geoffrey Otton believedhe could be quite uninhibited with
the advisersin sayingto them that he felt the minister was mistaken
about something. He commented,

I don't think anyof thepeopleI dealtwith wouldhave gone
of Statesaying,'that man Otton
runningoff to the Secretary
is still beingawkward'. I think theywouldhave gone back
saying, if they saidanything, 'the departmentis still
wonderingwhetherthis is theright thing to do andI can see
their point', or, 'perhapswe oughtto haveanother meeting'.
It wouldall havebeenquiteconstructive.
Perceptive ministers, too, could acknowledgethat this was a role
for advisersto perform. David Owen suggestedthat the Foreign Office
officials all recognizedthat working with David Stephen,'was a good
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way of getting the Foreign Secretary to be more amenable.'
Interestingly, Owen also claims in his autobiographythat had the very
experienced political journalist PeterJenkinsbeenable to agree to
become his political adviserin his first year the Foreign Secretary
might havebeenlessbrashand abrasive:'Peter would have been tough
enough to standup to me whereit was needed,particularly within the
Private Office, and I would have beena better Foreign Secretary for
having him near at hand, giving me a broaderbasewith his experience'
(1991, p. 265).

The permanentsecretaryat the ForeignOffice, MichaelPallisersaw
the liaisonrole of advisersasvery mucha two wayprocess:
They provided a channelof accessto the Secretary of State
when I didn't want to bother him. I would talk to the
advisers confident that I would get a pretty faithful
expression of the Secretaryof State'sthinking and that my
ideas would be fed by them through to him against the
background of their own experience and knowledge and
relationshipwith him. It didn't prevent one talking to him:
I talked to Secretariesof Statealmost every day while I was
permanent under secretary. It meantthat officials had an
additional point of entry, line of communication, and that
being so, I found the systemextremely helpful.
Maurice Pestonfelt that, 'the role of an adviseris sometimes to
help ministersfacereality when they were hoping for something a lot
better.' He believedthat officials recognized that influencing an
adviser could be a useful path to persuadingthe minister to accept
their argument. He gave the exampleof demographicprojections which
showedthe numberof schoolpupils was going to be less than the Labour
Party had thoughtin Opposition, and that, therefore, the number of
teachersrequired would be fewer than they had predicted. According to
Peston, 'The officials couldn't persuadethe minister of that, but I

theofficials talkedmethroughthe material, and
was ableto because
once I said, "this is not an attemptby civil servantsto underminea
LabourPartycommitment,it is just oneof the factsof life", then the
ministerwouldacceptthat.'
The analysisheresupportsthatof HecloandWildavskywho, as was
by eventhoseministers
noted,referredto the 'naggingdoubt'possessed
towardsofficials. They argued that if
who are favourablydisposed
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others were around the minister it would help the civil servants,
becauseministers could take a, 'more objective view of the uses and
abusesof civil servantsif they were not required to dependon them so
completely' (p.376). In similar vein, Adam Ridley observedthat, 'if a
minister is told one of his policies is unworkable,it helpshim to be
reassuredof this, if the specialadviserexaminesit and agrees.' The
permanent secretary at the Treasury, DouglasWass, echoed this by
stating:
It was useful if one could persuadethe specialadviser that
some particular party preference wasn't on, say for
administrativereasons... then he was a very useful ally when
the minister had also to be convincedthat the policy was not
administrativelyon. If the specialadvisercould say, 'well,
look I've beeninvolved with this for sometime and what the
department saysis absolutelycorrect, I'm afraid
', it
...
was very useful in helping to persuadethe minister.
Klein and Lewis speculatedwhetherthe willingness of Labour
advisers to rub the nosesof ministersin unpleasanttruths partly
reflected the fact that they, 'saw themselvesas having an expertise
independent of their political role' (p. 17). This theme will be
elaboratedin the sectionidentifying categoriesof effective advisers.

The DiverseandChanging$ýsjm

from Officials.

We can now explore severalfurther aspectsof the responseto advisers
from officials. The claims that the role has becomemore accepted and
formalized were examined in general. With regard specifically to
officials, there has been some drift in attitude from the more
dismissive views in the 1960sand 1974to greateracceptancein recent
years. John Hunt claimed that in the late 1960sand early 1970s, 'a lot
of civil servantswere probablydoubtful of the value of this. O.K.,
ministers wantedthis, but having it, we doubtedthe value.' By 1977,
however, he was able to tell the ExpenditureCommittee:

I think thattherehasbeensomethinglike a sea changeof
attitudessincepoliticaladvisersfirst startedcoming M.
Therehasbeenbotha recognitionby theCivil Service, which
the Civil Serviceoughtto haverecognised
a long time ago,
that thesepeoplehavesomething
genuinelyto contributein
terms of political input,political minefields, what their
chief is thinking,andsoon, andthepolitical advisers,I
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think, haveseenthat the machinehas somethingto contribute.
I have got no worries about this at all (Vol. 2 (2), pp.758-9).
In interview, he madea comparisonwith the attitude of officials
towards the CPRS,which had beenregardedwith suspicionwhen it was
established. At its demisemostofficials were sorry, and, he felt, if
the system of advisers,'were to be abandonedcompletely, most civil
servantswould think it rather a pity. '

Brian Abel-Smith felt that althoughthe role he played in the late
1960swas similar to that in the 1970s,he was somewhatmore integrated
into the structureof governmentin the latter period and experienced
less opposition. Although many officials agreethere was a move away
from the initial suspicion,it has not beenan undisturbedtrend towards
greater acceptance. In the 1960s,for example,there was thought to
have been a hardeningof attitudesafter the Labour Party gave its
evidence to the Fulton Committeeand called for an expansion in the
system. Similarly, the influx of advisersin 1974caused considerable
dismay to someofficials, partly becauseit was seenaspart of a trend

of criticismagainstthecivil service.
Generalizations aboutgrowing acceptanceare also difficult to make.
The responsevaried dependinguponindividuals, the roles they played,
their qualities, and the extentto which attitudes had hardened in a
departmentwhich hadbeenwithout advisersfor a while. SomeTory advisers
in the 1980sreportedmore hostility from the bureaucracythan most Labour
advisersclaimed to haveencountered. Furthermore, severalofficials were
less impressed with the contribution, and attitude, of advisers in the

1980sthantheyhadbeenin the 1970s.
The attitude of thecivil servantswas sometimesdifficult for
of thepragmatismnotedabove. Roger Dyson
advisersto judgebecause
thought thetypicalreactiontowardshim was, 'he is there,a) how can
you neutralizehim; b) whatvaluecanyou makeof it. ' Dysonwas also
one of severaladviserswhofelt that within the departmentsome
divisions were morecooperativeandfavourablydisposedthan others.
Stuart Sexton reportedthathis relationswith different officials
varied, but with sometherewas,'somepretty rough talking ... and
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sometimesa bitter complaint to the Secretaryof Statethat, "Sexton is
exceedinghis authority."'
Some people suggestedthat the reactiontowards advisers varied
betweendifferent levelsof the departmentalhierarchy. There was some
feeling that certain permanentsecretarieswere more favourably disposed
towardsadvisersthan officials lower in the department. Many parts of
a departmentmay have hadvirtually no contactwith an adviserand there
was inevitably some suspicionwhen suchofficials learnt that 'the
specialadviser' was comingto one of their meetings. Again the picture
is complicatedby the frequentlygood relationshipalready referred to
between advisersand the assistantsecretaryor principal heading the
private office, and by the role of someadvisersin acting asa channel
of communication betweenassistantsecretariesand the minister. In
such circumstances, the more effective political advisers were often
thought to be compatiblewith bright young officials of their own
generation. A few permanentsecretaries, however, felt that such
officials, outside the private office, might resent the advisers'
privileged accessto ministers.
One official was particularly scathing about the attitude of
permanent secretarieswho had come to regardadvisersas a convenience
and towards whom the adviserswere often deferential. He claimed that
permanentsecretariesfrequentlysaw advisersas, 'just anotherpawn in
the great game of keeping the minister contented. They largely
persuadedthemselvesthat specialadviserscan be put to many good
purposes, and they couldn't now do without them, and they can't
understand how they ever managedwithout them. Go lower down in the
hierarchy, I think you may find increasingscepticism.'

It wasclear,however,thatsomeministersexpectedtheir permanent
secretaryto smoothrelationsbetweentheadviserand the department.
Questioned
towardshis specialist
aboutwhethertherewasanyresentment
advisers,MichaelHeseltinereplied,'the permanentsecretaries
who were
involvedgavemeexemplarysupport;theywould sortout the problems.'
One further dimensionthat is difficult to unravel is the
considerablecorrelationbetweenofficials who thought highly of
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advisers,and adviserswho were generallyregardedaseffective. Whilst
civil servants would inevitably tend to have a higher regard for
effective advisers, it could be arguedthat one factor in increasing
their effectiveness,was operatingin a receptiveenvironment. However,
certain officials who valued advisers'work thought some were much
better than others, which suggeststhat it is the quality of the adviser
that is the most important factor. Nevertheless,even the most talented
advisers would find it difficult to work in a department where most
officials adoptedthe attitudesoutlined in category(i).
SECTION E

AMBIGUITIES 21 JU

ROLE.

A possiblelimitation in the role of advisers,illustrated in some of
the above comments from politicians and bureaucrats, lies in the
inherent ambiguity in their position. As we saw in Chapter2 they are
politically appointedto play a political role, and, in most cases, are
in the sameposition as ministersin that they may not see the papers
presentedto ministersof a previousadministration. And yet, they are
civil servants and bound, in theory, by most of the restrictions on
political activities imposedon civil servants,even though the position
has eased a little. Severalpeoplereferred to advisers as being
'hybrids' and others suggestedthey were, 'neither fish nor fowl'. We
have already seen(Chapter3 SectionC) that the position of advisers
could be regardedas being anomalousin the British and similar systems.
Doubt about the legitimacy of their role helpsexplain the hostility or
reservations of somecivil servantsand of politicians who take the
'traditional' view that in the systemof governmentthere should be only
elected politicians and permanent'non-political' officials, and that

the special advisersareneitherandsohaveno placein the system.
This view is now, ironically, somewhatsharedby Tony Benn:
thereshouldreallyonly be two waysof gettingto the top in
political power. One is by careerand the other is by
election,andthething aboutadvisersis that, althoughI had
excellentones who did a first ratejob andwere people of
total integrity,if it's possiblefor peopleto creepto the
top by patronage,evenministerialpatronage,there is a
dangerin that; andthereforemuchbetterto bring in electedMPs
andusethemfor the collectivecontrolof a department.
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Various advisersthought this ambiguity created difficulties and
reduced their effectiveness. The point was developed at length by
Darlington (1976). He cites a letter of his to the New Statesman
shortly after the appointmentof Labour advisers:
It is important that the civil servicecode is not forced upon
political advisers,sincepersonsappointedbecauseof their
partisan commitment lose someof their value if they are
compelledto abandonmuch of the party political activity that
demonstratesthat commitment. If this processis allowed to
continue, there will be a tendencyto treat us as a special
breed of civil servant,which we are not. This political
castration should be opposednow, before it becomes the
establishednorm (17 May 1974).
The letter, he comments,'led to a rebukefrom Number Ten which rather
makesthe point' (p.55). He also claims that during the 1975referendum
campaign, political adviserswho wished to work for the campaign by
anti-market ministerswere supposedto resign, but those assisting promarket ministerswere not expectedto do so. In practice, no advisers
were forced to resign, but Tony Banksillustrated the problems that
could arise. He recalledthat he and JackStraw helpedorganizea press
they had been asked
conference for Ministers again ft M;
questions and were reportedin the papers. The permanent secretary
called Banks in and soughtto establishthe basisof his appointment.
An associateddifficulty noted by several advisers was also
described by Brown and Steel: 'Their position is inevitably a rather
vulnerable one' (p.331). Suchadvisersbelievedtheir position, and
that of their colleagues,was entirely dependenton support from the
minister. They recognizedthat however strong their place appeared,
there was no guaranteeit would survive a changeof minister. Margaret
Beckett felt sheenjoyedJudith Hart's confidence,and enjoyed working
with her and respectedher, but shecame to realize it was 'a vulnerable
position'. Her clout dependedtotally on her relationship with Hart.

It wouldhavebeendifficult hadthe relationshipweakened
or Hart begun
to rely less on her advice:'It wasa strangeposition, you had no
political baseof your own, youoperatedonly throughyour relationship
with the minister.'
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A relatedproblem mentionedby certain adviserswas the uneasefelt
by some about their pay and conditionsand a general feeling that,
accordingto Chris Butler,
the rules of work are not adaptedto us as special advisers,
nor is there the correct degreeof opennessthat you might
expect. I am not sayingthere is openhostility, there isn't,
but there are all sortsof ways, subtle and unsubtle, of
making you feel different and apart from the rest of the flow.
Whatever the difficulties of integrating into the bureaucracy,
advisers haveto adaptto the civil servicecodesto some extent, and
therefore inevitably become somewhat removed from their party
background. Being, Butler observed,'in a sensein purgatory between
your party and the Civil Servicemeansthat the perquisites of either
will be deniedto you.' (1986, p. 18). The ambiguity also helps explain
the lack of clarity in the functionsof someadvisers.
To be effective, and overcomethe ambiguity, many respondents
thought advisersmust havethe ability to work with the civil service,
but not be absorbedby it. Lord Gowrie observedthat to be successful
in a department an adviserhad to, 'work simultaneously with, and
against, the grain of the culture.' One official believed, however,
that to be closely integrated,but not fully absorbed,into a department
involved, 'a contradictionwhich is insuperable. That is the objection
to having them.' Becauseadviserscould not act as either officials or
ministers, he believedthat the role requiredextraordinary qualities if

it was to be performedproperly; so few adviserspossessthese
abilitiesthat therole shouldbe discontinued.
Starting from a similar position, that of regarding advisers as
operating at the point wherethe administrativeand political systems
meet, it is possibleto developthe argumentin different directions.
First, some believe there will inevitably be tension. Successful
advisers often had to fight to achievethings, including access to
certain papers. The tensionneed not necessarily be destructive.
Gwilym Prys-Davieswas one of severaladviserswho thought it could be
creative. He wished to see the Welsh Office play more of an
anticipatory role even if, as we notedearlier, this could lead to
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conflict. He believedthat althoughthe civil servicethought he was
sometimes too critical of their papers,he had to be frank with them.
Someministerswho were generallyfavourably disposedtowards the civil
service, neverthelesswantedadviserswho would combine their expertise
with the independenceof the advisoryposition to stimulatenew thinking
in the department and developradical policies. Roy Jenkins, for
example, said that Anthony Lester's, 'role was to be a slight irritant
to the department... [But] He was very good at getting on with the
department and certainly wasn't such an irritant as to be
counterproductivefrom his own point of view. '
There was a degreeof ambiguity in Lester'sposition. Jenkins was
known to favour advisers who argued,in the words of Lester, 'to
solutions and not to dogmaticconclusions', but he was determined that
the legislation on sexand race discrimination should be introduced. It
has beennotedhow Lester was concernedto adopt the civil serviceethos
and he believedasfar as possiblethe civil serviceshould do the type
of thing he was doing becauseit would be destructive of moral and
career structureto havetoo many outsiderscoming in. Despite that,
Lester recognizedthat Jenkinsconsideredthat to achieve the desired
changes,it would be helpful to havesomebodyin the ambiguous position
of being in 'creative tensionwith the department'. Notwithstanding his
previous commentsLester claimed,
it is very hard for insidersto perform the role I was
performing. It requiresnot only a commitmentbut also an
obsessionalcommitment,working extraordinarily hard to get a
point of view acrossandbattle in Whitehall ... it also
requires a breadthof vision for somebodywho is inside the
systemto takeon boardvaluesfrom outside.
From this perspective it could be argued that it is the peculiar
position occupied by the adviserthat, whateverthe difficulties, is
crucial in enabling him to makea unique contribution.

Interviewees
alsosometimes
commented
on the ambiguityin terms of
the freewheeling
natureof therole. Many advisersandsomeothersfelt
that this was an advantage,especiallywhen comparedwith the
difficulties thatmightariseif advisersweretied in moretightly to
the structureof thedepartment:
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The specialadvisermust exploit his inherentambiguity
I
...
in
the
worked around, and closeconjunction with,
private
office; but if ever I sensedwoodennessor obstruction, I
could simply go elsewherewithout breachingformal procedures
or appearingdisloyal. The great strengthof specialadvisers
in policy making is that they can chancetheir arm, or on
occasions float a kite for civil servants, without everyone
being solemnlycommittedin advance. This gives considerable
flexibility (Tim Boswell).
A lot of our value andpower is derived from the ability to
'float like a butterfly and sting like a bee', and to go in at
whatever point we like within the system... our power was
derived from the minister, rather than from a particular point
within the structureof the ministry (Chris Butler).
In doing one's job it is a great help not to have a formal
placein the civil servicehierarchy,becauseif one had such
a formal placeone would often havebeendealing with people
who had higher statusand that would havebeenan inhibition
on speakingstrongly and bluntly and being irritating, as on
occasionone has to be in a polite way (David Coleman).
I did talk to anyoneand went to any meeting that sounded
interesting and reported back very freely to any of the
ministersand I thoughtthat was valuable. I thought the lack
of position within the administrativechain of commandwas a
huge advantage(StellaGreenall).
The specialadviser'spower baseis the minister, first and
last, and that is all he needs... It is a great mistake to
set up a spirit of antagonismwith the civil servants but
neverthelessone doesneedto be independent. There would be
the dangerif one were more firmly part of the machine that
you'd get the private secretaryor permanentsecretaryleaning
on you (RodneyLord).
The argumentsare complexbecausethe ambiguity has different
aspects. Many advisers,including someof thosequoted above, would
have liked the terms and conditionsapplied to the systemof advisersto
have beenclarified and someof the discontinuitiesremoved. Boswell,
for example,referred to anomaliesbetweenthe treatment of different
individuals in a variety of areasincluding access to secretaries.
Butler has beenquotedon both sidesof this discussionand was one of
several who thought that although someof the terms and conditions
should be clarified, officially raising someof the points about the
precise role of adviserscould causeproblems and might be best left
alone. As Ted Short discovered,attemptsto regulatespecifically for
adviserscan lead to trouble. Similarly, in Australia, Smith comments,
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'One suggestion, persistently made,was that the roles of advisers
should have been more rigidly defined. As should by now be clear,
trying to write detailedjob descriptions would have created more
trouble and anomaliesthan it was worth' (1977p. 156).
Whilst a freewheelingrole is perhapsinevitably part of the model
of the place of specialadvisers,and might perhapsbe appealingto some
advisers,it has beenarguedthat it might limit their ability to tackle
some of the root causesof problems facedby ministers. Edwin Plowden
is quotedby Hennessy(1989, p.21 1) as telling Ted Heath in relation to
Conservative plans in the 1960sfor the introduction of businessmen,
'One thing I do know about Whitehall is, if you have people floating
about in it, they will do no good and probably do harm.' Unlike the
businessmen,the advisershavehad someanchorageby being attached to
ministers. It was claimed that the cabinetproposalhad been welcomed
by organizationsrepresentingseniorcivil servantsin part because it
helped to put the role of political appointments and established
officials on a clearerfooting (IOD, 1986a). In interview John Hoskyns
argued there was a needfor a group of advisersand if they were going
to play a think tank role within departmentsthey neededto be in a
team, not freewheelingindividuals. How far advisershave played the
role of a policy initiator or analysthasvaried greatly, but examples
of advisers influencing policies can be identified, and will be
discussedin the next chapter.
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CHAPTER

NINE:EXAMPLES

AM

CHARACTERISTICS

QEEFFECTIVENESS.
SECTION A

IMPACT QN POLICIES.

Policy formulation was seenin Chapter3 to be an extremely complex
process and new policies are usually the product of the interaction of
many forces. Isolating the impact madeby any individual on policies is
very difficult and often controversial. In Australia, Walter commented,
although adviserscan identify caseswhere they had direct influence,
' most of their work is far more indeterminatein its effects seeking
...
to tracethe influenceof individuals is a somewhat artificial quest'
(p. 159-60). Nevertheless, becausethe analysisby Hall rA Al, (1975)
suggestedthat there were many variations in the pattern of influences
on policy makingin the UK, it was claimed earlier that room could be
left for adviserssometimesto play a part. Although the analysisbelow
concentrateson discussinghow adviserscould influence policy, the
majority of advisers believed they had not made a significant
contribution to policy development,and many instanceswere cited where
advisersmadepolicy suggestionswhich were not adopted.
The diversity of advisers' involvement, in ways that officials
cannot alwaysmatch, again underlinestheir potential effectiveness in
bringing flexibility to the system of government. Advisers can
contribute one or more of the following attributes: political
commitment; a backgroundof having worked on party policies; committed
expertise;practical experience;links with outsidegroups; independence
from the department. In some of the roles it is difficult to
distinguish between an advisermakingan independent contribution or
acting on behalf of his minister. For most advisers involvement in
policy consideration was usually in the reactive mode, but the
circumstancesin which a more proactiverole could be adoptedinclude:

- havinga continuingimpacton policieswhich theadviserhadhelpedto
formulatein Opposition;
- actingascatalyst,promoter,or sponsorof a policy;
- workingwithin a frameworksetby the ministerto developpolicies to
achievehis objectives,perhapsin conjunctionwith officials;
- helpingto developnewpolicy themesthroughdiscussingissueswith
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the minister;

devise a strategy or policy
- helping the minister and officials
framework for the department;
- originating new policies as a result of using specialist knowledge
and/or ideological commitment to analyse a problem, perhaps in
conjunctionwith officials;
- being a conduit for, and analystof, policy ideasgeneratedby policy
researchcentres;
- openingup issuesby analysingsubmissionsfrom officials and possibly
proposingalternativeoptions;
- discussing,evennegotiating, with pressuregroupsand bringing their
concerns to the departmentand/or generatingsupport from them for
policy options;
he is making his decision;
- discussingissueswith the minister when
- developingpolicies to go in the party manifesto;
- using the advisoryposition in an adventitiousway to take an interest
in particular issues which were not related to the reasons for
appointment.
Advisers often participated in several of these activities,
sometimes on the sameissue. Generallytheir role could be that of
either protagonistsor analysts. A complexand lengthy analysis would
be required to matchexamplesof advisers' involvement in specific
policies, with eachof theseactivities. It is possibly clearerin the
first instance, wherethe advisers(for example,Brian Abel-Smith on
pensions and healthpolicy, Stuart Holland on industrial policy, and
Arthur Cockfield on tax reforms) had participatedin creatingpolicies in
Opposition. Even here, however,tracing their preciserole through each
of the possiblelater stageswould be complicated.
Instead, several exampleswill be provided of advisers who were
widely thought to be influential on policy, sometimesin particular ways
that illustrate generalpoints. In his November 1974 Budget, Denis
Healey introducedtax relief on companies'stock appreciation. Healey,
in his autobiography,claims that, 'this tax relief was Nicky Kaldor's
invention, and his most valuablecontribution to my work at the
Treasury' (p.393). Otherswere calling for sometype of stock relief
(see,for example,MacDougall's accountof his role at the Confederation
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of British Industry, 1987,p.213). Nevertheless,in interview, Healey
saw the tax relief as his adviser'sinitiative and, whilst Kaldor worked
closely with the Inland Revenue,'without him the stock relief would
never have taken place.' Similarly Kaldor's biographer, Thirwall,
suggests, 'one major success,which inside the Treasury was entirely
Kaldor's invention, was the introduction of stock appreciation tax
relief for companies'(1987, p.254). This is a good illustration of the
argument referred to in Chapter3 that demonstratingan adviser had an
impact on specific policies did not necessarilyshow the individual (let
alone all advisers)to be generally, influential on policy. Overall
from 1974-6 Kaldor's 'influence on the Chancellor was minimal'
(Thirwall, p.250) and less than in the 1964-7period.
In addition to helping Geoffrey Howe carry into Government various
policies developedin Opposition,Adam Ridley was responsible,according
to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancasterand Minister for the Arts,
Lord Gowrie, for the 'lion's shareof the work' on developing the
proposalsfor tax relief on charitablegiving.
We have seenhow Michael HeseltinerecruitedTom Baron in 1979 to
help find solutionsto variousproblemsthat hadbeen identified by the
incoming minister. Baron's influencewas not limited to the months in
which he was in the department. He changedattitudesin the department
and thereforehelpedinfluencepolicies even after he had left. He had

an impact on policiesand/orhelpeddraft Circulars on housing and
planningmatters,includinglandavailabilityandbuilding regulations.
Furthermore,he assistedin urban renewalpolicies, devising some
schemesand encouragingother volume builders to participate in
activities,includingthedocklandsredevelopment.
In his long spellasadviserat theDepartmentof Industry (later
DTI), JeffreySterlingwasinvolvedwith manyissues.The minister who
first appointedhim, PatrickJenkin,believedthatit would have been
impossibleto havemovedsoquicklyinto the newpolicy of privatizing
British Telecom(BT) withoutSterling's,'expertise,rangeof contacts,
immediate,quick, graspof exactlywhat it waswe wereneedingto do,
and how we weregoingto do it. ' Oneof the key thingsSterling could
do, andthatJenkinfelt nobodyin thedepartment
couldhavedone, was
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to liaise with the City and check whetherwhat was then the new concept
of privatization, with proper regulationof prices, would be saleable.
Jenkin also usedSterling's servicesto ensureBT's SystemX was sorted
out: 'Jeffrey put that togetherin six weeks... going round and round,
getting to know the people- he knew quite a lot of them already - but
gradually actually putting the thing together and seeing the way
through; nobody in Whitehall could havedone that; they tell me they
couldn't. ' According to a SundayTimes profile, Sir Jeffrey, 'is asked
to do sensitivework becausehe is thought to do it better than a bright
civil servant. His triumph over SystemX, ... is a casein point' (8
May 1988). Similarly, Fryer (1989)reports that when the computer chip
company, Inmos, was sold off to Thorn EMI, 'Sir Jeffrey did more than
advise, he actually took part in the negotiations.'
On becoming Home Secretaryin 1983, Leon Brittan worked out a
complete strategy for the departmentand claimed it would have been
difficult, 'to have worked out a coherentstrategywhich made political
sensewithout the assistanceof a specialadviser.' The contribution of
the adviser, Robin Harris, was particularly important in planning the
strategyfor the Criminal Justicesystem. Having describedthe problem
of the tyranny of casework and shortterm crisis managementin the Home
Office, Hennessy(1989, p. 459) observesthat, 'Leon Brittan managed to
offend the hard and soft elementsin society during his ill-starred Home
Secretaryship in the mid-1980s, but in attempting to solve this
perpetual problem he excelledand his efforts havebeen recognised by
knowledgeableoutsiders.'
During his time as an adviserin two departments, Maurice Peston
illustrated how an advisercould contributeto a rangeof policies in a
variety of ways. Pestoninfluencedthe educationsectionof the October
1974Labour election manifesto. His minister at the DES, Reg Prentice,
describedPeston'sgeneralrole to Knight: 'I appointedMaurice Peston
as my SpecialAdviser. We had to createLabour's education policy as
far asit went The Party's schoolspolicy was devisedby myself and
...
Peston,Ernie Armstrong [Minister of State] and William Pile [permanent
secretary]' (1990, p. 88). One field in which Pestonsubsequentlyhad an
impact was the Adult Literacy Scheme. He thought he was more of a
catalyst or sponsorthan an originator of the proposals, being in a
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position to help canalizethe energiesof ChristopherPrice, a powerful
backbencher. He was instrumentalin seeingsomefunding was obtained
for the schemeandworked constructivelywith the Minister of State,
Gerry Fowler.
Roy Hattersley, Peston'sminister at the DPCP, referred to several
ways in which adviserscould influencepolicy but found it difficult to
remember exactly how new ideasstartedbecause they would generally
emerge from the eveningdiscussionshe quite often held with a group
including his advisers, private secretaries,Gavyn Davies from the
Number Ten Policy Unit, and Lord Williams, Chairman of the Price
Commission. In relation to one of the policies, the converting of
prices policies into an efficiency and competitionpolicy, Peston did
not think he was the originator, but was one of the key people who
developedthe view that policy should move in that direction. A further
way in which Pestoncould influencepolicy, accordingto Hattersley, was
that when submissionscameto him, 'Pestonand John Burgh were two
deputy secretarieswho would have the two final notes, so that I would
be getting the departmentalpolicy just slightly pushed in my
direction.'
A more detailedassessment
of the contribution of adviserswill be
made for two contrastingpolicy issues- the Sex Discrimination Act,
1975, and the AssistedPlacesScheme. In eachcaseI have drawn upon
previous detailedresearch.
Comments from other suchauthors,however, illustrate someof the
complexities when making a thoroughanalysisof the role of an adviser
in policy making. Two books on sex discrimination law written by
lawyers stressthe importanceof Anthony Lester's role. Beloff (1976,
p. iv) refers to Lester as the 1975Act's 'onlie begetter', and Pannick
(1985, preface)describesLester asbeing, 'the father and mother of sex
discrimination law in the United Kingdom.' Other researchers
(Callender, 1979; Meehan, 1985), whilst acknowledging Lester's role,
stressthe wider economic,socialand political factors that led to the
legislation. They do identify, however, Lester's earlier part in the
movement for anti-discriminationlegislation. He had already worked
with Roy Jenkinson race relations legislation in the 1960sand was a
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member of a Labour Party Study Group on Discrimination Against Women
which produced a final report in 1972 entitled Discrimination Against
The findings of that study group formed part of the evidence
before a House of Lords Select Committee on the Anti-Discrimination
Women.

Bill (Meehans,p.214).
It hasalready beennotedhow Lester was recruited primarily to, in
Jenkins's words, 'deal specifically with sex discrimination, race
relations, and racial equality.' Jenkinswas seenasbeing personally
committed to the introduction of legislation in these fields. When
asked whether Lester's role was to fill in the details within the
framework setby the minister, Jenkinsreplied, 'Yes, but he was also to
someextentan initiator as well, he kept me firmly in thosedirections.
He worked out the details, and he had a very high classlegal mind and
was extremelygood on the issues.' Lester's detaileddrafting work on
Women (Cmnd.5724), and later on
the White Paper, Equalfty f
instructions for the drafting of the Bill havealso been referred to
earlier.
Lester had a particularly influential role not only becauseof his
committed expertisein this field, but also becauseJenkinswas, in his
own words, 'a fairly detachedHome Secretary.' Wider issuessuch as the
debate about British membershipof the EEC were of greater concern to
him than disputesabout the detailsof the Sex Discrimination Bill. It
could be arguedthat the Secretaryof Stateshould have devoted more
time to motivating the civil servantsto produce the legislation he
desired. In the contextof the debateabout the role of advisers,
however, it might be thought it was sensiblefor a senior minister to
recruit an expert who sharedhis valuesto advancea major reform, thus
leaving the minister greateropportunity to engagein perhapsthe more
important political debate of the time. Furthermore, as Jenkins
explains in his autobiography, whereasin his first term as Home
Secretaryhis emphasishadbeenon promoting liberal laws, in his second
period, 1974-6, he saw his primary task as, 'the maintenanceof the
proper authority of the state' (p.376). Therefore, in the 1970s, his
human rights instincts, 'required a little stimulation' and, he
comments,
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given the change in my order of priorities, it was both
desirableand necessaryto haveLester there to keep me up to
the mark.
Together we had producedby the end of that summerof 1974 a
Sex Discrimination White Paper, which was both a sensible and
a popular addition to the Government's manifesto for the
Octoberelection, and which was turned into legislation in the
1974-5 session.'Together' was the right word, for although
Lester wrote the White Paperalmost single-handedhe required
a good deal of Secretaryof Statesupport, for there was more
departmentaloppositionat upper-middlelevel than I had ever
previously encountered(p. 376).
Lester's workload was so great he arrangedfor the appointment of
Angela Byre to assisthim. According to Jenkins, 'she did thatjob very
well. ' She felt that in the areaof employmentlaw and tribunals, where
shehad specialistknowledge,shewas able to influence the legislation,
'to a small extent'. Shearguedthat the minister was sold on the
legislation, 'but Anthony Lester substantiallyinfluenced the way it
emergedin a tangible form - he knew how race relations provisions could
work and understoodthe technicalways of producing legislation.' She
suspectedthat without the advisersthe policy would not have been
turned so quickly from a vaguecommitmentinto a pieceof legislation.
The advisers, shethought, strengthenedthe minister's position when
somecivil servantsand other ministersquestionedthe proposals:
in breaking new ground you havegot to have strong arguments
for doing it in a particular way becausepeople are naturally
cautious and conservativeabout doing it and, therefore, if

you have good technicalexpertiseat your elbow that can
explain how to do it, andgiveyou a goodmeansof doing it,
youarelikely to carrymuchmoreclout.

Both advisersagreedthat Lester did not get his own way all the
time. Lester explained that given the aim was to eliminate unfair
discrimination, the meansfor doing so was a matter of argument: 'I
was, in effect, in the leadon the formulation of policy with other full
time permanent officials expressing opinions about that, and the
Secretary of State, asit were, having to form a view sometimes when
there were disagreementsbetweenus.'

The disputesweregenerallyaboutthenatureof the legislation,
not overwhetherthereshouldbe legislationat all, but, accordingto
from within the civil
Rendel (1978, p.900), 'considerable
resistance
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service had to be overcome.' NeverthelessLester felt that he worked
pretty well with officials, especiallyafter the position of the Labour
Governmenthad beenstrengthenedby the October 1974election, and some
of the officials dealingwith the legislation had been changed. He
described the role of the specialist adviser as being, 'brokering
business, getting the policy through, winning arguments.' He visited
the United Stateswith Roy Jenkinsand learnt important lessons about
anti-discriminationlegislation there.
The importanceof Lester's role is widely accepted; Brian Cubbon
agreed he did the detailedwork on the White Paperand described his
position on the discrimination issueas 'dominant'. Cubbon felt that,
'it was more inertia than obstruction', that Lester faced. There is
also someway of reconciling someof the apparently contrasting views
about the influenceson the Act setout at the start of this exposition.
Thus, whatever the strengthand natureof the various forces that
created the situationin which it was thought appropriateto introduce
sex discrimination legislation, Lester clearly did influence its precise
content. Callender, however,also examinedthe role of various women's
groups and, using the frameworkprovided by Hall gi al., claimed that
their, 'numerous and varied activities provided the legitimacy,
feasibility and supportnecessaryfor legislation.' This claim is
perhapsmost contestablein relation to the feasibility argument. Byre
argued that although sheand Lester were pushingthe proposals further
(and the civil servantswere sayingthey had gone far enough), they were
not doing so becauseof what pressuregroupswere saying. However, she
continued:

We werehelpedby the factthatpressuregroupsmade a very
powerful casewhichwe couldargue... it wasvery useful to
be able to channelthearguments
thatyou probably thought
werecorrectanyway,... 'it hasbeenmadevery forcefully to
us', whereassomeof the time it is the argumentyou would
havebeenputting.
Meehans shows how the women's groupswere active in canvassing
Jenkins and the relevantParliamentaryUnder Secretary of State, Dr
Shirley Summerskill, and she examinesthe response of the InterOrganisationalCommittee, the umbrellaorganisationfor women's groups,
to the publication of the SexDiscrimination Bill in March 1975. The
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committeeproduceda long document:
in which it was statedthat many of their original points had
been met. They particularly welcomedthe inclusion of the
idea of indirect discrimination stemming from acts not
necessarily intended to be discriminatory. According to a
participant, however, this was not included asa result of
British women'sgroupsbut on American advice(p. 53).
Once again Lester's role, in travelling to America with Jenkins, was
influential. In generalit maybe concludedthat although there would
havebeena SexDiscrimination Act had Lester not beenappointed,he did
influence its final shape.
It is widely agreedthat Stuart Sexton exerted a considerable
influence on the AssistedPlacesSchemeintroducedin Section 17 of the
1980 Education Act. About 5,000 means-tested
placeswere to be made
available eachyear to academicallyable children whose parents could
not afford the full feesat independentschools. The state was to
reimbursethe schoolsfor feesremitted for the selectedpupils. It is
a controversialmeasure:'From the outset,it was defendedand attacked
with a fervour quite disproportionateto its modestscale' (Edwards,
&1., 1989, p. 1). Their researchshowsdoubtsexist about how far
Sexton was the originator of the scheme,because,'the proposals taken
up by the ConservativeParty in 1976had been devised and actively
promotedby headsof direct-grantschools' (p.35). Furthermore, Sexton
wantedmuch higher targetsfor numbersof placesthan others advocated.
But, 'while these are reasonsfor doubting claims that he is the
"acknowledged architect" of the AssistedPlacesScheme,his importance
as its "intellectual broker" is certainly evident' (p.36). Similarly,
Salter and tapper(1985, p. 198) sayof Sexton: 'Although the eventual
schemecannotbe said to be his personalproduct he undoubtedlyleft his
mark. His role is bestdescribedas that of the intellectual broker,
although ideasdo not originate with him he hasthe vital function of
transforming them into an acceptablepolitical form'.

Knight (1990, p.8) refers to Sexton as, 'instrumental in
formulatingmuchof Tory educationpolicy for the 1979Generalelection,
including the AssistedPlacesScheme',andEdwardsra al. (1989, p.36)
demonstrate
for it evenamongstConservative
thatenthusiasm
politicians
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was limited, and,
there was no discerniblecontribution to its making from the
many other policy advisers(formal and informal) who had been
engagedin preparingtheir Party for office. Even St. John
Stevas and his shadowsuccessor,Mark Carlisle,
... showed
only intermittent interest in it and Sexton'sown consistent
enthusiasm was thereforeinvaluablein enlisting political
supportfor the Scheme.
EdwardsC1al., describesomeof the stepstaken by Sexton, both to
ensure that the schemebecameofficial Conservative policy, and to
devisethe plansin great detail. His activities includedpromoting the
schemewithin the private sectorand identifying schoolslikely to offer
places and the terms on which they would be willing to do so. He was,
'determined to establish,by the time the Conservatives returned to
office, that there were enough schools willing to enter into a
contract' (p.31).

Sexton's role couldbe describedasdevelopingthe feasibility of
the scheme,althoughhe wasalsoconcerned
to increaseand demonstrate
its supportandlegitimacy. As with the discussion
of Lester's role,
the accountof the part played by Sextonbuilds on commentsmadealready
in various sectionsof this book. The role that Sexton had played in
generalin helping to developpolicy in Opposition, and particularly his
work on the Assisted PlacesScheme,led to his being one of the
comparatively few advisersappointedin 1979. In interview, Carlisle
statedthat the AssistedPlacesScheme,

was goingto requirea gooddealof pushto get it through,
firstly, becauseit wasnot a policy that was particularly
therewerea fair number of
popular with the department,
in
it
critics thearea;also neededa greatdealof work and
he'd been heavily involvedin it in advanceand knew the
people andschoolswho wouldlike to takepart, andwas very
importantandrelevantin thatarea.
Given, however,that the schemewas a manifesto commitment, once
the party had beenelected, andthe incoming minister confirmed his
support, it has beenarguedin interview by an official that the adviser
need not haveinfluencedthe policy any more becausethe civil service
would ensureits implementation. This proposition can be examined by
considering the progressof the proposals. As alwaysat a change of
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Government, the civil servantspresentedthe new minister with their
assessmentof how to implement the manifestoproposals. According to
Edwardsti L Sexton'sdetailedplan was larger in scopethan this, but,
'was certainly not ready-madefor implementation' (p. 37). Carlisle
reported that he instructedofficials that Sexton was to be involved,
with Lady Young, the Minister of State, in developingthe scheme. It
could be arguedthat the differencesbetweenSexton's plan and that
drawn up initially by officials suggestthat without Sexton's input,
the final schemewould havebeenmore restricted; but the differences
between Sexton's blueprint and the final Act, as implemented, imply
there were limitations on his influence.
Before considering someof the details of Sexton'srole, we can
consider several generalassessments.Edwardsgl g1. (1989, p. 35-6)
refer to, 'the crucial role in the developmentof the Scheme',played by
Sexton, 'both as a "broker" mediatingbetweenthe pressuregroup and the
relevantcivil servantsand asa direct influence on the decisionswhich
were being madeby ministers.' They identified severalfactors which,
together, 'all enabledhim to influence the details of the eventual
schemeas no minister would havebeenable or would have wantedto do.'
These factorsincluded: his long experiencein Opposition as a political
adviser; his regular presencein the DES; his commitment to assisted
places and his relative freedom from other responsibilities; and his
many contactsin the private sector. In terms of the distinction used
earlier, Sexton was a protagonistnot an analyst. In reviewing the
evaluationby Edwards1 al., one of thejunior ministers of the period,
Rhodes Boyson, saidof the schemethat, 'it was really the child of
18 May
Stuart Sexton - the indefatigablepolitical adviser' (,
1990).
Salter and Tapper (1985) suggestthat when the Assisted Places
legislation was framed, the traditionally important role of DES
officials (asdescribedin their earlier, 1981, study) was erodedby the
degreeof detailedpreparationwhich Sextonhad deliberately engaged in
to avoid the schemebeing emasculatedby the caution of officials or a
ministerial change of priorities. Knight also states, based on
information from Mark Carlisle, that, 'in 1979the APS was opposed by
most Conservatives involved in Education,and was not popular at the
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DES' (pp.147-8).
In an interestinganalysisEdwardsgl al. (1989, p.36-7) describe
the influence of the independentschools' representatives,and of career
civil servants,as well asthat of Sextonon the contentsof the scheme.
Although the leadingfigures in the independentschools' campaign had
come to value Sexton's, 'promotional skills and his energy', when the
details had to be worked out, they 'welcomed the clarity which civil
servantsbrought to early discussionsaboutthe terms of the Scheme and
their relative wariness abouthow dependenton assisted places any
independent school could afford to become.' Having referred to the,
'interaction betweencommitmentand practicality' in the final shaping
of the scheme,the authorsstate:
we found no evidencethat the civil servantsresponsible for
constructing a workable AssistedPlacesScheme were either
dilatory, or obstructive, or uneasy about the close
cooperationwith the private sectorwhich it involved ... The
civil servants had to consider(as Sexton did not) the
possible impact of the schemeon the public sector, and the
consequentneedto initiate at least nominal consultationwith
local authorities and teacherunions There was a more
...
general contrast too, notedin an internal DES memorandum,
between Sexton's dedicationto the detailed application of
'his' particular scheme,and the obligation of civil servants
to assessthe meritsof variousalternatives.
Many of thesepoints reflect the discussionin Chapter3 with the
officials being seento havevalues, suchas equity, which mean that,
whilst they will implement manifestoproposals,they are concernedabout
the long term maintenanceof the systemasa whole. As we saw, public
administratorsconform to public organizationnorms and, 'are concerned
with establishingan equitableand accountablesystemin which the work
of the schoolscan take place.' (Koganand Van Der Eyken, 1973p.65).
Carlisle statedin interview that they were under pressurenot to

go aheadwith the scheme,but Sextonwasvery supportive.He thoughtit
wouldbe, 'slightly overstatingit' to sayit wouldnot havegone ahead
therehelped.' SalterandTapper (1985,
withouthim, but 'his presence
p.204)claim that,
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Although the preparationfor the necessarylegislation was
proceedingvery smoothly in a technical sense,the scheme was
running into rough political waters. In a memo to the
Secretary of StateSexton clearly suspecteda perfidious
DES: 'It is infuriating ...
to read so many inaccurate
"authoritative" accountsof the AssistedPlacesScheme At
...
the approrpiatetime I would ask that I be allowed to write
a
Scheme,
be
the
to
concise,
accurate
summary
of
made
short,
public as a pressrelease,and I would rather I write it and
you checkedit. Ratherthan the PressOffice or anyone else
in the DES'.
Edwardsgl al. (1989, p.40) alsodescribeSexton'svarious activities
aimed at ensuringcontinuedministerial supportwhen the scheme faced
hostility. He drafted a statement,which Carlisle incorporated almost
unchanged into a speech,giving the clearestcommitmentto the scheme.
He also wrote severalmemorandato Carlisle, including one expressing
alarm at rumours that the schememight 'be dropped altogether' and
referring to a manifestocommitmentthat, 'could not havebeenclearer.'
Here Sextonwas acting as 'Keeper of the Ark of the Manifesto' -a role
we saw earlier (Chapter4 SectionB) that he accepted.
The greatest threat to the scheme came from the controversy
surroundingthe increasein public expenditurefrom a measureto support
independent schools,at a time of proposedcuts in public expenditure
elsewhere. Sexton was anxiousfor the schemeto be introduced as
rapidly as possiblesothat it could involve a large number of pupils,
and be confirmed a success,before the next election, thus making it
difficult to dismantleeven if Labour won. The decision was finally
madeto go aheadwith the scheme,but on a smaller scalethan originally
intended, rather than postponeit. In discussingwhetherthe decision
representeda victory or defeat,Edwardsg1 I. (1989, p.41) conclude:
'in view of Carlisle's reputationfor weaknessin defending educational
expenditure, and the undoubtedTreasuryand other pressuresto abandon
the Schemealtogether,its retentionin reducedform could be regarded
as a considerablevictory for the political skills of Sexton and the
independentschoollobby.'

In September1979Sextonaddressed
a meetingof the Head Masters'
Conference.Oppositionto themotionsupportingthe scheme,albeit from
a small minority, generated
somepublicity, which in turn, 'caused
problems for Sexton,who hadoutlinedthe Schemeto Conferencemembers
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with his usual fervour and was subsequentlywarned by Saville [the civil
servant who was Registrarfor IndependentSchools] that he risked
intensifying the oppositionto it by exaggeratingits scope.' (Edwards,
gl al., 1989, p.41). Their evaluationstudy also provides details of
Sexton's role in attendingmeetingsbetweenofficials and ministers;
internal meetings of officials; and departmental meetings with
outsiders,someof whom were surprisedto find an adviserpresent. This
role continuedafter the legislation had beenpassedand it had to be
implemented. Sexton's views continuedto be accepted at times, and
rejected at others. On the numberof schoolsto be included, Sexton's
initial planswent far wider thanjust the former direct - grant grammar
schools that had beenincluded in the DES's first response. Sexton
initially got his way and the letter asking for offers of placeswent to
all independentschoolsproviding secondaryeducation; the former direct
grant schoolsconstitutedabout half the total numberfinally involved.
Edwards ( g]. (1989, p.45) observe: 'Throughout the process of
recruiting suitableschools,Sextonwas more quantitatively ambitious
and less discriminating than were the civil servants ... Sexton's
advocacyof more liberal entry conditionshad only a marginal effect on
the final list. '
Whatever the limitations on Sexton'sinfluence, Carlisle agreed
that it was probably greaterthan that exertedby most special advisers
and he believed, 'it was invaluableto havehim - especially with the
implementationof the AssistedPlacesScheme.'
In Chapter 7 it was suggestedthat the type of policy, and the
degree of knowledgesurroundingit, and political consensussupporting
it, may require advisersto use different skills and do different work.
The two policies just consideredin detail were very different. The Sex
Discrimination Act was much larger in scopethan the Assisted Places
Scheme;it coveredthe concernsof other departmentsand in many aspects
raised issues about which the department had limited knowledge.
Nevertheless, there was a wide political consensusthat some such
measure should be introduced. There was no equivalent consensus
surroundingthe AssistedPlacesScheme. To this extent, Sexton, unlike
Lester, had to engagein activities aimedat ensuringthe measure was
introducedat all. Whilst Sexton'sknowledgeof which schoolsmight be
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interested in participating was valuable in demonstrating the
feasibility of the AssistedPlacesScheme,the schemedid not require
the introduction of new legal principles suchas Lester was advocating.
There were somesimilarities betweenthe policy areas,for example,
in both casesthere was a political imperative for speedyaction and in
neither case was there a clearly establishedpolicy community. The
political consensussurroundingthe sexdiscrimination legislation did
not, as we have seen,extendto the officials as would have been
necessaryfor a policy communityto have developed,and the Assisted
Places Schemedid not fall with the central concernsof the education
policy community. In thesecircumstancesthere was perhaps more room
than usualfor an individual campaignerto becomea specialadviser and
engage in whateveractivities the particular situation required, and
allowed, in relation to the formulation of new legislation, although
of the independentschoolswere also heavily involved in
representatives
planning the details of the AssistedPlacesSchemewith the DES

(Salter andTapper,1985;EdwardscL J, 1989).
Perhaps a greatercontrastin the impact of a policy area on the
work of advisersmay, ironically, be seenin the differences between
Sexton's successwith the AssistedPlacesScheme,and his and Oliver
Letwin's failure to persuadethe DES and Keith Joseph that it was
practical to introduce an EducationalVouchersScheme. This is one of
the exceptionsnoted by Holmes(1987) to his generalcomment, quoted in
Chapter 3, aboutMargaretThatcher'sGovernmentnot being deflected by
the civil service. The opinion that the civil service blocked this
scheme is vehemently expressedin 'public choice' terminology by
proponentsof the schemesuchas Seldon(1986, Summary): 'Bureaucratsas
a class must be expectedto opposeit becauseit would substantially
reduce their authority.' Other commentatorssuggest that ministers
simply came to acceptthe adviceof officials that there would be
enormousdifficulties in implementation. Letwin commented:
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it is mistaken to represent officials as if they were
obstructiveagainstthe wishesof the minister. They were in
my view wholly obstructive, but not againstthe wishesof the
minister. I think they were fulfilling their duty perfectly
well in the sensethat Sir Keith thought vouchers was an
attractiveprinciple and he would like to explore it. My job
was to explore how to do it and their job was to explore how
not.
The differencein scopebetweenthe two schemespartly explains the
different roles played by the advisers,and their degreeof success,in
advocating the adoption of the policies. Furthermore, Sexton's
knowledge about schools willing and eager to participate in any
Assisted Places Scheme,provided a strongerknowledge base than the
arguments supporting the Vouchers Scheme which were largely
theoretical despite the strengthwith which they were advocated and
somepreparatorywork undertakenby Kent County Council (Seldon). Even
the comparable experience from the United States (primarily the
experiment at Alum Rock, California, see Seldon) was much less
substantialthan that (described,for example,by Meehans)available to
Lester and others in support of the need to tackle 'indirect
discrimination'.
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SECTION $ý EXAMPLES Q EFFECTIVE ADVISERS.
The study has demonstratedthe diversenatureboth of the needs of
ministers for assistanceand of the background,recruitment, and roles
of advisers. Therefore, it would be unproductiveto attempt to produce
a full typology of adviserscovering all the possible categories.
Furthermore, the previous chapterillustrated various ways in which
adviserscould be ineffective and/or receivea hostile reactionfrom the
civil service. For thesereasonsthis section will be limited to
identifying severalcategoriesof effective advisers. The two clearest
categoriesare: 'the All-rounder' and 'the Highflier'. Of the advisers
interviewed, outstanding examplesof the former include: Brian AbelSmith, Anthony Lester, Maurice Peston,and Adam Ridley; and of the
second category: David Lipsey, Michael Portillo, and Jack Straw.
Examples of the effective work of theseadvisershave been used at
various points throughoutthis study. Favourablecomments about them
were madeby most, thoughnot necessarilyall, the ministers, officials,
and other advisers who knew of their work; and sometimes even by
politicians from the other party. Patrick Jenkin, for example,
commentedthat Jack Straw, 'was very much respectedby the department they thought he was the bestspecialadviserany minister had ever had.'
A few of the All-rounders might even havebeenin a category that
could be called the 'Depsecs'. Even the Depsecswere not, of course,
full permanentdeputy secretaries,but somehad the equivalentgrade and
status;Roy Hattersleyexplicitly stated,'Maurice Pestonworked like a
deputy secretary,with a political view. ' Roger Dyson's reference to
Abel-Smith almost becominga deputy secretarywas noted earlier. In
each case the All-rounder had many roles on policy issues, cabinet
briefing, and other areasthat involved the needfor expert knowledge
and political judgment. In somecasesthey pulled together diverse
strands within the department. The width of their role, their
perspective on issues, and their political skills, knowledge, and
commitment, distinguished them from other specialists and made it
inappropriateto regardthem as solely specialistadvisers.
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Various commentsdemonstratethe way in which their role was seen
to be broad. Brian Cubbonsaid, 'of all the specialadvisers I have
come across I think Anthony Lester was the most mature in the
argumentation and background he brought to the preparation of
legislation againstdiscrimination.' Although when he appointedLester,
whom he already regardedasa friend, Roy Jenkins specifically wanted
him to concentrateon anti-discriminationlegislation, Lester was free
to, 'pronounceon the whole rangeof Home Office affairs' in a way in
which, as we haveseen,JohnHarris was no longer able to do. In 1980
Brian Abel-Smith wrote, 'What the outsideacademicbrings to government
is not depth of knowledge,but breadthof knowledge, what he also brings
is a larger historical perspective.' A senior DHSS official echoed
these sentimentswhen he saidof Abel-Smith: 'he was right across the
board; that was one of his great merits, that he had a view across this
very large department.' Patrick Nairne said of Abel-Smith:
He is one of the world's expertson health servicesystems...
and he provided a particular degree of historical/academic
continuity in relation to the build up of the National Health
Service. He was able, againstthat background, to be an
adviser about strategy... and was also able to advise the
minister from the standpointof being a committed member of
the Labour Party.
According to DouglasWass, 'Adam Ridley, with his background in the
ConservativeResearchDepartment,his previous experienceof Whitehall,
and his training as an economist,did make quite a big input over a wide
area of policy. ' Similarly, anotherofficial said of Adam Ridley, 'he
is very like a civil servant,and indeedwould make a very good civil
servant. He got involved in everything; very energetic.' David Hill
thought that his advisory colleague,Maurice Peston, 'obviously was the
economic specialist adviser,but Maurice was also a man who had very
strong views on other subjects... and had generaladvice to give. '
We saw earlier that both Pestonand Roy Hattersley felt that
Peston'srole was so wide that he could no longer play it satisfactorily
when he becamepart time becauseof the needto return to his academic
career. This illustrates the great pressureson All-rounders. In
contrastto the recognizedsecurityof the deputy secretaryrole within
the hierarchy, variousfactors might make it difficult to sustain the

role of All-rounderandeachpoint is relevantfor at leastoneof the
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individuals cited. The independenceof the All-rounder might be
weakenedby pressureto be absorbedinto the civil service system. His
influence might be lessenedby a changeof minister. The length of time
he could hold the position might be curtailed by the need to maintain
links with a previous occupationon which his expertisemight be based.
The term highflier is often appliedby the civil service to
officials who are rising rapidly in the hierarchy and are likely to
spend a period asprivate secretaryto a minister. It was, therefore,
deliberately chosenbecauseseveralof the featuresthat distinguish the
effective special adviser who is a Highflier, are similar to those
characteristicsof good private secretaries,but Highflier advisersalso
exhibit political skills, being able to liaise with politicians and
others, sometimescrossinguncertainboundaries. Quite a number of the
younger (usually in their 20's) specialadvisers have provided good
political supportfor their ministersin terms of speechwriting, party
liaison, and spottingpolitical landmines. In addition to all those
skills the Highfliers havemanagedto developa relationship with civil
servantsin the departmentthat is complementaryto that of the private
secretary. This relationship is not necessarily based on policy
expertise,but on knowing and understandingthe minister's mind and the
political constraints within which he operatesin a way that is made
to the minister and the officials. Furthermore,
mutually advantageous
they were able to developinformal links with politicians and pressure
groups that meantthat they could bring in information useful to the
department. Officials were often keen to engagethe Highfliers in the
department'saffairs. Suchofficials rangedfrom permanent secretaries
to officials at about assistantsecretary rank recognized by the
Highfliers as often being peoplekeento show their abilities at policy

makingandwho mighthavebeenproposingoptionsthathadbeen winnowed
out of thefinal submission.
The general point that adviserscan help liaise between the
minister and the departmenthas beenmadebefore, but the following
additional quotations, starting with Donald Maitland on Michael
Portillo, illustrate ways in which the Highfliers were seen as being
particularly adeptat it:
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If you were to draw up a specification for a political
adviser, I think he would get a plus on every point ... I
think a 'bridge' is part of the role, 'channel' is part of the
role, 'lubricant' is part of the role, 'confidant' on both
sides.
Michael Portillo hadproved extremelygood at being a liaison
betweenme and variousparts of the departmentin a thoroughly
constructive way. And I think he got on extremely well with
everybody in the departmentwithout necessarilybecoming too
seducedby the department.(David Howell).
They were really a bridge betweenBarbara Castle and the
department,as well as with the political world
And they
...
were an effective bridge and peoplewhosejudgment I respected
and trusted, and confidenceI trusted. (SeniorDHSS Official).
The private office did a lot of the bridging but the political
adviser was doing it in a different context, a different
dimension(Andrew Sempleon David Lipsey).
In contrastto the All-rounder, the Highflier was unlikely to have
a major impact on policy development. He was the lubricant, not the
powerhouse. Both categories, especiallythe Highflier, were able,
however, to overcomethe delicacy in the role describedin Chapter 3,
and successfullycounteractuncertaintyabsorption,but to do so in an
open way so that the officials were generallyaware of what was being
sentto the minister. As was noted, Brian Abel-Smith had the confidence
to seethat it was beneficial for the Secretaryof Stateif the civil
serviceknew beforehandwhat the adviserwas saying.
The categorizationof advisersdevelopedin this section is less
comprehensive but more complex than the division between specialist
advisers and political advisersreferredto early in this study. It
allows the political dimension of the All-rounder's role to be
accommodated, and recognizes that the personal skills displayed by
Highfliers meantthat even without a relevantbackgroundexpertise, they
could rapidly be brought into the dialogue on issues within a
department. Commentingon the terms specialistand political advisers,
a DHSS official said of Abel-Smith, 'He was that admirable thing, a
combination of the two, and this why I said ... we were particularly
lucky. ' Bulmer's application to the UK of the four Images(See Chapter
3 SectionC) is also useful here. Two adviserswhoseroles he described
as being 'consonant with ImageIV' (1988, p. 38), in which the line
between advice and political action becameblurred, were Peston and
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Abel-Smith.
A further group of advisersare the Specialists and Businessmen.
Whilst they might have had more influenceon specific policies than even
some of the All-rounders, and they combined expertise with varying
degrees of ability to work with peoplein the system, they tended to
operate more within a specialistfield, rather than displaying a wide
rangeof political skills or roles. Successfulexamplesof this group,
including Tom Baron, Arthur Cockfield, Jeffrey Sterling, and David
Young, played such disparateroles that it is impossibleto argue they
form a further precisecategory. In somecases, for example Arthur
Cockfield, their previous Whitehall experiencewas considerably greater
than that of the All-rounders. In other cases,including David Young, it
was less. For many of his eight yearsasan adviser, Jeffrey Sterling
was very part time, whereasTom Baron servedfull time - but for a
period limited to six monthsfrom the outset.
SECTION C CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE ADVISERS.
CharacteristicsQ#All-roundersmd Highfliers.
Identifying thesecategorieshighlights the characteristicsof effective
advisers and some of thesequalities will now be examined, before
broadening the analysis. It is a truism to say that individual
qualities are importantfor determiningsuccess.However, for advisers
who have little inherent institutional statuson which to fall back,
their individual qualities - asjudged by ministersand officials - are
crucial.
The importance of personal qualities is perhaps particularly
crucial in the caseof Highfliers becausethesewere the common factor
they shared,rather than any similarity in the extentto which they had
prior experience of working with the minister or the subject matter.
David Lipsey had beenworking asresearchassistantin Opposition for
the ShadowEnvironmentSecretarywho becameSecretaryof State. Michael
Portillo had beenthe CRD desk officer covering Energy, but his shadow
minister, Tom King, did not becomethe Secretaryof State for Energy.
Jack Straw had not had previousexperienceof working either for Barbara
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Castle or in Health and Social Security matters. Indeedin an article
in ]J.ig SundayTimes on 21 April 1974about the newly appointed Labour
advisers, Hugo Young wrote of Straw: 'his party biography catalogues
his "special interests"- "education,transport and planning, community
development, law reform, race relations, industrial relations".
Virtually everything, that is, except healthor social security at which
department he is now a specialadviser.' All effective advisers are
likely to sharequalities of intelligence, a capacity for hard work,
drafting skills, political judgment, and ability to get on with
officials.
All-rounders not only possessedconsiderable expertise and
political commitmentbut, perhapsevenmore importantly, combined these
factors to provide a personalcommitmentto the policies ministers
wished to seeintroduced, and to the minister himself. Patrick Nairne
claimed that in addition to great knowledgeand political sensitivity
adviserssuchas Abel-Smith, 'were personallycommitted to the minister
so that the minister felt when she was talking to them that thesepeople
were wholly on her side.' John Biffen referred to the 'close
compatibility' between Adam Ridley and Geoffrey Howe. In most cases
All-rounders had previous experienceof working in Whitehall and 'knew
the ropes'. Severalquotationsillustrate how some of these points
could be brought together. In the Na, Minister series Roy Hattersley
describedhis adviser's attributes:
He was ProfessorMaurice Pestonwho, from my point of view,
had the supreme advantageof almost exactly sharing my
political beliefs ... We both believed in the direct
interventionof the governmentin the economy. In his phrase,
we thought that the Departmentof Prices had the primary job
of settingthe guidelinesfor the mixed economy:how companies
worked, levelsof competition, attackon monopolies, control

of prices,influenceof advertising.We thoughtthatwas the
department'sjob, andwhenI arrivedat the departmentvery
many of the civil servantsdidn't think that was the
department'sjob, andmy taskwasto convincethem that it
was. Now havingsomebody
who sharedmy views almost exactly
but couldalsosupportthemwith a bodyof academicbelief,
with a substantialacademicreputation, with that marvellous
cachet of being called a professor, was a major advantage
(Young and Sloman, 1982, pp.88-9).
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in Tg Sum Times 19 September1976of the work
In his assessment
of advisersin their first couple of years, Hugo Young thought that the
influence of advisershad generallybeenmarginal, but there were a few
exceptions:
At the Home Office, Anthony Lester madea major impact by
working with the grain of the civil service. He became the
principal technicalauthor of the new laws on race relations
and sex equality. On a broaderfront, he gave significant
advice on non-departmentalmatters and was accepted on
official committees,notably the recent working party on human
rights proposals.
A combination of genuine expertise, tactical flair and
strategic vision, backed by the complete support of Roy
Jenkins, are held in the departmentto accountfor a success
which mostly, they do not grudge him.
The Highfliers did not necessarilypossessexpertise, but, in
addition to their strongpersonaland political commitment to their
minister, the striking featureaboutthem was the respectin which they
were held by officials. They gainedthe trust of officials, without
losing that of the minister. The generalpoint is well made by Ian
Bancroft, who thoughthighly of David Lipsey and Jack Straw who both
were advisers in the DoE whilst he was permanent secretary. Bright
young special advisers,he thought, 'can pick up the essentials of a
subject very quickly - the most important thing is how to handle
people.' They hadto be trustedto get information from the department
and party offices.
This stresson personalqualitieshelpsexplain why it is useful to
supply comments on advisers'attributes. A few more can be selected
from the many possible, to add to thosealready usedto illustrate this
point. George Moseley, who was alsopermanentsecretaryat the DoE,
particularly valued adviserswho would 'engage' with the department and
be, 'a policy enabler,a translater, a liaison-man.' He commented that
Lipsey and Straw,

are the two who standout in a senseasbeing the sort of
political adviserthatI regardasof significantbenefit to

the permanentstaff ... My thesisabout wanting to see some
permanent recognitionof the means,and indeed desirability,
of extending the ministerial private office to include a
political dimension,dependsvery much for its success, and
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advantage to the civil service, on having calibre people in
there.
An official commentedthat Michael Portillo, 'was talked to and
trusted' at the Departmentof Energy. More adviserscould justifiably
be includedin the Highflier categorythan the All-rounders category,
with the examplesquotedbeing someof the outstandingones.
Various points in the modeldevelopedin Chapter3 help explain the
effectiveness of thesecategoriesof specialadvisers. First, it was
suggestedthat people who could contributefrom both ends of the
technical-valuesspectrummight be particularly valuable. All-rounders
can do this, and their strong commitmentto, and compatability with,
their minister enabledthem to commentdirectly to him. Their degreeof
expertise meant, as observedby Klein and Lewis (p. 17), that they
regardedthemselvesashaving a degreeof independence,eventhough they
were close to their minister. The ability of both categories,
especiallythe Highfliers, to get on with a variety of people, added to
their political sensitivity, allowed them to operatealong many channels

of informationboth insidethedepartment,wherethey could moveup and
down thehierarchy,andoutside. Furthermore,their intelligenceand
draftingability facilitatedtheprocessing
of the informationgathered,
to the benefit of their minister.

GeneralCharacteristics.
Many of the attributesjust referred to will be further explored in this
general sub-section, in which characteristicsrather than categories
are analysed. Not every effective adviserwould necessarilyexpect to
possessall the characteristics,but the two mentionedmost frequently
were, the ability to gain the respectof civil servants, and to be
clearly in receipt of strongbacking from the minister.

(i) Variouselements
couldcontributetowardsgainingthe respectof
officials. They wanted to feel theycould trust the adviser and
welcomedadviserswho 'workedwith thegrain.' Where advisers,for
exampleRogerLiddle, madea pointof beingopenwith officials this was
usually muchappreciated.Intellect,ability to operateat speed,and
drafting skills were admired. In thewordsof Jack Straw: 'people
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recognized certain administrativeskills of a similar kind to theirs.'
Severalofficials thoughteffective adviserswere thosewho were, 'clean
aboutthe house.'
Some took the argument further and suggestedthat effective
advisers not only worked with the grain, and eschewed hostility, but
also madea point of being friendly. According to Derek Scott, 'much of
the written work on this underestimates
the importanceof personality in
the role of specialadvisers a willingness to get along with
...
at least20 to 30 key civil servants.' Officials in the Treasury thought
that Scott got on well with peopleand according to one, Scott's
attendanceat the permanentsecretary's planning meetings, 'was a
tribute to his personalityand skills. ' The permanent secretary,
DouglasWass, also believed, 'the most effective adviserswere thosewho
set aboutpositively to work with the civil servicemachine.'
Foreign Office officials too, often laid stresson the adviser's
personality. JohnGrahamthoughtan effective adviserhad to have the
trust of the civil serviceand the minister. To gain this he believed
it important that the advisershouldknow the subject and have some
general wisdom. In addition Miles Hudson was, 'a congenial character'.
We have seenthat Lord Home thought the individual qualities of Hudson
were important reasons for making the appointment originally.
Furthermore, Hudson was, 'a very gregariousamusingpersonand livened
the whole place up ... he fitted in very well and was certainly useful'.
Similarly Tom McCaffrey thoughtthat if adviserswere to be effective
they had to, 'gain the respectof civil servants.' This he felt Tom
McNally was able to do not only becausehe was knowledgeableabout the
politics of Labour Party foreign policy, but also becausehe adopted a
friendly attitude towardsthe civil service. Another Foreign Office
official claimed there was a 'frisson of concern' about special
advisers, but David Stephenwas, 'Well equippedin personalskills to
deal with it. Peopleliked him and trustedhim and he had sane views.
Personalityis the key to specialadvisers'effectiveness.' In all three
examples, and others,the friendlinesswas only one component of the
factors that led to the advisergaining the trust of officials.
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Often the advisers worked well where a good relationship was
established with the private office. Although there was some feeling
that advisersprovided a commitmentthat private secretariescould not
provide, someof the most successfulspecialadvisersoperatedin tandem
with successfulprivate secretarieswho were close to their ministers,
for example,JohnHarris and David Dowler; Jack Straw and Norman Warner.
This fits in with the argumentthat good ministersknow how to get the
best out of people. There havebeensomesuggestionsthat influential
well-established special advisershavebeenin a position to suggest
names to the minister when it was necessaryto appoint a new principal
private secretary.
(ii) All the Highfliers and All-rounders had clear ministerial support,
which is the other elementoften describedas the key to advisory
effectiveness. Walter (p. 175-6)describessomeministers and advisers
as having a relationshipbasedon a form of symbiosisand suggests such
pairing may be integral to groupsaround leaders. Whilst the importance
of the aide/confidantrole hasbeendescribed,it is noticeable that
three of the All-rounders identified and all the Highfliers worked for
more than one minister.
Specialists interviewed thoughttheir link with the minister and
his support madetheir position strongerthan that of an expert brought
in by the department. The importanceof ministerial backing was often
commentedon by ministers, advisers,and officials. At the Treasury in
1979, for example,DouglasWassbelievedthat, 'the fact that Cropper
and Ridley enjoyedthe confidenceof Sir Geoffrey meantthat they were
taken seriouslyby the department.' Similarly, Ridley observedthat the
reasons why he was able to be involved with the department included,
'absolutely unequivocalministerial backing, and it becameclear early
on that if we intervenedon something,there was a seriouschance that
our intervention would carry weight.'
At MAFF, Terry Dawesthought the reactionof civil servants was,
'if they offendedAnn [Carlton] they offendedthe minister. ' Richard
Ehrman reflected the widespreadopinion notedearlier:
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the way they deal with the specialadviser is they just watch
to seehow much he has got the minister's ear. If you haven't
got the minister's ear you are a nobody ... and if you have
got his ear, and you are in on all the important things, then
you haveclout and influence; so the aide/confidant role is
frightfully importantto the specialadviser.
Someof thejunior adviserswithout any relevant subject expertise
recognized how much they relied on their ability to demonstrate to
officials that they enjoyedtheir minister's confidence. Michael Dobbs
took the argumentfurther; not only did the press officer and other
civil servantsshow him things becausethey could seethat he had a very
close relationship with the Secretary of State, but also his
effectiveness was greaterbecauseof that of the minister who cast, 'a
strong and long shadowin the department.' Where an adviser believed
there was a confrontationalsituationwith the department,then support
from the minister was important. Stuart Holland commented: 'there are
plenty of frustrationsfrom civil servants,but my experiencewas, both
in the '60s (and I have given you one instanceof it) and in the '70s,
that if you had effective accessto a minister who was interestedin the
issues,you could defeatthe civil service.'
Most did not seethe requirementfor support from ministers in
terms of defeatingthe bureaucracy,but there is considerableroom for
debate about the exact relationship between the two main
characteristics. In addition to stressingthe importanceof ministerial
backing, Ehrman emphasizedthe importanceof the advisergetting on with
the civil servants:'You havegot to work on your personalrelationships
with everyone. You have got to make yourself useful and friendly. ' Tom
King felt his advisers,Katharine Ramsayand Richard Ehrman, 'were very
effective and very helpful' and similarly thoughtthat the ability to

get on with the civil servantswascrucial: 'it dependsalot on the
personalityof thespecialadviser... theonesI have had integrated
themselves
well into theteam.' Someministers,includingBill Rodgers,
were keento ensurethatofficialsknewthat theminister's confidence
in an adviser did not detractfrom his confidencein them.
Many advisers,whilst recognizingthe importanceof developing a
good relationship with the civil service, were clear that their main
loyalty was to the minister who appointedthem, and whosesupport they
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usually thought was necessary.It was widely felt, therefore, that
rather than, 'working with the grain of the civil service', the
attribute shouldbe, 'working with the grain of the civil service, but
not being absorbedby it. ' Nevertheless,adviserssuch asBrian AbelSmith and JackStraw, who, aswe have seen,deliberately developed good
relations with officials, were also often in receipt of strong
ministerial backing and this combinationof attributes was appreciated
by officials. Patrick Nairne, who thought highly of both, commented:
Special advisersare an effective and successful development
in Whitehall when they are able to add to the political
sympathy they havewith their minister a considerable degree
of expertiseor experiencein the field in which the minister
is operatingand also an ability to work well, cooperatively,
with officials, without prejudiceto their commitment to the
minister.
Denis Healey suggestedthat the relationshipdevelopedwith the civil
service was even more important than ministerial support: 'if civil
servants think the special adviser is no good, but has a close
relationship with the minister, they have to fix him. '
Jim Prior illustratesthe fine balancethat has to be maintained.
He thought that, 'to start with the private office would try to keep the
chap out if they can', but once strong ministerial support had been
established, 'there was not much difficulty. ' We saw earlier how Rob
Shepherd felt he benefitedfrom the strong supportPrior displayed for
him, and accordingto an official, 'Rob Shepherdgot on terms really
quite quickly with seniorofficials and got their trust.' Prior also
believed that, up to a point, the adviser, to be effective, had to get
on well with officials:
They mustwork with the civil service, and if they don't work
well with the civil service, then they can be frozen out and
they can havevery little impact. On the other hand, they
have got to keep themselvesa little bit at arms length from
the civil service, otherwisethey becomejust another civil
servantand they are not there to perform that duty.

(iii) Prior's commentis similarto onefrom Tom Baron,and leads to
another quality identified by several interviewees, especially
ministers,asbeingimportantin an effectiveadviser- toughnessand
self confidence.MichaelHeseltinewantedhis advisersto work with the
326

civil service, 'as long as they were tough enoughcharactersnot to get
taken over by it. '
At various points it hasbeenshownthat there was inevitably a
degree of tensionin the role of mosteffective advisers. But it was
often thosevery advisersand/or their ministers who were amongst the
keenest for advisers to be openwith the civil service about their
adviceto ministers.
Reference was madein someinterviews to various other aspects of
resilience. They include: being a self-starter - particularly
important if the adviseris not to add to the overload on the minister;
possessionof, in the words of Darlington, 'a high tolerance of
uncertainty', (1976, p.21); and a degreeof independence.Several Allrounders, including Pestonand Lester, stressedthat they were in a
position where if they did not think they were getting adequate access,
they could threatento resign. Furthermore,asJohn Hoskynsemphasized,
it can be claimed that effective advisersneedto havean independence
from the minister that enablesthemto speakbluntly when necessary.
Usually suchindependenceis associatedwith the possessionof
expertise, and this is the next attribute to be examined. Klein and
(iv)

Lewis's concept of Labour specialistadvisers possessing, 'expertise
independent of their political role' (p. 17) was also applicablein the

serving as a Conservative
case of RogerDyson,oneof few academics
special adviser. He stated,'if I hadanyvalueit wasin my academic
expertise,where I gaveviewsirrespectiveof partystance,or in my
knowledgeof the service,whenI wasableto feedin information which
of State.' On issuessuchasindustrial relations
warnedthe Secretary
in the health service,Jenkinviewed Dyson as being 'a real expert' and,
'found him quite invaluable.'

Possessionof expertisewasvital for thosebroughtin to play a
specialistrole, and earlier weexaminedthe attitude adoptedby
officials towards specialistadvisersand noted that Boswell
highlightedthe Tories' usualpreference
for practionersoveracademics.
He commented:'I hadthe distinctionof beingpart time andof working
the restof thetime asa farmer,i. e. asa clientof my own ministry.
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This gave me both an insight in to the practical effects of our policies
and somethingof an expert entreeto official discussions.'
Some officials, in commonwith certain advisers and ministers,
believed that if advisersdid not possessspecificexpertisethey were
less likely to haveany impact. Exampleswere cited, in addition to
those in the previous sub-section,whereadvisershad both contacts and
knowledge, for exampleAlistair RossGooby with the City and pension
fund investment, and this was thought to be useful It may be more
important for advisersto haveattributessuch asa policy expertise
when the minister wishesto introduceradical policies.
Several intervieweessaw the possessionof expertiseas a factor
that would engenderthe respectof officials. John Smith thought an
effective adviserwould be, as was his adviserVincent Cable, 'expert
enough to be able to evaluatecivil serviceadvice in a way that is
respectedby civil servants- he shouldbe capable of conducting a
dialogue.' Some doubtsaboutthe universal importance of expertise
arise from the experienceof Ann Carlton. Sheworked for Tony Crosland
and JohnSilkin at the DoE and for John Silkin at MAFF and the contrast
in her level of expertiseis demonstratedby two reports in specialist
journals:
She has unparalleled knowledge and experience of local
government within the Transport House staff and a real
understandingof the grassroots of the Labour Party's local
government activity (Local GovernmentChronicle, 22 November
1974).
Mr Silkin seems to rely on Mrs Carlton's advice to a
considerable degree- thoughwhen sheaccompaniedhim to the
Ministry of Agriculture from the Departmentof the Environment
last autumnshe knew perhapsas little as he did about farming
(
Weekly, 4 March 1977).

Carlton admitsthatinitially sheknewlittle about agriculture.
When shetalked to a junior minister he said he had found somethingvery
Animals Bggk. Carlton, amused,
useful and produced the ISý
thought the Minister himself ought to havesomething better than a
junior minister and so, shecomments,'I went out and bought John f
ObserverD.QgkQf Animals.' Shebelievedthat her experienceasLabour's
local governmentofficer was an advantageat the DoE becauseshe knew:
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the issues;the local councillors; and the civil servantswith whom she
worked as adviserto the Local GovernmentMinister. Nevertheless, as
indicated in her 1986Tribune article quoted earlier, Carlton was
happier at MAFF than at the DoE. As previously demonstrated, the
strength of the relationshipwith the minister, and the civil servants
appreciationof this, was a crucial factor in her effectiveness, which,
in turn, according to Terry Dawes, was an important element in the
successof John Silkin who wasa strong minister.
(v) Various adviserswho hadprevious experience as civil servants
thought that was an advantage. They included: Vincent Cable; Howard
Davies; Vicky Kidd; Joan Mitchell; Maurice Peston;Adam Ridley; Derek
Scott and Maggie Sidgreaves. JohnHoustonbenefitedfrom his earlier
spell in the cabinetof a EuropeanCommissioner.
The final attribute is particularly important for the younger,
non-specialist, advisers if they are to avoid drifting towards the
'pretender' category identified in Figure 5 (Chapter 3) as somebody
without political or analytical skills. This is knowledge of the
political sceneand the ability to predict developmentsand the likely
(vi)

reaction by the minister, the party, and possibly the public, to
proposals. This is variously describedas political sensitivity, flair,
or nousand its possessionoften contributedtowardsthe adviser gaining
respectfrom officials. It is not always clear which qualities are most
desirablefor a political career, nor how far suchabilities are innate,

or canbe learnt. However,political nousshouldprobablybe included,
in this sub-section,in a
along with severalof theothersdiscussed
list of characteristicsof effective politicians. An indication of the
ability of various adviserswho were perceivedas effective is their
subsequentrapid political rise. Of the departmental advisers this
applied in particular to MargaretBeckett, Arthur Cockfield, Michael
Portillo, Jack Straw, and David Young who became Cabinet or Shadow
Cabinet Ministers. A similar point is relevant for others, including Tim
Boswell, John Cope, and RobertJackson,who becameministers.
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Situational
Factors.
Various situationalfactors, it hasbeensuggested,can be associated
with the effectivenessof advisers. However, few clear patternscan be
discerned; several advisers, for example, who worked in small
departmentsthought that that was an advantage,but effective advisers
were found in departmentsof all sizes. Nevertheless,four points can
be identified.
(i)

Advisers often functionedwell wherethere was more than one of
them. All the cited examplesof All-rounders operatedwith at least one
other adviser. Many who worked with others felt strongly that it was
advantageous,and someof thosewho actedalone believed that was a
limitation. StuartSexton, for example, 'welcomed' the arrival of an
additional adviser, Oliver Letwin, in the DES and both stated they
worked closely togetheron someissues,especially the proposals to
introduce vouchers. Having more than one adviser also allowed a
minister to appoint a teamwith a rangeof skills. This was noticeable
in the DHSS teamunderLabour and the Treasury team since 1979. It was
possible, for example,for Nigel Lawson, becausehe had other advisers
with strong party links, to make some interesting appointments of
talented peoplewho were not membersof the Tory party. They included
Howard Davies, perhapsthe nearestBritish equivalentto the typical
member of a French cabinetin that he could offer the minister recent
experienceof the departmentaswell as soleloyalty.
Where there was more than one adviser, opinions sometimes differed
as to how far they could be called a team. The three advisers in the
Treasury were widely, thoughnot universally, regardedas being a team,
not only by themselvesbut also by others. For example, although
servingat differnt times, both Arthur Cockfield, asMinister of State,
and Norman Lamont, as Financial Secretary, thought that the three
advisersworked asa team for the group of ministers. Whilst he was at

the TreasuryRobinHarristhoughttherewasvery mucha teamunder Adam
Ridleywho 'wasa goodleader'. The advisersdid not meettogetherasa
team, but all attendedprayermeetings. There were various, and
somewhatdiverse,opinionsaboutwhethertheDHSSadviserswerea team,
but quotationsfrom DavidMetcalfandPaulChapmanillustratethe middle
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of the rangeviews:
There was quite an elementof teamwork, but it was team work
through personalgood will, not through any structure.
There were someaspectsof teamwork aroundit and certainly
there was a lot of camaraderieand cooperation ... but it
didn't function as a formal teamin the sense of
having
team.
meetings
as
a
regular
Various qualificationscan be madeto the statementthat advisers
work most effectively if they are not alone. Someadvisers functioned
well on their own. They included, taking one examplefrom each period:
Miles Hudson, Roger Liddle, and EdwardBickham. Each was well regarded
by ministersand officials alike. Certainadvisers,for example Miles
Hudson, would not have welcomedthe appointment of an additional
adviser. Furthermore,building on the analysisof the degree of team
work, it can be shown, first that holding a morejunior post in a group
was sometimesless attractivethan being the sole adviser, second that
some advisers did not seegroupsasteams,and third that sometimes
problemscan exist within groups. The following points are relevant to
discussion later aboutproposedreforms, and are again taken from the
two groups of advisers which are clearly identified as the most
effective teams - Labour advisersin the DHSS from 1974-9, and the
Tories in the Treasuryfrom 1979.
It may be more than coincidencethat in the period from 1979 to
1987there were two 'Advisers to the Chancellor of the Exchequer', which
was recognizedasthe seniorpost, and six designatedas 'Adviser to the
Financial Secretary', althoughin practice usually appointed by, and
working to, the Chancellor. Whilst the six were generallyeffective and
left to take up good opportunities,it was perhaps sometimes a less
satisfying role. Robin Harris comparedhis two periods as an adviser:
'In the Treasury I was thejunior specialadviser ... and my functions
were limited and they were propagandist. When I was in the Home Office
I was the only specialadviser ... I was not a great confidant of
Geoffrey Howe, but I was a confidant of Leon Brittan. '

LyndaRousesimilarlyworkedasadviserto the Financial Secretary
and asthe only adviserin a differentdepartment
- Energy, where she
was highly regardedby officials. Shemovedin the oppositedirection
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from Harris as shewent with Nigel Lawson from Energy to the Treasury,
in fact taking over Harris's Treasury slot in June 1983. Shecommented:
'I never felt ashappythere as I had in the Departmentof Energy and
didn't really settlein to a role distinct from the other two advisers
that mademuch sense.'
Several aspectsof the experienceof Labour advisersin the DHSS
indicate issuesthat might haveto be resolvedif a group of advisersis
to work to maximumeffectiveness.The two advisers,Paul Chapman and
Geoff Alltimes, recruitedessentiallyaspersonalor researchassistants
to Brian Abel-Smith, played slightly different roles, but Abel-Smith
found it difficult to usethem to full advantageand observed, 'they
didn't saveall that much time, althoughthey tried very hard.' Chapman
believed that his workload tendedto be in the more marginal areas and,
therefore, stated: 'I suspectif I had not beenthere, what would have
happened is that my areasof work simply would not have had been
addressedby any specialadviser. I don't think it would have had the
effect of diluting what they were doing.' He thought a civil servant
who had beenexposedto someof the policy issueswould probably have
been more use to Abel-Smith. He consideredthat althoughinitially he
had beenwell usedtowardsthe end it becameless obvious that he had a
role, and his work had becomelessinterestingbecauseit was very much
about issuesof presentation. Alltimes followed Chapmanbut when David
Townsend was appointed,following Alltimes's departure,the role had
more clearly evolved into one for a separateadviser, not an assistant,
covering the social servicesbrief; andTownsendhad greater experience
prior to his appointmentby David Ennals.
However, the role of Tony Lynes demonstratesthat even appointing
somebodywith a well establishedreputation for subjectexpertise needs
careful planning. There appearsto havebeensomeconfusion over how
far he was an assistantto Abel-Smith, and how far a special adviser
with the brief to cover a specialistfield. At the end of 1975, for
example, Barbara Castle was questioned in the Commons about her
advisers. On 4 November shereferred to her four advisers,outlined the
work of JackStraw, anddescribedAbel-Smith asa distinguished expert
Vol. 899,
explaining, 'two supporthim in his work', (Official $g
,
cols 205-6). On 9 December,in a Written Answer, the roles were
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described a little more fully. Following the account of Abel-Smith's
functions, the answercontinued: 'He is assistedby Mr Alltimes. Mr
Lynes advises on socialsecurity questions and attends appropriate
meetingsheld by ministers', (Official Reps, Vol. 902, col. 144).
Without referring to this in particular, Lynes argued that being a
special adviser but also being billed as somebody else's assistant
would mean that nobody knew whereyou stood. It was one thing for a
specialadviserto havea researchassistant,but, he argued,
once you say A is a specialadviser, and B is a special
adviser, then the implication of that is both A and B are
providing adviceto ministers; and you can pay one more than
the other if you want to, but basically they are fulfilling
the same role; and you can divide thejob up by subjects,
obviously, but what you can't do is to say you are both
special advisersbut B's advice hasto be channelled through
A. So if that is what is happeningB is not a special
adviser, B is just a research assistant ... that wasn't
generally happeningin my case.
Although, as hasbeendescribed,Lynes found a very satisfactory
role basedin the SupplementaryBenefitsCommission, and his work was
valued by ministersand officials, this discussion raises important
issueswhich would needto be addressedif schemesto expand the current
numberof adviserswere adopted. Furthermore, although the Policy Unit
is sometimesviewed as a model, there are differencesbetweenNumber Ten
and departmentswhich would makeproblematicthe successfulintroduction
of a group of seniorpolicy advisers working for a departmental
minister. It is easierto allocate responsibilitiesamongstthe seven

or eight membersof theNumberTenPolicyUnit who betweenthem are
of state.
attemptingto covermostdepartments
So, whilst working where therewas more than one adviser was a
situation that was likely to increaseeffectiveness, or, at least,
satisfaction,problemscould be encountered.

Severaladvisersthoughtit waspreferableto be appointedwhen
(ii)
the minister was newto thedepartment
- especiallywhen it was an
incoming Governmentandtheadviserhadbeen involved in developing
manifestoproposals.It wascleartoo, to officials, thatadviserswho
had beenassistingwith policy formulationin Opposition,for example
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Robbie Gilbert and Rob Shepherd,shouldbe involved as part of the team
in drawing up consultativedocumentsand legislation in the fields most
important to the new minister. Similarly, in addition to the previously
examined views of Jim Prior, Lord Gowrie, the Minister of Stateat the
Department of Employment in 1979, also thought that the advisers,
Gilbert and Shepherd,were 'very good' at pushing the 'step-by-step'
approachon industrial relations legislation devisedin Opposition.
(iii)

Michael Heseltine, Tom Baron, and officials all believed that
bringing Baron in for just a six month period was very effective.
Heseltine argued, 'it is quite urgent to have the six months,and then
if they are going to do it, they havegot to do it fast.' Another
situation which seemedto be effective was for an All-rounder, Anthony
Lester, to pull in a specialist,Angela Byre, to work with him for the
duration of a specific major project - the preparation of the Sex
Discrimination legislation. He suggestedthat her appointmentto assist
him with that issuehelpedto enablehim to engagein a wide range of
activities and madea 'big difference' to his effectiveness. These are
individualistic, not general, points but they could have wider
application in any developmentof the system.
Some advisers, for exampleTim Boswell and Peter Davis, were
appointed when the departmentwas facing a major crisis and felt they
were particularly welcome. Other advisersthought that during a crisis
(iv)

their contribution was mostappreciated. There are two elements to
this. First, 'an extra pair of hands'in performing presentational and
liaison tasks, especiallyof a riskier natureand where the boundaries
were uncertain. A generalthesisbeing expoundedin this study is that
advisers provide flexibility in the systemand are an immediateway of
respondingto ministers' needs. The requirementsare intensified during
a crisis. Second, having somebodyclose to a minister to act as a
'safety valve' or 'medieval fool', to absorb the minister's
frustrations, to speakbluntly to him, or to provide reassurance,is
particularly valued during a crisis. We saw that assistancewith crisis
managementwas consideredimportant by severaladvisersin the DHSS,
including Mike Hartley-Brewer who was also one who believed the
adviser's role was sometimesakin to that of a medieval fool. His
minister, David Ennals, agreedwith the ideathe adviserscould have a
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psychologicalrole and added,'they could also criticize my performance
in a way that civil servantscouldn't. '
Perhaps the bestevidenceto supportthe argumentthat an adviser
can play a medievalfool role comesfrom Douglas Hurd who thought that
the adviserwas the only personwho was likely to be around who could
say, when necessary,"'Well, that asan awful speech",or, "you clearly
were exasperatedby thosepeopleand you shouldn't have been because
they were trying their best."' When he was serving as political
secretary to the Prime Minister, he usedto say similar things to Ted
Heath, 'and not many peopledid and he usedalways to say, "what a fool
you are sir", but neverthelessit was important.' Similarly, as an
adviser, Edward Bickham felt that he was in a privileged position so
that on rare occasionswhenHurd, 'had done somethingthat I thought
could havebeenperformedbetter, I thought it was actually one of my
duties to tell him so.' At other times advisersbelievedit was useful
to provide unequivocalsupportfor the minister. According to Maurice
Peston,
A lot of the work is almostpsychotherapeuticin the sense
that what you are trying to do is either tell the minister
that his instinctsare right, or reassurehim in some other
way ... ministerslike someoneto say, 'Yes, you are right',
because they are sitting there being bombarded by people
telling them, 'Yes, but. '

Thesepointspartiallyoverlapwith somemadewhenconsideringthe
desirabilityof havinga strongrelationshipwith the minister,and the
of effectivenessare important
various aspectsand characteristics
elementsin the final assessment
of the systemwhichcannowbe made.
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]IN;

ASSESSMENTSAND PROPROSALS.

The evidencegatheredin the precedingchapterswill now be usedto draw
conclusions and make assessmentsof some of the major findings.
Assessmentswill be attempted of: the overall effectiveness of
individual advisers; how far the system has been accepted; the
of the model set out in Chapter3; and the impact of the
appropriateness
system of advisers on the systemof government. In Chapter 3 the
analysis moved from an examinationof the needsof ministers to the
development of a modelof a place for advisers. Here the exposition
flows in the oppositedirection: from the narrower focus, in Section C,
of confirming the appropriateness
of the model's features,to the broader
and much more problematicissue, in SectionD, of whether the system of
advisers makesa sufficiently effective contribution to the system of
government to provide solutionsto the various problems identified.
Finally the assessments
and the model will be usedto examine various
proposalsfor reform.
SECTION j OVERALL EFFECTIVENESSQE INDIVIDUAL SPECIAL
ADVISERS AND CRITICISMS QP THEIR WORK.
The effectivenessof specialadvisersvaries enormously. It was claimed
earlier that the diversity in the ageand backgroundof specialadvisers
was probably greater than that of any other group of people in
Whitehall. It is not surprising, therefore,that their effectiveness
should also vary. However, there was often a broad measureof agreement
from different actorsabout the effectivenessof an individual adviser.
There were, though, somenotableexceptions. For example, Tony Benn
claimed that his advisers:
provided eyesand earsfor me which greatly strengthenedthe
position of the minister in controlling the department ...
[The functions] I askedthem to undertake they undertook
brilliantly
I
havedonewith more of them, or with
... could
more MPs ... I think they were underpaidand under-recognized
I
but that wasn't of my doing really
[Without
... Cabinet]them] wouldn't
have been able to write a paper [for
on nuclear
power; I wouldn't havebeenable to put in alternative papers
on the IMF; ... the EMS; I wouldn't havebeenable to make contact
with other ministers;I wouldn't have had the same
relations with the ParliamentaryParty, the National Executive;
public speeches.It was a comprehensiveservicethey provided.
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In an article entitled, How Whitehall's Mandarins tamed
Labour's
i

3$ Spg&ial Advisers, Hugo Young suggestedin
Sunday Times 19
September 1976that one of the few examplesof the concept of special
advisers being madeto work was provided by Benn's advisers and that
'they haveachievedquite a lot. ' But various respondentsheld up the
experience of Tony Benn's advisersasan exampleof how not to operate
the systemof specialadvisers. Critical commentswere volunteered by
diverse civil servants,ministers, and advisersalike during general
discussion on the effectivenessof the systemof advisers. Depending
upon one's position, however, this may be taken to indicate either that
they were effective in helping the minister in the confrontational
attitude he adoptedtowardsthe departmentand in overcoming what he
regardedas civil serviceobstructionto the extent that he did, or that
they made it harderfor Bennto achievehis goals in the department.
This example is particularly interestingbecause it represents the
clearest clashbetweenwhat were seento be the two key attributes of
effective advisers - gaining the respectof officials and possessing
clear ministerial backing. It was widely agreedthat the latter was
vital for Benn's advisers.
There was naturally somereluctanceon the part of ministers to
criticize their own advisersbut in generalministers were awareof, and
sometimesshared,civil servicereservationsabout the effectiveness of
certain advisers. One minister admittedhe madea bad appointment and
in the end askedthe appointeeto leave, and anotherreportedthat his
adviser 'got in the hair' of civil servantsand was therefore moved out.
A few advisersattractedparticular scorn from officials. One suggested
that the civil servicecould, 'eat the little basketsfor breakfast' and
anotherdescribedoneadviseras a 'nothing'. Very occasionally former
permanentsecretariesor junior ministershad forgotten the existenceof
a particular adviserwhich suggestshe had not beeneffective.
There is someevidencethat a minister was less likely to reappoint
when either the adviserleft, or the minister moved departments,if he
inherited an adviser from anotherminister or from the period of
Opposition. This does not necessarily mean the adviser was not
effective but might indicate that the minister was not particularly keen
to haveone in the first place.
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An analysisof opinionsexpressedin the interviews suggests that
about20 per centof adviserscould be classifiedas being ineffective.
This does not, of course, meanthe remaining ones were universally
regarded as effective, nor that they were effective in all their
activities.
Despitethe generallyreasonablyhigh level of effectiveness, many
advisers were limited by the ambiguity in the role, and some by the
hostility of the civil serviceand the hostility or indifference of
politicians. It was a very demandingposition and one which, in a
manner similar to someprivate secretaries,many of the best felt they
could only hold for a numberof years. Where adviserswere considered
to be ineffective they were more likely to be the younger political
advisers - whoserole was sometimesdismissedeven by the specialist
advisers. Somespecialistsfound being only part time severely limited
their impact. A few adviserssuggestedthat their effectiveness was
limited becausethe minister did not properly work out how to use them.
More ministers than not believedthemselvesto be (and probably
were) somewhat more effective in relation to at least some of their
tasks when they had specialadvisers. This finding seems consistent
with the commentsof Smith from Australia: 'ministers themselvesshowed
no signs of wanting to revert to earlier arrangements. If they had
criticisms of ministerial staff, they were more likely to be about other
ministers' staff than their own or of the systemas a whole. However,
this may have indicatedacceptancerather a judgment of effectiveness'
(1977 p. 155).
In this study only a few exampleswere reportedof civil servants
thinking that ministerswere less effective, or relations worse, because
of the presenceof advisers. This was even the casein some situations
where advisers were felt to be ineffective or unnecessary; in such
circumstancesthe civil servantsusually felt they could neutralize the
adviser. Perhapsthe greatestproblemsfor officials, and sometimesfor
ministers, came whenadvisershad their own agenda,different from that
of the minister, and insistedon pursuing it in the departmentor in the
party evenafter the minister had madehis lack of support clear. This
illustratesthe potential dangersof the adviseras protagonist, rather
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than analyst. In a few instancesit was felt that advisers were
disloyal to their ministers.
If advisers could not build the good working relationship with
officials that many ministerswished them to have this could reduce
their effectiveness. Having resignedas adviserto Denis Healey, Adrian
Ham (1976, and 1981) was critical of the influence of officials.
Healey claims,
The role of the outsideexpert in Whitehall is a difficult
one; if he cannotget on with the civil servicehe can do more
harm than good. Either he will isolatehis Minister from what
should be his main sourceof advice, or he will kick his heels
with frustration and becomea sourceof continual friction.
The sameis true of an outsidepolitical adviser; my first had
a reciprocatedmistrustof all permanentofficials, while the
second, Derek Scott, did me yeomanservicebecause he could
arguewith the Treasurywithout losing its confidence(p.391).
Some officials alsobelievedthat adviserstook up an excessive
amount of the minister's time. Furthermore, advisers sometimes used
their privileged position to draw to their minister's attention items
that ministersdid not have the time and/or inclination to process. The
danger of this would be greaterwith a larger teamof advisers. Judith
Hart shrewdly observed: 'One of the problemsabout expert advisers is
that they can createproblemsfor you to deal with which weren't really
on your deskbefore, and you think, "Oh God, I wish I didn't know about
this." I am sure it is terribly useful for them to do that but it does

createratherthanresolveoverload.'
Difficulties also arosein a few caseswhereadvisersfailed to
negotiatewith adequatecarethe delicatebalance,referred to in
Chapter3, involvedin counteracting
the uncertaintyabsorption,but
doing soin an openway.
In consideringthe overall effectivenessof an individual adviser,
the key point was his effectivenessin performing the functions required
of him by the minister. Furthermore, the importanceof a minister in
determiningthe role of his adviser, and in legitimizing his activities,
meansthat the adviseris likely to be effective only to the extent, and

in the form, thatthe ministerwishesto haveadvisory support. This
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underlines the main conclusionemergingfrom this research - enormous
variety exists in the systemin terms of effectiveness, reasons for
appointment,and roles played.
The influenceof the minister's wishesis illustrated by one area
in which adviserspotentially facecriticism. There is a very fine line
between being ineffective throughacting as a protagonist for views
which a minister once supported but has come to realize are
impracticable, and possibly being the licensed fool, or political
conscience, which the minister appointedthe adviserto be. In this
situation there can be considerableambiguity for the adviser. It was
noted that BarbaraCastlestressedthe needfor, 'a political conscience
at the heart of the departmentalbattle.' In thosecircumstancesTony
Lynes, for example,was meetinghis minister's wishes whilst possibly
appearingawkward:
I think the extra that one had wasn't so much to the minister
- perhapsit ought to have been- as to ideas and policies.
There were timeswhen I waspushingpolicies which might well
have embarrassed
the minister, and the departmentwas loyally
telling me not to ... to someextentyou can act as the
minister's consciencein the way the civil servicecan't ..
Part of the civil service'sjob is to makethe minister's job
as easy as possible-that is not thejob of all special
advisers.
Similarly, Adam Ridley's commentabout having, 'far more licence to say,
"are you sure you want to changethat policy?"' is relevant. When
playing this role an adviserwith clear ministerial backing is not being
the 'political commissar' or 'party apparatchik' so despised and
derided, especiallyby civil servants.
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SECTION I GROWING ACCEPTANCE AM

CYCLICAL PHASSES.

Before makinga final assessment
aboutthe degreeof acceptability the
system now enjoys, a slightly different way of examining possible
changes in how the role is perceived could be developed. It
is tentatively suggestedthat there are various cyclical phases
influencing the need for, and role and effectiveness of, special
advisers.
(i)

When a party comesto power after a period in Opposition it
entertains,asdescribedin Chapter3, somesuspicionabout how far the
civil servicewill cooperatein implementingparty policies. Chapter 4
discussedhow such fearswere seen,especiallyby officials, as a reason
behind ministers' appointmentof advisers. Such suspicion existed in
1964 and 1974and was a factor. The samewas to someextent true in
1970 and 1979 as notedin the article by George Cardona (1981).
However, in 1970the main emphasiswas more on changesin the machineryof- governmentthan the introduction of political secretaries, and in
1979the undoubtedelementof suspicionwas, as in 1970, counterbalanced
to some extent by a desireto behavedifferently from the previous
Labour Administration. This initial suspicionmeant, as we saw in the
analysis of reasons,that someministersand peoplein the party saw a
needfor advisers. First, they could provide knowledgeof the policies,
political commitment,and the technicalexpertisethat might be of value
to help pushthrough the departmentpolicies devisedin Opposition. The
suggestion that the developmentof specialadvisershas coincided with
the growth of adversarialpolitics seemsespeciallyrelevant here.
Second, they could act aspeoplealready known to the minister and
thereforeable to play an aide/confidantrole. As JohnLyttle observed:

For a newlyappointedministermovinginto a departmentwhere
he or shedoesn'tknowanyoneat all, thefirst few monthsare
critical, andit's ratherimportant,I think, psychologically

as well as in political ways, that the minister should have
someone whom he or she knows well and to whom they can
instantly relate. That relationship develops within a
departmentbut it certainly isn't there when a minister moves

in.
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Support for this view comesfrom various permanent secretaries.
George Moseley thought that ministers, 'needthem at all stages, but
particularly in policy formulation stagesand in the early days in the
department.' Similarly, Patrick Nairne describedhow advisers, 'help
the minister standup to the departmentsometimes,particularly when he
or she first arrives and a departmentfeels it a duty to point out some

of thedifficulties.'
There is a contrary view, perhapsparticularly relevant for 1979,
that a newly electedgovernmenthasgreaterpolitical will and less need
for advisersthan a mid-term or dying government.
(ii)

After ministershad beenin post for a while, somecame to depend
even more on their civil servantswhom they saw not to be blocking their
policies. Some ministerscameto rely less on advisers, especially
specialist ones, but at the sametime certain peoplein the party came
to think the needfor adviserswas greater. The picture was described
in generalby Ian Bancroftwho claimed that new ministers camein:
armedwith one or two specialadviserswho had beeninvaluable
to them in Oppositionproviding ideasand helping to write
and then ... the ministers tended to
speechesand so on
discover that there ...
was really quite a useful corpus of
knowledge existing in the department itself amongst the
regular officials ... over a period of time the special
advisers found that their privileged accessto the minister
became more and more attenuated. This was not the result of
vile plots on the part of the permanentsecretaryor private
secretary,it was simply a questionof pressureof time.
One specific exampleof this phenomenonwas described earlier Robert Carr soon found he had lessneedthan he had anticipatedto rely
on Stephen Abbott. Pollitt discusseshow, also in 1970, even in the
first hundred days of the Conservative Government, the new junior
minister and adviserat the CSD faced similar problems: 'Howell - and
probably Schreiberevenmore - found their former status on machinery
questions somewhateroded. Neither headeda department. Neither had
automatic access to Heath (as Armstrong, Trend, Meyjes, Rayner and
Jellicoe did). Most important, their former role as a co-ordinating
secretariatwas naturally assumedby the Civil Service' (1984, p.90).
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Commenting in 1969SamBrittan observed:'one can generalise that
irregulars are a phenomenonof new governments, This timing is a
...
misfortune ... They would be more useful several years later when
ministershavebecomepart of the machineand their ideashavedried up,
but that is when they leastfeel the need for outside influences'

(p.331).
A similar developmenthasbeenobservedelsewhere. In Australia,
Wilenski commentedon the role of 'Staffers' appointedunder Whitlam's
Government: 'while the influenceof thesestaffs tendedto fade after
the first six monthsthey did provide continuedadditional support to
the exercise of ministerial control' (p. 100). A more scathing
assessment
comesfrom Canada:
The classic pattern has recurred: lack of expertise,
experience and resourcescomparedto departmentshas led to
ministerial staff losing their influenceafter leadingcertain
ministers into costly mistakes. The outcome is that the
seniorcivil servicehasbeenable to standits ground against
private political staff, although there is a manifest
continuing unease(Bourgaultand Dion, p. 164).
The suggestion that eventsprove that the civil service will
implement any government'spolicy wishesseemedparticularly valid under
Margaret Thatcher'sGovernment(see,for example,Rose, 1986, p.50; Fry,
1990). This view hasbeenchallenged(see,for example,Simmonds, 1988)
by peoplewho believe that somegovernmentpolicies were blocked, and
that more advisersor politically appointedcivil servantsare required

to maintain the thrust of policies- in the name of democracy.
Sometimesit is allegedthatboth ministersandadviserswere defeated
by the bureaucracy. Thus Alfred Shermanwrote to T Times declaring:
'In 1979,John Hoskynsand I decidedthat sincethe Treasury team and
its advisershadbeenswallowedalive by the Treasury knights, the PM
neededan adviserof her own who was strong enoughto close his ears to
their siren-song'(1 August 1990).

This is a minorityopinion. Thebulk of the evidencesuggests
that
in the 1980s,evenif the
the Civil Servicedid not block theGovernment
perceptionin 1979wasthatthey mightwell do so. Evidencein 10 IjAIS
in Whitehall,collectedby an RIPA WorkingGroup(1987),suggestedthat
althoughthecivil servicehadnot beenpoliticized,morecivil servants
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with 'a can-do' attitude hadbeenpromoted, i. e. officials with an
enthusiastic attitude towardsimplementingthe Government's policies.
Someadvocatesof reform recognizethat opinionsare mixed about whether
radical policies have been blocked, but claim that this does not
invalidate the argument for reforms such as the introduction of
cabinets. John Hoskyns, for example,in introducing the Re-skilling
Government Seminar in May 1986, referred to three red herrings which
tended to get raised during discussionsabout reform of the
machinery-of-government.The secondof which,
is that the Government has already been radical to a
surprisingextentand thereforethere is really no needto do
anything. I think opinionsmight differ about how radical the
Government really havebeen. In any caseI think that that
is probably in spite of the difficulties inherent in the system
rather than becauseof, and I think that that is indeeda bit
of a cop-out (IOD, 1986,p. 2).
In mid-term governmentstend to run into presentational problems
and might drift away from their parties. This increases the need,
therefore, for advisers to help with presentation, liaison, and
cohesion. Evidenceto supportthis comesfrom Douglas Hurd (1979); from
the expansionof advisersand respondents'different emphaseson reasons
(iii)

for appointmentafter 1981; and from the efforts at greaterliaison made
by the Policy Unit since 1983.
(iv)
The issues of presentation and cohesion become especially
important in the run up to an election whenadvisershave a major role
in helping to preparethe manifesto. The role played by advisersin the
1983 and 1987electionsis thoughtto haveinfluenced Margaret Thatcher
to look more favourably uponadvisers. We saw (Chapter8 SectionB) how
networks are more effective at thesetimes.

The suggestion
thattherole of advisersmightvary at different
stagesin a governmentis compatiblewith the flexibility of the
proposedmodelof theplaceof specialadvisers.As noted by Stephen
Sherbourne,it is a furtherreasonagainsthavinga blue-printfor the
introductionof specialadvisers.
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Acceptance by Civil Service wd Institutionalization.

Despite a number of caveatsmentionedearlier there is now greater
acceptanceof the role of specialadvisersand this can probably be
associatedwith increasedformalizationof the role noted in Chapter
7, SectionE. On the basisof his long experienceDouglas Hurd linked
the two points. By the late 1980she thought the relationship with the
departmentwas much more worked out than it had beenin earlier periods:
'he [Edward Bickham] is now part of the Home Office machinery and the
civil service would be lost without him ... there are things he does
which makestheir life easieras well as mine.' There is a potential
problem in making phase(ii) of the cyclical sequencecompatible with
the conceptof the growing acceptanceof advisers:phase(ii) suggests
sometimes as ministersbecomeestablishedthey begin to see less need
for advisers which might in turn reduce their acceptability to
officials. However, often relationshipsbuild up betweenministers and
advisers who were not well acquaintedat the time of appointment.
Furthermore, it may well be that ministerswho come to appreciate that
the civil service is not obstructingthem, will also find that the
special adviser's role flourishes, rather than contracts, in the
positive atmosphere. The propositionis expressed most clearly by
Michael Palliser, whom it is worth quoting at length:

It startsvery often- theideaof havinga specialadviser -

from the notion that you needsomeoneto keep an eye on the
civil serviceto makesure they are doing what you want them
to by carrying out thepolicy of the political party in
power ... There is a tendencyto think of the Foreign Office
as having a Foreign Office policy and that you needsomeoneto
keep an eºe on that and to adviseyou and tip you off if
things aren t being done. The interestingthing to me was how
well the specialadvisers,after an initial period of getting

into theswingof it, got on with the restof the Office ..
in
it
The

reasonwhy, my view, alwaysworked extremely well,
(any one of thoseyou mentioned[Miles Hudson, Tom McNally,
Denis Grennan, David Lipsey, Michael Stewart, and David
Stephen]would tell you they had a very happyrelationship) is

thatthereis actuallya misconception
in thegeneral public,
but also amongstpoliticians,about this thing called a
Foreign Office foreignpolicy ... I haveseenthis over many
years, thatwhereyouhavea ForeignSecretary,of whatever
party, who knowswhathe wantsto do andhasa policy, that
will be carriedout very faithfully by the ForeignOffice
Oneof the reasonswhy specialadvisers,afterthey have been
in theForeignOffice for a shortwhile, got on sowell with
the Office wasbecause
theythemselves
cameto realize that
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the Office simply wantedto be told what to do and would then
advise to the best of its ability on how this could be
done
being so there was almost bound to be a
... and that
perfectly satisfactoryrelationshipwith the specialadvisers.
Whilst many respondentsdid not seethe situation in quite such
harmonious terms or see the bureaucracy as being so compliant,
nevertheless,the increasedformalization in the role of someindividual
advisers, discussedearlier, could havebeen accompanied by greater
acceptanceof their presence. There was a rapid dissipation of
suspiciontowardsadviserssuchasJack Straw, Margaret Beckett, and Ann
Carlton. BarbaraCastledescribesthis in her Diaries, and Beckett's
accountwas confirmed by officials: 'When I left, the private office and
the permanentsecretarysaid they had beenapprehensiveat the start,
but felt it had worked well. They felt it had beenhelpful to them.'
At first, accordingto one official, the arrival of Ann Carlton at MAFF:
was a bit of a shockto the system... what do we want a
political adviserfor? What doessheknow about linseed oil?
It was obviously that kind of reactionto some extent. But
she so quickly madeherselfuseful, and was so agreeable
really, people found shedidn't havehorns, and she could
help, and in a relatively short space of time she was
accepted.
Several reasonsemergeto explain the favourableattitude adopted
towards certain advisers. They were found to be: acceptable to civil
servantsbecauseof the way they behaved;useful to civil servants; and
not a threat. In describingthe Labour advisersfrom 1974, Darlington
in interview observed: 'There was a bit of suspicionat first, but I
think the careercivil servantsrapidly got the measureof us, realized
we were no great threat to them and the more enlightenedof them found
that on the contrary we could be quite useful to them if we established
a working relationship.'

Growing acceptanceat the levelof thesystemhasbeen described
in Chapters7 and8. It is perhapssymbolizedin thecontrast between
the favourablecommentsabout advisersmadeby the FDA to the Treasury
and Civil Service Committeein 1986(Vol. 2, p. 73) and the attitude they
adopted in 1974, when the FDA chairmanwas quotedby Darlington (p.40)
as sayingthat he feared 'a barrier betweenus and the minister.' This,

in turn, wasratherlesshostilethanthe attitudeof the Civil and
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Public ServantsAssociation(CPSA)to the appointmentof John Cope to
the DTI in 1972. His arrival was describedby William Kendall of the
CPSA as, 'pregnantwith constitutionalimplications of a revolutionary
kind' Mg TjIM, 9 October 1972,quotedin Rose, 1974).
Someadviserswere highly suspiciousof the FDA's reported support
for an increase in the numberof advisersor their inclusion in an
enlargedprivate office. An advisercommented:
Someof us thoughtthat the whole businessof the cabinet, and
this suddenacceptanceof us, was so unreal it wasn't true,
and that, in effect, if you had a cabinet with a special
adviser in it, actually in the sameroom, you would be much
more undercontrol of the private office, and it was a selfserving civil serviceploy.in order to incorporate us and
nobble us more closely within the system.
The dangerof incorporation will be a themerunning through this
final chapter. It is also possiblethat someofficials supportadvisers
because they are seen as a way of preventing the development of
something'worse'. Furthermore, there were indicationsthat advisersdo
not yet enjoy the universalconfidenceof officials, someof whom still
refer to the specialadviser 'experiment'. The expansion into new
departmentssometimes met difficulties and certain officials were
thought to be continuing to opposethe system(see,for example, Butler,
1986). At least one adviserthought that the civil servicewas hoping
that this current study would produceevidenceto show the systemto be
an aberation.

for whateverreasons,andtheyarediverse, advisers
Nevertheless,
do now seemto be widely accepted.The debatein later sectionsis not
betweenretentionor abolition,but betweenmaintenance
or expansion.
Various theorieswereexploredto helpexplainthe establishment
of a placefor advisersin theWhitehallscene.We sawin Chapter 3
that Walter developed
a theoryto accountfor thegrowth of personal
advisersto ministers. In his model adviserswere viewed as an
inevitabledevelopment
in Westerndemocracies
to assistministers faced
by modernbureaucracies.His final sentences
claimed: 'Their emergence
is a manifestationof the functionalrole of the intelligentsiain
modernpolitics. Theyarehereto stay' (p.188).
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Within the UK, it is possibleto see acceptanceof the system of
special advisersasevidenceof the adaptabilityof the civil service.
This is supported in two ways. First, ashas been explained, many
officials have beenincreasinglypreparedto work with advisers and
appreciatethe contribution they can make. Second,in various ways, the
civil servicehasrespondedby filling someof the gapsin the services
provided to ministers that have beenexposed by the activities of
advisers. In particular, the civil servicemight well have viewed most
advisersappointedin the 1980sas posing lessof a threat to them than
the group of economistswho were introducedasadvisersin the 1960s
partly because there were then relatively few specialists within the
ranks of the civil service. Now that the bureaucracyhas adapted and
greatly expanded its own economicadvisory services, the need for
economiststo be introducedasadvisershasdeclinedalthough it has not
vanished.
The adaptability of the civil servicecould also be linked to a
speculativetheory about the increasinglyfavourableattitude officials
have adopted towards advisers. There is much debate about the
politicization of the bureaucracy,and many would deny it has occurred
even if an increasingnumberof 'can-do' officials have been promoted.
Somepeopleseespecialadvisersasan important mechanismfor ensuring
that the civil servicemaintainsits traditional role. John Patten
stated: 'I am a great believer in the British Civil Serviceremaining a
non-political and non-politicized animal, henceQED I am a great
believer in the political adviser system.' Similar views were
formulated, evenbefore the politicization debatebecameso intense, by
someLabour ministerssuchas John Smith who, in interview, argued that
the advantageof advisersfrom the civil serviceperspective was that
they, 'lessen any requirementon civil servantsto be partisan in a
party political way.' This line of argumentwas further developed by
Smithin a recentspeechto the RIPA (1991).
Whilst there is little evidenceto take the argumentfurther than
claiming that civil servantsfind it convenientto have advisersaround,
it could be arguedthat in a climate in which their neutrality is under
greaterscrutiny than before, this is particularly useful. These issues

weretouchedon by theTreasuryandCivil ServiceCommitteein 1990. A
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witness from the FDA pointed out the existence of a continuum of
political work, someof which had alwaysbeen regarded as perfectly
proper, and some,including writing the party conferencespeech, which
had alwaysbeenregardedas improper. He continued:
We are concernedthat the point on that continuum at which we
stand between what is consideredacceptable and what is
considerednot acceptablehasbeenpushedsomewhat,over many
yearspast ... in the direction of officials doing rather more
of Ministers' political work for them, as opposed to rather
less, and we would like to seesome check to that drift
(1990, p. 8).
The Committeedid not specificallyarguefor advisersto do more of
the political work but earlier the samewitnesshad stated: 'there is
scope for debateasto preciselywhich duties within Departments are
best carried out by political advisersand which duties are bestcarried
out by permanentcareercivil servants... I think one could argue that
some press office activities might be carried out by political
advisers.' (p.7). This remainsan issuewhich hasnot been resolved.
Considerableroom remainsfor debateabout whether advisers can
more appropriatelybe slotted into a partnership,or a conflict, model
of the relationshipbetweenministersand the bureaucracyin the UK. It
has beensuggested,and demonstrated,in this studythat the perceptions
of ministersadoptingeither position haveoften been that they need to
appoint advisers. There is somewhatgreaterconsensusabout the model
of the place that adviserscan occupy.

QE IHE MODEL QE IHE PLAS
SECTION Cj APPROPRIATENESS
AND ROLEQf ADVISERS.
The extentto which the systemhas beeninstitutionalizedis one of the
many indicationsthat there is a placeand role for specialadvisers as
setout in the model in Chapter3. Various illustrations of aspects of
the model havebeenincludedin this study, and the diversity that was
implicit in the model has beenamply demonstrated.Most featuresof the
model appearto have beensubstantiated:

The importanceof beingthe minister's'own person', 'on the
spot', 'in the know', independent
of thedepartment,and politically

(i)
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committed.
The possessionof an informal, flexible, statusthat assists the
(ii)
adviser in operatingalong a rangeof possiblelines of communication
all of which are vital for the minister in his nodal position, but
time-consuming unlessdelegated. Somecut acrossuncertain boundaries
which potentially might be difficult for others to cross. Certain
effective adviserswere able to play the informal brokeragerole set out
in Chapter3.
The existenceof a wide rangeof possibleplacesfor advisers to
(iii)
occupy and functions for them to perform. In the discussion of
functions in Chapter3, the independenceand flexibility in the model
were seen to be important andallow advisersto play many different
roles. Advisers with the ability might achievea position where they
have some discretionto choosefrom amongsta large menu of possible
roles and places. However, the role of any adviseris also the product
of several interacting factorsincluding: the minister's continuing
wishes and needs;the capability of the adviser; and the capabilities,
attitudes andexpectationsof others. Time pressureson ministers in
fulfilling all the functionsset out in Chapter3 are great. There is
always, therefore, plenty for the adviserto do, even if it is a time
consumingchore.
(iv)
The existenceof a variety of ways in which adviserscan influence
policy (even thoughtheir overall impact is limited). These include:
bringing in expertiseand/or knowledgeof, and commitment to, party
policies; being in a position to be able to 'sponsor' certain policies;
being somebody independentof the departmentto look at issues and
interest groups and so
submissions; liaising with under-represented
occasionallywidening the relevantpolicy community; and, especiallyin
the caseof the Policy Unit, acting occasionallyas brokers for a range
of policy researchcentres. Partly on the basisof their role in policy
making it is possibleto considerthe feasibility of developinga model
of advisersequivalentto Meltsner's view of American policy analystsas
members of a professionwhich had 'emerged' (1986, p.300) or Walter's
description of Australian advisersasa distinct group within the
intelligentsia. In the UK, however, numbersare too few, and roles too
diverse, for any suchanalysisto be very conclusive. Furthermore, we
saw that Walter's attemptat psycho-analysisof the characteristics of
ministerial advisers was inappropriatein the UK where many advisers
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were eventually seeking,not shunning,a public role. However, the
growth in the useof specialadvisersis sometimesseenasone of many
ways in which social scientistsand academicresearchmay be brought
into Government(Banting, 1979;Bulmer, 1987). Kavanaghsuggeststhat
advisers form part of a group called, 'for want of a better term',
'political entrepreneurs'. It also consistsof, 'members of thinktanks, researchers,and others who, holding no formal party position,
contribute to the formulation of party policy' (1992, p. 18).
Departmentalspecialadvisersform only one part of this group and, the
present research has shown, at least up until 1987, advisers were
involved in many activities in addition to policy formulation.
Therefore, the wide-rangingbut flexible model developedin Chapter 3
remainsan appropriateway of encompassingadvisers' roles.
The combination of severalof the abovepoints to ensure the
provision of a valued counterto the inevitable 'uncertainty absorption'
that takes place in departmentsas a result of the minister being
surroundedby generalistadministrators. (As mentionedin Chapter3 the
(v)

concept of uncertaintyabsorptionis being usedhere very broadly to
cover most of the activities civil servantsengagein when preparing
simplified policy options to put to ministers.) Playing this role
inevitably involves the adviserin operatingas an 'extra pair of eyes
and ears'. In contactswith officials there is only limited scope for
advisers to play an antagonisticrole of somehow pushing reluctant
officials towardsacceptanceof their minister's proposals.
The contribution of advisersto countering 'uncertainty absorption'
is probably greatest where there is most, rather than least, trust
between officials and the advisers. It is important, as Norman Warner
explained, for advisersand officials to agreeas far aspossible on the
facts - it is no help to a minister to be presented with alternative
sets of facts. Furthermore,whilst a certain degreeof robustness may
be necessaryfor an adviserto gain accessto information, it is through
building up trust with officials that advisers are usually most
effective at gatheringinformation. Where, aswith Roger Dyson, extra
information was being collectedfrom outside the department,but covered
the managementresponsibilitiesof the department,there was scope for
considerableconflict.
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Advisers and ministers who adopted a conflict model stressed
different points from the majority. Thus, FrancesMorrell asked:
Why should it be thoughtto be in the interests of the
minister for his specialadvisersto be closely integrated
into the departmentthat he hasbrought them into, to provide
an alternative? ... of course there was tension between
special advisersand civil servants. Any effective special
adviserscreatetensionsbecausethey're an alternative source
of advice. The tensionsdidn't reduceour effectiveness at
all.
Most interviewees felt that on this issue, at least, the more
cooperative approach,in line with a partnershipmodel, paid dividends
when trying to counter 'uncertainty absorption'. Often advisers'
dealings with the department were seento be to the department's
advantage as well. This forms one part of the 'incorporation thesis'
which has perhaps bestbeendescribedby Young and Sloman (1982),
commenting on a contribution to their programmeNQ, Minister by Ian
Bancroft:
Now, according to Sir Ian Bancroft, the head of the civil
service, they are thoroughlyapprovedof: which is perhaps
another way of sayingthat they've been taken on board,
absorbed in to the system,housetrained, and, as agents of
anything like radical change,ever so politely suffocated.
Bancroft:
I... For the most part they've beenof considerablebenefit to
the ministers for whom they were working, and in a curious
sort of sidewayseffect also to the departmentsin which they
were working for thoseministers, becausethey do provide an
extra dimensionin termsof being ableto go to meetings,keep
up contactswith the party of the day in a way which no civil
servantpossiblecould ... I found them overwhelmingly useful
rather than the reverse.'
If we're talking about power, power asbetweenministers and
civil servants, that soundsalmostlike an epitaph on the
political-adviser experiment. At best they're a minor
cosmetic on the great graniteface of the body politic: good
for appearances,even for a politician's self-regard,but not
likely to changevery much (p.90-1).
In responseto that, JackStraw, one of the adviserswho worked
with Ian Bancroft, argued:
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You can't win on Hugo Young's basisand I wasn't absorbed.
Whether we were successful- to an extentI was successful depended on getting on with people What was the point of
...
having a raging argumentif you could
get what you wanted
without the raging argument... That doesn't meanto say that
there weren't meetings when I took a different view from
officials. That happeneda lot of the time.
This discussionhighlights the importanceof the argumentsat the
end of the previous sectionaboutadvisersfitting into both conflict
and partnershipmodels. Clearly the perceptionsof ministers about the
need for advisers,and of advisersabout the most productive ways to
function, vary widely. The systemstheory usedin Chapter3 to help
develop the modelwas useful in both indicating how factors such as the
overload of information might contributeto the needfor advisers, and
identifying possiblelocationsin which they could operate. However,
although advisershavebeenshownto fulfil a variety of roles within
systemstheory as setout in Chapter3, Section4, the processeswithin
the 'black box' of governmentcan only be properly illuminated if the
perceptions of the different actorsare also analysed. Thus, for
example, many agreed that ministersare overloaded, but only some
ministers perceived of advisersas a way of relieving the overload.
Acknowledging this duality of looking at the perceptions of actors
within the framework of understandingthe structural forces has been
of the flexible
useful in helping to demonstratethe appropriateness
model developedin Chapter3, and will also be important in the final
in the next section.
assessments
SECTION M EFFECTIVENESSOf ADVISERS' CONTRIBUTIONS IQ
SYSTEM Of GOVERNMENT.
It is clear from this studythat there is a placefor advisersto occupy and
functions for them to fulfil, and that thesediverse functions are often
performed to the satisfactionof ministers. The qualities of successful
advisers have been highlighted. (The study may sometimes appear to be
excessively eulogistic becauseof the necessaryattention paid to these
points.) Nevertheless,crucial questionsremain aboutthe effectiveness of
the contribution of the system of special advisers to the system of
government. This is much more difficult to determine,and someof the results
will appear much less impressive when viewed against the escalating
requirements of ministers set out in Chapter 3. These remaining
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questionsmay be groupedin four ways:

(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Are advisersnecessaryin principle?
Do advisers constitutea solution to the problems
facing ministers?
Have advisers caused any harm to the system of
government?
Has the systemof advisersas a whole beeneffective?

(i)

The first group of questionsrevolve around the issueof whether,
if adviserscan in practiceenhancethe effectivenessof someministers,
this demonstratesthat they are necessaryin principle. There are
various ways of assessingthis. Someministershavemanaged perfectly
satisfactorily without advisers- either entirely, or for a long period
whilst a new adviserwas being arranged. Severalministers who had had
an adviserand found him quite useful, nevertheless,did not reappoint.
They includedNicholas Edwardsand Harold Lever. By contrastPeter Rees
moved from being a junior Treasuryminister to Minister of Stateat the
Department of Trade, and, having worked with three advisers at the
Treasury, thoughtthe ministersat Trade might have beenslightly more
effective if they had hadan adviser. David Ennals exclaimed, 'I'm
always surprised when I hearministerssay they don't need special
advisers. I think its an essentialpart of the structureof government.
Obviously choiceof the right charactersis very important.'
from Ennals'spermanentsecretary,Patrick Nairne,
The assessment
was only slightly lesspositive:

Are specialadvisers,at theendof theday, a luxury, or are
they a necessi createdby the growth of government,the
of the
greatstrainsandpressures
on ministers'requirements
department
No
I
that
job?
quick answerto that. think
any
canservea ministereffectivelywithoutspecialadvisers ...
and I don't think thatspecial advisersare an absolute
essential,but I do think theyarenotjust a luxury. They
are an additionalaccretionto government
which has proved
helpful, constructive,andin the sortof conditionswe have
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been talking about they have improved the quality of
government, as well asproviding a support to ministers.
Maybe the support is more social and psychological than
actually relieving themof the burden of office too much, but
after all, don't we all want social, psychologicalsupport in
hard times.
One of the reasonswhy it is difficult to move from saying that
advisers are valuable, to claiming that they are essential,is that by
the very natureof their flexible role, the systemdoesnot collapse if
they are not there. JohnHunt contrastedtheir role with that of a
private secretary,and said that the adviser's value lay in his being a
'spare resource' with time to go off and spendtime thinking about an
issueor writing a speech.
Some officials suggestedthere was no real needfor advisers, but
given they existed, things were found for them to do, and thesecould be
useful activities. Otherswent further and said, 'they have been used
for various tasksand peopleare then declaring, "they are the ideal
person, closeto us."'
A surprising numberof activities that an adviser seemsthe ideal
person to perform, can, in practice,be carriedout by others. This
includes activities that involve crossinguncertain boundaries. Ian
Bancroft, for example,claims not to havecompromised his 'political
virginity' by the liaison activities he carried out with CRD when
private secretary. Similarly, questionsare raisedabout whether it has
to be a politically committedpersonto fill the role. It is sometimes
argued that the valuecomesfrom having an extra, talented, person in
the teamserving the minister, and that it neednot be somebodywith a
political background. Lynda Rousegavesomecredenceto this argument
by describingthe previouslyreferred to early evening meetingswith the
minister, the private secretary,and the chief information officer. A
discussionabout the presentationof governmentpolicies might cover the
political input, the mechanicsof gettingjournalists to understand and

say theright thing, andthequestionof decidingon theright policy,
'but you couldn't really say preciselywho was doing what.'
Furthermore,she sawthepoliticaladviser'srole as being, 'another
' However she
memberof theprivateoffice, anotherprivatesecretary.
thoughtthereweresomepoliticalthingsshedid thatthe civil servants
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could not do, and other of her activities that they would not have done.
Theseissueswere examinedat length in Chapter7, and we saw that
there could be an advantagein having one personor group to perform the
various functions, and that an adviser'smode of operation would be
different. These findings can now be emphasizedby looking at the
combination of factorsthat come togetherin the model of the place of
the adviser. It is a uniquecombination. A minister doesnot enjoy the
same degree of flexibility as his adviserand officials do not have
the freedom to assistthe minister in party political activities.
Advisers can play a unique role which complementsthe work of others,
without precisely duplicating the work of others in their own fields.
This position was recognizedin the Government's1986response to the
Seventh Report from Treasuryand Civil ServiceCommittee where, with
reference to advisers,junior ministers, and PPSs, the point was made
that, 'the functions of the three are distinct and different'
(Cmnd.9841, para 31). The Governmentresponsewent on to observe,
however, that the junior ministersand PPS may provide sufficient
political input and someministershaveno advisers. This shows, it
could be argued, that advisershavea distinct but not absolutely
essential role. The distinct role meansthat, in the words of one
official, 'the political adviseris there asan animal who bestrides
officials within the departmentand the political views of the party. '
We have seenhow adviserssometimes,by their activities, or by
being the first to respondto an issue, reveal areas where services
provided by officials are limited. However, it has been claimed that
the civil serviceitself is sufficiently flexible to fill some of the
gaps, and, in the long term fill them more proficiently than do
advisers. In 1964virtually all the 'irregulars' were experts, but
there are now many specialists(especiallyeconomists) in the civil
service, and as Henkel (1991) showsa much greateruse of consultants,
and most of the advisersby 1987were playing a political more than
specialist role. In severalinstances,advisersclaim to have set up
information gathering networks, or presentationalarrangements, or
parliamentary liaison systems that were eventually taken over by
officials. For example, John Houstonbelieved that the work he
performed in liaising with MPs, and stressingwithin the Foreign Office
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the importance of this activity, encouragedthe Office to create a
larger and more effectiveparliamentaryliaison unit to cultivate MPs
and explain Foreign Office opinions. The 1988White Paperfrom the DTI,
1I = The DepartmentX41Enterprise, (Cm. 278) implicitly argued for
more secondmentson the groundsthat the department'sofficials needed
to have the experienceand knowledgethat the then minister, David
Young, brought to the departmentwhen he was a specialadviser.
The conclusion is that the value of advisers' contributions
indicates that they are beneficial, if not essential. If major shifts
do occur in the rangeof activities in which they can play a valuable
role, then that is broadly in tune with the flexible model proposed for
the role of advisers. As in Australia, the majority of ministers would
not now like to be without them, and to the extent that effective
ministersproduceeffective government,the contribution of advisers is
helpful. The personalnatureof the role meansthat it would not work
if a minister did not want one; whilst they might not in principle,
therefore, be absolutely necessary,all ministers should carefully
considerwhetherthey would not be better servedby appointing at least
one adviser.
The second group of questionsinvolves the extent to which
advisersconstitutea solution to the problemsfacing ministers. It is
widely felt, and this was a conclusionof Klein and Lewis, that advisers
help relieve the symptomsof problemssuchas overload, but they do not
tackle the root causes. Advisersoften help ministersperform slightly
more functions, or operatea little more effectively, but do not usually
(ii)

make ministersnoticeablylessoverloaded. Some ministerswho have made
important contributionsto the discussionabout the role of advisers,
including Barbara CastleandDouglasHurd, believe that advisers can
reduceoverload. To do so, they needto be top quality, and appreciate

the importanceof working with the bureaucracy.Starting with a
specificexampleDouglasHurd wenton to developthegeneralargument:
I am talking to the Home Affairs Committee of the
ParliamentaryParty this evening. That is a political
occasionandI don't wanta text, but I needthoughtson the
sequencein whichI shoulddealwith mattersandthe kind of
points I shouldmake. Edward[Bickham]will do that. That
will save mehalf an hour.As the mediamultiply, and this
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burden of communicationsincreases,which as I said in the
[1986, RIPA] lecture is one of the main growths in pressureon
government, the more you needpeople who are not civil
servants by tradebut who know the subjectmatter, know what
the minister wants to sayand can actually help to assembleit
for him
of course, if they are no good, they simply add to
the load,...so their quality is enormouslyimportant ... All the
time you want your life simplified, not complicated;the last
thing you want is to arbitrateon jurisdictional questions
betweenmembersof your staff.
Hurd was awareof the dangerof adding too many advisers. Some
other ministers though, especiallyEdmundDell, believed that every
adviser generated extra overloadon the minister, by, as he told the
Re-skilling Government Seminar,involving them in the activities of
other departments,or in issueswithin their own departmentwhich could
satisfactorilybe left to junior ministers(IOD, 1986, p.33-4).
The discussion of overloadin Chapter3 included reference to
several possible sourcesof overloadas seen within systems theory.
There it was suggestedthat the provision of extra channel capacity
could reduce the overload of demandson the system but increase the
overload on the decisionmaker. Although adviserscould be seen as
operating in this way, it is important to stress that when advisers
provide this extra channel capacityit is often to parts of the
political systemwith which the minister perceivesit asdesirable for
him to have more contact. At other timesadvisersmay help the minister
cope with the overloadby providing the reassurancethat somebodyof a
like political mind hasexaminedthe demandsthat finally reach the
minister after they havebeenprocessedby the permanentbureaucracy.
One minor benefit to the systemof governmentfrom the introduction
of advisersin the UK is that it hasaddeda degreeof flexibility to
the system by allowing somepeopleto be given a title, and/or pay,
and/or accessto papers,to perform useful, but idiosyncratic, roles.
Theseadvisersinclude Robin Cookeand the successivesecretariesto the
GovernmentChief Whip.

The very natureof an adviser'spositionasthe loyal servantof
his ministerweakenshis ability to performfunctionssuchas advancing
therole of the party in the
cohesionin government,or strengthening
government,if the government
movesawayfrom the party manifesto.
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Benn's Diaries show how thesetwo points may, indeed, be in conflict.
Similarly, whilst advisersmay help with effective presentation of
the governmentcase,thereare zero-sumelementsin the extent to which
all ministerscan appearto shinein the media.
The small numberof adviserslimits the contribution they can make
in areas suchas: providing a meansby which future politicians can
gain valuable experience of how Whitehall functions; enhancing the
ability of ministers to carry out their collective role (which again has
zero-sum elements);and enabling more long term strategicthinking to take
place in government. This point is not necessarilyan argument against
advisers, but possibly part of a casefor additional reforms. The
various aspects of this point can be examined by analysing the
contributions of the largestgroup of departmentalspecial advisers the DHSS teamunderLabour. The first two items on this list were to
somedegreeachievedby this slightly bigger group of advisers (several
of whom, were part time). JackStraw thinks that having beenan adviser
is of advantageto a political career,and various exampleshavealready
been given of the team's effectivenesson Cabinet briefing. The
greatestproblemsarise in relation to long term thinking. According to
BarbaraCastle'sprivate secretary,NormanWarner:
If you're measuringeffectivenesson the basisof ministerial
successrate in getting through their policies, I think the
Straw, Abel-Smith, Lynes trio scored pretty well. It's
inevitable in the way we run governmentin this country that
we don't actually havea long term strategicview very often.
We're very much crisis management - short term,
considerations. Now that's not the fault of the special
advisers and to lay all thoseproblemsat the door of the
specialadvisersis a nonsensebecausethey were not set up to
do that. They were set up to help the ministers achievetheir
political objectives,and mostof thosepolitical objectives
tendedto be short term.

This issueis of importancein the final sectionon suggestedreforms
because
an understanding
of thefunctionsof possiblenewadvisoryunits
is requiredbeforetheproposalscanbe assessed.
Overall,the significance
of thedevelopment
of specialadvisersis
that it representsthelowestcommondenominatorof what could be
achieved,and whatwasthoughtdesirable.Devolution, for instance,
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might tackle someof the root causesof overload on ministers, but it
has proved to be lesspolitically acceptablethan the development of
advisers. At the May 1986Re-skilling GovernmentSeminarJohn Hoskyns
madesimilar points and manypeoplecommentedthat the main proposal in
the prepared paper was to introduce a cabinet (IOD, 1986). Many
additional reforms were supportedat the seminarbut, significantly, the
final report from the Re-skilling Government Group (1987) consisted
solely of the plan for the introduction of cabinetswhich is analysedin
the next section. This outcomeemphasizesthe way advisers, or an
extensionof the system,are seenas the lowest common denominator.
In his studyof ministerial advisersin Australia, Smith suggested
that the experiencesof the advisersto the Whitlam Government, 'have
not resolvedany of the questionmarksthat standalso againstthe work
of specialadvisersin Britain or the PMO in Canada' (p. 156). However,
he continued, this did not disposeof the forces in Australia or
elsewhere that led to the developmentof advisers. In modern
government, he claimed, 'two problems intertwine: the problem of
enabling political parties to exercisemeaningful control over the
institutions of government, and the problem of appreciating and
responding to changingsocialforcesabout which knowledge is scarce'
(p. 156). To the extent that theseare seenas problemsfacing British
governments, it is perhapsinstructive that even the larger groups of
advisers used in Australia were deemedto be unsuccessfulin dealing
with them.
The third setof questionsconcernwhetherany harm hasbeen done
to the systemof governmentby the introduction of special advisers.
Darlington (1976, Chapter7) lists six objectionsthat have been made
(iii)

againstthe system:
(1)

it should not exist - all advice should come from the civil
service;

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

by ministers;
it involvespersonalpatronage
advisershavetoo muchpowerandarenon-accountable;
they constitutea securityrisk;
they shouldnot be paid from public fundsandareoverpaid;
Parliamentandthepublicknow too little aboutthe system.
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Many of thesepoints were discussedin the analysesof both the
reactions of politicians andbureaucratsand the criticisms made of
individual advisers'effectiveness. Darlington suggestsa casecould be
made out againstall the objectionsexceptthe final one which is less
relevantnow than when Darlington wrote, and shouldbe answeredby this
study. The remainingpoints can be consideredin reverseorder.
The level of advisers'pay hasbeendiscussed,and is not generally
thought to be excessive. It is now widely acceptedthat they should be
paid from public funds. Indeed, makingthem temporary civil servants
perhapshelpsreducethe fourth objection. The evidenceindicates both
that advisersdo not poseany security risk, and that the suggestions
they have been responsible for embarrassingleaks of Government
information are generallyunfounded. Someadvisershave beencriticized
on groundsof unaccountability,but flexibility is an inherent feature
of their role, and they are answerableto the minister who could
terminate their employmentat any time and who has to answer questions
about their activities in Parliament. The idea that advisers are too
powerful is supportedby very few people - many more criticize their
lack of impact. The secondobjectionalso arisesinevitably from the
nature of their role, but there have not been the criticisms of
nepotism made in Britain that havebeenallegedagainsta few of the
larger numberof advisersappointedin Australia (see,for example, R.
Smith).
The first objectionis perhapsthe most substantial, though also

the explanationof why manyadviserswereoriginally appointed.Various
specific pointsmightflow from this line of criticism. One official,
developingthe argumentdescribedin Chapter3 aboutthe strengthof
generalistofficials within theBritishcivil service, argued that
another layerof generalistadviserssurroundingthe ministerwould be
damagingratherthanhelpful.
Somepeoplenow arguethat Margaret Thatcherpoliticized the civil
service and that officials are expectedto provide the answers wanted
and ignore their traditional duty to provide objective advice. The
accuracy of this suggestionis strongly disputed,but somewho make it
go on to claim that advisersare exacerbatingthe problem because, by

361

providing a steeron the minister's thinking, they are, in practice,
further reducing the scopefor objective analysis. This is referred to
by somecivil servantsas a processof 'dejudgementalising'the service;
according to Hennessy(1989) the introduction of economic advisers in
1964appearedto someWhitehall regulars, 'to be the thin end of a wedge
of politicisation which has advancedever since. One seasonedTreasury
man, for example,tracesto October 1964a growing tendencyamong some
career officials to trim their advice to ministerial preferences'
(p. 189).
This point is strongly madeby a few officials, and is additional
to criticism that some advisers have had their own agenda. An
associatedquestion has also beenraised about the role of some
advisers, especiallyin the Policy Unit, in acting as protagonists and
brokering the proposalsfrom policy researchcentres. Perhaps greater
attentionshould be given to analysing,rather than brokering, the ideas
so as to meetthe criticism that in the 1980sthe ways of processingthe
proposalscoming from the think tankswere inadequate(see,for example,
Donoughue, 1990).
Other specific complaints include the alleged impact certain
advisers had on someappointmentsand the fear - more about any future
expandedsystemthan the current one - that attractivejobs might go to
advisers and lessenthe appealof the civil service. This point was
made in the RIPA analysisof the secondmentsscheme in Whitehall.
Gosling and Nutting (1990, p. 15-6) report an official as saying:
'"Bringing in high-flyers can have a demoralizingeffect on our own
staff, especially wherethe secondeeis usedto do things that civil
servantscould do, and would benefit from doing*'.

However, only a minorityof officialssawadvisers,overall,as a
hindranceto the systemof Government.
(iv)

The fourth set of questions
involvethe effectivenessof the
in severalways. Opinions
systemas a whole. This canbe assessed
about theeffectiveness
of individualadviserscanbe collated as was
done earlier. Furthermore,manyrespondents
expressedopinions about
the systemasa wholeandthesetoo canbe collatedbut again varied
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widely. The view taken about specialadvisersat the start of a
government can influencethe later perceptionof effectiveness. For
example, those who in 1974took 'the invasion of Whitehall' (unday
Times, 21 April 1974)view could, by 1976, claim, 'How Whitehall's
Mandarins tamed Labour's 38 SpecialAdvisers'. (Sum Times, 19 June
1976). Some of the initial doubtsexpressedby Tories in 1979 were
shownto be inappropriateasadvisersproved their worth.
Special advisers were sometimesseenas more influential than
backbenchers,PPSs, and even, in a few instances,junior ministers.
Theakston(1987) too reportedthat, 'in interview a permanent secretary
recalled a specialadviserwho, "cut much more ice with the secretaryof
state" than a parliamentaryunder-secretarywhom he named' (p.99). In
Lobbying Government,CharlesMiller listed on a scaleof 10-1 various
categories of peoplethoughtto haveinfluence. Specialadvisers were
rated at 3- the sameas PPSsand higher than backbenchMPs. Sedgemore
(1980) claims adviserswho becomeMPs mostly lose power and influence.
Several advisers who havebecomeMPs supported this view. Douglas
French thought that backbencherscould make more noise, 'but noise
doesn't automaticallymeaninfluence', and that in terms of having
an impact on decisionsmadeby ministers, suchas the content of the
Budget, the adviserhas more influence than an ordinary backbencher.
Michael Portillo commented: 'Was I more influential as a special
adviser than asa backbencher?Certainly, yes, no doubt about that;
more influential asa specialadviserthan a PPS? Yes, I think I was,
becauseof the inside knowledge- you don't have it as a PPS.'
Various other authorson British Government,however, have been
rather dismissiveof the role of specialadvisers,for example Greenwood
and Wilson (1984) suggestedthat most, 'hitherto seem to have been
largely neutralisedby the civil service' (p.85). Young and Sloman in
their IQ, Mini

r programmejust quotedcalled it suffocation.

To someextentthis discrepancy
mightarisefrom different factors
beingtakeninto account.If effectiveness
is takenasan aggregateof
the perceptionsof ministersaboutthe effectivenessof individual
advisersin carrying out what the minister wished, then a more
favourableconclusionwill probablybe reachedthanif theeffectiveness
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of the systemis judged accordingto its contribution to the system of
government. Although this is only a partial explanation, it is an
attempt to put in perspectivewhat remainsa very diverse range of
opinions, even after allowanceis madefor the fact that people who
worked with successfuladviserswere more likely to seethe system as
being effective. Further evidenceto supportthis explanation comes
from the stressmany intervieweesgave to the usefulnessof advisers
rather than to their influence. Although the Treasury and Civil Service
Committeeconcludedin 1986that, 'At present,Ministers make patchy and
unsystematic use of specialadvisers' (1986, Vol. 1, para 5.23), this
does not necessarily meanthey are not, in general, satisfactorily
performing the functions the diverse ministers require from them.
Drawing on the evidencegatheredin this study, and analysed in
this chapter, it seems appropriate to make a generally positive
assessmentof the hypothesisexpoundedin Chapter 1. Special advisers
havebecomesufficiently institutionalizedfor there to be a recognized
place for them in the British systemof government,and they can often
play a reasonablyeffectiverole. The final part of the hypothesis is,
as we have seenabove, the most contentiousand there are quite strong
limitations on the degreeof effectiveness- particularly when viewed
against the needsof the systemof government. By the mid 1980s there
was a considerablemovementin favour of extendingthe systemso as to
enhance its effectiveness. Theseproposalsare examinedin the final
section.
SECTION L

PROPOSALSFOR REFORM.

PWssals.
Summary
Qfßecent
In 1986-7 various proposals for reform, and usually for further
development, of the systemof specialadviserscame from: The Treasury
and Civil Service Committee(SeventhReport, Session 1985-86); the
GovernmentResponse(Cmnd 9841,1986); the TjW I& in Whitehall report
produced by an RIPA Working Group (1987); the Re-skilling Government
Group (1987); the FabianSociety (Lipsey, 1987). These proposals are
given in tabular form in Table 7 with the functions of each proposed

unit in relationto activitiesin a rangeof fieldsoutlinedin Table8.
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advisers.
Should be up to
individual
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TABLE 7 Continued.
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There would
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artment results
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other
departments.

A minister
can set up
what is in all
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whatever format
structures
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say. Different
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TABLE 8: Summary of Functions of Each of the Units in
for Reform.
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TABLE 8: Continued.
Presentation

Press adviser
would be in
unit and
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political
appointment

Civil
servants
in press
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office
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as other
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ministerial
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Most of the points on the Tablesare self-explanatorybut it is worth
stressing that the proposalsgenerallyinclude the suggestion that
experimentsbe conducted.

Summaaof QpinionsGatheredin ft Research.
A large numberof opinions aboutreforms to the systemof advisers were
gatheredin the interviews and they varied greatly. Someproposals for
reform went further than an increasein the numberof special advisers.
Tony Benn backed a reform which, ashe told the Treasury and Civil
Service Committee(1986, Vol. 2, p. 136) had beensuggestedearlier in the
century by Fred Jowett, and was repeated by the 1977 Expenditure
Committee (Vol. 1, para.149), that ministersshould take a group of
backbench MPs into a departmentwith them to perform functions similar
to thosenow performedby advisers. There was somesupport for Denis
Healey's approach in the 1960sof using a few officials in a special
unit to advise a minister on the questionsto ask to gain greater
control over his department. On reflection, Denis Healey thought
something like the ProgrammeEvaluationGroup (PEG) might be worth
ministers trying again,althoughcare would be neededto ensure that
first, the right, high calibre, officials were appointed,and second,it

did not becomea bufferbetweenthe ministerandthe department.
In all there was not so much supportfor some of the proposals
outlined in the Tables as might have been assumed. Some former
officials think that a numberof peoplehavethe ideathat because the
system of special advisershas not worked then greater numbers are
required. The questionnaire finding, discussedin Chapter 8, that
comparativelyfew advisersfelt their effectivenesslimited by a lack of
position within the administrativechain of command, suggeststhat there
is lessdemandfrom advisersfor a move into a more formal position than
might have beenexpected. Again the commentsfrom Norman Warner on the
effective Labour teamat DHSS are significant:
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a proper position within the civil servicechain of command
would havebeenthe kiss of death. Their effectivenesswas to
someextentbasedon a small amountof mystery about precisely
how they operatedand the fact that they were external
..
There were enoughof them for them to be mutually supportive.
They were very well integratedwith the private office. Both
thosetwo factorswere fairly important ... If you put them in
a formal relationshipI would judge that they will become
bureaucratized,they will not fulfill what they were meant to
do.
Overall about twice as many intervieweessupportedretentionof the
system at approximately its current size as advocated an increased
number of advisersand a movementinto a more formal position probably
entailing amalgamationwith the private office. It is impossibleto be
precise about the phrase'approximatelyat its current size'; for the
Tories who servedasadvisersin the Treasury,that would mean three,
but for othersit would meanonly one or two. Hostility towards the
idea of a cabinetwas greatestamongstministers. Someadvisersopposed
this idea, as mentionedpreviously, becausethey fearedit would lead to
incorporation; perhapssignificantly, proportionately most support for
cabinetscamefrom civil servants,and one minister, William Waldegrave,
who backed the ideadid so to bring special advisers under proper
'managerialdiscipline'.
There was some support - especiallyfrom advisers - for the
introduction of more outsidersinto executivepositionswithin the civil
serviceand for a civil servantto be allocatedto supportadvisers, in
addition to a typist.

ImplicationsQft
(i)

Assessments.

The first implicationof thefindingsis thattherole of advisers

may changedependinguponchangingneedsof ministersand the services
they expect and receive from civil servants. It is important to
consider (especially in the light of the commentsabout the cyclical
phases of the role of advisers and the possible development of
adversarialpolitics) how far changesin the civil service are permanent
and how far a different governmentwould have different requirements.
There is a widespreadview amongstformer Labour advisersand ministers
that the civil service has beenpoliticized in a Tory direction.
Although this claim is widely disputed(seeSectionD of this chapter),
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its importance lies in the impact it might haveon the behaviour of
future non-Tory ministers. It doesseemwidely acceptedthat officials,
if not politicized, at least adopta 'can-do' attitude. Some accept
that the same officials who adopt a 'can-do' attitude towards Tory
policies might also adopta 'can-do' attitude to non-Tory policies.
Othersbelieve that permanentofficials more sympatheticto Labour would
have to be promoted. Throughoutthe period of Tory Governments since
1979 a seriesof Opposition figures have suggestedthat more special
advisers would be required, sometimesadding that the task would be
greater for the incoming ministersthan in 1964 or 1974 (see, for
example, Silkin, 1982, and 1987;John Cunningham - report in T1
Inndent,

9 January1989).

Not all changes in ministerial needs, or current changes and
proposed reforms in the civil service, would result in a demand for a
greater numberof specialadvisersor other partisansupportstaff for
ministers. There are, however,a numberof changesthat it is claimed
havehad, or would have, this effect. They include:
A greaterpositivecommitmentby the civil service to achieving
goals set out by ministers. In Imp JQbjin Wbitehall, it was suggested
that this had happened;othersclaim that this can be seenin statements
made by the former CabinetSecretaryabout the role of civil servants
(a)

(see, for example,the memorandumsubmittedby the Head of the Home
Civil Service (
Armstrong Memorandum)to the Treasury and Civil
Service Committee, 1986, Vol.2, pp.7-9). To the extentthat ministers
now expect a greaterdegreeof positive commitment from the civil
service there are areassuchas the presentation and promotion of
policies where somecivil servantsmay be unableor unwilling to give
the supportthat ministersrequire. Certain ministersagree that the
civil service should not do this. Therefore there is/could be an
expanded role here for advisersand one that, in part, helps to reestablishthe uncertainboundarybetween'can-do' officials enthusiastic
to implement the Government'spolicies, and the party political arena.
The greateruse of short term contractsfor people with specific
(b)
skills has beenproposed. Whilst many suchpeople would not be special
advisers, a few could be deployedin a mannersimilar to that used by
Michael Heseltine. Advocatesof greateruseof outsiderson short term
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contracts do not necessarilyseethis asan alternative to appointing
advisers. Thus, for example,William Rodgers(1982, p. 160) stated: 'The
acceptanceof the SpecialAdviser - one or more than one - as the rule
not the exception would be consistentwith a career Civil Service
characterizedby more adventurousrecruitment, more movement in-and-out
and better specialisttraining'.
(c)
A minister who takesa greaterinterestin the managementof, and
policy formulation within, his departmentmight wish to developa system
similar to Denis Healey's PEG; this could be an alternative to, or have
implications for, the role of specialadvisers.
Perhapsthe minister who came nearestto emulating Healey's arrangements
was David Owen who, as one of the ministerial teamin Defence in the
1960s, had beenimpressedwith PEG. In his autobiography(p.263) Owen
explainedhow he built a policy sectionwithin the private office. The
specialadviserswere associatedwith this team. The increasing number
of highflying officials who haveleft Whitehall could constitutea pool
of people who could be brought back in as advisers with valuable
knowledge about their department. Howard Davies has shown how this
potentially delicaterole can be successfullyplayed.
(d)

Notwithstanding thesecontentionsprobably the biggest change in

the perceivedneedsof ministersrelatedto the developmentof advisers
is that Tory ministershaveincreasinglycome to accept that it is
useful for them to have advisers. The need is thought to be
particularly related to the performance of party political and
presentational tasks where it is felt inappropriate to use civil
servants. It therefore seemslikely that specialadvisersin some form
are here to stay. At the endof 1992there were about 35 advisers
covering virtually all departments(Vacher's, November 1992). The
debate is about possibleexpansionof the system,or its integration
into more radical changes.

The secondimplicationis thatthere should be no standardblueprint
(ii)
becausethe needsof ministersvary asdoesthecapacityof departments
to meetthose needs.If ministersareforcedto appointadvisersandfind
no usefor them it will notwork. Civil servicecooperationwith special
advisersdepends
upon their perceptionof the relationshipbetween
advisersand the minister.
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The presentsystemis very flexible; different advisershave been
used in very different ways and havebeenable to carve out valuable
roles. This suggeststhat there might be continuing value in allowing
ministersto experiment. However, given the previous point, there could
be dangersin conductingexperimentsrigidly accordingto pre-conceived
blueprints. In particular, the idea from the Re-skilling Government
(iii)

Group that their experimentshouldalso be conductedwith some junior
ministers, whoseSecretariesof Statewould continue with the ordinary
current provision, would probably createunworkable strains. Already,
some Secretariesof Statehave beenreportedto be uneasy if their
adviserappearsto be doing too much for junior ministers.
There is no reasonto assumethat the systemhas to expand. The
current systemcould be viewed asa finished product; the vast majority
of the post 1981expansionwas in termsof more departmentshaving an
(iv)

adviser, rather than larger teamsbeing formed. The suggestionthat the
system of specialadvisersmight representa lowest common denominator
is very important. It is certainly not the casethatjust because one
or two advisersin a departmenthaveproved to be of benefit, a team of
six in a unit suchas a cabinetwould be three times more beneficial.
Indeed, two to three advisersmight be the optimum size - because any
further increase,especiallyif accompaniedby consequentialchanges in
the structure of the private office, might create dysfunctional
tensions. An All-rounder anda Highflier, perhapswith a short term or
part time businessmanor specialist,may provide the perfect complements
to the private office, whereasa larger teamwould possibly gum it up.

Elm IQ1h;E=sed RefQrns.
Rdafin 1ýModelQftheAdvisers'
The points developedin the previousparagraphcould be said to
flow from an acknowledgementof the natureof the model of the advisers'
place developed in Chapter3. That model was conceived following an
analysisof various problemsthat ministersmight perceivethemselvesas
facing, despite the existenceof traditional sources of support, in
fulfilling their many roles. Someof the reasonsfor wanting to appoint
extra peopleof their own were seento be almost contradictory. Many
commentatorsstressedthe needfor ministersto have accessto more long
term strategicanalysis,but often ministerswere more acutely aware of
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the need for politically knowledgeableand sensitive advice and
assistance- especiallyduring immediatecrises.
The analysisin SectionD of this chaptersuggeststhat the system
of special advisers(evenwherethere were effective teams) has not
fully addressedsome of thoseproblems confronting the system of
governmentthat were highlightedin Chapter3. In particular, there is
still thought to be a lack of long term, strategic analysis being
conductedby peopleclose to ministers. This hasbeena major theme in
the criticisms made by John Hoskyns(1982, and 1983), and the Reskilling Government Group he led. Thus one of the features of the
cabinets proposed in the Group's final report (1987) was that they
shouldinclude, 'analystscapableof policy researchand development on
long-term issuesand with live links to outsideresearch bodies' (Reskilling GovernmentGroup, 1987,para.3).
Not all the reform proposals advocated the introduction of
cabinets. Both the Treasury and Civil ServiceCommittee(1986) and the
RIPA Working Group (1987) explicitly statedthey were not using the term
because what they were proposingwas not based on the French or
continental models. The Treasuryand Civil Service Committee stated
that they wantedto disposeof the word cabinetpartly because:
we do not wish what we are to recommendto be seenin any way
as a copy or evenan adaptationof any of the existing
continental systems. What we are proposing is more an
in which the
expanded private office than a Win,
traditional functions of the private office would be fully
preserved. However, to emphasisethat it is also more than
the existing private office we proposeto call it a Minister's
Policy Unit (Vol. 1, para. 5.28).
In the RIPA report the considerabledifferencesbetweenthe French
and British civil serviceswere exploredand it was argued that, 'the
French experience revealsa numberof actual or potential drawbacks
which lead us to opposegiving an executiverole to ministerial staff
units' (para.5.16). The report endorsedthe proposalfrom the Treasury
and Civil Service Committeeand, as noted in Table 7, advocated an
expanded private office and it was claimedthat, The new arrangement,
which would be quite different from the French model, should perhapsnot
be called a cabinetto avoid any confusion' (para. 5.17).
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However, as both proposalsinvolve incorporating political and
outside figures into a private office (which, at least in the RIPA
report, could be headedby an outsidepolitical appointee) they do
resemble cabinets in someways. The Re-skilling Government report
observes, 'we use the word "cabinet" to refer to the type of unit
variously called, in recentdebate,ExecutiveOffice, Minister's Policy
Unit, expandedor enhancedPrivate Office' (para.3). Furthermore, the
Chairman of the Sub-committeewhich developedthe Treasury and Civil
Service Committee Report, Austin Mitchell, said in 1987 about his
Report, 'the proposalfor ministerial 'cabinets', renamed Minister's
Policy Units, was well supportedby the evidence' (p.480). This
suggests, in practice, it may be difficult to distinguish between the

way theproposedreformsmightdevelop,andtraditionalcabinets.
This current study hasdemonstratedthat special advisers have
establisheda place within the existing system;but several related
questions raise doubtsabout how a cabinetwould fit into the system
unlessother radical changeswere made. Theakston(1990, p.48) recently
commented: 'Appointing politically-committed outside experts in
particular subjectsand creatingministerial cabinetshave, of course,
been staple items in Labour's reform thinking for many years... The
party leadership has,however, neverproperly faced up to difficult
questions about exactly what a cabinetsystemshould be and how it
should operate.'
A successionof authors have noted that the introduction of
cabinets would entail major changesin the British systemof government
(Rose, 1974, pp.454-5; Klein and Lewis, pp.21-2; Neville-Jones; RIPA,
1987, para.5.15 and 5.16; James, 1992, pp.218-9). Some authors
criticize the idea of introducingcabinetsin the UK, others are
concerned that the drawbacksshould at least be acknowledged in any
debate. The analysisbelow drawsupon theseauthorsand the findings of
this study. Various issues would arise with any introduction of
cabinets and might, to varying degrees,also be relevant for the
proposalsto extendprivate offices:
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Who would headthe new unit? If it was headedby a career civil
servantthis would placeadvisersunderthe authority of a career civil
servant for the first time. If, however,a political outsider was in
command this might damagelinks with the department. In Australia R.
(i)

Smith (p. 152) suggestedthat for the ministerial offices (which are
somewhat similar to the proposalsbeing madefor the UK), 'the least
tractable problem was the role of the [departmental]liaison officer. '
This current studyhas shownhow effectiveadvisers can occasionally
assistthe private office andpermanentsecretaryin providing a perfect
gear box for a minister with a clear and strongpolitical will to move
his departmentin the direction he wishesto go.
(ii)

How would the minister maintainthe direct accessto the senior
departmental officials he currently enjoys? Neville-Jones and others
refer to the dangersof a cabin servingto wall-off ministersfrom the
department, and the departmentreactingnegativelyto a large group of
political appointees.
(iii)
If the cabinetsbegan,as in France,to direct the work of the
departmentswhat would be the role of permanentsecretaries?
(iv)
If, again as on the continent, the cabinetsbecameresponsiblefor
inter-departmental liaison, would departmentsstop performing this
valuablefunction?

(v)

How wouldit be possible,within an enlargedteam,to preservethe
essentialfeatureof thespecialadvisersystemi. e. that the adviser
wasthe minister's'own person'?A few difficultieswithin groups were
indicatedin the research
andassoonasan even larger group was
createdthen,inevitably,a hierarchywouldemergeandthis could mean
that, on a miniature scale, all the problems of 'uncertainty
absorption'beganagainastheheadof the unit wouldhaveto filter out
someof the materialgatheredby theteam. It is difficult to imaginea
minister having six 'alter egos'. As DouglasHurd told the RIPA
in 1986:
Conference
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If the chief constraintis a constraint on the Minister's
time, it is not removedby increasingthe number of voices
aroundhim. I remembera wise Americanjournalist warning me
againstthis belief with the illustration of the United States
Senatortrotting down the long corridors of Congresswith his
staffers running besidehim desperatelycompetingto catch a
secondor two of the great man's time (p. 10).
Klein and Lewis also stressedthat the key features of personal
loyalty and trust dependedon small numbers(p.23).
Given some of thesequestions,Hoskyns, in interview, suggested
that his main concernwas that a teamof sufficiently seniorpeople be
appointed to conduct proper strategicthinking. It would not be
absolutely necessaryfor sucha group to go into the private office if
this would be counter-productive.The problem then, however, as Dror
(1987) has shown, is ensuringthat notice is taken of suchadvice. As
Lipsey (1987, pp.25-6) commented:
The problem with the Fulton-style cabin is this. If it
concentrates(asit is supposedto) on the long term, it will
no longer be part of the day to day decision-taking process,
and it will becomedetachedfrom ministers, whosetime horizon
is, necessarily,often short. Thus its policy work, however
good, will tend to fall on stonyground. Where Fulton-style
policy units havebeencreatedthey have, on the whole, proved
a failure for this reason.
There is clearly much ground still to be debatedand in the UK it
is the long term strategicthinking that is the least tractableproblem,
but the presenceof an effective group of about three special advisers,
at least one of whom finds time for long term thinking, might be the
optimum level of personal,political, supportfor ministers. Indeed,
someof the evidencegatheredin this study suggeststhat seniorspecial
advisers, becauseof their ability to contributefrom both ends of
political-technical spectrum described in Chapter3, might be well
placed to encourageministersto acceptthe harshimplications of long
term analysis. Oneof the mostrecent contributionsto the debatecomes
from James(1992). He claims, 'specialadvisershavebeena success...
'cabinets' would entail major changesto partsof the machinery, which
at present seem to work well and aboutwhich ministers have little
complaint. The needfor political adviceseemsto be met adequately by
special advisers' (pp.218-19). Despitethe ambiguities and remaining
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problemsthis studyhas demonstratedthere is a placewithin the current
British systemof governmentfor advisersof the right calibre to play
an effective role.
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n' x Q=

The Questionnaire
S= IQSpecialAdvisers.

Questionnaire
Q

al Advisers.

1) Name:
2) Department(s)

Dates

Full/part time

3) Age at which recruited:
4) Were you a memberof the party in power when recruited?
...
If so, what position(s)did you hold?
5) How were you recruited?

6) Startingremuneration
andsource:
7) Occupationbefore becomingspecialadviser:
8) Occupationafter being a specialadviser:
9) Was your experienceasa specialadviserof benefit in your subsequent
careerdevelopment?

10)Whatwasyour formaltitle?
11)Did youhavea formaljob descriptionor termsof reference?...

If not, were the functions that you were expectedto carry out clearly
statedat the time of your appointment?

12) How many hours a weekdid you work?

13)How close,physically,wasyour office to thatof the minister?
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14) Various reasonshave beensuggestedfor the appointmentof special
advisers. In the caseof your appointment,what importancedo you
think was attachedby the minister to eachof the following:
6 ubstan

Consid

Riat

erable

a) Relieve the overload of
business on ministers

b) Provide political
support
within the departments
staffed by "neutral"
civil
servants, to ministers
wishing to introduce
changes

c) Fill any gaps in the
knowledge or experience
of the civil
service with
experts committed to the
policies
of the party.

d) Help ministers carry out
a more effective
collective role in cabinet.

drifting
e) Prevent ministers
from
the party by
away
liaising
with the various
sections of the party.

f)

Help the ministers
with
the presentation
of their
views on departmental and
general issues.

g) Provide new/alternative
policy ideas.

h) Reducethe isolation of
ministers by playing an
aide/confidant role.

i) other - please specify
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Moder , Slight
ate

Negligible

15) How frequent was your contact (either face-to-face or by telephone)
with:

pe;ly

Several
times a

Weekly

Less
frequent

week

a)

The cabinet minister

b)

Junior

c)

Parliamentary private
secretary

d)

The private

e)

The permanent secretary

f)

Other civil

g)

Advisers
policy

minister(s)

office

servants

in the PM's
unit

h)

Advisers to other
ministers

i)

Backbench MPs

j)

Party officials

k)

Members of the CPRS

L)

Members of relevant
pressure

groups

m) Academics/other
specialists
n)

Government whips

o)

Journalists

p)

Others - please specify

a
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Never

16) What amountof time did you spendon the following aspects
of your work.
Substa
-ntial
a)

b)

lConsid
I-erablel

j

Examining papers on departmental matters going to the
him
minister
and briefing
on them.
Preparing reports on
policy on departmental
matters.

C) Chasing up the progress
on implementing the
minister's
d)

e)

wishes.

Preparing briefs on nondepartmental agenda items
for cabinet or cabinet
committees.
Attending meetings of
all the politicians
within the department.
Corresponding with party
MPs, officials
etc. /

g)

attending party meetings/
receiving party deputations
on behalf of the minister.
Speech writing.

h)

Discussing issues with the
-minister.

i)

Attending

meetings, visits,
receiving deputations
other than party ones with the minister
on
departmental business.

J) Attending departmental
meetings and receiving
deputations - other
than party ones - on
behalf of the minister.
k) Advising the minister on
(and involvement with) the
presentation of departmental
policy and the minister's
general views.
l) Other - please specify.

ý
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Moder I Slight
II
-ate

I Insignif
-icant

17) To what extent was your contribution effective in the following
aspectsof your job:
substan
tially
a)

b)

Consider
ably

Examining papers on
departmental matters
going to ministers
and
briefing
ministers
on them.
Preparing reports on policy
on departmental matters.

c)

Chasing up the progress on
implementing the minister's

d)

Preparing briefs on non.
departmental agenda items
for cabinet and cabinet

wishes.

e)

f)

committees.
Attending meetings of
all the politicians
within the department.

Corresponding with
party MPs, officials
etc.
/attending
party meetings/
receiving party deputations

g)

on behalf of the minister.
Speech writing.

h)

Discussing

i)

minister.
Attending

issues with
meetings,

the

visits,

receiving deputations other than party ones with the minister
on
departmental business
j)

Attending

departmental

meetings and receiving
deputations
- other than
party ones - on behalf
the minister.

k)

0

of

Advising the minister on
(and involvement with) the
presentation of departmental policy and the
minister's general views.
Other - please specify.
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Modera Slightly
teLy

Insignif
icantly

18) To what extentwas your effectivenesslimited by the following:
Moderati Sliphtlyj
ISubstan lConsiderl
I
tiaLty I
ably
elY

II

Insig

i

nific

antLy
a)

Inadequate access to the
minister.

b)

inadequate access to
information.
official

c)

Inadequate active support
from the private office.

d)

inadequate active support
from the rest of the
civil
service.

e)

Inadequate experience of
the way the department(s)
operated.

f)

The lack of a proper
position
within the
administrative
chain
of command.

g)

Difficult
relations with
junior ministers in the
department.

h)

Inadequate knowledge of
the policy issues.

1)

Inadequate time to carry
out all the tasks.

J)

Absenceof research
staff.

k)

Other - please specify

19)To which typesof informationwereyounot allowedaccess?
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